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Western Technology and

Soviet Economic Development

1945 to 1965

Third volume of a three-volume series

By
ANTONY C. SUTTON

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

1973

134597

The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, founded at Stanford
University in 1919 by the late President Herbert Hoover , is a center for advanced
study and research on public and international affairs in the twentieth century.
The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hoover Institution.

Hoover Institution Publications 113

International Standard Book Number: 0-8179-1 131 -6

1973 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 68-24442

Printed in the United States of America

FOR
Jane and Elizabeth

Preface

The considerable financial burden for this three-volume study has been borne
by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace established by former
President Herbert Hoover at Stanford University. The Institution's extensive
archival holdings, a library in excess of one million volumes, first-rate research
facilities, and the unique freedom given to individual researchers make it an
unparalleled center for original research. The Institution is, of course, in no
way responsible for my errors and omissions, nor does it necessarily accept
my argument.

Of the many at the Hoover Institution who have contributed to this study
special mention should be made of Dr. W. Glenn Campbell, Director of the
Hoover Institution since 1960; Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Associate Director for
Administration; and Dr. Roger A. Freeman, Senior Fellow. The assistance
given by the expert curators and an efficient Library staff is also gratefully
acknowledged.

The Hoover Institution Press, headed by Mr. Brien Benson, handled the
publication chores for the series and particular acknowledgment is due the editorial
staff: Miss Michelle Hogan, former production editor; Miss Liselotte Hofmann,
assistant editor; Mr. London G. Green, the editor directly responsible for the
first two volumes; and Mrs. Carole Norton, who supervised the editorial work
on volumes One and Two and undertook the detailed editing of this final volume.
Miss Marcia Taylor compiled the bibliography and Mrs. Joan Johanson com-
piled the index for this volume.

To these and others who have given their assistance — thank you.

Stanford, California
June, 1970.

A. C. S.

Contents

XVII

Tables xxiii

Figures xxv

Introduction

PART 1, The Transfer Mechanisms: 1945 to 1965

CHAPTER ONE: LendLeaseandihe "Pipeline Agreement," 1941 ,o!946 3

USSR Lend Lease Program: The Supply Protocols

Composition of Lend Lease Supplies to the Soviet Umon ^

The Pipeline Agreement of October 15, 1945 ^

United Kingdom Lend Lease to the U.S.S.R ^

UNRRA Supplies to the Ukraine and Belorussia ]3

Soviet Requests and Soviet Receipts

Chapter Two: World War 11 Reparations for the Soviet Union . 15

Objectives of the Soviet Reparations Policies ig

Salvaee Value of Dismantled Plants ■ ,,

Organizational Structure of the German Reparations *«&*"- " g

Reparations Plants Shipped from Allied Zones to the Soviet Un.on 2J>

Plant Removals from the Soviet Zone of Germany

Deportation of German Scientists and Technicians ^

Reparations from Finland, 1944 to 1955 • • ■ • • ^

Reparations from Japan 34

Removals from Manchuria 37

Reparations from Italy ■ 37

Reparations and Removals from Austria 3g

Reparations and Removals from Rumania

Chapter Three: Trade as a Transfer Mechanism ..... ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ •

iSS Kingdom as a Supplier of Capita. Goods to the Soviet Union 43

Germany as a Supplier of Capital Goods to the Soviet Union . 46
Italy as a Supplier of Capital Goods to the Sov.et Union

Contents

Scandinavia as a Supplier of Capital Goods to the Soviet Union 49

Japan as a Supplier of Capital Goods to the Soviet Union .... 50
East European Countries as Suppliers of Capital Goods to the Soviet

Union 51

Western Restrictions on Trade with the Soviet Union 53

Effect of Western Export Control Restrictions 54

Chapter Four: Technical Assistance and Foreign Prototypes ... 56

Chapter Five: Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers 66

Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord 70

Chase National Bank 71

U.S. Credits for Finland: Administrative Schizophrenia 72

Chapter Six: Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance to the Soviet

Union 76

Direct Transfers of Technology Originating in the United States and

Europe 77

Technical Cooperation Agreements with Socialist Countries .... 78

Technical Assistance from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union . 83

Specialized Assistance from Yugoslavia 85

Polish Assistance in Shipbuilding 86

East German Technical Assistance to the U.S.S.R 88

An Example of Indirect Transfer of a Technology: Marine Diesels 89

Chapter Seven: Western Equipment and Soviet Foreign Aid . . , 92

The Bhilai Steel Project in India 92

The Role of Egyptian Contractors and Foreign Equipment in Building

the Aswan Dam 96

Other Soviet Projects in the Underdeveloped World 98

Part II. Technical Transfers and Their Role in Soviet Industry

ChapterEicht: WesternOriginsofMiningandExcavating Equipment 103
Foreign Origins of Underground Mining Equipment in the Coal

Industry 106

Beneftciation of Iron Ore 1 09

The Peat Industry in Russia Hi

The Origins of Soviet Excavators 112

Chapter Nine: Western Assistance to the Nonferrous Metal

Industries 115

Canadian Assistance for Nickel Production 115

Contents

The Copper Mining and Smelting Industry ^

Aluminum Production in the U.S.S.R '/'*"■','"

' Removal of the German Magnesium Alloy Industry to the Soviet ^

Union

Chapter Ten: Western Assistance to the Soviet Iron and Steel ^

Industry " _ 12 2

Blast-Furnace Design and Operations since 1950 ^

Blast-Furnace Innovations 124

Continuous Casting of Steel ]27

Steel Rolling Techniques in the Soviet Union ^ g

The Steel Pipe and Tube Industry l31

Soviet Contributions to Metallurgy

Chapter Eleven: WesiernOriginsofPetroleumandAlliedlndustries 133

The Turbodrill: An Indigenous Development ^

U.S. Origins of Refinery Processes ^

Development of Natural Gas Utilization ]3?

The German Hydrogenation Plants • Q

Removal of the German Brown Coal Briquetting Industry j ^

Koppers-Becker Coke Oven Technology

CHAPTER Twelve: Western Assistance to the Basic Chemical and

Fertilizer Industry ■ ■ ..,

Western Purchases for Khrushchev's Chemical Plan

Program for Expansion of Fertilizer Production

Chapter Thirteen: Western Assistance to the Rubber and Plastics ^

Industries ^3

Synthetic Rubbers Introduced after 1945

Production of Calcium Carbide and Acetylene

Western Assistance for Rubber Tire Production

Technical Assistance to the Plastics Industries

Chapter Fourteen: Western Assistance to the Glass and Cement ^

Industries , jg^

Western Assistance to the Glass Industry

Western Assistance to the Cement Industry

Chapter Fifteen: Western Technical Assistance to the Textile,

Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries ^

Textiles and Chemical Fibers

Duplication of Western Textile Equipment

Contents

Western Development of Soviet Synthetic Fiber Capacity 178

Origins of Nylon 6 (Kapron) and Nylon 66 (Anid) Technology 180

Krupp Construction of the Stalinogorsk-Kursk Lavsan Complex 182

Polyspinners, Ltd., Construction of the Siberian Lavsan Plant. 183

Purchase of Japanese Kanekalon and Acrylonitrile Plants .... 184

Western Assistance to the Pulp and Paper Industry 184

Chapter Sixteen: Western Assistance to the Motor Vehicle and

Agricultural Equipment Industries 191

The Motor Vehicle Industry 191

German Automotive Plants Removed to the Soviet Union ... 193

Origins of the Moskvich Passenger Automobile 197

The Ford-Gorki Plant 198

The Moscow Plant im. Likhachev 198

The Odessa Truck Assembly Plant 199

U.S. and Italian Assistance to Volgograd (VAZ) 200

Tractors and Agricultural Machinery 203

The S-8Q and S-100 (Caterpillar) Crawler Tractors 205

Wheel-Track Tractors in the Soviet Union 210

Origins of Other Farm Machinery and Equipment 211

The Rust Cotton-Picking Machine 212

Chapter Seventeen Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers . 214

Foreign Technical Assistance to Soviet Marine Engine Construction 221

Diesel Engines for Truck Use 223

Diesel-Electric Prime Movers 224

Internal Combustion Engines 224

French Origins of Marine Gas Turbines 226

Western Origins of Soviet Steam Turbines 226

Origins of Marine Boilers Installed between 1945 and I960 ... 228

Chapter Eighteen: Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 231

Soviet Theoretical Work before World War II 231

Contribution of the Atomic Spies to Soviet Work 233

The German Contribution to Soviet Atomic Energy Projects ... 234

Industrial Aspects of the Soviet Atomic Program 239

Soviet Uranium Mining in Saxony: Wismuth A.G 241

The First Soviet Reactor 242

CERN Assistance for the Serpukhov Proton Synchrotron 245

Chapter Nineteen: Western Origins of Soviet Railroad Locomotives 248

American Origins of Diesel-Electric Locomotive: 249

X1U

Contents

252
Foreign Prototypes of Electric Locomotives

254
254

Chapter Twenty: W estemOrigins of Aircraft andSpaceTechnology

Aircraft Design and Engine Technology

The German Aircraft Engine Industry in the Sov.et Zone
Transfer of German Technicians and Technology to the U.S.S.K. ^

261

Development of the First Soviet Jet Engine

Rolls-Royce Nene and Derwent Turbojets ^

Soviet Acquisition of Four-Engine Aircraft

The German Contribution to the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry 268

The Soviet Space Program • ■ ■ ■ ■ • • • • ■ ■ ■ y __ .

German Rocket Technology at the End of World War II .... in

The Balance Sheet on German Rocket Technology

German Origins of Soviet Rockets and Missiles ^

U.S. Soviet Technical Cooperation in Space

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE: Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant ^

Marine 280

Shipyard Facilities in the Soviet Union ^

Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

Soviet Oil Tankers and Western Diesel Engines

Modernization and Expansion of the Soviet Fishing Fleet ... ™
Fish Factory Ships, Mother Ships, and Refrigerated F.sh Trawlers 28V

Soviet Oceanographic and Research Vessels

Western Origins of Soviet Icebreakers

Chapter Twenty-two: Western Assistance to the Machine Tool

Industry . . 3 qj

Soviet Acquisitions in Germany ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ .'

Imports and Exports of Machine Tools from 1946 to 1966 .... 308

Duplication of Western Machine Tools

Ball Bearing Manufacture Capability

Computing, Measuring, and Precision Instruments

Chapter Twenty-three: Western Origins of Electronics and

Electrical Engineering Technology 3 lg

Soviet Computer Technology in 1960s ^

Automation and Control Engineering - ■ ■ •

The Nature of German Transfers in the Electncal Industry .... i«

Western Assistance to Instrumentation Systems ^

Soviet Radio and Television Receivers ^

Import of Power Station Equipment

xiv Contents

The Increase in Electrical Generating Capacity 33 1

Chapter Twenty-four: Western Assistance to Consumer Goods

Industries 335

Comparative Technology in Beet Sugar Plants 336

Western Assistance for Food-Packing Plants 350

The Wearing Apparel Industry in 1960 352

Part III. Implications and Conclusions of the Study

Chapter Twenty-five: Innovation in the Soviet Union 357

Soviet Invention in the World Market 358

Indigenous Innovation in Weapons Technology 361

Scaling-up Innovation 362

An Overview of Technological Origins 365

Chapter Twenty-six: The Level of Technology in the Soviet Union 372

Diffusion of Technology within a Sector 375

Comparative Levels of Technology 378

ChapterTwenty-SEVEN: NationalSecurityandTechnicalTransfers 381

Direct Supply of Military Goods to the U.S.S.R 382

Technology and Equipment for the Production of Military Goods 383

The Failure of Western Export Controls 394

Release of Resources, Indirect Transfers, and Western Security . 398

Chapter Twenty-eight: Economic Aspects of Technical Transfers 401

The Unstated Prerequisite for Central Planning 401

The Function of Imported Technology in the Soviet System . . . 402

The Soviet Approach to Import Substitution 403

The Output of Engineering Skills 404

Use of Imports to Fulfill Planning Objectives 406

The "Catching-up" Hypothesis 408

Chapter Twenty-nine: Conclusions 411

Empirical Conclusions: 1917 to 1930 411

Empirical Conclusions: t930 to 1945 412

Empirical Conclusions: 1945 to 1965 414

Original Western Intent for Technical Transfers 416

Implications for the Soviet Union 419

Implications for the Western Business Firm 421

Implications for Socio-economic Systems 422

Contents

BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

425
457

Tables

1-1 Major Categories of Lend Lease Supply to the Soviet

Union ' ' ' " ' '

1-2 Total Amount Owed, Aggregate Payments, and Total Out-
standing on Soviet Lend Lease "Pipeline" Account as ot
December 31, 1967

1-3 UNRRA Deliveries to Belorussia and the Ukraine

2-1 Summary of Organizational Forms Used by the Soviet Union
to Transfer Reparations after 1944

2-2 The Soviet Dismantling Schedule in Manchuria (Major Plants

Only) ■■ """'f'

2-3 Plants from Western Zones Allocated to the U.S.S.R. as or

November 30, 1948 •

2-4 Status on Advance Reparations Plants for the U.S S .R. at the

End of 1946 • ' ■.'

2-5 Reduction of Industrial Capacity by Dismantling in the Soviet

Zone of Germany

2-6 Complete Industrial Plants Supplied to the U.S.S.R. under

Finnish Reparations _"

2-7 Reduction in Capacity of Manchurian Industry by Soviet Re-
movals .'.'■'

3- 1 Percentage of Total Exports to the Soviet Union Comprising

Machinery and Equipment (S1TC 7) from 1953 to 1961 4!
3-2 United Kingdom Deliveries to the Soviet Union under the

1947 Trade Agreement

3-3 Commodity Quotas for Imports from West Germany to the
U.S.S.R. under the Trade Agreement of December 31,

1960 47

5-1 Credits Granted to Finland by the United States, 1945-47 75
6-1 COMECON Specialization for Heavy Industrial Equipment 80-81
6-2 Machinery and Equipment as Percentage of Total Soviet Trade

with East European Socialist Countries in 1960 83

6-3 Commodities Supplied by Yugoslavia to the U.S.S.R. during

January 1960-September 1961

6-4 Western License Agreements for Shipbuilding Technology

with Polish Shipbuilders (in Force as of 1964) 87

7-1 Comparison of Products from Bhilai Mill (India) and Mon-

terrey Mill (Mexico)

xvii

XVL11

Tables

7-2 Location of Training for Engineers and Skilled Wo'kers for

the Bhilai Project 95

8-1 Lend Lease Exports of Mining and Excavating Equipment to

the U.S.S.R 104

8-2 Power Loading Machines in Soviet Coal Mines (as of

April 1, 1956) 107

8-3 The Peat Industry Method of Extraction (1913 to 1950) . Ill
9-1 Mines, Alumina Plants, and Aluminum Plants in the

U.S.S.R. (with Aluminum Plant Production) 117

9-2 Aluminum and Magnesium Works Removed from Germany to

the U.S.S.R., 1945 118

10-1 Disposal of 29 Krupp-Renn Direct-Reduction Plants .... 124
10-2 Origins of Soviet Continuous Wide Strip Mills as of 1960 128
10-3 Process Used in Soviet Pipe and Tube Mills in 1963 .. 129
11-1 Major Soviet Refineries Built between 1945 and 1960 .. 136
1 1 -2 Location and Capacity of Major German Briquetting Plants

Completely Removed to the U.S.S.R. in 1944-46 140

11-3 Development of Soviet Coke Oven Construction, 1945-60 142

12-1 Foreign Puchases of Fertilizer Plants after 1960 151

13- 1 Synthetic Rubber Production Technology in the Soviet Union

in 1960 (By Type of Rubber and Plant) 155

13-2 Production of Acetylene from Carbide and Hydrocarbons,

1958 158

13-3 Soviet Tire Output in Relation to Western Equipment

Supply 160

14-1 Manchurian Cement Plants Removed to the U.S.S.R. .. 171
15-1 Originsof Soviet Paper, Board, and Pulp Capacity as of 1958 185
15-2 Japanese Pulp and Paper Mills on Sakhalin (Karafuto) Taken

over by the Soviet Union in 1945 187

15-3 Origins of Soviet Pulp, Board, and Paper Capacity in 1960 189
16-1 Western Origins of Automobile and Truck Plants in the

Soviet Union as of 1971 [92

16-2 Models Produced by Auto-Union A.G. in 1945 as Per-
centage of Total German Production 194

16-3 Summary of German Automobile Plants Moved to the Soviet

Union in t944-50 196

16-4 Export of U.S. Machinery for the Volgograd Automobile

Plant 202

16-5 Comparative Metallurgical Specifications in Soviet S-80 and

Caterpillar D-7 Tractors 209

17-1 Technical Characteristics of Soviet Marine Diesels in Use

in 1967 215

Tables

17-2 Origins of Soviet Marine Diesels, by Number of Each

Design, 1967 216-17

17-3 Origins of Soviet Marine Diesels as of 1967, by Aggregate

Horsepower for Each Design 218-19

17-4 Percentage of Soviet Marine Diesels Built outside the Soviet

Union as of 1967 (by Rated Horsepower Category) .. 220

17-5 Utilization of Diesel Engines in Soviet Vehicles 222

17-6 Origins of Truck Diesel Engines in the Soviet Union up to

1960 222

17-7 Origins of Automobile and Truck Internal Combustion En-
gines in the Soviet Union up to 1960 225

17-8 Origins of Soviet Marine Gas Turbines as of 1967 .... 227
17-9 Origins of Marine Boilers Installed in the Soviet Union

between 1945 and 1960 229

18-1 Summary of German Atomic Energy Projects Removed to the

U.S.S.R. in 1945 235

18-2 Comparative Characteristics of the American Hanford and

Soviet PSR Reactors 243

18-3 Comparative Development of Atomic Power Reactors ... 244
19-1 Diesel-Electric Locomotives in the Soviet Union from 1944

to 1965 249.

19-2 Origins of Electric Locomotives in Use in the Soviet Union,

Early 1960s 251

20-1 Removal of Main German Aircraft Engine Plants in 1945-46 259-60

20-2 Origins and Utilization of Soviet Jet Engines 263

20-3 Soviet Rockets and Their German V-2 Origins 275

20-4 Soviet Missiles in 1960 and Their German Origins 276

21-1 Shipyards Removed from Germany to the U.S.S.R. in

1945-46 280

21-2 Merchant Ships Built in Poland on Soviet Account from 1950

to 1966 282

21-3 Trawlers Supplied by Brooke-Marine, Ltd., to the U.S.S.R.

in 1956-59 287

21-4 Origins of Soviet Stern Trawlers as of 1965 288

21-5 Origins of Refrigerator Fish Carriers and Production Ref-

ion

rtgerator Transports i07

21-6 Icebreakers Built in Finland on Soviet Account from 1955

to 1959 293

21-7 Comparison of Soviet "Ledokol" Class and Earlier Ice-
breakers Supplied from Finland 294

21-8A Origins of Main Engines in Soviet Merchant Ships added to

Fleet before 1930 295

xx Tables

21-8B Origins of Main Engines in Soviet Merchant Ships Added to

Fleet between 1930 and 1940 296

21-8C Origins of Main Engines in Soviet Merchant Ships Added to

Fleet between 1941 and 1945 297

21-8D Construction of the Soviet Tanker Fleet from 1951 to 1967 297
21-8E Foreign Construction of Marine Diesel Engines for the

Soviet Tanker Fleet, 1951 July 1967 298

21-8F Design Origins of Marine Diesels Used in the Soviet Tanker

Fleet, 1951-JuIy 1967 299

21-8G Construction of Small Tankers (1772 GRT and Less),

1951-67 300

21-8H Construction of Medium Class Tankers (3300-3820 GRT),

1954-67 301

21-81 Construction of Large Tankers (13,000 Tons and over),

1959-67 302

22-1 German Machine Tool Manufacturers of "Outstanding

Importance" Removed to the Soviet Union in 1945-46 . 307-08
22-2 Soviet Imports and Exports of Machine Tools from 1946 to

1966 309

23-1 Comparative Data on Soviet and Western Computers up to

1968 320

23-2 Comparative Increments in Electrical Power Capacity in the

United States and the U.S.S.R., 1950-67 333

25-1 Complete Listing of Soviet Patent and License Agreements

in Force outside the U.S.S.R. as of January 1967 ... 358-59
25-2 Summary of Soviet Foreign Licensing Agreements as of 1 967 360
25-3 An Overview of Technological Origins of Main Soviet

Industrial Processes from 1917 to 1965 365-69

25-4 Summary Statement of the Origins of Soviet Technology from

1917 to 1965 371

26-1 Transfer of Engine Manufacturing Technology (Interna! Com-
bustion and Diesel) to the U.S.S.R. from 1925 to 1970 373-74
26-2 Western Marine Diesels and Soviet GOST Designations 374
26-3 Comparative Statements on Soviet Technological Lags as

of 1970 379

27-1 Civilian and Military Models Procued in Soviet Automobile

Plants, 1945-70 384

27-2 Western Origins of Main Engines in Soviet Ships (96) Used

on the Haiphong Supply Run 392

27-3 Haiphong Run Ships with Engines Made under the Burmeister

& Wain Technical-Assistance Agreement of 1959 .... 393

Tables

27-4 Ships Known 10 Have Transported Material to North Vietnam 393
28-1 Soviet Imports by Soviet Trade Category from 1946 to 1966 407
29-1 Indigenous Soviet Innovation,

1917-65 4 23

Figures

2-1 Allied Organizational Structure for German Reparations . 26
3-1 Exports of Machinery and Equipment, as Percentage of

Total Trade,' from Capitalist Countries to the Soviet Union

(1959) 42

3-2 Exports of Machinery and Equipment, as Percentage of Total

Trade, to Capitalist Countries from the Soviet Union (1959) 42

4-1 Foreign Origins of Soviet Electric Locomotives 62

4-2 Marine Diesels: Time Lags in Converting Foreign to Soviet

Models 64

6-1 Indirect Technical Assistance to the U.S.S.R. via Eastern

Europe: The Case of Marine Diesel Engines 90

8-1 Development of Soviet Tractors and Equipment from the

Caterpillar D-7 Tractor ' '^

14-1 The Fourcault Process for Sheet Glass Manufacture .... 169

14-2 Soviet VVS Machine for Sheet Glass Manufacture 170

16-1 Comparison of Caterpillar D-7 and Chelyabinsk S-80 . . . 206-08

18-1 The Soviet Uranium Mines in Saxony (map) 242

20-1 Location of the German Aeroengine Plants at the End of

World War II (map) 256

24-1 Flow Sheet of Typical Soviet Beet Sugar Plant jjs-jv

24-2 The Dyer Beet Washer 340

24-3 The Dobrovolskii Beet Washer Unit 34!

24-4 Cross-sectional Elevation of a Robert Cell 34 2

24-5 Soviet Diffusion Cell 343

24-6 TsINS Predefecation Tank 343

24-7 Brieghel-Muller Predefectator 344

24-8 Dorr Multifeed Thickener 345

24-9 Rostov Machine-Building Plant Multicompartment Thickener 346

24-10 Roberts-Type Evaporator 347

24-1 1 Soviet Construction Evaporator 34 °

24-12 Crystallizer by Sugar and Chemical Machinery, Inc 348

24- 1 3 Soviet Crystallizer

27-1 Soviet Ships on the Haiphong Run: Construction Origins of
Main Diesel Engines in Relation to Maximum Speed and

Tonnage 3%

Figures

27-2 Soviet Ships on the Haiphong Run: Design Origins of Main Diesel
Engines in Relation to Maximum Speed and Tonnage

397

Introduction

This is the third volume of an analysis of the impact of Western technology
and skills on the industrial development of the Soviet Union. With this volume,
which covers the years 1945-1965, the original hypothesis that by far the most
significant factor in the development of the Soviet economy has been its absorption
of Western technology and skills 1 is substantially supported over a period of
50 years.

The reader should bear in mind the distinctions made in this analysis between
science and technology and between invention and innovation. Science is here
defined as theory and laboratory development of theory, while technology is
the selective application of scientific findings to industrial production. Similarly,
invention is the process of discovery and the prototype development of discovery,
while innovation is the selective application of invention to industrial production.
Usually there are many inventions available for selection in any industrial system;
but in practice only a few are applied to become innovations.

No fundamental industrial innovation of Soviet origin has been identified
in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1965, and preliminary investigation
suggests that this situation continued throughout the decade of the sixties. 2
Soviet innovations have consisted, in substance, in adopting those made first
outside the U.S.S.R. or using those made by Western firms specifically for
the Soviet Union and for Soviet industrial conditions and factor resource patterns.
A comparative statement of Soviet innovation — to the limited extent that it
exists — is made in chapter 25.

The question now is: Why does the Soviet Union lack major indigenous
innovation? Up to about 1957 the explanation could well have been posed
in terms of "catching up," i.e., it was cheaper and less time-consuming for
the U .S.S.R. to adopt Western technology than to institute the innovative process
herself. After about 1957 the catching-up hypothesis cannot be supported; the

1 See A. C. Sutton. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930

(Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1968). Hereafter cited as Sutton I.
* The cut-off date varies according to the amount of information available for each industrial sector;

for chapter 21 (shipbuilding), information was available to July 1967. while for chapter 9 (non-

fenous metals) information is scarce after the early 1960s,

XXV1 Introduction

Soviet Union had caught up technically in the thirties and once again in the
forties by "borrowing" in one form or another from the West.

In 1957 came the era of "peaceful competition between systems," when
Khrushchev challenged and threatened to "bury' ' the United States economically.
This challenge may well have been a bombastic cover for Soviet intent to
increase — not reduce — the acquisition of Western technology . On the other hand,
Soviet economists may have concluded that the years 1957-58 represented the
zenith of technical assimilation from abroad and that Sputnik would usher in
an era of Soviet innovation. Some Soviet innovation did indeed evolve in the
late 1950s — in fact examples appear to be concentrated in these years — but
it did not survive in the face of dynamic Western technical advances. 3

Today it is no longer a question of "catching up." Jt is a question of
the innate ability of the Soviet system to innovate at all. On the basis of the
research findings elaborated in this three-volume series, we conclude that a
society with the kind of central planning that guides the Soviet Union has
virtually no capability for self-generated indigenous innovation.

Yet Soviet propaganda concerning Soviet technology has by and large been
successful. In the face of the empirical evidence in these volumes, the Soviets
have convinced a large proportion of the Free World, and perhaps the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union itself, of their technological prowess.

Although the record of foreign technological dependence is largely expunged
from Soviet writing, it is possible from time to time to find frank and open
statements bearing on the issue. For example, at the Twenty-third Congress
of the CPSU in 1966, the report on the directives delivered by Kosygin included
the straightforward statement:

The Soviet Union is going to buy . . . over a thousand sets of equipment for
enterprises and shops in the chemical, light, food and other industries. Deliveries
from the fraternal countries will cover 48 percent of our needs in sea-going freight-
ers, 40 percent of our needs in main line and industrial electric locomotives,
about 36 percent of our needs in railway cars.*

As the Soviet definition of ' ' sets' ' of equipment equals complete plant i nstallations
and the period covered by the statement was five years, the magnitude of the
planned assistance may be readily seen.'

This Soviet dependence on foreign countries has largely escaped the attention
of the Western world. For example, a survey conducted by ihe U.S. Information

3 Among many examples, see chapter IS and synthetic fibers.

' Novosti, 23rd Congress of the Communis! Parry of the Soviet Unic, t Moscow, 1966), p. 256.
See also A.C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1920 to 1945
(Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1971; hereafter cited as Sutton II), p 3; and A.C. Sutton,
"Soviet Merchant Marine", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1970.

5 These figures coincide with the material presented in chapter 21 (for ships) and chapter 20
(for locomotives).

Introduction *

Agency on European opinion concerning the relative success of U.S. and Soviet
scientific and technical achievements 6 had extraordinary results. Accepting that
the layman does not make a distinction between science and technology, then
in 1961 more people in Western Europe believed the Soviet Union was technically
ahead of the United Stales than vice versa. This opinion varied by country:
in Great Britain 59 percent thought the Soviet Union was ahead and only 21
percent thought the United States was, while in West Germany one-half of
the interviewees thought the United States was ahead compared with 19 percent
for the Soviet Union. Where further questions were asked of those who thought
the Soviet Union ahead, the answers were not in terms of Soviet use of Western
technology but rather in terms of factors not supported by this study. Only
about 15 percent of the German responses mentioned "captured German scien-
tists" as a key factor in Soviet weapons and atomic energy programs. But
most "Soviets-ahead" answers tended to be negative about the United States
rather than positive about Soviet "success"; i.e., there were such observations
as "Americans like a good time," "no coordination in America," "insufficiency
of good scientists in the U.S." 7

The paradox, or perhaps dilemma, that remains with us is that this study
presents detailed and profuse evidence not only at variance with the Soviets'
own interpretations of their achievements — despite their exceptional statements
that hint otherwise — but also at complete variance with the beliefs of a majority
of the Free World, including its academic communities. The confusion may
even extend into U.S. Government departments. To illustrate this point, it may
be profitable to explore the views of the U.S. State Department concerning
Soviet technology and Soviet economic achievements because the State Depart-
ment, as the senior U.S. executive department, has excellent sources of informa-
tion and plays the paramount role in the establishment of U.S. economic policy
toward the U.S.S.R.

Published State Department papers and statements made by State Department
officials to Congress suggest conclusions directly opposed to those of this study.
In brief, the State Department has consistently argued from 1918 to the present
time — but more importantly in the years since about i960 — that Soviet industrial
development has little connection with Western technology, and specifically
that it has no vital connection with trade or with the other mechanisms discussed
in this study as technology transfer vehicles.

In The Bailie Act Report: 1963, submitted by the State Department to Con-
gress, it is stated that trade with the West had made "[an] obviously limited
contribution to Soviet economic and industrial growth" and that denial of trade
could not affect basic Soviet military capability. The report continued to the

6 Leo P. Crespi, "The Image of U.S. Versus Soviet Science in Western European Public
Opinion," in R. L. Merrill and D. J. Puchala. eds„ Western European Perspectives on Inter-
national Affairs: Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations (New York: Praeger, 1967).

7 Ibid.

xx viii Introduction

effect that the Battle Act embargo program was not as extensive as in the
early 1950s on the grounds that "the inevitable process of industrial and economic
growth during those 12 years has meant that the Soviets have developed their
own productive capability in many of the areas where a restraining impact
was necessary and possible 10 years ago." 8 This State Department report was
made precisely at a time when the Soviets were midway in a program to purchase
complete industrial sectors in the West — concentrated fertilizers, synthetic rub-
bers and fibers, engines, computers, electric locomotives, and automobiles — all
for industrial sectors either nonexistent or very backward in the U.S.S.R. in
1963.

A great deal of information for this study was derived from reports made
by various U.S. industry delegations to the Soviet Union under the auspices
of the State Department, although not all such delegation reports have been
declassified. Some delegations commented adversely on the value of their visits
insofar as the United States is concerned, and indeed from the technical viewpoint
there has been little U.S. advantage. For example, the American Gas Industry
Delegation was greeted in Leningrad by a number of prominent officials, and

. . .a major part of their presentation included a discussion of a butane regeneration
plant in the city and of its use in the local gas distribution supply operations.
It was with extreme difficulty that a visit to the butane regeneration plant was
finally arranged. The plant had not been in operation for two years."

An American petroleum industry delegation was shown four refineries in
August I960 10 — three of them (Nuovo Ufa, Novo Kuibyshev, and Syzran)
Lend Lease refineries, " and the fourth (Novo Baku) either a Lend Lease refinery
or a Soviet copy of a U.S. installation. 12 The reports made by this delegation
have been of particular value to the study. A skilled observer — and members
of the delegation were skilled observers — cannot be easily fooled. Although

a U .S. Dept. of State, The Battle Act Report: 1961. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of
1951 (Washington; 1963), p. 8. See Sutton II. pp. 3-6, for other Stale Department and
academic statements on this topic; also see p. 211 for Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack
N. Behrman's denial of Soviet "copying" of agricultural machinery.

This writer is of course by no means the first to have raised serious doubts about the analytical
performance of the Stale Department. A well-qualified critique which touches on some aspects of
this study has been made by a former assistant chief of the Division of Research of the Slate
Department: Bryton Barron, Inside the State Departmenl. (New York; Cornel Press, 1956).
See p. 417 below.

• "U.S.S.R. Natural Gas Industry," Report of the U.S. Natural Gas Delegation, July 1961 , p. 38.

'• Robert E. Ebel, The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet Union (New York: American Petroleum
Institute. June 1961), p. 107.

11 U.S. Dept. of the Interior, A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-1945
(Washington, 1946), p. 270,

" See p. 135.

•' All delegations, without exception, commented favorably on the hospitality.

XXIX

Introduction

information pertaining to such transfers ^ addJtion

Hence another alternative was used in P re P* ,n J ™7 [he Soviet Union ,
to starting with Western firms and tracing techno og to ^ J ^^
tneauthor examined and traced '^'^^^"L. know to
able limits of time and space) major processes or <J P established,

be in use in the Soviet Union. When a techmca hnkwas
a search was begun for a specific Western export «^Jvg is a chloro .
U was found that the Soviet ^mhet, «hto NjJ. for = K ^ ^
prene rubber that traces back to the export o u > ^ Qnly

Lease. Much work originated in U - S \™ 11 ^. ^^ Uningra( i" television
search and collection. For example £he ^ f - q £j G S erman origins,
sets had already been traced by ^^.A*™^ 003 and Junkers 004
and turbojet engines had been ;XVt .nets S 80 was foundtobe the Caterpil-

No. all technical links could be fully corf «« d Jor h „ n* o „ t g

of identification accuracy have been established and are eferred ^

the text. Where positive identification has been .made ^£^ J
process or piece of equipment is ^"^ZZ £TZ «te hand, if
origin, it is classified as a "po«nve ^"XJlntificrton includes
identification had to be inferred it is so noted me

the category for which information has been provided on a corf de ^

gr0 und basis. The YaAZ truck engine 1947 «*J£J J M&] data
be a General Motors engine on the basis oi romp d

and the knowledge that such engines were exported to the U.S.fc.K

Primine Office, 1945).

xxx Introduction

Lend Lease. Soviet adoption of some nonferrous metals processes has been
indicated to the writer on a confidential basis. 15

Khrushchev's challenge to the West in the late 1950s w peaceful competition
coincided with the beginning of a massive Soviet progran, to purchase complete
plants from the West. The year 1957 is central to our siudy. Up to that time
the Soviets had been duplicating technology imported .n the 1930s and under
Lend Lease; no indigenous progress of any magnitude had been achieved, while
certain industries, such as chemicals and synthetic fibers, were perhaps 40 years
out of date. Consequently, rates of growth were slipping.

In 1957 several books were published in the Soviet Un.on proclaiming the
benefits of socialist production and the role of Lenin and the Communist Party
in bringing about the wonders of socialist Russia. An examination of some
of these books 18 suggests several factors germinal to our study. First, little
specific information is given; Moskatov, for example, uses multiple or percentage
statements rather than absolute figures. Secondly, and of more interest for our
purposes, data concerning qualitative factors — somewhat more difficult to dis-
guise — suggest there was an extremely limited product range in Soviet industry
in the late 1950s; a situation confirmed by the present study. Sominskii" lists
a number of machines by model number, and the origins of these machines
are presented in the text below. Moskatov covers similar ground and in one
or two cases gives a quantitative framework for the number of models actually
in use; e.g., in 1957 there were six basic models of tractors. There is, of
course, no mention of the origins of this tractor technology.

In brief, Soviet publications on the question of technical progress make
statements that, while greatly abbreviated, are not inconsistent with the findings
of this study in the sense that no statement is made concerning types of equipment
not covered in this text. The technology for types not mentioned did not even
exist; such is consistent with subsequent purchase abroad as outlined in this
study .

Finally, in a study full of paradoxes let a supreme paradox be suggested.
The Soviet Union is the dedicated enemy of the Free World — this by the admission
of its own leadership. There is no question that since 1917 there has been
a continuing advocacy of the overthrow of capitalist systems. Yet the technical
transfers described in these volumes have been the lifeblood of the Soviet indus-
trial process and of the Soviets' ability to back up their avowed campaign
of world revolution.

" Many aspects of the transfer have been more adequately discussed elsewhere. For example, the
transfer of a duplicate set of plates for printing currency (from the U.S. Treasury to the Soviet
Union, thus giving the Soviets the ability to print unlimited quantities of currency redeemable in
U.S. dollars) has been well described and documented in Vladimir Petrov, Money and Conquest
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

16 V. S. Sominskii. O tekhnicheskom progressc promyshlennosti SSSR (Moscow, 1957), and P. G.
Moskatov, Po pmi lekhnichetkogo progresta (Moscow, 19S7).

Introduction

xxxi

What is more, the technical transfers have not only been allowed by Western
governments but have in fact been encouraged and sometimes ^even W
out for acclaim. For example,- the builder of the firs. .modern Soviet
trawlers-Brooke-Marine, Ltd., of Lowestoft, England_was honored by Queen
Szabeth with an M.B.E. (Member of the Order of the British Emp. for
Charles Ernest White, the assistant general manager in charge of P™ du * I0n .
in 1946 Swedish firms were reportedly threatened by the* government s m m stry
of industry and commerce if they refused to take Sov,et orders.' h Ge many
in the 1950s and 1960s the Howaldtwerke shipyards in Kiel owned by the
Gemaf Government, was a prominent builder of ships on ,W ^ accoun.
Then in the mid-sixties came President Johnson's "bridges for peace which
I^ne wider the floodgates of American technology for the So-e^aUho J
to be sure a similar argument had been used by Edwin Gay of the War Trade
Board Tl!l9 to imitate trade with the Bolsheviks ("trade would bring the
Rnkheviks into the civilized world"). ,

Such then, is the confused political arena for the transactions discussed

in this study.

» ^Z^erl:^e E W « B uM er (London). Feb™, 1956. p. .19.
" Electrical Review (London), vol. 139, p. 890.

PARTI

The Transfer Mechanisms:
1945 to 1965

CHAPTER ONE

Lend Lease and the "Pipeline Agreement,'
1941 to 1946

There are two aspects to Lend Lease transfers: (!) shipments made under the
five Supply Protocols of 1941-45 and related programs and (2) shipments made
under the October 1945 "pipeline agreement "-after the end of the war with
Japan and covering goods in inventory or procurement on September 2, 1WS.

U.S.S.R. LEND LEASE PROGRAM: THE SUPPLY PROTOCOLS

Negotiations on the First Supply Protocol began on December 7, 1941
but they were postponed until December 28 due to the entry of the United
States into war with Japan. A few Soviet military requests in the First Protocol
could not be fulfilled or had to be scaled down, and while the War Department
was able to meet most commitments it could not at first supply all requests
for trucks, guns, and light bombers, antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and mortars.
The War Department did supply tanks, trucks and planes, 100,000 field tele-
phones, 500,000 miles of field telephone wire, 20,000 tons of toluol, 12,600
tons of leather, and 1,500,000 pairs of army boots. Approximately 1,752,000
tons of supplies were made available under this protocol.

' Data used in chis chapter are from the unpublished U.S. Dept. of State. "Report on War
AidFurnished by (he United States to the U.S.S.R." (Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation
1945). The published Supply Protocols are not a guide to actua! shipments, only to ^""P*"^
ones. The reader should also consult George R. Jordan, From Major Jordan i D«.n« (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), based on Soviet copies of the delivery notes,
in most categories Major Jordan's report is consistent with the State Department publication.
but sometimes he includes details to be found only in the Lend Lease invoices stored at the
Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. .

The ■'pipeline agreement" of October 1945 is published in Documents on American Fore.gn
Relations VIII, July 1945-December 1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. Ul-ii.
U should be noted that Schedules A and B to the "pipeline agreement" have no, been pubh h d
but are available from the Department of State; a copy of these schedules has been deposited

^;:S™S manuscript of unknown but clearly — ive authorship
in the Hoover Special Collections; ■■U.S.S.R. Lend-Lease Program (1945). This has data
on the virtually unknown "special programs."

4 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The Second Supply Protocol, known as the "Washington Protocol," was
signed December 6, 1942, and approximately 770,000 short tons of material
were made available by the War Department and 3,274,000 tons by all U.S.
agencies. The War Department delivered planes, jeeps, antiaircraft guns, explo-
sives, toluol, tractors, radio sets, clothing, field telephones and wire signal
equipment, battery charging sets, tubes, and radio components. Items requested
by the Soviets but not offered by the U.S. in this protocol included tarpaulin
material, field glasses, radio locators, radio beacons, stereoscopic observation
instruments for artillery, radio repair trucks, and light field repair shops for
tanks and trucks.

The Third Supply Protocol, known as the "London Protocol," was signed
in London on October 19, 1943. The War Department made substantial offerings
against all Soviet requests except in teletype apparatus and in locomotives where
it offered 500 to 700 locomotives against requests of 2000 to 3000. The total
supplied by the War Department was 1 ,466,000 tons, including substantial quan-
tities of locomotives, railroad cars, industrial lift trucks, tractors, cranes (mobile
construction and port use types), power shovels, and teletype apparatus. The
United States also began production on Soviet account of 600 steam locomotives
and procurement for 10,000 flatcars and 1,000 dump trucks.

The Fourth Supply Protocol, signed in February 1944, covered the last
half of 1 944 and 1945. It included substantial deliveries of radio locators, tractors,
large radio stations, cranes, shovels, shoes, and medical supplies; the main
new item under this protocol was mobile construction equipment. U .S . offerings
totaled 1,700,000 tons as well as port equipment (valued at $10 million) that
included floating, portal, and mobile cranes for the Black Sea ports and heavy
cranes for Murmansk and Archangel. The following U.S. offers were turned
down by the Soviets: nonstandard combination power supply units, mainline
electric locomotives, and nitroglycerin powder.

The Fifth Supply Protocol, signed in March 1945, included motor vehicles,
cranes and shovels, tractors, road construction equipment, locomotives, some
signal equipment but mainly industrial equipment.

There were in addition programs subordinate to the main Lend Lease Supply
Protocols. These included an Arctic program for the supply of Soviet arctic
ports, the "Outpost" program for construction of ports in the Soviet Far East,
and the highly important Northern Siberian Air Route Program, as well as
"Project Milepost" in support of Soviet Far Eastern operations.

The Northern Siberian Air Route program to establish a trans-Siberian airways
system was initially suggested to Ray Ellis, director of the Radio and Radar
Division of the War Production Board, while he was on a visit to the U.S.S.R.,
and was handled separately from the main Supply Protocol arrangements. Equip-
ment comprising transmitters, receivers, and range equipment for eight major
and 50 minor stations, and valued at $1 2 million, was requested and substantially

Lend Lease and the "Pipeline Agreement:' 1941 to 1946 5

assigned by March 30, 1945, for 7000 miles of airways with five 200-mile
feeder lines. 2 The relationship of this program to Allied wartime operations
is obscure.

COMPOSITION OF LEND LEASE SUPPLIES TO THE SOVIET UNION

About 98 percent of U.S. exports to the Soviet Union between June 1941
and September 1945 consisted of Lend Lease supplies. Table 1-1 shows the
major categories of supplies and the approximate amounts shipped; this^section
describes the content of each of these supply categories in more detail.

™* - major «igsa i i 8 8 sfi^ N u D M{^ 8E8UPPLY

Categories

US. Dollar
Equivalents

Gross
Long Tons

U.S. Dollar
Equivalents

Grass
Long Tons

Food

Clothing, textiles,

and footwear
Medical and

sanitation
Agricultural

equ ipment and seeds
Industrial equipment

$29,591,800
7.044,200

991,100

5,412,100

1 7,780,800

101,396

5,784

646

8,050

25,977

$99,437,700
1 7,207,700

2,445,500

16,986,900

52,119,500

315.748
16,225

1,037

38,069

95,970

Total

$60,620,000

141,853

$188,199,300

467,049

Source: G. Woodbridge, UNRRA. II
p. 250.

;New York: Columbia University Press, 1960),

Source: Great Britain. Accounts and Papers. 1942-43, XI, Command 6483 (November 1943).

U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Trade Notes. (Washington) vol. 22, no. 6 (June 1946). p.

49.

This section is based on George Woodbridge, UNRRA (New Yoit.: Columbia Univerisry Press,

1950), vol. II, pp. 231-56.

The U. N. subcommittee granting the suspension gave the following reason for suspension

of payment: ' 'Information supplied to the Subcommittee by the representatives of the Byelorussi an

Soviet Socialist Republic indicated that in accordance with the constitutional provisions of

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this constituent republic has no foreign exchange

Lend Lease and the •'Pipeline Agreement," 1941 to 1946 13

in Russia to administer the program; the missions reported that supplies were
equitably distributed, although with no indication that they originated with the
United Nations, and mission reports were submitted concerning their distribution.
By March 1947 the supply program was about 99.61 percent fulfilled, only
$982,700 remaining of the one-quarter billion dollar allotment.

Top priority was given to fats, oils, and meats. These were followed by
industrial equipment, with emphasis on equipment for restoration of public
utilities and communications together with equipment for basic industries such
as peat extraction equipment, a brick-making plant, an asphalt plant, and a
mineral wool plant. Almost half of the industrial procurement program was
devoted to "protocol goods," mainly electric power stations ordered by the
U.S.S.R. in the United Kingdom under the Third Protocol of 1942 but not
delivered by 1945. Industrial goods not requiring manufacture (e.g., small
locomotives, raw materials, electrical systems, and military vehicles) were by
and large delivered before the end of 1946.

SOVIET REQUESTS AND SOVIET RECEIPTS

The Soviet view of Lend Lease in historical perspective is highly deprecatory.
A. N. Lagovskii, for example, suggests that the first deliveries arrived only
in February 1942, in very insignificant quantities, and "even this delivery was
far from being first class." 9 After pointing out that the United States subsequently
increased its deliveries to a total of "several billions," Lagovskii suggests
that very little was in the form of needed tanks and aircraft and that the U.S.S.R.
was "one of the best economically developed countries in the world" on the
eve of World War II, 10 Lagovskii concludes that deliveries were "very modest"
and that the "Soviet Armed Forces defeated the Fascist German Armies with
domestic weapons, developed by our designers, engineers, and workers at our
plants." 11

Other Soviet accounts also maintain that Lend Lease was a minor factor
in defeating the German invaders, and no mention has been found in any of
them of the deliveries of over $1 billion of industrial equipment.

A comparison of Soviet requests with actual U.S . deliveries does not support

assets of its own, such ussets being entirely in the hands of the government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless, in view of the great destruction in the Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, the Subcommittee recommends that the government of the Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic be considered at this time not to be in a position to pay with suitable
means of foreign exchange for relief and rehabilitation supplies which the Director General
will make available."' Woodbridge, op. cit. n. 7, p. 234.

* A. N. Lagovskii, Slraiegiia i Ekonomika, 2d edition {Moscow, 1961). pp. 113-14.

10 Ibid., pp. 116-17.

" Ibid., pp. 115-16.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

the Soviet position in any manner whatsoever. For example, the initial Soviet
request for 3000 pursuit planes was sizable; however, the combined U.S. and
British offers under the First Protocol were 2700 pursuit planes, obtained by
stripping every other front of its requests. Initial Soviet requests for tanks were
for 9900 light and medium tanks, and combined U.S. and British supply on
the First Protocol was 4700 tanks. Other items were filled, and indeed overfilled.
For example, the Soviets initially requested 20,000 submachine guns — they
were offered 98,220 under the First Protocol alone. 12

We may therefore conclude that Lend Lease with its associated and sup-
plementary postwar programs injected about $1.25 billion worth of the latest
American industrial equipment into the Soviet economy. This figure does not
include the value of semifabricated materials, foodstuffs, industrial supplies,
and vehicles of indirect benefit. This industrial equipment comprised machines
and technologies generally in advance of Soviet wartime capabilities (as will
be described in later chapters), and the greater proportion was of significant
value to the postwar economy.

1S Based on data in anonymous, op. cit. n.l, p. 30. A comparison of the oilier protocols and
Soviet requests could be constructed from the data given in Robert H. Jones, The Roads to
Russia (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). pp. 1 19. 167.

CHAPTER TWO

World War II Reparations
for the Soviet Union

OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET REPARATIONS POLICIES

A prime objective of the Soviet Union during World War II was to exact
from its enemies the maximum of reparations in kind to rebuild the war-torn
and occupied areas of Russia. U.S. Secretary of State Edward J. Stettinius
recalled the great importance attached to such reparations: "Stalin, on the question
of German reparations, spoke with great emotion, which was in sharp contrast
to his usual calm, even manner." 1

Only those reparations acquired in the form of plants and equipment transfer-
red to the U.S.S.R- from enemy countries come within (he scope of this study.

Table 2-7

SUMMARY OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS USED BY THE
SOVIET UNION TO TRANSFER REPARATIONS AFTER 1944

Capital transfers
(reparations in kind)

Trophy brigades
(war booty)

Joint stock companies
(financial penetration)

Italy

Yes

Austria

Yes

Manchuria

Yes

A few only

Finland

Yes

Korea

Probably No

Yes

Japan

Rumania

Yes

Hungary

Yes

Bulgaria

Yes

—

Yes (a iew)

Germany (East)

Yes

Germany (West-

Yes

ern zones)

Yugoslavia

—

Limited

Source: J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1 945-50 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1951); and N. Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern
Europe (New York: The Technology Press of M.I.T., and John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians : The Yalta Conference (New York: Doubleday,
1949), p. 263.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

Some other forms of reparations — the "trophy brigades'*, for example, and
the operation of plants in occupied areas on Soviet account like the SAGs
(Soviet companies in East Germany) and the SOVROMs (Soviet companies
in Rumania) — are not fully discussed, as they do not fall directly within the
scope of our examination. 8

Capital goods and technology that were transferred to the U.S.S.R. under
the reparations agreements and that contributed both industrial capacity and
technology will be described on a geographic basis i.; this chapter. Various
chapters in Part II include descriptions of the impact of reparations on individual
sectors of the Russian economy.

In monetary terms, reparations claims were substantial; in fact, a figure
of $20 billion in 1938 dollars is commonly cited as the Soviet objective. The
claims can be approximately and more cogently summarized on a country-
by-country basis as follows: 3

Germany $10,000 million (plus one-third of the German fleet)

Austria 400 million

Finland 300 million

Italy 100 million (plus one-third of the Italian fleet)

Rumania 300 million

Bulgaria 70 million

Hungary 300 million

Manchuria 800 million (allocated to the Chinese reparations account

but arbitrarily removed by the U.S.S.R.)

The figure of $20 billion for total Allied reparations, of which about one-half
was to go to the U.S.S.R., was apparently arrived at with only passing objection
from the United Kingdom and none from the United States. The original Molotov
submission at the Yalta conference was that the amount be fixed at $20 billion
with $10 billion to go to the U.S.S.R." Stettinius reported that he himself
suggested 50 percent should go to the U.S.S.R. 5 , but that there was no final
agreement on total absolute amounts:

These are discussed in two excellent books. See J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet
Policy in Germany. I94S-S0 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951) for Germany, and Nicolas
Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (New York: The Technology Press
of M.I.T. and John Wiley & Sons 1957), for excellent, very detailed material on the other
East European countries .

Estimates of actual, in contrast to planned, transfers suggest a total of about $10 billion. For
example, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency stated: 'The economic gains accruing to the
U.S.S.R. as a result of the European bloc arrangements was greatest during the 1945-55 period
when direct and indirect reparations netted the U.S.S.R. an amount estimated at roughly 10
billion dollars.' It should be noted that this excludes Manchuria and possibly Finland. U.S.
Congress, Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Joint Economic Committee,
Sub-Committee on Economic Statistics, Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in Coopera-
tion with the Department of State and the Department of Defense, Supplemental Statement
on Costs and Benefits to the Soviet Union of Its Bloc and Pact System: Comparisons with
the Western Alliance System, 82nd Congress, 2d session (Washington, I960).
Stellinius, op. cit. n.l, p. 165.
Ibid., p. 231.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union 17

It should be understood that (here was absolutely no commitment at Yalta that
the total sum of reparations should be twenty billion and that fifty percent should
go io the Soviet Union. We made it clear that these figures were merely a basis
for discussion. 6

Stettinius added that Russia claimed "incorrectly" that Roosevelt agreed to
the $20 billion figure. 7 It is noticeable that no one suggested a measure of
relative war damages as a basis for reparations, nor were any engineering or
economic studies made to support relative damage claims. 8
According to one authority, J. P. Ncttl:

It is clear that the Soviet authorities were working on a separate plan, prepared
before the long drawn-out discussions in the Allied Control Council had even
begun. The plan was in operation at a time when the Western Reparations Agency
had only begun to register the individual claims of participating powers and was
tentatively having particular works earmarked for dismantling."

The method used by the Soviets to arrive at specific country reparations
demands differed according to Soviet military and political relationships with
the respective countries. Reparations from Germany, Austria, and Italy were
settled at discussions by the Big Three; the Soviet share was first taken out
on a priority basis by the Moscow Reparations Commission and the balance
transferred to an Allied Reparations Commission in Brussels for further distribu-
tion, including a second cut for the U.S. S.R. This arrangement worked well— for

the Soviet Union.

Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria made bilateral peace agreements
with the U.S.S.R. and their reparations were also determined by bilateral agree-
ments. Manchurian industry was actually a charge against the Chinese reparations
account; however, the Soviets unilaterally moved into Manchuria just before
the end of war in the Far East and' removed some $800 million worth of equipment
before the U.S. Inspection Commission arrived. 10

The Soviet reparations program, as pointed out by Nettl, contained definite
indications of detailed long-range planning with clearcut objectives, and although
each country (Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Germany, Italy, Korea, and
Manchuria) was treated differently, some basic parallels can be drawn.

First, the reparations programs were designed to supply capital goods to
the Soviet economy, but only modern units of technology were to be supplied.

• Ibid., p. 266.

7 Ibid., p. 231. , . . , „ . .

8 Ibid. . p. 231 . The UNRRA studies of damage in the Soviet Union were not based on tirst-nana

information, and are extremely vague,

>° Edwin Pauley. Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States.
July 1946 (Washington, 1946).

18 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Obsolescent plants were ignored. The intent was to gear acquisitions to the
future needs of the Soviet economy.

Second, there are some unusual parallels. For example, the Finland repara-
tions program was similar to that of Korea, while the German program was
similar to that of Manchuria. There is no question that the Soviets had a plan,
but scattered evidence also suggests they tried to cover their steps and obscure
the plan. In Manchuria, for example, they encouraged Chinese mobs to wreck
the plants after Soviet dismantling had removed desirable equipment."

Third, equipment choices are interesting as they parallel deductions about
weaknesses in the Soviet economy; however, such choices puzzled the Pauley
Mission engineers in Manchuria, who could not understand, for example, why
the Soviets left electric furnaces and cement kilns and removed ball bearings.

SALVAGE VALUE OF DISMANTLED PLANTS

It has been widely suggested that dismantling of plants and removal to
the U.S.S.R. was wasteful, inefficient, and of minor economic and technical
value.

Statements of a general nature can be found by American officials concerned
with Soviet policy in the late 1940s. For example, Walter Bedell Smith, U.S.
Ambassador in Moscow, made the following comment:

The destructive and unskilled methods used by the Soviet Army in dismantling
German industrial plants had been enormously wasteful, and it had proved difficult
for the Russians to reestablish these plants in the Soviet Union.

Foreigners who traveled by rail from Berlin to Moscow reported that every
railroad yard and siding was jammed with German machinery, much of ii deteriorat-
ing in the rain and snow. l!

A similar statement was made by Lucius Clay, U.S. military governor in Ger-
many:

The Soviet Government soon found that ii could not reconstruct these factories
quickly, if at all. Reports verified by photographs reaching U.S. intelligence
agencies in Germany showed that atmosi every siding in East Germany, and
many in Russia, contained railway cars filled with valuable machine tools rusting
into ruins.' 3

Closer observation may be gleaned from Fritz Lowenthal," a former Com-
" ibid,

'! W. B. Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia; j. B. Lippmcou. 1950), p. 224
14 . IUS ?■ Clay ' Decis '° n t« Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1950).

Fntz Lowenlhal, News from Soviet Germany (London: Victor Gollancz. 1950). p. 207.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union 19

munist official in charge of the Control Department of the Central Legal Adminis-
tration in the Soviet Zone:

In Odessa, Kiev, Oranienbaum, Kimry, and other places, where the dismantled
factories were to be reassembled, it often turned out that vital machinery was
missing or had been damaged beyond repair, as the dismantling is invariably
carried out by the Russians at top speed and without proper care. ls

Vladimir Alexandrov, a Russian refugee, makes even stronger statements.
For example: "The dismantling of German industry . . . was characterized mainly
by the almost complete absence of any overall direction, particularly with regard
to the technical questions involved in dismantling complicated industrial equip-
ment." 16 Alexandrov adds that shortage of railroad equipment, disorganized
loading, weather, and general inefficiency greatly reduced the value of the disman-
tled equipment.

Other writers have viewed this inefficiency as the reason for a change in
Soviet policy and the establishment of the SAGs to provide current reparations
for the Soviet economy in lieu of the transfer of capital equipment. For example,
Almond reports the following:

A! first they believed this purpose [i.e., the transfer of capital equipment] to
be served best by the removal 10 Russia of large quantities of industrial equipment.
It soon became apparent, however, that the Russians generally lacked the skilled
labor and technical know-how required to dismantle, reassemble, and operate
this equipment efficiently; consequently , this method of exacting reparations proved
to be even more wasteful than would normally be expected. Soviet policy then
switched to reparations out of current production. Roughly one-third of the industrial
capacity remaining in the zone was transferred to Soviet ownership, but left in
place to be operated for Soviet account using German labor, fuel, and raw materi-
als."

Two conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing statements: (1) the Soviets
were hasty and unskilled and consequently may have damaged machinery and
equipment, and (2) weather, particularly rain, may have corroded machinery. 18

On the other hand, Nettl observes: "Against this is the fact that the Soviet

15 Ibid.

J " Robert Slusscr, cd.,.V<n7Y; Ecunnnnc Poluv in Pusiuur Get'trtunv (Now York: Research Program
on the U.S.S.R., 1953), p. 14.

17 Gabriel A. Almond, The Struggle for Democracy in Germany (Richmond: The William Byrd
Press, 1949), p. 1 58.

18 Rainfall in Eastern Europe tends to be less than in Wesiern Europe and precipitation for the
years 1945-48 was normal. Average rainfall at Berlin from 1938 10 1950 was 594.7 mm per
year; in 1946 it was slightly below this (570.6 mm) and in 1945 and 1947 slightly above
(629.8 and 626.9 mm, respectively), World Weather Records. 1941-50. (Washington, U.S.
Weather Bureau), p. 677.

20 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Government had great experience of removing and reassembling complete fac-
tories. Much was done during the war, but the principle goes back to Tsarist
days!" 19 Examination of the evidence of installation of equipment in the Soviet
Union suggests that the Soviets did indeed reerect these plants in the U.S.S.R.
and that the plants in fact made a significant contribution to Soviet industrial
development in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The amount of waste, however, cannot be determined on the basis of the
evidence at hand. As the physical removals were numerous, it is essential to
determine accurately the possibilities of successful dismantling in order to arrive
at a more accurate assessment of its potential contribution to the Soviet economy.
Ff dismantled plants could not be reerected in the U.S.S.R., or if they were
lost or heavily damaged in transit, then regardless of how many plants were
dismantled and transferred, the economic impact would be insignificant. 20 Some
consideration is therefore given to this question, and the arguments are sum-
marized in the next sections .

The first factor that has to be taken into account is the condition of the
plant as inherited by Soviet occupation forces, particularly whether Allied bom-
bing—extremely heavy in the later phases of the war— had damaged factories
beyond usefulness. Reports of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, a series
of highly detailed postwar ground examinations of 25 target plants, concluded
that large tonnages of bombs had not, for several reasons, reduced these plants
to a completely unusable condition. The effect of heavy bombing was to halt
production temporarily, not to destroy productive capacity. For example:

Physical damage studies point to the fact that machine tools and heavy manufactur-
ing equipment of all kinds are very difficult lo destroy or to damage beyond
repair by bombing attacks. Buildings housing such equipment may be burned
down and destroyed but, after clearing away the wreckage, it has been found
more often than not, that heavy equipment when buried under tons of debris
may be salvaged and put back into operation in a relatively short time and with
comparatively little difficulty. 11

Since the Soviets transported only less damageable items (e.g., machine
tools and equipment rather than utility lines, steel -fabricated structures, and

" Neltl, op. cit. n.2. p. 20S.

This is a technical question. The economics of dismantling, as many commentators have sug-
gested, are obscure. For example, John Hynd, M.P.: "1 have never been able to understand
the economics of putting 2000 men at work for twelve months— 2000 man years— dismantling
a rusty old steel factory, breaking it up, marking up the parts, packing them up into crates,
and sending them to some other country, where it will probably take two or three years to
rebuild the factory, and when, In four or five years' time, someone will have an out-of-date
and rusty factory, whereas, if we had left it in Germany producing steel, we should probably
have been able to build in the same time, and without any loss, a new modern, well equipped
up-to-date factory" (Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates . October 27, 1949, p, 534).

S1 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Division; Industry Report, no. 84, January 1947.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union 21

gas holders) it may be asserted that strategic bombing had very little effect,
and probably reduced the number of even the most desirable machine tools
available for reparations by only about ten percent.

The next question concerns the extent of damage incurred in dismantling
and removal procedures. Most Western commentators on dismantling have stated
that Soviet dismantling policy was inept and wasteful, and that ultimately the
Soviets were induced to switch to a policy of leaving industry in place to be
operated by captive companies on Soviet account. This may be a rather superficial
view.

At the end of hostilities in Europe the Russians had a great deal of experience
in dismantling and the West had very little — this assertion may be highlighted
by examining those categories which were subject to little dismantling. The
Soviets concentrated on plants containing equipment and machines that could
be safely transported. Close comparison of removals in Manchuria and East
Germany indicates that almost 100 percent of removals had a high salvage
value and were easily removed and transported, i.e., machine tools, precision
instruments, and small items of equipment not made of fabricated sheet metal.
On the other hand, the Western Allies in Europe appear to have concentrated
their removals on plants with a relatively low salvage value. One cannot, for
example, satisfactorily remove an iron and steel plant to another location, which
is exactly what the Allies tried to do. In fact, the Western Allies reduced
German steel capacity by 25 percent and concentrated removals in this sector. "
Although the Soviets did try cutting up and removing cement kilns in Manchuria,
the mistake was not repeated in East Germany.

Soviet proficiency in dismantling and shipping plants to Russia is exemplified
by events in 1944 in Persia. There the United States used two truck assembly
plants (TAP I and TAP II) to assemble U.S. trucks that had been "knocked
down" before on-shipment to the U.S.S.R. under Lend Lease. Almost 200,000
trucks were finally assembled in these two plants. Apart from the vehicles
assembled, the plants themselves were allocated to the Soviet Union under
the Lend Lease agreement, and on December 7 , 1 944, orders arrived to dismantle
and transfer to Russia. A Soviet Acceptance Committee arrived three days
later. One plant was divided into small segments, each in charge of one U.S.
officer, one Soviet officer, and one interpreter. By January 17, 1945, the entire
plant had been dismantled, labeled, loaded onto 115 flatcars, and shipped by
rail to the U.S.S.R. Thus in a little over four weeks what U.S. Army spokesmen
described as a "considerable consignment" was handled with no trouble. The
second plant followed in April on 260 flatcars and was handled with equal
dispatch. 23

" See n. 20, comments of Mr. Hynd, M. P.

» T. H. V. Metier, The Persian Corridor and Aid To Russia (Washington: Department of the
Army, Office of the Chief of Military History. 1952).

22 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

It should be noted also that 20 years later, on the testimony of Juanita
Castro R.uz (sister of Fidel Castro of Cuba), Cuban sugar mills were "dismantled
and shipped to the U.S.S.R. as collateral for Cuba's imports of Soviet arms
and ammunition. " 2 *

Therefore, we may have imputed to the Soviets the same mistakes we made
ourselves due to lack of experience in dismantling and removing plants. Further,
although dismantling is a very inefficient method of developing capacity, the
Soviets may have partly avoided or at least offset this factor by long-range
planning and greater dismantling experience gained in the 1940-42 movement
of more than 1300 large industrial plants behind the Urals, including all aircraft,
tank, and motor plants; 93 steel plants; 150 machine tool plants; and 40 electrical
plants. "

Thus the change in policy in May 1946, when the Soviets announced that
dismantling in the Soviet Zone was almost completed, was probably not the
result of "inefficiency" but of a knowledge born of experience that remaining
plants could not be removed successfully and would better serve the Soviet
purpose by operation in place.

We can team something of Soviet dismantling policy by examining those
plants left in place and not removed to the U.S.S.R, Five dismantling patterns
emerge:

1. Plants with a low salvage value were not removed in toto, although
individual pieces of equipment and instruments from such plants were
selectively removed. Thus the Soviets avoided removing iron and steel
furnaces and cement kilns, for example.

2. Machines and equipment with a high salvage value and a high value-
to-weight ratio were prime targets for removal. Thus machine tools
of all types, textile, papermaking, and food processing machinery, instru-
ments from all industries, and electrical equipment received first priority.
Such equipment can be easily removed, easily prepared for shipment,
and easily crated and loaded, and it withstands transportation relatively
well.

3. The first two observations are modified in one important way: choice
of removals was selective in terms of obsolescence. This came out
clearly in Manchuria, where the older machines were almost always
left and the more modem machines always removed.

4. Selective removals were supplemented by items in short supply in the
U.S.S.R., particularly rubber conveyer belts (used for shoe repair),
electric motors of all types and sizes, hand tools, laboratory equipment,
and hospital equipment.

" U.S. House of Representatives, Annual Report for the Year 1965, House Committee on Un-

American Activities, 89th Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1966).
" R. H. Jones, Tht Roads lo Russia (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). p. 222,

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union

5. The planned nature of the removals is emphasized in several ways.
It is particularly notable that sufficient equipment to produce the power
needed for the dismantling operation was left in place; a casual program
would have removed such equipment.

It has been suggested that much reparations equipment was damaged in
removal or that bad packing resulted in damage in transit. Contrary evidence
can be drawn from two areas, Manchuria and Germany. The Pauley Mission
obtained photographs and information concerning the dismantling of Manchunan
equipment. The work was undertaken by Soviet troops under the direction of
officers who were presumably civilian specialists temporarily in army uniform.
Photographs of these troops at work indicate that they were young, but their
work appears, from the photographs, to have been methodical. The equipment
was removed from its bases, placed on wood skids, and then crated. Heavy
damage was done to factory walls only to remove equipment. American engineers
on later inspection trips noted several points which lead to the conclusion that
the dismantling was not done in great haste. Certain plants were subjected
to dismantling several times at intervals of several months. (See Table 2-2.)

Table 2-2 THE SOVIET DISMANTLING SCHEDULE IN MANCHURIA

(MAJOR PLANTS ONLY)

Manchunan Plant

Reported start
ol dismantling

Reported finish
of dismantling

Mukden Main Arsenal
Manchuria Machine Tool Co.
Manchurian Gas Co.
Mukden Refinery
Fouhsin Power Plant
Japanese Army 1st Fuel Depot
Fushun Power Rant
Molybdenite Mine
Manchuria Machine Tool Co.
Manchu Wire Rope Co.
Manchu Iron Co.
Southern Manchurian Railway

Co. Repair Shops
Nippon Air Brake Co.
Manchu Rubber Co.
Manchurian Light Metal Co.
Tafengmen Power HEP
Anshan Teto Transmission

Tower Co.
Taiping Hospital
Manchu Otani Heavy Ind. Co.

August 15. 1945

August 20, 1945

August 21, 1945

August 26, 1945

September 15, 1945

September 20, 1945

Two weeks in September 1945

September 1945

Mid-September 1945

September 1945

October 12, 1945

October 1945

Three weeks in October 1945

October 1945

End October 1945
November 1945

March 7, 1946
November 14, 1945
December 1945
February 1946
November 1945
November 10, 1945
October 30, 1945

November 1945
Mid-November 1945
February 1946
October 25, 1945

October 25, 1945
November 19, 1945
Early November 1945

November 1945

End November 1945
November 1945

Source: Reconstructed from Edwin Pauley, Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria
to me President of the United States. July 1946 (Washington, D.C.. 1946), Appendix 3.

24 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Sometimes the Soviets made it more difficult for later repair work e g by
bending over hold-down bolts; such effort is unlikely to be expended in a hasty
operation. J

Photographs of the crates and the crating process in Germany suggest careful
work under Soviet supervision. " Crates were marked for Stankoimport an
organization with extensive experience in importing foreign equipment There
is no reason to suppose these shipments would not be handled like any other
Soviet imports of machinery. It also must be borne in mind that Soviet practice
is to place complete responsibility on the individual in charge, with harsh penalties
for failure, and there is no reason to believe that any other procedure was
followed in the reparations removals. There was certainly pressure on the 70 000
or so individual German and Chinese laborers recruited to assist in removals

Another factor to be considered is whether damaged equipment could have
been restored to its former usefulness; and there is evidence that Soviet engineers
have exerted great ingenuity in such efforts." A practical view of the possibility
of this type of recovery was seen in a 1946 German exhibition in the British
sector of Berlin with the theme "Value from under the Ruins." Exhibits included
lathes, stamping dies, presses, gears, and even more delicate apparatus such
as electrical equ.pment, typewriters, sewing machines, and printing machines
retrieved from under debris (where they had lain for two ycars <> r more ) and
returned to ong.nal working order. Acid baths and abrasives were used to remove
rust, high-penetration oils freed interior working parts, and badly damaged parts
were replaced. Precision bearings were brought back by electrodeposition of
chromium, and sandblasting was used on larger metal parts. 28 This then is
a practical example of recovery of delicate equipment subjected to far greater
abuse and more adverse conditions than any equipment removed from Germany
to the Sov,et Union. There is no reason why Soviet technicians could not have
performed as well on weatherbeaten equipment or on equipment damaged in
transit.

Support for this argument may be derived from reports on German equipment
moved during World War II across national frontiers and sometimes underground
to avoid bombing damage. For example, in a claims letter from Bussing NAG
Flugmotorenwerke to Reichsluftfahrtministerium in July 1944 the company— ob-
viously for claims purposes putting on the worst front— stressed that moving
caused a lot of wear and tear, but "this damage was done chiefly when the
machines were being moved into the salt mines." Further explanations suggest
that chemical action in the salt mines and operation by unskilled labor did

" ra»£ton? wf m <n '"' : ° ffl " ° f mhary G0Ver ' 1,nen, fOT German > < US - Z "^ Economics
27 Seep. 30 below.

^Recovery of Machinery from Ruins." British Zone Review (Hamburg), April 26. 1946 p.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union 25

more damage to the equipment than lowering it into the mines, although many
pieces had to be up-ended for this purpose. zs

In general, it is suggested that pessimistic interpretations of Soviet ability
to make good use of reparations equipment are not founded on all the available
evidence. In fact, reparations equipment was a valuable addition to the Soviet
economy.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN
REPARATIONS PROGRAM

The organization of German reparations was from start to finish favorable
to the Soviet Union. The initial Soviet share was determined by the Moscow
Reparations Commission, whose work was undertaken in "strict secrecy," with
Dr. Isadore Lubin as the U.S. representative on the Moscow Reparations Com-
mittee.

The Allied Control Council for Germany at Potsdam, through its Coordina-
tion Committee, made allocations of reparations in the Western zones of Ger-
many; plants and equipment in the Soviet Zone were not handled through the
Allied Control Council, only by ihe Soviet authorities. The Coordination Com-
mittee allocated reparations from the "Western portion" between the Soviets
and an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (IARA). The Soviets then dismantled
their allocations immediately, while the remaining 18 allies had to wait until
further distribution had been determined by the IARA.

In this manner the Soviets, by virtue of having only to bid against IARA
and not 18 individual allies, had the cream of Western zone plants as welt
as all plants in the Soviet Zone; even at the IARA level, bargaining was bilateral
rather than multilateral (Figure 2-1).

Finally, under the program known as "Operation RAP" the Soviets were
given priority in removing Western zone plants allocated under this preferential
procedure, so that at the end of 1946, 94 percent of shipments from- the U.S.
Zone had been sent to the Soviet Union.

The formal Soviet claim in the Western zones was determined as follows
(Section 4 of the allocation agreement):

(a) 15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in
the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing
industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should
be removed from the Western Zones of Germany in exchange foranequiva-

19 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Bussing-NAG Flugmaorenwerke, Number 89,GmBH (Bruns-
wick. Germany, January 1947), pp. 9-10.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Devempmem, 1945-1965

lent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, limber, clay products, petroleum
products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon,
(b) 10 percent of such industrial equipment as is unnecessary for the German
peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be
transferred to the Soviet Government on reparation account without payment
or exchange of any kind in return.
Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simul-
taneously.*

Figure 2-1

ALLIED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR
GERMAN REPARATIONS

Moscow Reparations Committee

Selected SO percent for U.S.S.R. in

Eastern Europe

Allied Control Council for Germany — Selected 25 percent for U.S.S.R. in West
(Coordination Committee) Germany

"Operation RAP" — Priority for Soviets

Source: Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, Report of Secretary-General lor the Year 1946
(Brussels, 1946), annex X, pp. 61-62; Germany, Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone),
Economics Division, A Year ot Potsdam: The German Economy Since the Surrender (n.pj
OMGUS. 1946).

In return for equipment dismantled under Section 4(a) the Soviets agreed
to make reciprocal deliveries of raw materials valued at 60 percent of the equip-
ment received from the Western zones. In October 1947 the U.S.S.R. presented
a first list of reciprocal commodities, which was accepted, and deliveries were
duly made." In May 1948 the U.S.S.R. presented a second list of commodities,
also accepted by the Western Allies. A dispute then arose over delivery points
and the Soviets made no further deliveries.

Therefore, the Soviets delivered a total of 5,967 S85 RM (1938: about
$1 .5 million) against a commitment of the 50 million RM which would represent
60 percent of the value of industrial equipment received by the Soviet Union
under Section 4(a). In other words, the Soviets paid only 12 percent of their
commitment for reparations received under Section 4(a).

REPARATIONS PLANTS SHIPPED FROM WESTERN
ALLIED ZONES TO THE SOVIET UNION

A total of 25 percent of industrial plants in the Western Allied zones was
allocated to the U.S.S.R. under Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of the ailc cation agreement,

30 Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, Report of Secretory-General for the Year 1949 (Brussels
1950), p. 3.

31 For a list of Soviet reciprocal deliveries see ibid. , p. 17.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union 27

and dismantling of these plants was expedited on a priority basis. The Soviet
allocation status as of November 30, 1948, is given in Table 2-3.

Table 2-3 PLANTS FROM WESTERN ZONES ALLOCATED

TO THE U.S.S.R. AS OF NOVEMBER 30, 1948

Zone ol occupation War plants Reparations plants

U.S. (the RAP program) 20 4Vi

British 6 4V*

French 3 1_

29 10

Source: Germany, Office of the Military Government (U.S. Zone), Report of the Military
Governor, November 1948, p. 25.

Probably the most important single plant dismantled for the Soviet Union
was the Bandeisenwalzwerk Dinslaken A.G, in the British Zone." This plant
was the largest and most efficient hot- and cold-rolled strip mill on the European
continent. The effect of the removal on German productive capacity was a
reduction of 15 to 30 percent in strip steel, 20 percent in sheet steel, and
50 percent in tinplate strip steel. 33 Another important steel plant removed to
the Soviet Union was Hiittenwerk Essen-Borbeck; dismantling required the ser-
vices of 3000 workers over a period of two years to prepare for shipment. 34

By August 1, 1946, a total of 156 plants in the U.S. Zone had been confirmed
for reparations by the economic directorate of the Allied Control Council; of
these, 24 had been designated in October 1945 as "advance reparations" under
the swift appraisal plan known as Operation RAP. As described officially,
"this [designation] represented an attempt to make available in the shortest
time possible a number of reparations plants to the Soviet Union and the Western
Nations." 35 The dismantling status of these "advance reparations" plants as
of September 1, 1946, suggests that the Soviet Union indeed benefited. Inasmuch

« Wilhelm Hasenack, Dismantling in the Ruhr Valley (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1949).

33 Ibid.

" ibid p 51 The Hiittenwerk Essen-Borbcck plan! was siill being dismantled in May 1949;
see British Zone Review. May 20, 1949, and Neue Zuereher Ztitung. December 10. 1947.
Note these are rolling mills, not blast furnaces with low salvage value.

» A Year of Potsdam, op. cil. n.26. p. 35. The New York Times reports on this question
are not accurate. For example, see New York Times Magazine. December 7, 1947, p. 14:
"Also there was a short period when, for technical reasons, the American zonal authorities
gave priority to the shipment of a small amount of equipment to the Soviet zone, a situation
that resulted in such misleading headlines as "Russia Obtains 95 percent of Reparations from
U.S. Zone." This statement is, of course, inconsistent with the evidence presented here. The
same issue also reports (p. 56) that U.K. and U.S. reparations shipments to the U.S.S.R.
stopped in May 1946. However, shipments were continuing as late as February 1948 according
to Dept. of State Bulletin. February 22. 1948, p. 240. In May 1949 the Borbeck plant was
still being dismantled for the U.S.S.R.; British Zone Review. May 20, 1949.

28 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

as 95 percent of all dismantling shipments up to the end of 1946 went to the
Soviet Union and the U.S.S.R. was allocated twenty-four and one-half plants,
it could be argued that the RAP program existed virtually for Soviet benefit'
(see Table 2-4.)

The RAP operation moved swiftly. Dismantling of the huge Kugelfischer
ball bearing plant in Bavaria for the U.S.S.R. started only on March 1 , 1946,
but the first shipment of equipment— which was the first shipment of reparations
equipment from the U.S. Zone to any destination— was made on March 31
1946. By August 1946 a total of 11,100 tons of reparations had been made
from the RAP plants allocated to the U.S.S.R. 38 Of 40,374 tons of reparations
equipment shipped from the U.S. Zone in 1946, the Soviet Union received
38,977 tons, or 94.3 percent." In all, nearly one-third of reparations removals
from the U.S. Zone of Germany went to the Soviet Union. Between March
30, 1946, and March 31, 1947, a total of 209,655 tons of equipment (valued
at RM 190,279,000, 1938 prices) was removed. Of this total, 66,981 tons
(valued at RM 45,246,000) went to the U.S.S.R. 38

Other removals from Germany during 1944-51 can be understood only in
the context of the way in which occupations took place within the inter-allied
zona! borders. The U.S. Army had stopped at the Elbe River while the Soviets
occupied the whole of Berlin, 39 and this worked in favor of the Soviet dismantling
policy.

The historic and geographic factors have been treated in great detail elsewhere
and may be but briefly summarized here. In the closing days of the war the
Soviet armies moved up to the Elbe River, facing the U.S. and British armies,
and occupied the whole of Berlin including what were to become the U.S.!
British, and French sectors of the city. They then proceeded to strip Berlin
of its industry, including the highly important electrical equipment factories,
and including plants in all sectors. This removal was probably completed by
June 1945 because when the Western Allies suggested moving into their Berlin
zones— the Soviets in turn to occupy the whole of their zone west of the
Elbe — the Soviets asked only for a few days delay, until July 1.

In the meantime, i.e., from late April to July 1, 1945, the Americans and
British maintained industry in their territory, so that when the Soviets moved
into the rest of their occupation zone they received yet more factories including
a highly important sector of the aircraft industry and, of course, the Nordhausen

38 A Year of Potsdam, op. cit. n. 26, p. 37,
37 New York Times, January 23, 1947. p. 13.

" wT ft?!' Mili ' ary °° vtrnor ' °«ice of the U.S. Military Governor (Germany), no. 45
March 1949.

" S ™ C ° rnelius R^". The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1966). on the "drive
to Berlm controversy. The official U.S. Government account of this controversy is soon
to be published under the title The Last Offensive.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union

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Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

V-l and V-2 rocket plants. Thus the Allied drive to the ElDe gave the Soviets
the opportunity, willingly taken, to acquire the extensive German electrical equip-
ment industry in Berlin 40 and find the German aircraft industry waiting intact
when the zonal frontiers were rearranged a few weeks later." 1

PLANT REMOVALS FROM THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY

At the end of 1944 a special committee was organized under the Soviet
Council of Ministers and under the leadership of Malenkov Its twin tasks
were the dismantling of German industry and the expansion o. Soviet industry
by the use of the equipment removed. 42 The committee's central headquarters
in Moscow was staffed by members of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and divided into departments with staff drawn from
Soviet industry, given military ranks. As individual targets were located, instruc-
tions passed to military units for actual dismantling then were carried out by
German prisoners of war and local labor under Soviet officers. 43

Dismantling of East German industry began with the arrival of the second
wave of Soviet forces, first in Berlin (all zones) and then throughout the provinces
of Silesia, Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony.

Although the facts of dismantling have been strictly censored by the Soviets
and no Allied observers were allowed into theSoviet Zone at the time, information
of reasonable accuracy has filtered through the Iron Curtain. In particular the
SPD (Soziaidemokratische Partei Deutschlands) in West Germany collected
dismantling information on a plant-by-plant basis and published this information
in 1951. 44 Further, reports by former Soviet officials add to our knowledge,
although some of these leave the impression of being more enthusiastic than
accurate.

Dismantling involved several thousand plants and included the best of industry

40 For a description see U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, reports by A. G. P. Sanders, Capt
Nichols, and Col. Ames on electrical equipment targets In Berlin, July 1945.

41 In the interval of two months numerous U.S. and British intelligence, army, navy air force
and civilian teams explored the technical side of Germany industry in the Soviet Zone This
exploration was conducted in the following directions: (a) interviewing German technicians
(b) acquiring papers and materials for reports on technological and economic structure (c)
obtaining drawings, instruments, and samples, and (d) acquiring V-l and V-2 samples and
engine samples. There were no equipment removals. The plants were left intact and some
were even repaired for the Soviets. So the Soviets obtained the productive capacily intact
but did not obtain engineers or papers. The papers were acquired under the FIAT programs'

" Slusser, op. cit., n. 16, p. 18.

Some 10,000 local Germans were assigned to dismantle the brown coal plants at Regis- Breitingen
and another 5000 dismantled the Lauta works at Hoyersworda; 12.000 Germans were used
at the Ciessches Erben works; and 20,000 were used at the large plant at Brona. Lowenthal
op. cil. n. 14, pp. 182-85.

" °'- E " Harmssen ' Am Abtnd d " Oemoniage; Sechs Jahre Reptiraiionspotiiik. (Bremen- F
Trujen, 1951).

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union

moved to East Germany during the war to avoid Allied bombing. All together,
a total of about 12,000 trainloads of equipment was removed to the U.S.S.R.

Table 2-5

REDUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY BY DISMANTLING
IN THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY

Nefff's percentage

estimate of

Equivalent in

Industry

1 936 Production

capacity reduction

tonnage terms

Vehicles

532,706 units

346,259

Cement

1,687,000 tons

674,800

Rubber goods:

Tires

176,000 units

70-80

123,000-140,800

Tubes

148,000 units

70-80

103,600-118,400

Paper and cardboard

1,195,000 tons

478,000

Cellulose

205,400 tons

82,160

Sources: J. P. Netll, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945-50 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 202. Wolfgang F. Stolper, The Structure of the East
German Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 146. 180, 196,
207.

Details of this dismantling in the Soviet Zone have been included in the chapters
on industrial activities (chapters 8 through 24).

DEPORTATION OF GERMAN SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS

One significant aspect of the reparations transfer process was the deportation
of German scientists and technicians to the Soviet Union, on a mass scale
concentrated in the fait of 1946. The major program was completed during
the night of October 28, 1946, when trainloads of Germans from aircraft and
armaments plants were moved with their families and furniture to the Soviet
Union.' 15

Deportations were concentrated among the staffs of key German plants.
According to Fritz Lowenthal, more than 300 scientists, technicians, and skilled
workers were deported from Zeiss; 26 chemists, seven engineers, and several
skilled mechanics were co-opted from the Leuna works; and technicians and
workers were drawn from the Junkers works at Dessau, the Oberspree cable
works in Niederschoenweida, the Schott glass works in Jena, the optical works
in Saalfeld and Poessneck, and the Gera workshops." 6 Lowenthal also cites

For descriptions of deportation, see Lowenthal, op. cit. n. 14, and V. L. Sokolov, Soviet
Use of German Science and Technology. 1945-1946 (New York: Research Program on the
U.S.S.R., 1955).
Lowenthal, op. cit. n. 14, pp. 203-4.

32 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

a U.S. Navy report to Congress stating that 10,000 German scientists and
technical specialists had been absorbed into Soviet industry by May 1947." 7
These German workers began to filter back home in the early 1950s together
with German, Austrian, and Italian prisoners of war and deportees. In January
1 952 The Times (London) reported that there was a continuing flow of Germans
from the optical and precision instruments industries: "It seems to show that
Russia can now do without these craftsmen.'" 18 The report particularly noted
the return of 310 highly skilled workers from the Zeiss works in Jena, after
five years in Russia. It is probable that all German deported workers were
returned by 1957-58.

REPARATIONS FROM FINLAND, 1944 TO 1955

The Finnish-Soviet Peace Treaty of December 17, 1944, required Finland
to transfer goods to the Soviet Union valued at $300 million in 1938 prices
over a period of eight years. The amount was similar to that for Hungarian
and Rumanian reparations, but in the Finnish case there was little Soviet interfer-
ence in the manufacturing and delivery— this being entirely a Finnish responsibil-
ity whereas in Hungary and Rumania the Soviets formed "joint companies"
to carry out the task. Some 60 percent of the indemnity comprised metallurgical
and engineering products, the balance being ships, cable, and wood prod-
ucts — amounting in all to a considerable proportion of the Finnish national prod-
uct. 49

The technical nature of this huge indemnity required Finland to establish
major new industries and to expand engineering industries that were of only
negligible importance before the war. This was done with credits and equipment
from the United States and Sweden, and thus provides some excellent examples
of "indirect transfers."

A. G. Mazour sums up Finnish achievements in reparations deliveries to
the U.S.S.R. as follows: "Mere survival was a miracle. To meet the obligations
and still manage to survive was an achievement which commands profound
respect and admiration." 50 Jensen has calculated the reparation payments as
a percentage of net national product as follows: 51

Ibid., pp. 205-6,

The Times (London), January 29, 1952. p. 4g,

Barlel] C. Jensen, The Impact of Reparations on the Posi-war Finnish Economy (Homewood,

111: Richard D. Irwin, 1966). See also A. C. Mazour, Finland Between East and Wen (Princeton:

Van Nostrand, 1956), p. 173.

Mazour, op. cit. n. 49.

Jensen, op. cit. n. 49, p. 18.

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union

Reparations as

percentage of

Year

percentage of NNP

state expenditures

1944

0.3

0.7

1945

7.6

20.9

1946

4.S

13.7

1947

4.1

13.7

1948

3.2

10.7

1949

3.2

10.8

1950

1.6

6.1

1951

1.8

6.8

1952

1.1

4.1

The major deliveries under the program comprised about two-thirds of Fin-
land's prewar ship tonnage plus considerable new construction. Ships transferred
included 70 cargo vessels, one tanker, seven passenger ships, two icebreakers,
and 15 barges from the merchant marine. In addition, substantial new deliveries
of wooden and metal ships were required. During the first four years of the
reparations period Finland delivered 143 new ships and two floating docks
valued at $25.8 million, while the program for the second four years called
for 371 ships and two docks valued at $40.2 million." In all, about 359,000
gross registered tons of shipping with a total valuation of $66 million in new
ships and $14 million in existing ships was delivered, requiring a significant
expansion and modernization of the Finnish shipbuilding industry. 53

The next largest category, comprising $70.7 million, was made up of indus-
trial equipment and a number of complete plants. Among other things, this
segment included 17 complete industrial plants to establish mills for the production
of prefabricated wooden houses. This is of particular interest because instead
of themselves supplying a plant specification, the Soviets requested that the
Finns supply it (the delays involved in this procedure subjected Finland to
a monthly fine of $45,000 payable in supplementary deliveries). The plants
delivered (Table 2-6) were complete with sawmills, lumber kilns, conveyers,
power plants, and repair shops. si

The remaining major categories included 2600 km of power cable, 34,375
tons of bright copper wire, and 1700 km of control cable ($12.9 million),
pulp and paper products ($34.9 million), and wood products ($28 million)."

" J. Auer, Suomen somkorvausioimituksei neiivosmliiiolle (Helsinki: Werner Soderstrom

Osakeyhtio. 1956), p. 318.
" Ibid., p. 327; for a listing of ships by type see Urho Toivola. The Finland Yeur Book IV4/

(Helsinki, 1947), p. 84.
s * Toivola, op. cit. n. 53, p. 335.
« Ibid., pp. 84-85.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1 945 -1965

Table 2-6

COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS SUPPLIED TO THE
U.S.S.R. UNDER FINNISH REPARATIONS

Number of

plants

Description

Capacity per plant, annually

Sulfite cellulose

40,000 tons bleached cellulose

Cardboard mills

58,000 tons cardboard

Woodpulp mills

50,000 tons woodpulp

Paper mills

30,000 tons paper

Prefabricated houses

1 800 houses (each SO square meters)

Plywood plants

12-15,000 cubic meters

Woodflour mills

2000 tons

Source: Urho Tolvola, The Finland Year Book 1947 (Helsinki, 1947), pp. 84-85.

REPARATIONS FROM JAPAN

In contrast to Manchuria, no reparations have been traced as originating
in Japan for the Soviet Union.

Owen Lattimore had responsibility for developing and writing the machine
tool and aluminum sections of the Pauley Mission report on Japanese repara-
tions." He makes only one reference to a possibility of Soviet reparations
from Japan: "Although I do not believe that the U.S .S .R. should assert a substan-
tial claim for reparations from Japan, nevertheless certain plants and machine
tools may well be made available to the U.S.S.R." 57 Lattimore's reasoning
was that the equipment might be allocated to the Soviet Union because the
low economic development of the Far East would make absorption of Japanese
industrial equipment and capacity difficult for Far Eastern countries and that
China and the Philippines were not ready to receive reparations . S8 This argument
was presented to the Far East Committee of January 12, 1946. There is no
evidence, however, that the U.S.S.R. ever received the 850,000 machine toots
Lattimore estimated were available in Japan for reparations purposes. 59

REMOVALS FROM MANCHURIA

The 1946 Pauley Mission in Manchuria was organized in April 1946 under
the instructions of President Truman. The mission included qualified American

s " Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United Slates.
November 194$ to April 1946 {Washington, April 1, 1946).

" Ibid., pp. U-12.

sa Lattimore's logic is elusive. Low developmem suggests a requirement for machine lools; further-
more, the Soviet Union also had a relatively low level of development.

" Pauley, op. cil. n. 56, p. 3.

35
Vorid War II Reparations for the Soviet Union

;ivilian engineers and industrial specialists from General MacArthur's headquar-

'^From^base established at Mukden, inspection trips were made to important
industrial and mining centers-. Mukden, Fushun, Liaoyang, Anshan, PenhsAu,
Kungyuan, Chinchow, Chinhsiao, Pehpiao, Fu-hs.en, Hulutao, Ka.yuan, Ssup-
ingchieh, Hsin-an, Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, and Mutankiang. Da,ren how
ever was not visited because permits were not granted by the Sov.et Government
or the local authorities; Antung was not visited because the Chinese Commumsts

refused permission. tlin , pv

The four objectives of the Pauley Mission were as follows. (1) to survey
Japanese assets in Manchuria subject to reparations; (2) to ascertain the productive
capacity of Manchurian industry; (3) to estimate if immediate reparations remov-
als from Japan could be utilized to improve or rehabilitate Manchunan industry,
and (4) to prove or disprove reports that crippling removals had been made.
Manchuria has many natural resources, and the Japanese had created an
extensive industrial structure there on the basis of these resources. The defeat

«* 2-7 BEDUCTiON ,N CAPACITY^ ™™™>* INDUSTRY

Pauley Report "

Industry

Cost ol

installations Percentage

dismantled reduction

and removed in capacity

Japanese statistics "

Cost of

installations Percentage

dismantled reduction

and removed in capacity

Electric power
Coal and coke
Iron and steel
Nonferrous metals
Railroad
Machinery
Petroleum
Chemical
Cement industry
Textiles
Pulp & paper
Radio

$201,000

$219,540

50,000
131.260

10.000
221 ,390

90
50-100

75
50-100

44,720
204,052

60,815
193,756

60-100
50-100
50-100

163,000

158,870

11,380

40,719

14,000

74,786

23,000

23,167

38,000

135,113

7,000

13,926

25,000

20-100

4,588

$895,030,000

$1,174,072,000

Total

1956), Communist China Problem Research Series.

36 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

of Japan caused disruption of production centers and trade channels and upset
the entire economic structure of the Far East; Soviet occupation further disrupted
the industrial structure.

The findings of the Pauley Commission were that the wrecked condition
of Manchurian industry evident between the time of the Japanese surrender
and the visit of the Pauley Mission was due directly to Soviet removals and
pillage, and to a lesser extent to indirect consequences of the Soviet occupation.
The Soviets had concentrated their efforts on certain categories of supplies,
machinery, and equipment: functioning power-generating and transforming
equipment, electric motors, experimental plants, laboratories and hospitals, and
the newest and best machine tools. The wrecked condition was due mainly
to Soviet removals and partly to Soviet failure to preserve order. 60 (See Table
2-7.)

At the Fushun power plant, four 50,000-kw steam- electric generators plus
the condensers, auxiliary equipment, stokers, and drums were removed. Thirty-
four low-voltage transformers for electric furnaces were taken from the aluminum
plant at Fushun (there were 36 transformers at the plant, but two outside on
skids were left behind), and the Sodeberg electrodes were removed.

All machine tools from the Fushun coal hydrogenation plant were removed.
From the Manchu iron works (Anshan) power house, one 25,000-kw Siemens
Halske turbogenerator and one 18,000-kw turbogenerator were removed, leaving
30,500 kw of capacity in place. From the plant's boiler house, four complete
boilers with equipment were removed plus equipment for two more boilers.
All rolling equipment was removed from the blooming mill. Ball mills and
motors were removed from the sponge iron plant. Magnetic separators were
removed from the iron ore treating plant; bearings on the roasting kiln were
removed; chargers, pushers, and valve mechanisms were taken from the coke
ovens; motors and trolleys from the blast furnace stockyard crane and skip
hoists, and blowers and auxiliaries for six of the nine blast furnaces were also
removed.

Practically all the machine tools and electrical equipment, seven cranes,
and all electric motors were removed from the Mitsubishi machine plant in
Mukden. In addition, all equipment (except one large press) and three overhead
cranes were removed from the forging shop; cranes, machinery, and a large
electric furnace were taken from the foundry. All equipment from the welding
shop and all equipment for manufacturing steel tubes were taken from the seamless
tube mill at the Mitsubishi plant.

Equipment removed from the coal hydrogenation research institute included
high-pressure compressors, machine tools, and the distillation apparatus. All

" For example, one report states: "Mukden, the largest city in Manchuria, has been left without
power for light, water, and other utilities, endangering the health and lives of its two million
Inhabitants." "Selected Photographs from Pauley Mission lo Manchuria: June 1946," Special
Collection in the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

World War 11 Reparations for the Soviet Union

machinery (except lens polishers and some grinders) was removed from the
optical instrument plant at Mukden.

Boilers and heavy rubber processing equipment were taken from the belt-
making building of the Manchu Rubber Company (Liaoyang), as were tire
manufacturing equipment, hydraulic presses, rubber mills and collandars as well
as bicycle tires, power and transmission belt manufacturing equipment, and
machines for the manufacture of shoes and raincoats.

All tire-making machinery was removed from the Toyo Rubber Tire Company
operation at Mukden, all cotton spinning equipment from the tire cord plant,
and four nitrators for picric acid removal together with four centrifuges from
Arsenal 383. 61

REPARATIONS FROM ITALY

Under the Soviet Treaty of Peace 62 with Italy it was agreed that reparations
amounting to $100 million were to be paid during a period of seven years.
The reparations were to include pan of Italy's "factory and tool equipment
designed for the manufacture of war material"; part of Italian assets in Rumania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary with certain exceptions; and part of Italian current produc-
tion together with one-third of the Italian naval fleet. 63

REPARATIONS AND REMOVALS FROM AUSTRIA

An estimated $400 million worth of capital equipment was removed by
the Soviets from the Soviet zone of Austria in 1945-46.

The Austrian oil industry was exclusively in the Soviet zone, as were many
finishing industries and most of the electrical industry. At Zistersdorf in Lower
Austria, Soviet occupation forces removed and shipped to Russia about $25
million worth of oil well supplies and equipment. The Alpine Monton company
in Styra, with steel plants at Donawitz and finishing plants at Kreiglach and
Kindberg, had much of its equipment removed by the Red Army— all together
75 trainloads, including a new blooming mill, two 25-ton electric furnaces,
one turbogenerator, and hundreds of machine tools.

There was extensive removal of equipment from the electrical equipment
industry, including the wire and cable industry where almost all production
facilities fell into Soviet hands. The two Vienna electrical plants. Simmering

61 Ibid. Photos for this report were taken by U.S. Signal Corps during the inspection of Japanese

industries by American industrial engineers.
« United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 49, no. 747 (1950), pp. 154 et seq.
" For details see Giuseppe Vedovato, It Troitaio di Pace con Matin (Rome: Ediziom Leonardo,

1947), pp. 127-30, 317-31 . 363, 561 .

38 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development . 1945-1965

and Engerthstrasse, were partially dismantled by the Soviets. The Goertz Optical
Works, the leading manufacturer of optical lenses, was seized and removed
in 1946.

In transportation industries the plant of Weiner Lokomotiv Fabrik, a manufac-
turer of locomotives, was dismantled and one thousand of the twelve hundred
machine tools in the plant were shipped to Russia. The largest of Austria's
motor vehicle producers, Steyr-Daimler-Pusch A.G., suffered extensive equip-
ment removals (however, the largest agricultural machinery producer, Hofherr-
Schrandz, was left intact and operated under Soviet control). Numerous plants
in the clothing, fertilizer, and chemical industries also had extensive equipment
removals to the Soviet Union.

In addition to the dismantling and removal, major deliveries of goods to
the Soviet Union were required by the treaty under which Austria regained
her independence. The value of such deliveries, largely industrial and transporta-
tion equipment, totaled $150 million in six years (plus ten million metric tons
of crude oil valued at about $200 million in ten years). 64

REPARATIONS AND REMOVALS FROM RUMANIA

Under the armistice signed September 12, 1944, Rumania agreed to provide
Russia with reparations valued at $300 million, in addition to acceding to Soviet
annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. The Soviets then proceeded
to remove the entire Rumanian Navy plus 700 ships, barges, and tugs comprising
the major part of the Rumanian merchant marine, about one-half the country's
rolling stock, all automobiles, and large quantities of equipment from the Ruma-
nian oil fields.

Particular emphasis was placed on removal of oil refineries and equipment
owned by American and British companies. In November 1944, the following
was reported to the U.S. Secretary of State:

The Russians have been working with all possible speed, even at night, to remove
oil equipment of Astra Romana, Stela Romana, and another oil company in
which both British and American companies are interested, This equipment is
being taken to Russia. 81

In addition, 23,000 tons of tubes and casing was removed from oil company
warehouses. The Soviets claimed that this material was actually the property
of German companies sent to Rumania during the war and therefore was not

a * The Rehabilitation of Austria, 1945 to 1947 (Vienna: U.S. Allied Commission for Austria,
[1948?]; F. Nemschak, Ten Years of Austrian Economic Development, I945-I95S, (Vienna:
Association of Austrian Industrialists, 1955), p. g.

" U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. IV (1944), p. 253 .

World War II Reparations for the Soviet Union 39

owned by the American and British companies. In any event, Andrei Vyshinsky .
then the Soviet assistant people's commissar for foreign affairs, suggested it
comprised only a small amount of the equipment required for rehabilitation,
and "the amount of equipment was so small il might be written off as a minor
Lend Lease shipment." 66

It was later reported that the Russians had occupied more than 700 factories
in Rumania, and that considerable amounts of industrial equipment and supplies
including oil drilling equipment, actually the property of British and American
oil companies, were being removed to Russia.* 7

Diplomatic protests by the United States led to the establishment in 1945
of a Joint U ,S .-Soviet Oil Commission to consider the problem. This commission
was dissolved in August 1947 without apparently arriving at any agreement.
It was then stated that the Soviets had removed 7000 tons of equipment at
the end of 1944 from Romana-Americana, a U.S. subsidiary of Standard Oil
of New Jersey. This equipment was valued at $ 1,000 ,000. 68

There is no question that there were stable Soviet equipment removals
from occupied areas after World War 11; a minimum value figure in excess
of $10 billion in 1938 prices can be set for equipment thus removed. The
unresolved question concerns the usefulness of such removals in the U.S.S.R.

The argument against usefulness, which also assumes irrationality on the
part of the Soviets, is built on no hard evidence except observations of rusting
equipment along rail lines from Germany to the U.S.S.R.

On the other hand, the fact that dismantling was spread over a number
of years suggests that there was a continuing demand for the equipment. We
can also trace delivery of important processes and equipment to the U.S.S.R.,
and the Berlin Ambi-Budd plant negotiated back to the West was found to
have been carefully numbered and guarded for a period of some years although
not used by the Soviets.

Furthermore, by the time the war ended the Soviets had extensive experience
in dismantling, and after the war they took pains to disguise their intentions
and actions. In Manchuria there is evidence that Chinese mobs were encouraged
to loot buildings after Soviet removals, and it is not unlikely that such decoy
actions were undertaken in Germany.

It is concluded, therefore, that the Soviets removed extensive industrial capac-
ity from a number of countries under a carefully planned program executed
with reasonable care. This capacity had the potential to make a significant
contribution to Soviet postwar industrial production, and this contribution will
be examined in more detail in Part II.

« 8 Ibid., p. 263.

97 Ibid., vol. V (1945), pp. 542, 629.

*" U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin. Augusi 3. 1947. p. 225.

CHAPTER THREE

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism

The prime means for transfer of Western technology to the Soviet Union has
been through normal channels of commerce. Since 1918 Russian foreign trade
has been a state monopoly, and this monopoly power has been utilized in a
superbly efficient manner to direct the most advanced of Western technological
achievement to the Soviet economy. Its monopolistic position, of course, allows
the Soviet state to play one foreign country against others and individual Western
firms against firms in all other countries in the acquiskion process.

Table 3- 1 , based on United Nations data, presents the percentage of machinery
and equipment (U.N. category SITC 7) contained in total Soviet trade with
major Western countries between 1953 and 1961. The rv-st significant observ-
able feature is the consistently large percentage that "»I TC 7 forms of total
Soviet imports. Although the high point (97.56 percent of 1959 Danish exports
to the U.S.S.R.) is today unusual, the percentage is usually in excess of 60
percent of Soviet imports from almost all major Western industrialized nations,
and percentages in excess of 70 percent are not unusual.

Figure 3-1 presents data for the single year 1959 in schematic form and
indicates at a glance the high proportion of machinery ar.d equipment from
all Western countries. Figure 4-2 illustrates the significant lack of Soviet capital
goods exported to the West; only Greece imported Soviet machinery and equip-
ment in 1959. The Soviet Union normally exports machinery and equipment
only to underdeveloped areas as part of barter deals; even foreign assistance
projects financed by the Soviets have a major foreign machinery component. 1

In the 1920s and 1930s over 90 percent of U.K. and German shipments
to the Soviet Union came within the SITC 7 category; since that period such
high percentages are less frequent, but they have remained sizable enough over
a period of almost 50 years to suggest the key relationship between trade and
Soviet industry. 2

1 See chapter 7 .

1 Even well informed commentators have taken positions directly opposed to this factual presenta-
tion. For example, Senator Jacob Javits of New York comments: "Trade with the West as
a general matter, must necessarily be a marginal factor in the performance and potentialities
of the Soviet economy." Congressional Record. Senate, vol. 1 12, pt. 9 (89th Congress, 2d
session), May 24, 1966, p. 11233.

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism

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The following selection of trade agreements made by the Soviets with Western
nations illustrates that Soviet exports consist almost entirely of raw materials:

Date and trade agreement

Soviet exports under the trade agreement

1953 Denmark trade agreement

1 956 Japan trade agreement

1 957 Denmark trade agreement

1959 United Kingdom Irade agreement

"Wheat, oil cake, soya beans, cotton,
timber, pig iron, asbestos, apatite concen-
trate."

(U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 125. no. 2292, p.
10)

"Lumber, coal, mineral ores, oil, metals,

fertilizer, asbestos and fibers."

(Japan Times [Tokyo], October 20, 1956)

"Grain, apatite concentrate, potash, pig
iron, coal, coke, petroleum products,
timber, cotton, chemicals, agricultural
equipment, 150 autos, 150 motorcycles."
(U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 271, no. 3912, p.

132)

"Grain, timber and timber products, wood
pulp, manganese ore, asbestos, ferro-
alloys, non-ferrous metals, minerals, fer-
tilizers, flax and other goods."
(U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 374, no. 5344, p.
305)

This pattern of Soviet foreign trade, a consistent pattern since about 1922, 3
may then be seen as essentially an exchange of raw materials for Western
technology.

More detailed examination of the impact pattern on a country-by-country
basis for the period after 1945 illustrates the manner in which the Soviet foreign
trade monopoly has been superbly used to induce a flow of modern technology
into the Soviet economy to fill numerous gaps and offset persistent shortfalls
in the planning process. Complementary to this process has been a propaganda
campaign, obviously very effective, to obscure the exchange pattern. This cam-
paign has succeeded to the extent of informing U.S , State Department statements
to Congress and the public. 4

UNITED KINGDOM AS A SUPPLIER OF
CAPITAL GOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION

The first postwar trade and payments agreement between the U.S.S.R. and

See chapter 21, Sultan I: Western Technology . . . 1917 so 1930; cf. Sutton, "Soviet Export
Strategy," in Ordttnce. November-December 1969. A complete list of Soviet trade agreements
at June ! , 1958, may be found i n Spmvochnik po vneslwei torgovle SSR (Moscow; Vneshtorgiz-
dat. 1958), pp. 91-92,

See, for example, testimony of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.S, House of Representa-
tives, Investigatioti and Study of ihc Administration. Operation . ^im^ Enforcement of the Export

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

the United Kingdom was signed at Moscow on December 27, 1947. 5 The
agreement included both short- and long-term arrangements. Under the short-term
arrangement the Soviet Union agreed to supply from its 1947 harvest 450,000

Table 3-2

UNITED KINGDOM DELIVERIES TO THE SOVIET UNION
UNDER THE 1947 TRADE AGREEMENT

Deliveries under Schedule I

Deliveries under Schedule II

Item

Number

Quantity

Description

Number

Quantity

Description

1100

Narrow gauge

£150,000

Scientific and

750-mm

value

laboratory

locomotives

apparatus

2400

Flat trucks,
750-mm

Pile drivers
mounted on
pontoons

2400

Winches (2 and
3 drums)

4 sets

Winding gear

210

Excavators

Electro dredger

Caterpillar
loading cranes

Ball mills
for copper
ore grinding

250

Auto timber
carriers

Ball milis
for grinding
apatite

Tugs

Rod mills for
grinding ores

Dredgers

Spiral type
classifiers

200

Locomobiles

Gyratory crushers

160

Mobile diesel
electric
generators, 50 kw

Railway steam
cranes

Steam power
turbine
stations, 500 kw

154-kv Voltage
transformers

£1,050,000

Plywood

Complete

value

equipment

distributing
sets

£400,000

Timber mill

Isolating

value

equipment

switches
(154 kv)

Oil purifying
apparatus

300

100-kw electric
motors

Source:

Great Britain, Soviet Union No 1 (1348) Command 7297, (London: HMSO, 1948).

Control Act of 1949, ami Related Acts. 87lh Congress, !st session. October mid December

1961, (Washington, 1962), and ibid., 2d session. Hearings, part. Ill, 1962.

Published as Great Britain, Soviet Union No. 1 094S), Command 7297 (London: HMSO,

1948).

45
Trade as a Transfer Mechanism

tons of barley, 200,000 tons of maize, and 100,000 metric tons of oats. In
return the United Kingdom agreed to ensure the supply of 25.000 long tons
of light rails with fishplates, nuts, and bolts, with an additional 10,000 tons
to be supplied from U.K. military surpluses.

The long-term arrangement was more extensive. It included U.K. delivery
of materials listed in Schedules 1 and II (Table 3-2) and supplies of wheat,
pulses, pit props, cellulose, and canned goods from the Soviet Union in exchange
for oil well tubes and tinplate from the United Kingdom.

Schedules I and II consist entirely of equipment and machinery. Two separate
categories may be isolated: (1) sizable quantities of such equipment as narrow-
gauge locomotives, flat trucks, winches, auto timber carriers, locomobiles, and
generators-yearly intended for production purposes; and (2) four pile drivers,
sets of winding gear, two gyratory crushers, and three railway steam cranes-ma-
terials in much smaller quantities for which it is unlikely the Soviets had produc-
tion uses in mind. The spare parts and maintenance problem for a few equipment
items is too great to make such purchases worthwhile; these items were probably
intended for examination and technical information on British manufacturing

methods. ,

Two major agreements were made with British companies a few years later,
in 1954 In January of that year, 20 trawlers valued at $16.8 million were
ordered from Brooke -Marine, Ltd. The specifications for these trawlers included
the most advanced features available in the West (see chapter 21). In May
1954 a $19.6 million agreement was made with Piatt Brothers for supplying
textile equipment (see chapter 15).

Another five-year trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union came into force on May 24, 1959.° Again, in exchange for raw
materials 7 the Soviet Union agreed to place orders with British firms:

for equipment for the manufacture of synthetic fibres, synthetic materials and
manufactures from them, and also other types of equipment for the chemical
industry; equipment for the pulp and paper industry; forging, stamping and casting
equipment; metalworking machine tools; equipment for the electro-technical and
cable industry; equipment and instruments for the automation of production proces-
ses' pumping, compression and refrigeration equipment; equipment for sugar beet
factories and other types of equipment for the food industry; equipment for the
building industry, light industry and other branches of industry as well as industrial
products and raw materials customarily bought from United Kingdom firms.

There was also a comparatively small exchange of consumer goods in the agree-
ment, to the value of $2 million.

« Uniied Nations. Trmty Scrio-, vol. 374, nos. 5323-5350 (1960). p. 306.

7 See page 43.

" Op. cit. n. 6, p. 308.

46 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The 1959 agreement was extended for another live years in 1964, und the
quotas for the ten years between 1959 and 1969 provided for a continuing
supply of United Kingdom technology to the U.S.S.R. This included machine
tools, earthmoving equipment, mechanical handling equipment, equipment for
the Soviet peat industry (there is no peat industry in the United Kingdom),
mining equipment, gas and arc welding equipment, chemical, refrigeration and
compressor equipment, and a wide range of scientific and optical instruments. 9

The use to which some of this equipment has been put may be gleaned
from a Soviet booklet published by NIIOMTP (Scientific Research Institute
for Organization, Mechanization, and Technical Assistance to the Construction
Industry) detailing the technical characteristics of British construction equip-
ment. 10

GERMANY AS A SUPPLIER OF CAPITAL
GOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION

The German-Soviet trade agreements of the 1950s comprised the exchange
of German equipment and machinery for Soviet raw materials, continuing the
prewar pattern. For example, the 1958 trade agreement called for West Germany
to export to the Soviet Union "mainly . .. capital goods, including equipment
for mining and the metallurgical industry, heavy and automatic machine tools
for metalworking industries, equipment for the chemical industry, whaling factory
ships.""

The German-Soviet trade agreement of December 31, 1960, affords a good
example of the general composition and implementation of German-Soviet trade;
this agreement provided for mutual trade from January 1 , 1 96 1 , through December
31, 1963, and the form in which it was to be carried out. Two lists, A and
B, were attached to the agreement providing commodity quotas for imports
into both Germany and the Soviet Union, and both governments agreed to
take "every measure" to enable fulfillment of these quotas. List A, comprising
German imports from the Soviet Union, consists entirely of foodstuffs (grain,
caviar, fish, oilcake, and vegetable oils), lumber products (sawed timber,
plywood, and cellulose), and mineral materials (coal, iron ore, manganese,
chrome, and particularly platinum and platinum group metals.). No products
of a technological nature are included among German imports from the Soviet
Union.

For a complete statement of the quotas and the agreement see Peter Zentner, East-West Trade:
A Practical Guide to Selling in Eastern Europe (London: Max Parrish, 1967), pp. 152-57.
V. M. Kazarinov and S.N. Lamunin, Zarubezhnye mashiny ilia mekhanizatsii stroitel'nykh
robot. (Moscow; Niiomtp, 1959).
East-West Commerce (London), May 7, 1958, p. 1 1 .

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism 4 ~

List B, comprising commodity quotas for imports from West Germany into
the U.S.S.R. for the years 1961 to 1963, consists almost entirely of goods
of a technical nature . Table 3-3 lists the machinery and equipment items included

Table 3-3 COMMODITY QUOTAS FOR IMPORTS FROM WEST

GERMANY TO THE U.S.S.R. UNDER THE TRADE
AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 31, 1960

Commodity Value (In DM)

Machine tools for metal cutting (turning lathes, grinding machines, 31 ,000,000

gear cutting machines, jig-boring machines, vertical lapping

machines, machines for the processing of piston rings, component

parts for passenger cars and tractors)
Machines (or noncutting shaping (mechanical and automatic presses 10,000,000

for the metal powder industry, embossing machines, hydraulic

stamping presses, vacuum presses, forging manipulators, casting

machines)
Power equ ipment and apparatus for the electrical engineering indus- 1 0,000,000

try (water eddy brakes, furnaces, diesel power stations, silicon

rectifiers for electric locomotives, electric dynamometers)
Coal mining equipment, equipment for metallurgical and petroleum 1 10,000,000

industries (coal preparation plants, equ ipment for open-pit mining,

agglomeration plants, rolling mills for cold rolling of tubes, rapid-
working cable percussion drilling plants, loading machines)
Equipment for the food industry, including three complete sugar 126,000,000

factories
Refrigeration plants 52,000,000

Equipment for light industries 5,000,000

Equipment for the chemical industry, 1 1 complete

Complete plant for production of polypropylene plants

Crystallization of sodium sulfate (four plants)

Hydraulic refining of benzene (one plant)

Production of di-isozyanatene (one plant)

Production of phosphorus (one plant)

Production of simazine and atrazine (one plant)

Manufacture of foils from viniplast (two plants)
Equ ipment for the cellulose and paper industry (vacuu m evaporating 26 ,000 ,000

plants, supercalenders)
Equipment for the buildi ng materials i ndustry (veneer plants lUeber - 21 ,000 ,000

furnieranlagen] for pressed. boards made of wood fiber,

assembling machines, equipment for the production of mineral

wood)
Pumping and compressor plants (pumps and compressors of various 63,000,000

kinds, glassblowing machines, ventilators)
Equ ipment for the polygraphs industry 1 0,000,000

Equipment for the cable industry 1 5,000,000

Fittings and component parts for high-pressure pipelines 44,000,000

Main track electric locomotives ~0

Shins 157,000,000

Miscellaneous apparatus, including precision instruments and opti- 16,000,000

cal apparatus
Miscellaneous equipment, including special-type automobiles 21 ,000,000

Source: U.S. Senate, east-West Trade, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 88th Congress, 2d Session, March 13, 16, 23 and April 8, 9, 1964, p. 110.

48 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

in List B; these items, totaling 717 million DM, comprise machine tools and
advanced equipment for the mechanical, mining, chemical, paper, building mater-
ial, and electrical industries. The list also includes eleven complete plants for
the chemical industry not included in the total of DM 717 million. The remaining
DM 600 million of the agreement comprises specialized iron and steel pro-
ducts — rolled stock and tubes, for precisely those areas in which the Soviet
Union is backward.

Thus the 1960 German-Soviet agreement is an excellent example of the
nature of Soviet trade with industrialized countries. The Soviet Union imports
from Germany goods with a technological component or of unusually difficult
technical specification, and in return provides raw materials produced with equip-
ment formerly imported from Germany and other Western countries.

ITALY AS A SUPPLIER OF CAPITAL GOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION

Italy has been a major supplier of industrial equipment to the Soviet Union
since the 1920s. The 1953 Italian-Soviet agreement, for example, required the
export of Italian machinery for manufacture of steel plate, textiles, foodstuffs,
electrical cables, and fibers. Also under this agreement Italy contracted to supply
cargo ships, refrigerated motor ships, tugs, cranes, and equipment for thermal
electric stations. 12

The Italian-Soviet trade agreement for 1958 required a far greater quantity
of Italian industrial equipment, including equipment for complete production
lines and plants. A partial list of the equipment supplied by Italian firms is
as follows: 13

530 interior and centerless grinders

25 horizontal boring machines with mandrels of 75-310 mm
44 repetition turret lathes

20 automatic thread -cutting machines of the "Cridan" type

43 vertical milling machines with table measuring 500 by 2500 mm

75 die-casting machines

26 crawler-mounted diesel electric cranes with grab buckets having a
capacity of 25 to 50 tons

Cranes and excavators (470 million lire)

Two water turbines of 10,000 kw

Pressure pipe for hydroelectric power stations (610 million lire)

Three throttle valves for hydroelectric power stations

Three hydraulic brakes

Spares for thermoelectric power stations (625 million lire)

" The Times (London), October 28, 1933.

13 East-West Commerce, V, 4 (April 8, 1958), 9.

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism 4"

One plant equipment for manufacture of sugar from molasses

10 production lines, complete, for tomato puree

Two production lines for tin boxes with tongue and key

Machinery for light industry (5500 million lire)

One cement manufacturing plant, complete with ovens

One plant for manufacture of reinforced concrete poles for electric trans-

mission lines and lighting purposes.

One machinery plant for manufacture of asbestos cement tubes

Spare parts for ships (235 million lire)

High-frequency tools (780 million lire)

Miscellaneous machines (4700 million lire)

SCANDINAVIA AS A SUPPLIER OF CAPITAL
GOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION

Finland has been a major supplier of equipment to the Soviet Union since
1945. For example, no less than 95 percent of all ships manufactured in Finland
since World War II have been on Soviet account.

Major deliveries under the Finnish reparations agreements 11 were continued
throughout the 1950s and 1960s by annual trade agreements. In exchange for
Soviet raw materials, Finland was committed to supply not only ships but power
plant equipment (including 25 boilers annually from 1956 to 1960), woodworking
and paper-making equipment including complete plants for manufacture of paper
and cardboard, plants for manufacture of cellulose, sawmills, veneer-making
plants, frame saws, and wood planers. Hoisting equipment, including large
bridge cranes, railway cranes, and freight elevators, comprise a significant portion
of Finnish supplies. 15

Sweden has been an important supplier of equipment for the Soviet chemical,
food, and building industries under annual trade agreements since 1946. For
example, the 1950 trade agreement between Sweden and the Soviet Union called
for Swedish delivery of the following equipment 16 :

Equipment for building industry and manufacture of building materials

(Sw. Kr. 23,500,000)

Equipment for food industries (Sw. Kr. 9,000,000)

Equipment for chemical industry (Sw. Kr. 12,000,000)

Power and electrotechnical equipment (Sw. Kr. 6,500,000)

One unit of mine elevator gear

" See chapter 2.

,s United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 240, no. 3403 (1956). pp. 198-204.

" East-West Commerce, V, 4 (April 8, 1958), 6.

50 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Four units of excavating machinery and spare parts for deep drilling

machinery (Sw. Kr. 1.300,000)

Spare parts for ships (Sw. Kr. 1,300,000)

Miscellaneous machinery and equipment (Sw. Kr. 3,250,000)

Denmark has also been a major supplier of equipment, particularly of diesel
engines and cargo ships. The 1959 Danish-Soviet Trade Agreement included
the following items of equipment:"

Cargo ships of 11,500 tons d.w. carrying capacity and with a minimum

speed of 17.5 knots

Refrigerator ships of 1500 tons d.w.t.

Ship's equipment and spare parts (3,500,000 D. Kr.)

Components and parts for ships' diesel motors (6,000,000 D. Kr.>

Machinery for chemical industry and equipment (26,000,000 D. Kr.)

Machinery and equipment for food industry (17,000,000 D. Kr.)

Machinery and equipment for manufacture of cement and other building

materials (3,500,000 D. Kr.)

Various machinery and equipment (3,500,000 D. Kr.)

Instruments and electronic apparatus (7,000.000 D. Kr.)

JAPAN AS A SUPPLIER OF CAP1TALGOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION

During the decade of the fifties, Japan, unlike the Soviet Union, developed
a first-rate capability to build and export complete plants using in a few cases
an indigenous Japanese technology (as in the case of Kanekalon) or more often
an adapted or licensed foreign technology. Although Japan at first lacked experi-
ence in certain areas (e.g., the ability to guarantee complete performance for
a plant in contrast to performance of individual items of equipment), this ability
was gained during the 1960s.

Thus the late 1 950s saw the beginning of a considerable export of advanced
Japanese equipment to the Soviet Union. The first postwar trade and payments
agreement between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed concurrently with
the joint declaration ending the state of war between the two countries on October
19, 1956. 18

The trade agreement provided for most-favored national treatment and
included a list of products to be exported by each country. Soviet exports were,
typically, raw materials, with a small quantity ($1 million) of metal cutting

,T Ibid., VI, 9 (September 28, 1959). 6.
" Japan Times (Tokyo), October 20, 1956.

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism 5 ]

equipment. On the other hand, Japanese exports to the Soviet Union were
almost completely in the form of machinery or equipment, with significant
proportions of specialized metal products. Marine equipment included two herring
packing ships, two tuna fishing boats, and two floating cranes, in addition
to marine diesels presumably for installation in Soviet vessels; also provided
were ten sets of canning facilities for crab-packing ships and ten for salmon
and trout. Moreover, provision was made for Soviet ship repairs in Japanese
yards. Other transportation equipment included 25 locomotives (diesel, electric,
and steam) with 25 passenger and freight cars in addition to 100,000 kw of
mercury rectifiers for Soviet electric locomotives.

Other general machinery included mobile cranes and textile machinery, com-
munications equipment, and various machine tools. Specialized metals included
rolled steel products, tin plates, steel wire, and uncoated copper wire and cable.
Various medical supplies and fiber yarns made up the balance.

A subsequent Japanese-Soviet trade agreement (1959) further demonstrated
the continuing Soviet interest in Japanese capital goods — for example, in paper
mills, cold storage plants, chemical plants, and related areas. About 60 percent
of the later agreement comprised export of Japanese plants and equipment in
exchange for Soviet raw materials.

Japanese exports may be described, then, as falling into two categories:
advanced machinery, particularly transportation equipment; and specialized
materials related to sectors where the Soviet Union has a very limited and
antiquated capacity, Some exports, such as mercury rectifiers for electric loco-
motives and marine diesels. reflect sectors in which the Soviets have known
weaknesses.'*

EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS SUPPLIERS OF
CAPITAL GOODS TO THE SOVIET UNION

The communist countries of Eastern Europe have been consistent and major
suppliers of machinery and equipment to the Soviet Union since 1945. After
extensive dismantling in 1945-46, the SAGs and similar joint stock companies
were used to ensure a continuity of equipment to the Soviet Union. In the
1950s supply was placed under annual trade agreements.

In 1 953 East Germany signed a trade agreement that had as its chief component
the provision to the Soviet Union of electrical equipment, chemicals, machinery
for the manufacture of building materials, and mining equipment. 20 The 1957
East German trade agreement with the Soviet Union called for the supply of

See below, p. 22! , A good description of the I960 exports is in The Oriental Economist.
{Tokyo), October 1960. pp. 552-57.
20 The Times (London). April 29, 1953.

52 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

rolling mill equipment, hoisting equipment, forges, presses, raw stock, and
a large quantity of seagoing vessels and river craft. 21

Under the agreements for 1960-65 supply, signed on November 21, 1959,
East Germany was required to supply the Soviet Union with engineering products,
refrigerated vans and trains , main line passenger coaches, passenger ships , fishing
vessels, a number of complete cement plants, equipment for the chemical industry,
machine tools, and forge and pressing equipment. **

Poland under its trade agreements with the Soviet Union has been a major
supplier of machine tools and equipment, rolling stock, and oceangoing
ships. " Czechoslovakia has probably been the most important East European
communist supplier of equipment. The Skoda Works in Pilsen has been a promi-
nent supplier of machine tools and diesel engines for marine and locomotive
use. Other Czechoslovak plants have sent electric locomotives, power plants,
and general industrial equipment.' 4

During negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia in the summer
of 1947 the Soviets agreed to grant Yugoslavia $135 million in capital goods,
including iron and steel plants, coking ovens, refineries, a zinc electrolysis
plant, a sulfuric acid plant, copper and aluminum rolling mills, and molybdenum
processing installation." The resulting agreement (July 1947), which specified
in great detail the equipment to be provided by the U.S.S.R. to Yugoslavia,
included equipment of obvious Western origin, such as Dwight-Lloyd belts, Blake
and Symons crushers. Dorr concentrators, Dorko pumps, Abraham filter presses,
Sirocco ventilators, Sweetland filter presses, Dix hammer crushers, MacCully
crushers. Junkers saws and Geller saws. 26 This was in addition to unnamed
equipment for which, from material presented elsewhere, we know that the
Soviets utilized a Western design — i.e., drill rigs, sulfuric acid and plant equip-
ment, furnaces, rolling mills, and so on. However, concerning this 1947 agree-
ment Vladimir Dedijer, a former member of the Yugoslav party central commit-
tee, comments: "The agreement was a mere ruse, for the Soviet Union had

no intention of honoring it Of the 135 million dollars promised, the Soviet

Union sent us installations valued at only $800,000. ""

Since the 1950s Yugoslavia has been a supplier of advance equipment to
the U.S.S.R., including numerous large and fast cargo ships and scarce copper
sections.

East-West Commerce, IV, 3 (March 12, 1957), 12.

Ibid., VI. 12 (December 8, 1959), 11-12.

Ibid., V, S (May 7. 1958), 7.

Ibid., V, 1 (January 3, 1958), 9.

V. Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon & Schusrer, 1953), p. 288.

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 130, no. 1732 (1952), pp. 374 et seq.

Dedijer, op. cit. n. 25, pp. 288-89.

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism 53

WESTERN RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Attempts by Western countries to restrict export of goods with a strategic
value to the Soviet Union have taken two main legislative forms. One is exem-
plified in the U.S. Export Control Act of 1949 and similar national acts in
allied countries, and the other in the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act
of 1951 (known as the Battle Act) in the United States.

The Battle Act represents an attempt to prevent export of strategic items
with capability of strengthening the military power of the Soviet Union from
Western countries to the Soviet Union. At the time the act was introduced,
at the end of the 1940s, the Free World had legislative control over export
of strategic materials. The Battle Act provides for United States participation
in the coordination of these national controls through an informal international
committee, meeting in Paris and known as CoCom (Coordinating Committee).
Essentially, the act reinforces the system of international controls in effect prior
to its enactment and provides a link with U.S. strategic trade controls under
the Export Control Act of 1949.

The Battle Act forbids U.S. aid to any country that knowingly permits
shipment of strategic items to the Soviet bloc when such items are listed for
embargo by the administrator of the act, i.e., by the State Department. The
CoCom embargo lists are not made public, but the United Kingdom has published
from time to time an embargo list as it relates to British exports to the Soviet
bloc. This list gives an idea of the erosion that has taken place in restrictions
since 1950. For example, on August 15, 1958, it was announced in the United
Kingdom that certain goods had been freed from CoCom embargo control:

All electrical generating machinery (other than mobile generators of more than
5 mw); all electrical motors (except those specially designed for submarines);
ail turbines; spectrographs, spectrometers (other than mass spectrographs and mass
spectrometers); X-ray diffraction and electron diffraction equipment; electron mic-
roscopes; radio valve making machinery (except certain advanced types and those
designed specially for making embargoed types of valves); civilian vehicles and
aircraft; compressors and blowers; many types of machine tools; and ships (with
certain restrictions on speed). 29

The U.S. State Department for its part has never requested the President
to apply sanctions under Section 103(B) of the Battle Act, and scores of violations
have been made by Western countries without imposition of the sanctions required
by law. In fact, inasmuch as the Battle Act has been violated from its inception,
it has never provided an effective restraint to the export of strategic goods

26 Electrical Review (London), August 22, 1958, p. 342.

54 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

from the West to the Soviet Union. 2 " It is arguable that the measure is simply
a badly conceived instrument, that it is for various reasons unenforceable. But
certainly lax administrative action and gross administrative ignorance concerning
Soviet technical capabilities and the use of Western processes and technologies
have been major contributory causes to its failure and to the decline of coordinated
export control.

The Export Control Act of 1949 as extended and amended to 1969 (when
it was replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1969), provides for restric-
tions on materials whose export may have an adverse effect on the national
security of the United States. Section 3(a) provides th-; oiles and regulations
shall be established for denial of exports, including technical data, to any nation
"threatening the national security of the United States" if the President deter-
mines that such export "makes a significant contribuLon to the military or
economic potential of such nation,'* 30

This power is administered by the Department of Commerce for most exports,
by the Department of State for munitions, and by the Atomic Energy Commission
for nuclear materials,

EFFECT OF WESTERN EXPORT CONTROL RES TRICTiONS

The general assessment appears to be that Western export controls have
not been effective. 31

An excellent example of their ineffectiveness may be found in the supply
of transportation equipment to the Soviet Union and iis subsequent use against
the United States and its Asian allies in the Vietnamese war. Whereas the
Battle Act of 1951 and the more restrictive Export Control Act of 1949 include
an embargo on "transportation materials of strategic value," an analysis of
merchant vessels utilized by the Soviet Union to carry armaments to South
Vietnam" and leased by Poland to Red China for similar purposes indicates
that such ships and technology were acquired after the passage of the two export
control acts.

Of 96 ships known to have been used by the Soviets on the Haiphong
run, 12 have not been identified since construction is too recent for listing
in ship registers. Of 84 ships positively identified, only 15 were even partly
built in Soviet yards, and one of these was a small tug on a one-way trip

» For further material. s « Battle Act reports to Congress and Gunnar Adler-Karisson. West™
Economic Warfart. 1947-67 (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell 1968)

US House of Representatives, op. ell. n. 4, 1st session. October and December 1961 , Section
J(a),

31 Adler-Karlsson, op. cil. a. 29, pp. 83-139.

" WelT^T™*!?* P 010 ' 8 ". 00 ' ""!! lhe Soviet ««*!» <»ny the armaments while leased
western vessels carry the economic supplies.

Trade as a Transfer Mechanism

to Haiphong. The other 69, all tankers and cargo ships, were built outside
the U.S.S.R.

Of these 69 ships, only 13 were built before the Battle Act embargo of
195 1 — in other words 56 were built after the embargo and outside of the U.S.S.R.
Six of the 13 built before 1951 are Lend Lease ships.

The most important component of a ship is its propulsion unit, i.e., its
main engine. None of the 84 identified ships on the Haiphong run has a main
engine designed and manufactured in the Soviet Union. (There is one possible
exception, where complete positive identification of a Sulzer steam turbine has
not been made.)

Small marine diesel engines (2000 hp and less) are made at the prerevolution-
ary Russky Diesel works in Leningrad, under a 1956 technical-assistance agree-
ment with the Skoda firm of Prague, Czechoslovakia. Larger and of course
more important marine diesel engines, up to 9000 bhp (the largest made in
the U.S.S.R.), are of Burmeister and Wain (Copenhagen) design. Although
Denmark is a member of NATO and presumably supports the NATO objective
of an embargo on war materials to the Soviet Union, the Burmeister and Wain
firm was allowed (in 1959) to make a technical-assistance agreement for manufac-
ture of the B & W series of marine diesel engines at the Bryansk plant in
the U.S.S.R. These diesels are massive units, each 60 feet long by 35 feet
high and almost 1000 tons in weight, with obvious strategic value,

Under such circumstances it may be asserted that attempts to control export
of strategic goods have not been successful. Indeed there has been a massive
and identifiable flow of military equipment to the Soviet Union from Western
countries through the CoCom control net. As each member of CoCom has
a veto over any shipment, it appears that the information utilized by the State
Department and comparable Allied government offices is grossly inadequate
and inaccurate. 33

This argument is expanded in chapter 27,

CHAPTER FOUR

Technical Assistance
and Foreign Prototypes

Formal technical-assistance agreements with the Soviet Union are far less pub-
licized today than they were in the early 1930s and therefore little public informa-
tion is forthcoming. This information scarcity is compounded by the refusal
of the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce to release precise information
concerning U.S. assistance to the U.S.S.R. It is estimated, however, that since
the 1930s the Soviets have had about 100 technical-assistance agreements in
force with Western companies at any given time. This assertion applied as
recently as late 1968, and it is unlikely the situation has changed since then
or will change in the foreseeable future.'

Quite apart from formally contracted technical assistance there is a transfer
of assistance through the medium of equipment sales and installations. Sometimes
provision for such assistance is included in a formal agreement to supply an
installation. For example, the 1968 agreement whereby Olivetti of Italy (a sub-
sidiary of General Electric) undertook to build a $90 million plant at Oryol,
south of Moscow, for manufacture of automation equipment and office machines
was an outgrowth of a technical-assistance agreement in 1965. 2 Another such
agreement — one of many that could be cited — was that between the Soviets
and Fisher-Bendix of the United Kingdom in 1967, under which the British
firm agreed to provide technical documentation and know-how to produce the
Bendix automatic commercial washer in the Soviet Union. 3

However, in the final analysis, any sizable sale of plant or equipment entails
technical assistance. Such a sale usually includes not only equipment but also
assistance for preparation of the specification, installation, training, and start-up.
This was the case in the misnamed "Fiat deal" in which the supply of U.S.
equipment was supplemented by Italian technical assistance including the printing
of training manuals (in Russian) for Russian operatives in Italian printing plants.
Quite clearly, then, technical assistance need not be formalized into an agreement;

' Business Weft. October 5, 196ft. p. 124. According lo this source, in 1968, "100-odd ...

Western companies ... have technical accords with the Soviets "
2 Ibid.
* Easi-Wesi Trade News (London), III, 7 (April 15, 1967).

Technical Assistance and Foreign Prototypes 57

ii is more realistically viewed as part of any sale of technology, regardless
of whether or not it is the stated subject of a written agreement.

Apart from formal technical assistance, there is the allied consideration of
Soviet imports of single items of equipment for use as prototypes. There is
no question that the Soviet Union draws an almost unbelievably large quantity
of such prototypes from the West, primarily from the United States and Germany.
It might not be rash to assert that the Soviet Union attempts to purchase one
of every major industrial product manufactured in the West for analysis and
possible reproduction. Examples extracted more or less at random from Soviet
imports from the United States in 1960 and 1970 illustrate the magnitude of
this flow of single items. In the third quarter of I960" 1 the Soviet Union imported
the following items from the United States (almost all single items):

Value

Industrial power sweeper $ 2,001

Gas turbine engine 17,830

Centrifugal separator 19,850

Ultracentrifuge 15,645

Analytical balance 1 .993

Air compressor 83

Centrifugal pump 1 ,700

Fluid stream analyzers 28,500

Hard gelatin capsule machine 309,631

Hydraulic presses 27,273

Industrial sewing machine 1,508

Mixing and blending machines 4,538

Percussion type drill 95,000

Plastics molding press 12,490

Vertical turret lathe 95,970

Tracklaying tractor (and blade) 15,000

Beet harvester and topper 8,055

Haying machine 4,970

Police molorcycle (with accessories) 1,944

Potato planters 6,093

Airplane tug and engine starter 66,450

Klischograph 8,950

Wattmeters 596

These small-lot imports are almost certainly for design purposes. Indeed, there
never has been export of more than one or two items to the U .S.S.R. of agricultural
equipment of the types listed (beet harvesters, haying machines, potato planters,
and tractors) since the early 1930s (with the exception of Lend Lease items
charged to the U.S. Treasury). Single imports of such equipment, when continued

4 U.S. Dcpi. of Commerce, Expon Comrol, Fifty-third Quarterly Report (Third Quarter I960).
p. 10.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic development, 1945-1965

over a lengthy period and not followed by substantial orders, are clearly for
prototype use.

Ten years later we find a similar pattern of Soviet imports. In the second
quarter of 1969 the U.S.S.R. imported from the United States the following
items: 5

Value

Airborne navigation equipment $ 18,116

Electronic computer 1 69,334

Spectrophotometer 1 69.334

Diesel engines 13,495

Atmospheric furnace system 92,944

Water filtration system 54,128

Sweep generator 16,358

Industrial weighing scales 15,752

Radiation detection and measuring instruments 203,410

Automatic typewriter 6, BOO

Power sweeper 6,283

That this process of single-item import has extended over a considerable
period of time is determined by examination of the statistics of Soviet foreign
trade . Soviet Trade Group 1 45 is " Excavators and road constructi on eq uipment " ;
imports in this group from the United States have been as follows: 6

Value in
rubles

Estimated
number ol units

1949-56

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961-65

1966

None
80,000
122,000
46,000
57,000
None
55,000

None

2
None

The tabulation shows that import of small batches or single units is followed
by a gap with no imports and then small-batch imports are resumed.

The manner in which such single items are analyzed in the Soviet Union
may be inferred from Soviet technical manuals. Such books fall into two basic
categories: (I) those that describe in a detailed, comparative manner individual
items of foreign equipment, and (2) those that describe the single item that

U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Export Control, Eighty-eighth Quarterly Report (Second Quarter
1969), p. 12.

Values taken from Vneshniaia torgovliaia SSSR; Siaiisrichtslcil sbornik. 1918-1966 (Moscow.
1967), pp. 146-47; units calculated at approximately 25,000 to 45,000 rubles per unit.

Technical Assistance and Foreign Prototypes 59

has been chosen as the Soviet standard, i.e., for duplication on a large scale.
Selected data from several such Soviet publications will make the argument
clear.

Soviet technical literature has always contained a sizable number of books
— usually paperbacks issued in editions of between 2000 and 10,000
copies — making comparative studies of foreign machines. The Soviet Academy
of Construction and Architecture, for example, issued in 1959 a 62-page paper-
back entitled Zarubezhnye mashiny dlia mekhanizatsii stroitel'nykh robot, con-
sisting of a detailed examination of foreign mechanical equipment used in the
construction industry. On pages 19-20 a detailed table provides comparative
figures on capacity, load, type, and model of engine, speed (converted to kilome-
ters per hour), number of speeds, and total weight in kilograms for 38 foreign
models of mechanical dump cars. These models include Aveling-Barford (U.K.);
Road Machines (U.K.); Benoto (France); Bates (U.K.); Dart (U.S.A.); Koering
(U.S.A.); Orenstein Koppel (West Germany) . In other words the Soviets acquired
one of virtually every foreign dump car and made a detailed comparative study
of characteristics. The booklet is complete with photographs and diagrammatic
blowups of the mechanical features. Several of the more interesting Western
models are examined in more detail by comparing such features as chassis
construction, brakes, and engine characteristics. Finally technicoeconomic effi-
ciency factors are calculated. It might be argued that such comparative studies
may be a prelude to Soviet purchase, except that this type of equipment has
not been imported in quantities larger than small batches of one to six since
the 1930s and (as will be indicated later) Soviet equipment is based with only
minor exceptions on such Western models.

A similar hard-cover publication (3400 copies) was a book issued in 1968,
authored by N. N. Kalmykov and entitled Burovaia tekhnika i tekhnologiia
za rubezhom. Pages 20 to 27 contain numerous photographs of United States
tri-cone drilling bits — supposedly denied export from the United States to the
U.S.S.R. under export control laws. Figure 7 illustrates the Globe Type S-3;
Figure 8 the Globe Type SS-2; Figure 9 the Hughes Type OWV; Figure 10
the Smith Type SV-2; Figure 1 1 the Globe Type MHY-3; Figure 12 two views
of the Type EM and two views of the Type EM-IC manufactured by Chicago-
Pneumatic; Figure 13 the Reed Type YS and Type YM; Figure 14 the Security
Type M4N; Figure 15 the Globe Type M-3; Figure 16 the Chicago Pneumatic
Type ER-1; Figure 17 the Chicago Pneumatic Type ER-2; Figure 18 Security
Types S4 and S-4T; Figure 19 the Reed Type YR; and so on. 7

The rest of the volume is a detailed discussion of American oil well drilling
equipment. Some of the diagrams suggest that copying of the equipment is
the objective: for example, the diagram on page 199 compares tooth profiles

' The model letters were not transliterated from the original English to the Russian; therefore,
they have not been transliterated into English but are given as in the Russian text.

Western Technology and Soviel Economic Development, 1945-1965

on various tubes. In brief, the book is a clear comparative exposition of the
technical features of U.S. oil well drilling equipment.

In the field of U.S. coal mining practice and equipment, a recent Soviet
book is R. Yu. Poderni, Ugol'niia promyshlennost' SShA (Moscow, 1968;
2600 copies). This book contains comparative performance and technical data
on U.S. equipment that would be difficult to find even in the United States.
For example, pages 132-33 detail operating characteristics of all Bucyrus-Erie
and Marion excavators currently in production; page 146 has comparative data
on the seven walking draglines produced by the Marion Company, and is followed
by details on the method used by the firm to calculate excavator productivity.
If the book were to be translated into English it would provide a useful little
manual for excavator and dragline operators in the United States. A similar
book on mining practice also was published in 1968, entitled Rekonstruktsiia.
mekhanizatsiia i avtomatizatsiia shakhl za rubezhom, by K. K. Kuznetsov and
others (Moscow , 1 968 ; 2700 copies) .This book pro v ides i nformati on on de velop-
ment and mechanization of foreign mine shafts. The bibliography suggests the
scope of Soviet acquisitions; it includes company catalogs and literature (that
of the Hibernia and Westphalia firms) and company journals. Soviet interest
is reflected in the issue of foreign developments in the field as "Express Informa-
tion."

The refinement of technical details given in this type of book is suggested
by the following translation of Table 1 in a publication entitled Analiz rabot
po avtomatizatsii pitaniia utkom tkatskikh stankov za rubezhom by Yu. P. Sidorov
(Moscow, 1968; p. 10). The table compares operating characteristics of foreign-
made stitching machines:

Operating Angles of Automatics

Start

Ught
(no had)

Transfer

Full

Model of machine

stitching

to new

Shift

operating

and Sim

operations
311

stitching

bobbin

spools

angle

Northrop, England

Ruti, Switzerland

325

Draper, U.S.A.

312

Sohengo, West Germany

306

Saurer, Switzerland

320

In the electronic sector, one type of publication includes operating characteris-
tics of foreign equipment, no doubt as a guide to purchases by Soviet organiza-
tions. For example, a booklet issued in 1968 includes details on over 2000
American, Japanese, East German, and West German transistors — Zarubezhnye
transistory shirokogo primeneniia, by V. F. Leont'ev. Another type of publica-
tion includes data on utilization of equipment in the West and obviously provides

Technical Assistance and Foreign Prototypes 61

more than mere information on available equipment. For example, G. G. Sit-
nikov's Transzistornye televisory SShA i laponii (Moscow, 1968) is a selection
of articles either translated from American and Japanese sources, or detailing
circuits reproduced from such sources; pages 68-70 are entitled "TV 120771
firmy EMERSON (SShA)."

These precise examinations of foreign abilities are by no means limited
to technology in the narrow sense. They also include analyses of Western manage-
ment systems. For example, one booklet of 143 pages (9000 copies printed)
describes the operations of Olivetti-General Electric plants in Italy — N. A.
Salomatin's Organizatsiia i mekhanizatsiia upravleniia proizvodstvom na pred-
priialiiakh italii (Moscow, 1969). It provides information on the Italian plants
of Olivetti-General Electric that would be difficult to find in a well-stocked
Western business library. After a brief introduction (without the usual Marxist-
Leninist prefixes), it discusses organization of production in each of the G.E.
plants (with photographs), including reproduction of documents used, types
and numbers of business machines, organization charts, work programs, and
a small section on the use of the PERT management system.

An examination of plastics used in buildings, but compiled without benefit
of the courtesy extended by Olivetti-General Electric at the plant level, is
entitled Polimernye stroilel'nye materitily (Moscow, 1968). This 102-page book-
let (7000 copies issued) details Western uses of plastics in building, and includes
three rather bad color photographs and a discussion of products by trade name
and physical properties.

With the help of such fairly common publications it is possible to trace
import of foreign equipment in small batches, and its subsequent use first as
prototype then as duplication of the prototype for series production of a "Soviet"
machine or piece of equipment.

The Soviet production of electric locomotives provides an excellent example
of this evolution. Small batches of electric locomotives were imported from
the West in early 1930s — first General Electric and Brown-Boveri, followed
in the 1950s by Skoda, Japanese mercury rectifiers, and Schneider-Alsthom
locomotives from France. More recently these imports have been supplemented
by batches of Krupp silicon rectifier electric locomotives and another group
of Czech locomotives. Figure 4-1 illustrates the process by which these batches
of imported prototype locomotives have been converted into Soviet classes of
electric locomotives.

It is unlikely that export of technical data, a normal accompaniment to
sales, by itself provides information for "copying." The Export Control Act
of 1949 provides specific authority for controlling export of data for national
security reasons, and in 1951 stringent controls were put on data for Soviet
bloc destinations; since then validated export licenses have been required for
shipment of data not generally available in published form. General license

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

Figure 4-1

FOREIGN ORIGINS OF SOVIET ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES

Sower utilization:

Number

Russian

As proto-

Date

Foreign locomotive type imported

imported

class

type lor

Date

1930

1932

"S" Cless

1932

General-Electric (U.S.A.)

Brown-Boveri (Italy)

Si \

1934

VL-19

1934

1936

1938

VL-22

1938

1940

VL-22
(340 kw)

1940

1942

1944

(VI- 1-1 08) U.S. Lend Lease

1944

1946

VL-22m

1946

1948

(400 kw)

1948

1950

1952

VL-8 (N-8)

1952

1954

Skoda (Czechoslovakia) mercury ■—

rectifiers

silicon rectifiers
Japanese (mercury rectifiers only)

"NO" Class

N-60
N-62
N-60 electric

1954

mechanical

equipment— i

- VL-23

1956

Skoda (Czechoslovakia) mercury

chSI

1956

1958

Schneider-Alsthom (France)

F(T)

1958

1960

Schneider-Alsthom (France)

FP (TP)

1960

Krupp (Germany) silicon rectifier

1962

Skoda (Czechoslovakia)

ChS2

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

Legend: —+~ Prototype development

» Production

Sources: Association of American Railroads, A Report on Diesel Locomotive Design
and Maintenance on Soviet Railways (Chicago: AAR Research Center, 1966); and Associa-
tion of American Railroads, Railroads of the U.S.S.R. (Washington, D.C., n.d).

Technical Assistance and Foreign Prototypes 63

GTDP permits export of data generally available in stores or by subscriptions,
or of unpublished data "not directly and significantly related to design, produc-
tion, and utilization in industrial processes' ' and available in academic institutions
and laboratories.

It is also unlikely that firms would freely ship data to the U.S.S.R. given
the Soviets' long history of retaining such material or making unauthorized
use of it. Moreover since June 1959 all U.S. exporters of certain specified
types of unpublished chemical data and services relating to petroleum and pe-
trochemical plants and processes must obtain written assurances from the importers
in friendly countries that neither the technical data nor the resultant machine,
equipment, plant, process, or service is intended to be sent to a Sino-Soviet
bloc destination or to Poland.

Thus in the third quarter of 1960 the Department of Commerce approved
only 18 licenses for export of technical data to the Soviet bloc, including those
for rolling mill accessory equipment, a phosphoric acid plant, compressors for
urea plants, drawbenches for tubes and bars, superchargers for vehicles, and
instructions manuals for communications equipment. 8 Given the restrictions and
the limited exports of such data, then, it is probable that the import of prototypes
provides the more valuable source for copying.

Import of prototypes and subsequent copying is advantageous to the Soviet
Union in several ways: it minimizes internal research and development invest-
ment, provides a quick answer to the Party's demands for instant technology,
and above all eliminates the cost of investing in processes that will fall by
the wayside.

In a market economy numerous processes and products, perhaps several
hundred alternatives for any one product, may move from invention to innovation
and enter the marketplace for sale to consumers . Consumer demand and technical
efficiency (or inefficiency) eliminate the least desirable, and normally there
is only a relative handful of survivors. The elimination of those that fall by
the wayside, those products and processes sometimes called the "wastes of
competition," is, however, a necessary step along the road to achieving efficient
economic and technical choices. Socialists may criticize the waste involved,
but the alternative is either to choose a single process arbitrarily without going
through the market or to depend on technology tested in a foreign market-place.

The time lag between selection of a specific foreign process and its subsequent
production in the U.S.S.R. (via import of prototypes and copying) is significant.
Figure 4-2 illustrates the approximate time lags for some of the more important
types of marine diesels adopted from foreign designs; between six and eight
years appears to be the average time between import of the first foreign model

8 U.S. Dept. of Commerce , op. cil. n. 5. p. 7.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

MARINE DIESELS: TIME LAGS IN
CONVERTING FOREIGN TO SOVIET MODELS

figure 4-2

Rated

b.h.p.

10,000
9000
8000
7000 ■
6000
5000
4000-
3000
2000
1000

1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 19501952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966
I A | First model imported from West

[ W | First engine produced in Soviet Union to imported design

Source: Registr Soyuza SSR, Regislrovayakniga morskikh sudsvsoyoza SSR 1964-1965
(Moscow, 1966).

and its initial production in the U.S.S.R, (The exception is produced under
joint technical -assistance agreements set up in COMECON.; This lag is favorable
when compared to the alternative of developing a suitable technology inside
the U.S.S.R. without a background of research and development experience
and without the guidance of the marketplace. There is little question that without
such imports the Soviet Union (unless it were to effecvv»Iy decentralize the
innovative function and adopt a market economy) would have great difficulty
in advancing from its present technological levels. It may be noted in this
regard that even Yugoslavia, a socialist country with a quasi-market influence
which supplies important technology to the U.S.S.R. (see the Skoda example
cited in Figure 4-2), is itself still dependent on Western technology in the
marine diesel sector. 8

I I I
B& W674 VT 160

160-

N74

B&W550VT
1 1

110

eries

| A
(Skoda) ^

. i

IN 55/110-

430 S

Alco (Lent

l-Leas

e)Mc

idel

• 8 DR 43/610
1 I I

p 1

' D50(6ChN31.8/33)

— I — I — U I

More detailed informaCLon concerning marine diesels is given in chapters 6, 17, and 21 .

Technical Assistance and Foreign Prototypes

We may infer from this brief discussion a point that will be further illustrated
later: the degree of indigenous technical innovation in an economy appears
to be directly related to the structure of the economy. The greater the influence
of market forces, including a demand-supply price system, the profit incentive,
and free entry and exit, the greater the degree of indigenous innovation. Con-
versely, the greater the degree of centralized technical decision-making and
lack of personal profit incentive and disciplinary marketplace forces, the less
the degree of indigenous innovation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers

Previous volumes of this study have only cursorily mentioned the financial
means by which technical transfers have been effected. These financial factors
are generally beyond the scope of this study, but a summary outline is perhaps
in order at this point. 1

The financing of technical assistance has not normally taken the form of
government-to-government transfers; until recently, it was usually accomplished
through private loans and credits guaranteed by a Western government, but
several large French and German long-term loans in the late sixties may herald
a change. Although the role of Western governments has been obscure it has
also been fundamental: it is unlikely that individual Western firms, financial
institutions, and banks would have continued to provide long-term credits or
loans without government guarantees. For example, in discussing British Govern-
ment support, Paul Einzig points out how the Soviets have reneged on payments.
Soviet arrears on United Nations payments, he writes, are a breach of the
"most solemn pledge imaginable," and "were it not for the guarantees given
by the official Export Credit Guarantees Department most industrial firms would
not dare to risk granting such credits and would find it difficult to finance
them." 2

1 The relations between Western financial houses and the Soviet Union have been explored
in the literature of only one country — France. Henry Coston. a well-known French writer
of reference books, has also published detailed studies on French financiers and their financial
support of the U.S.S.R. The following in Coston's "Lectures Francaises" series are of interest:
Entre Rothschild et Moicou; Les Financiers uppuint 1'Axe Paris-Moscou; L 'Alliance avec
Moscou: Les Allies capitaiisies du communisme 'Internationale ; La Haute finance et les revolu-
tions. See also two longer studies by Coston: Les Financiers qui menent !e monde (Paris:
Librairie Francaise, 1958), and La Haute Banque et les trusts (Paris: Librairie Francaise,
1958).

A vast unexplored research field awaits some ambitious economist in the financial relations
between American, British, and German financial houses and the Soviet Union. There is a
great deal of raw archival material available for such a study or studies . The writer has been
unable to locate any full-length published studies on these topics, and the article literature
is limited to the subject of Western government financing of the Bolshevik Revolution: see
for example George Katkov. "German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to
the Bolsheviks in 1917," International Affairs. April 1956, pp. 181-89.

1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle (London), February 20, 1964, p. 14. In a laler article
Einzig takes the British Government to task for favoring the Soviets over the Western countries;

Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers 67

The financing of U.S. equipment for the Volgograd automobile plant, to
cite a recent example in the United States, was not of interest to private sources,
and the original intent was to finance Volgograd through the Export-Import
Bank. When this approach was rejected by Congress, other means were found
by the administration to provide U.S. Government backing for construction
of the largest automobile plant in the U.S.S.R. It is useful, then, to trace
the main threads of such financing from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution
to the present day, for without Western government and private assistance the
technical transfers described in this analysis could not have taken place.

The Bolshevik Revolution itself was financed by "a steady flow of funds"
from the German Foreign Ministry. 3 A memorandum to the German kaiser
from Baron R. von Kuhlmann, minister of foreign affairs, dated December
3, 1917, reported that German objectives were to support the Bolsheviks finan-
cially in order first to remove Russia from the European war as an ally of
Britain and France, and then "to provide help for Russia in various ways ...
rehabilitation of the railways [and] provision of a substantial loan"* The first
volume of this series describes how such German assistance was a key factor
in bringing about Soviet recovery from the economic depths of 1922.

AH banking institutions in the Soviet Union were nationalized under a decree
of December 14, 1917. All banking business was declared to be a state monopoly,
and all existing private joint stock banks and branches of foreign banks were
merged into the State Bank. A subsequent decree, of December 2, 1918, liquid-
ated foreign banks in the U.S.S.R.

Sometime before September 19 19 the American-Russian Industrial Syndicate
Incorporated was formed in New York by the financial interests of Guggenheim
and Sinclair in order to trade with Russia. 5 The long-time interest in Soviet

he suggests thai it is one thing to finance routine Soviet transactions but "it is a totally different
thing for the British Government to go out of its way to provide additional special facilities
for credits up lo fifteen years to a maximum of £ 100 million for the exclusive benefit of
the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries." Ibid.. March 12, 1964, p. 11. Unfortunately,
Einzig does not detail Soviet defaults; these are both numerous and substantial, although there
is a prevailing myth to the contrary,

3 Kuhlmann memorandum; see G. Katkov, "German Foreign Office Documents on Financial
Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917." International Affairs. 32 (April 1956), 181-89. These
"political funds" went through several routes to the Bolsheviks; one route was to the Nye
Banken in Sweden and then to the Siberian Bank in Petrograd. The Nya Banken was headed
by Olaf Asehberg who was rewarded after the Revolution with the Russian Bank of Commerce
concession in Russia. See also the roles of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus) and Kuba
Furstenberg as reconstructed from German documents and other sources in Z. A. B. Zeman
and W, B. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution (Oxford and New York, 1965). It should
be noted on Parvus that his considerable wealth was acquired suddenly, and that no record
exists as to its origins and no trace of it was found after his death.

Another flow of funds for revolution in Russia reportedly was from U.S. and European bankers
(Schiff, Warburg. Guggenheim); see A. Goulevtich, Czarism and Revolution (Hawthorne, Calif.:
Omni, 1962), pp. 230-34,

* Katkov, op. cit. n. 3.

1 U.S. Stale Dept. Decimal File 316-126-50.

68 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

finance of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York also began in 1919,
with a letter to the State Department inquiring about the legal status of Soviet
banking institutions.*

In October 1921 the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) was formed in Moscow
with branches in Petrograd, Kassan, and elsewhere. Later in the same year
the Guaranty Trust Company of New York was approacheC by Olaf Aschberg,
a former director of the Nya Banken in Stockholm, 7 and tie New York bank
in turn went to the federal administration with a proposal to open exchange
relations with Gosbank. 8 The views of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
on this question were concisely stated: "This seems to me to be entirely in
line with our general policy not to interfere with commercial relations that
our citizens may desire to set up at their own risk." 9

However, Charles E. Hughes, then U.S. secretary of state, pointed out
that the Bolsheviks could acquire foreign credits by such an arrangement with
the Guaranty Trust Company; and (although the secretary did not place much
weight on this point) he suggested that the United States might not be able
to protect representatives of Guaranty Trust in the Soviet state. Hughes concluded
his memorandum: "Particularly I should like to know how it is proposed to
secure an effective control of the use by the Bolsheviks of the foreign credits
which would be made available in the new State Bank." 10 It was Hoover's
subsequent recommendation that any such credits accruing to the State Bank
be used for the purchase (question mark "purpose" in original memorandum)
of civilian commodities in the United States, and thereby consistent with the
humanitarian objectives previously established by the United States with respect
to Bolshevik Russia.

In February 1922 overtures were also made to the Irving National Bank
of New York to enter into business relations wi th the State Bank of the U . S . S . R . ' '
This does not appear to have been pursued; the State Department files contain
only a draft copy of an agreement between Guaranty Trust Company and Gos-
bank.' ' Under this agreement the Guaranty Trust Company assisted Gosbank
in "establishing and maintaining an adequate system covering remittances from
the United States of America to the Republic of Russia and [agreed to act]
as its agent." The State Department took a noncommittal attitude and apparently
disappointed Guaranty Trust Company because "it did not help them very
much." 13

Ibid.. 58. Directors of Guaranty Trust at this time included W. Averdl Harriman and Thomas
W. Latnonl; see Sutton I: Western Technology ... 1917 to 1930.
U.S. Stale Dept. Decimal File 316-126-663.
Ibid., 136.

Ibid.

141.

Ibid.

158.

Ibid.

160-169

Ibid.

174.

Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers 69

This link with Guaranty Trust in the United States was followed in 1922
by the establishment of an international bank — the Russian Bank of Commerce
in Moscow — by a foreign syndicate including the Krupp and Stinnes interests
in Germany, and Danish, Dutch, Swedish, and American banks and banking
institutions including Guaranty Trust. The head of the Russian Bank of Com-
merce was Olaf Aschberg. 14 The board of the concession included A. D. Schle-
singer (formerly chief of Moscow Merchant Bank), Kalaschkin (chief of the
Junker Bank), V. V. Ternovsky (former chief of the Siberian Bank), and Max
May of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. May was designated director
of the foreign division of the new bank.' s A report on an interview with him
contains the following statement: "In his opinion, besides its purely banking
operations, it [the concession] will of course largely finance all lines of Russian
industries." 18

At that time Aschberg had severed his connection with Nya Banken and
was president of the Economic Bolaget bank in Stockholm, which acted as
the Swedish representative of the Russian Commercial Bank. In Germany the
Russian bank was represented by Garantie- und Credit Bank fur den Osten
of Berlin. At the end of December 1922 the U.S. legation at Riga referred
to this Aschberg concession as the "only real effort made by a foreign group
of capitalists" to finance the Soviet Union." It was also pointed out that a
group with German capita! was working on a project — the Central Asiatic Finan-
cial Project — to finance German export trade in Turkestan.

There is in the State Department files an excellent contemporary report
by A. Michelson entitled "Private Banks in the Republic of Soviets." 18 Michel-
son points out that the Russian Bank of Commerce, i.e., the bankoperated
by Aschberg and linked to Guaranty Trust in New York, was the largest such
private bank in the U.S.S.R. and the first bank that had succeeded in establishing
itself "partly through the assistance of foreign capital." Michelson adds the
interesting comment that "there are, however, serious reasons to suppose that
the capital of the Russian Bank of Commerce constitutes the sums belonging
to the Bolsheviks themselves which are deposited with Swedish banks." This
report also refers to Aschberg as an "agent of Soviet power for all sorts of
its financial combinations." The Russian Bank of Commerce was clearly the
largest such bank in terms of balances — 232.6 million rubles in 1923 as compared
to 128,8 million rubles for the Industrial Bank (Prombank) and 80.9 million
for the Municipal Bank of Moscow. In March 1923, however, the Russian
Bank of Commerce failed. 19 The U.S. Legation in Stockholm reported in 1924

" Ibid., 209-211.

,s Ibid. , 237; see Report 2437 from U.S. Legation in Stockholm, Sweden, October 23, 1922.

18 Ibid.. 249.

17 Ibid.. 264.

'" Ibid., 432. Michelson was general secretary of the committee of representatives of Russian

banks in Paris.

" Financial Times (London), March 3, 1924.

70 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

that Aschberg had been dismissed from his connection with the Russian Bank
of Commerce in Moscow and that "a large portion" of Soviet funds had been
employed by Aschberg for investments on his personal account. 20

The Gosbank, established in 1922, also depended heavily on foreign consul-
tants for its establishment. Sweden's Professor Gustav Cassel, a leading European
authority on banking who was appointed advisor to Gosbank in 1922, provided
a public statement to the effect, "I do not believe in a negative policy —
To leave Russia to her own resources and to her own fate is simply folly." 21

The creation of both Gosbank and the Russian Bank of Commerce was
made in close consultation with European and American bankers. For example,
in May 1922 Wittenberg, head of the National Bank of Germany, acted as
consultant in the Soviet Union," and in October 1922 a group of bankers
including Aschberg, Wittenberg, and Scheinmann (chief of Gosbank) arrived
in Stockholm to conduct further negotiations with foreign banks.

Finally, an agreement between the Guaranty Trust Company of New York
and Gosbank was signed on August 1 , 1923. It was agreed that all transactions
would be in dollars, with the Guaranty Trust Company acting as a clearing
house. 13 The Guaranty Trust Company so advised the Department of State
in a letter dated September 14, 1923. " Thus the Guaranty Trust was uniquely
connected with the establishment of banking in the U.S.S.R. and the financing
of trade with the West.

BANQUE COMMERCIALS POUR L'EUROPE DU NORD

In January 1923 it was reported that the Soviet Union had acquired all
the shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway formerly held by the Russo-Asiatic
Bank; two French financial institutions, the Societe Generate and the Banque
de Paris et Pays Bas, were the main owners of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. 21
By June 1923 the Soviets had acquired 60 percent of the shares of the Russo-
Asiatic Bank while French holders retained the balance.

Negotiations between representatives of the Soviet Union and French banking
interests for the formation of a joint Franco-Soviet bank in France broke down
in May 1925. Thereupon the Soviets purchased a small bank in Paris, Banque
Commerciale pour les Pays du Nord, with a main office in Paris. This bank,
founded in 1920 by Russian banker A. Khaiss with a capital of one million
francs, was purchased in 1921 by the Wissotski interests, important prerevolution-

20 U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 3 16- 1 26-534 .

" Ibid.. 235-236.

" Ibid., 182.

" Ibid., 424.

" Ibid.. 459.

" Ibid.. 28S.

Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers 71

ary Russian merchants. The reported purchase price paid by the Soviets to
the Wissotskis was £130,000 sterling. 26

After purchase of the bank the brothers D. V. Wissotski and F. Wissotski
continued to serve on the board temporarily, while two new directors, Volidsky
and Sharov, were appointed to represent Soviet interests; also appointed as
directors were Reisen and lablokov, two former officers of the Azov Bank;
Coon, formerly chairman of the Trade and Industry Bank; and Kempner, formerly
of the Central Mutual Credit Bank. The American Consulate in Paris reported
on August 20, 1925, that the Soviet intention was to issue new stock on the
French market and so indirectly secure foreign participation in the enterprise.
During the 1930s the Banque Commerciale was accused of financing Com-
munist Party activities in France. By 1964 there had been a slight name change
and assets had grown to S562 million. There were 268 employees, of whom
only three were Russian. A similar bank in London, also founded in the early
1920s, was the Moscow Narodny Bank, which had a remarkable growth from
only S24 million in assets in 1958 to $573 million in 1964; by the late 1960s
this bank was the fourth largest dealer among the London banks in the Eurodollar
market. Only the five directors were Russian, the balance of 200 employees
being British.

In 1966 the Soviets opened the Woxchod Handelsbank in Zurich, Switzerland.
The Soviets also own an insurance company in Vienna (Garant Versicherung)
and have attempted to convert it into a full-fledged banking operation. The
Austrian Government has so far objected to such operations on the grounds
that Garant Versicherung has illegally bought into Western companies to influence
their commercial policies. 27

Thus although Western skills are still heavily utilized in banking, the scene
of operations has been transferred from the Soviet Union, where foreign banks
are forbidden to operate, to Europe and the United States, utilizing foreign
employees under Russian control. One of the key advantages to the Soviets
is that such penetration assists the task of influencing and directing the trade
policies of Western firms on sales of Western technology to the Soviet Union.

CHASE NATIONAL BANK 28

In the 1930s the Chase National was one of four American banks and
financial houses to institute relations with the Soviets (in addition to Equitable
Trust, Guaranty Trust, and Kuhn, Loeb). Its role in the twenties and the thirties

" Ibid.. S03-8O4.

" Forbes. February 15, 1967, p. 60.

" Chase National merged with Bank of Manhattan (a former Kuhn, Loeb bank) March 31,
1955, to become Chase Manhattan Bank. Directors of the Chase Manhattan Bank (1968) are
David Rockefeller, Eugene R. Slack, Roger M. Blough, John T. Connor, and C. Douglas

72 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

has been described. '" There was a close connection between Chase and the
Soviets in the pre-World War n days; for example the advisor to Reeve Schley
(director and vice president of Chase National Bank) was Alexander Gumberg,
reportedly a Bolshevik agent. 30 The Chase Bank also acted as an agent for
the Soviets in the 1930s, 31 and in 1930 Amtorg accounts, according to the
U.S. Treasury, were "all with the Chase Bank." 32 Today Chase Manhattan
(the merged Chase National and Manhattan banks) is Moscow Narodny's corres-
pondent in New York; hence the ties appear to continue.

The Chase Manhattan Bank is controlled by the Rockefeller interests. Nelson
A. Rockefeller, governor of the State of New York, is also the prime founder
of the International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), which in 1967 made
an agreement with Tower International, Inc., headed by Cyrus Eaton, Jr., of
Cleveland to further transfers of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. As
this agreement was reported, "The joint effort contemplated by International
Basic Economy and Tower is seen as combining the investment skills and
resources of the Rockefellers and the special entree to Soviet-bloc officialdom
that Tower enjoys." 33

U.S. CREDITS FOR FINLAND; ADMINISTRATIVE SCHIZOPHRENIA

While this study is limited chiefly to the technical and economic aspects

Dillon. Most if not all appear to be proponents of expanded trade with the U.S.S.R. For
John T. Connor see U.S. Senate, Export Expansion and Regulation . Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on International Finance, 91st Congress, 1st session (Washington. 1969), pp. 183-85;
for Dillon (former Secretary of the Treasury), see U.S. Senate, Government Guarantees of
Credit to Communist Countries, Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
88th Congress, 1st session, November 1963 (Washington, 1964), pp. 74-109.

" See Sutton. I, pp. 90. 207-9, 226, 262, 277-78, 289-91 , The links between Western financial
houses providing financial assistance to the Soviet Union might be worth exploring. For example.
Equitable Trust signed an agreement in London on March 7, 1923, to act for Gosbank (U.S.
State Dept. Decimal File 316-126-295); a director of Equitable Trust was Otto Kahn, who
was a director of Kuhn. Loeb. which has been prominent in financing of Russian business.
Directors of Guaranty Trust included Thomas W. Lament (of Morgan interests) and W. Averell
Harriman, who also had other business connections with the U.S.S.R. The evidence appears
to suggest (although the author has not explored the topic) that a comparatively small group
of bankers and financiers has been consistently associated with Soviet financing. At least these
are the names that tum up in the fifty-year history; it may simply be that more information is
on record concerning their financial houses. (A study of the financial Jinks between the West
and the Soviet Union would be a fascinating and worthwhile topic for a doctoral dissertation.)

s0 Guide to the Manuscripts of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Madison: Wisconsin
State Historical Society, 1957), p. 57. On Gumberg, see Robert Bruce Lockhart, British Agent
(New York and London; G. Putnam's Sons, 1933), p, 220.

11 Congressional Record, House, vol. 77, pt. 6, 73d Congress, 1st session, June 15, 1933,
p. 6227.

32 U.S. Senate, Morgenthau Diary (China). Committee on the Judiciary, (Washington, 1965),
p. 70.

" New York Times, January 16, !967.

Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers 73

of transfers, it may be instructive to examine in more detail a sample case
of U.S. Government assistance to the U.S.S.R.

Credits from the United Stales were used to modernize and expand the
wood products and paper industries of Finland after World War II; and the
output of these industries was sent to the U.S.S.R. as reparations. There is
a divergence between contemporary accounts of U.S. intentions and actions
as recorded in the State Department files (at least in the declassified portions).
While it was denied that there was any intent to grant U.S. credits to enable
Finland to make Soviet reparations, in practice the United States advanced
credits for precisely that purpose in a case that affords a well-documented example
of foreign government assistance to the U.S.S.R.

In 1945 the New York Times noted that it was unlikely the United States
would grant a Finnish request for a $150 million loan; such a grant was deemed
undesirable as it would be used to develop industry to pay Soviet reparations. 3,1
Two weeks later, however, the Export-Import Bank granted a $5 million cotton
credit and a $35 million general credit. 35 In the following month (January 1946)
Secretary of State James Byrnes telegraphed American Charge Hulley in Finland
concerning the manner in which he should inform the Finnish authorities of
the Bank actions:

You should carefully emphasize that lhe credit has no political implications but
has been granted entirely on the basis of economic considerations, and within
the framework of our policy which you have repeatedly stressed to Finns that
we do no! propose to contribute directly or indirectly to reparations payment
by Finland; that the purpose of credit is to facilitate the resumption of U .S.-Finnish
trade. 38

Later in the year there was a series of communications from the State Depart-
ment to Finland advising that further loans could not be given or even considered.
In one telegram (August 9, 1946) Hamilton, U.S. minister in Finland, indicated
that the Finnish Government had been informed it would be a mistake for
a Finnish mission to go to the United States with too optimistic a feeling,
as the Export-Import Bank had many demands upon it. 3T This was followed
by an urgent telegram (Acheson to Hamilton): "Further credit Eximbank out
of question at this time" and "visit of mission to U.S. most undesirable and
should be indefinitely postponed," 38 and by another (Hamilton to Acheson):
"[I have] strongly advised Finnish Government against mission to U.S.A. also

New York Times, December 1, 1945, 7:3.

U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 860d,5 1/1 -1446: telegram.

Ibid.

Ibid,. 860d ,5 1/8-946: telegram. Hamilton, August 9, 1946.

Ibid.. Acheson to Hamilton, August 12, 1946.

74 Western Technology and Soviet Economic DevMppment, 1945-1965

advised against Graesbeck [head of the Finnish financial hiission] proceeding
to U.S.A. in private capacity.""

These telegrams, however, were followed by a grant of a $20 million long-
term credit, a $12 million short-term credit, and a $5 million credit for industrial
goods. 40 And contrary to the published assertions, the credits granted to Finland
were in large part specifically for equipment that was virtually certain to be
used to manufacture reparations goods for the Soviet Union. For example,
the $20 million long-term credit of January 1948 was for

machinery, equipment and materials required for recovery of export production
in the lumber, pulp and paper industry. These materials include wood-working
machinery, hydroelectric equipment, iron and steel, spare parts for trucks, lead,
coal, and petroleum products. 1 "

There is no question that the State Department was informed that these
credits would be used to modernize and expand the pulp industries. A Memoran-
dum of Conversation dated December 12, 1946, concerning the discussion
between the Finnish delegation headed by Graesbeck and two State Department
officials (Havlik and Cleveland)" raised a question about the low level of
Finnish exports of chemical pulp and commented, "Mr. Graesbeck's explanation
of . . . the run-down state of the machine equipment was not entirely satisfac-
tory.'" 13 However, the meeting culminated in a suggestion that the Finns go
to the Export-Import Bank. The consensus of the U.S. participants, after the
departure of the Finnish delegation, was that a "small" loan of $20 to $25
million should be granted. One month later a $20 million loan was granted
for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the lumber and
pulp and paper industries.

The U.S. export figures to Finland for the years 1945-48 reflect these credits
and their use to purchase equipment for the manufacture of Soviet reparations.
Sweden had provided credits for Finnish reconstruction in 1944 and 1945 to
the amount of Krl50 million; Sweden's share of total Finnish imports was
51.3 percent in 1945 and only 10.0 percent in 1946 as the credits ran out."
On the other hand, the U.S. share of total Finnish imports was zero in 1945
(when no financing was available) and 19.4 percent in 1946 as financing became
available under the Export-Import Bank credits." Out of $59 million in 1947,
just under $11 million was U.S. machinery and just under $5 million steel
products — both categories required for the Finnish industrialization plan needed

M U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 860d .51/8- 1446: telegram. Hamilton to Acheson, August 14
1946. • s ■

" See Table J- 1.

" New York Times. January 23. 1947, 13:3.

" U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 860d.Sl/12-1246.

" Ibid.

" Urho Toivola, The Finland Year Book 1947 (Helsinki, 1947), p, 261

" Ibid. V

Financial Aspects of Technical Transfers

to meet Soviet reparations demands. In the following year (1948) U.S. exports
to Finland declined to $36 million but the proportion of machinery increased
by almost 40 percent to over $14 million, including $5.5 million of industrial
machinery. Thus American machinery, financed by the Export-Import Bank,
was acquired by Finland to manufacture reparations for the Soviet Union." 6
(See Table 5-1.)

Table 5-1 CREDITS GRANTED TO FINLAND 8Y THE UNITED STATES, 1945-47

Government agency
In the United states

Amount

Date

authorized

Details

December 1945

Export-Import Bank

$5.0 million

Cotton credit

December 1945

Export-Import Bank

$35.0 million

General credit

January 1 947

Export-Import Bank

$37.0 million

$20 million

long term
$12 million

short term
$5 million credit

for industrial

goods

February 1947

Export-Import Bank

$2.5 million

Credit

May 1947

Foreign Liquidation

$10.0 million

Creditto purchase
surplus property
overseas

September 1 947

War Asset

$10.0 million

Creditto purchase

Administration

surplus in U.S.

Total 1945-47

$99.5 million

Source: New

York Times. December 1, 1945

, 7:3; January 23,

1947, 13:3.

In the 1960s direct government-to-government financing came to the fore-
front . Germany advanced $400 million to the Soviet Union to purchase oil pipeline
at 6 percent over 12 years coupled with assistance to pump natural gas into
Germany. Italy financed about $400 million of the U.S.-VAZ automobile
plant. 47 The largest single such transaction was made in early 1970 under the
Pompidou Government in France; this agreement provided a credit of $810 mil-
lion to the U.S.S.R. to finance five years' purchases of French machinery
and equipment; the credits were for seven to eight and a half years, but inter-
est rates were not announced. 48

The large proportion of Finnish output accounted for by reparations in the lumber, pulp, and
paper fields, and in shipbuilding, may be found in Toivola, Ibid., pp. 187-209.
Washington Post. March 14, 1970, pp. At, A15.

Ibid. The interest rate is of some significance. This was an era of world investment opportunities
at 8 percent; previous French credits were granted at 5,95 percent and it was reported the
Soviets were pressing to bring even this low rate down. If Pompidou had granted lower rates
(or even 5. 95 percent in the light of world conditions in 1970) there would indeed have been
widespread criticism. Il does appear on the basis of the skimpy evidence publicly available,
however, that the French, British, German, and Italian (and perhaps the U.S.) governments
have been willing to grant more favorable terms to the U.S.S.R. than to their own citizens.

CHAPTER SIX

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance
to the Soviet Union

There are several reasonably well-defined patterns of indirect transfer of
technology to the Soviet Union apart from the direct transfers that are the subject
of the bulk of this three-volume series. These important indirect transfers pose
particular problems for enforcement of export control laws; indeed the existence
of indirect transfers has been cited as a prime reason for the difficulty of reaching
inter-allied agreement on export control . This difficulty in turn is urged by propo-
nents of more assistance to the U.S.S.R. as a reason for further abandonment
of control .

Flows of technology may be broadly categorized as follows:

A. Technology originating in the United States and transferred

1 , directly from the United States to the Soviet Union, as in the "Trans-
fermatic Case"

2, indirectly from the United States to an East European communist
country, then retransferred to the U.S .S .R. either as technical assistance
under COMECON 1 specialization agreements or in the form of equip-
ment manufactured in Eastern Europe and supplied to the U.S.S.R.

3. indirectly from the United States to Europe and then to the U.S.S.R.

4. as direct assistance to an East European plant making equipment
for the Soviet Union, i.e., contributing to their operative efficiency
for technological exports to U.S.S.R.

B . Technology originating in Europe and Japan and transferred

1. directly to the U.S.S.R., as in the Burmeister & Wain technical-
assistance agreement of 1959

2. indirectly through East Europe, as were M.A.N. (West Germany)
engines built under license in Poland and exported in Polish ships
to the U.S.S.R.

3. as European assistance to East European countries contributing
to their capability to supply technology to the U.S.S.R.

1 COMECON is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An excellent review of its
structure and function is M. Kaser, Comccon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies,
2d edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance 77

It is these indirect flows that are briefly considered in this chapter.

DIRECT TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY
ORIGINATING IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

An excellent example of technology originating in the United States and
directly transferred to the Soviet Union may be found in the "Transfermatic
Case" of 1960-61. This case involved the proposed U.S. sale to the Soviet
Union of two Transfermatic machines valued at $5 .3 million. The units involved
are multi-stage transfer machines for complete process machining of an
engine — milling, boring, broaching, drilling, etc. Although the initial Department
of Defense position was against granting the license on the grounds it would
make a significant contribution to Soviet technology, in the final analysis U.S.
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara decided on the basis of his own knowledge
of such equipment that the application could go forward. Similar cases decided
at about the same time involved Bryant Automatic grinders equipped with high-
frequency grinding spindles, and automatic bore grinders for use in the manufac-
ture of internal combustion engines. All these cases embodied a technology
significantly advanced beyond that in the Soviet Union at I960. 4

More typical than these major transactions decided at a high political level
are the smaller exports of U .S . technology . One of thousands of possible examples
involved the December 4, 1961 licensing for shipment to the U.S.S.R. of
eight flame detectors and industrial instruments. The shipments reportedly were
for use in a plant to produce titanium dioxide. The rationale for export of
such flame detectors was that industrial instruments of this type could be readily
obtained by the Soviet Union from Western Europe. 3

An example of direct transfer of technology from Europe to the Soviet
Union is embodied in the Burmeister & Wain technical-assistance agreement
of 1959 to transfer large marine diesel engine technology to the U.S.S.R. Thus
the large marine diesels produced at the Bryansk plant in the Soviet Union
are of Burmeister & Wain design. Burmeister & Wain technology is also transfer-
red to the Soviet Union indirectly, through East European communist countries.
For example, Polish marine diesel engines are based largely on the designs
of Sulzer in Switzerland and Burmeister & Wain in Denmark, both of which
firms have technical licensing agreements with Polish organizations.

* See p. 224 for more data.

1 U.S. House of Representatives, Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation and
Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949. and Related Acts. Hearings before the Select
Committee on Export Control, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1962), pt. I, p. 411.

78 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Numerous agreements aimed at strengthening technical cooperation among
socialist countries and with European countries were made by the Soviet Union
in the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s and provided vehicles for transfer
of Western technology. These included agreements with Yugoslavia (April 26,
1955)/ East Germany (April 26, 1956), s Finland (July 17, 1954),* Hungary
(June 28, 1956),' United Kingdom (May 24, 1959), 8 (December 1, 1959),"
and (January 9, 1961). I0

Article I of such treaties is exemplified by the Soviet-Yugoslav agreement
of 1955:

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall strive to develop scientific
and technical cooperation between the two countries by exchanging the experience
and technical achievements of the two Contracting States in industry, mining,
construction, transport, agriculture, and other fields of economic activity, in the
interest of each Contracting State.' 1

Article II usually specifies the manner by which the transfer shall be effected,
i.e., through the "reciprocal communication of technical documentation and
the exchange of relevant information, including p^nts and licenses, in
accordance with the provisions in force in each of the Contracting States." 12

The transfer in the Yugoslav case was to be concerted by the exchange
of experts, students, and researchers and by the provision of documents and
materials. The final articles in the treaty specify the technical details of funding,
location of commissions, and similar matters.

The basic agreement was established with the creation of COMECON
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, formed in January 1949), but it
was not implemented for a number of years. Its purpose is to exchange economic
experience, extend technical assistance, and generally render mutual economic
assistance among socialist countries; it also provides for the bilateral technical-
assistance agreements, or specialization agreements, among socialist countries

United Nations, Treaty Stries, vol. 378, no. 5423 (1960).

Ibid., vol. 259, no. 3692 (1957).

/Wd.. vol.240, no. 3403 (1956).

Ibid., vol. 259, no. 3700 (1957).

Ibid., vol. 374, no. 5344 (1960).

Ibid., vol. 351, no. 5033 (1960).

Ibid., vol.404, no. 5810(1961).

Ibid., vol. 378, no. 5423 (1960).

Ibid.

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance 79

(Table 6-1). These agreements provide the organizational structure for transfer
of Western technology indirectly to the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe.

The specialization agreements made under COMECON and the resultant
bilateral agreements (as reported in Western sources) are surprising in that,
with the exception of agricultural and raw materials which comprise the bulk
of Soviet exports, the listed specializations for production by the Soviet Union
often are in sectors where this study has revealed a definite technical lag on
the part of the Soviet Union.

The listed specializations do include all technologies mastered by Soviet
engineers and those in which there has been a degree of indigenous progress,
i.e., blast furnaces, open-hearth steel, heavy-section rolling mills, steam turbines
over 100,000 kw, large generators, power plants, and heavy tractors. 13 Although
in greater part based on foreign technology, these are sectors where the Soviet
Union in the early 1960s was standing on its own feet.

On the other hand, the specialization agreements involve some technical
areas where the Soviets are decidedly weak and backward. For example, very
large long-distance pipe lines, synthetic rubber, large-capacity cement mills,
printing industry equipment, synthetic fiber production equipment, heavy diesel
and electric locomotives, passenger automobiles, and specialized ships all are
areas where the Soviet Union is backward and requires continuing dependence
on imported technology. 14

Production of both synthetic rubber and plastics is retarded in the Soviet
Union. The bulk of synthetic rubber capacity at 1960 was either the prewar
SK-B or the Dupont Nairit process; similarly, plastics were few in number,
poor in quality, and utilized a great deal of imported equipment or Soviet copies
of foreign equipment. In neither of these industrial processes has the Soviet
Union any new or worthwhile production equipment for export.

Ships are listed as a Soviet COMECON specialty, although three-quarters
of the Soviet mercantile fleet and four-fifths of its marine propulsion units
have been built in foreign yards. Large marine and locomotive diesel s are also
listed, although the Soviets lag badly in both . Equipment for the printing industry
and synthetic fiber industries is currently imported, and Lavsan and Nitron
fibers use British equipment.

Forging equipment is a known area of Soviet backwardness. Cement factories
of large capacities are bought abroad . In 1970 steel sheet rolling mill and finishing
equipment was at the U.S. 1930 level. Passenger cars were the subject of
the so-called "Fiat agreement" in 1966.

13 Not all shown on Table 6-1; sec Heinz Kohler, Economic Integration in th& Soviet Bloc,
(New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 138-40.

" Ibid, . pp. 138-40. For evidence see the following: long-distance pipelines, p. 130; synthetic
rubber, p. 153; cement mills, p. 170; printing equipment, p. 329; synthetic fiber equip-
ment, p. 178; locomotives, p. 248; passenger automobiles, p. 191; and specialized ships,
p. 282. Compare with Table 6-1 .

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

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82 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

It is interesting to note, therefore, that most of the categories claimed for
Soviet specialization fall into one or the other of the two extremes — that which
the Soviet Union has mastered and technically does reasonably well and that
where it is decidedly backward and behind other bloc members, who themselves
turn westward for technology.

The asserted existence of a COMECON category of Soviet specialization
in sectors where the Soviet Union is ill equipped for specialization is confirmed
by trade figures for the Soviet Union with East European countries. Table
6-2 expresses machinery and equipment as a percentage of total trade between
the U.S.S.R. and various East European communist countries; the category
of machinery and equipment of course comprises the most important category
of products included in specialization agreements. With all East European social-
ist countries taken as a group, just over 42 percent of their total exports to
the Soviet Union comprise machinery and equipment. On an overall basis,
only 13 percent of Soviet exports to these countries comprises machinery and
equipment; this 13 percent also includes exports to relatively backward countries,
such as Bulgaria. In other words, East European countries in general are three
times more important as shippers of machinery and equipment to the U.S.S.R.
than is the U.S.S.R. as a shipper of equipment to those countries. This certainly
suggests a relative technical backwardness in the Soviet Union in machinery
and equipment. This pattern is highlighted by exports of the most important
equipment producers: 62 percent of East German exports to the U.S.S.R. com-
prise machinery and equipment, over 58 percent of Hungarian exports are of
this nature, and almost 45 percent of Czech exports.

Although the COMECON specialization and technical-assistance features
relate to documentation and engineering assistance, not to physical movements
of machinery, these trade figures do support the assertion of Soviet backwardness,
as trade figures must broadly parallel relative technical capabilities. It would
be unlikely that the Soviet Union is a major importer of machinery and at
the same time provides extensive technical assistance for that machinery; such
might apply in one or two special cases {e.g. , in the provision of documentation
for a specific machine), but not over the broad range of technology indicated.
In any event, we know from other sources that the listed Soviet technical speciali-
zations which are in fact East European technical specializations, involve areas
where these East European countries are receiving technical assistance from
Western firms. For example, ship equipment is the subject of "hundreds" of
technical-assistance agreements between Western firms and East European coun-
tries; 15 these firms are major builders on Soviet account although "specialized
ships" are listed as a Soviet category under COMECON.

This question will now be examined in more detail.

" John D. Harbron. Communist Ships and Shipping (London, 1962), p. 108.

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance

Table 6-2 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

SOVIET TRADE WITH EAST EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN 1960

Country

All Socialist countries
of Eastern Europe
East Germany
Hungary
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Bulgaria
Rumania
Yugoslavia

Percentage of machinery
and equipment
in total exports
to the U.S.SA.

Percentage ot machinery

and equipment

in total imports

from tha U.S.SJR.

42.36

13.52

62.19

3.59

58.39

22.57

44.97

9.5

31.32

11.31

16.36

13.52

8.33

22.13

14.58

26.00

Source: P. I. Kumykin, ed., 50 Let sovetskoi vneshnel torgovli (Moscow, 1967), pp.
108-38.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM
CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE SOVIET UNION

In December 1947 a scientific and technical cooperation agreement was
signed between theU.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. It has been renewed at annual
intervals with changes in the direction and focus of the technical cooperation.
The agreement provides for extensive exchange of both personnel and documents.
During 1956, for example, Czechoslovakia granted documentation to the Soviet
Union on processes for leatherworking and shoe making machinery, glass blocks,
measuring and medical instruments, piping insulation, turbine blades, railroad
wagons, locomotives, heavy diesel engines, and automobile engines:

Over 100 Soviet experts acquainted themselves in Czechoslovakia with the produc-
tion of sanitary equipment. Groups of experts from 16 Union Republics visited
Czechoslovakia in order to study the manufacture of different kinds of footwear,
artificial fibers, building structures, pumps, compressors, etc. 18

In turn the Soviet Union passed over documentation for production of raw
rubber, aluminum, phenol, steel works, coke and chemical plants, an aluminum
wide-sheet mill, a plant for manufacture of penicillin and streptomycin, and
high- voltage cables."

In 1957 the Soviet Union assisted in the construction of an atomic reactor

" Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin (Prague). February 1957, pp. 17-19.
17 Ibid., p. 18.

84 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

and a cyclotron and Czechoslovakia in tum passed to the Soviet Union documenta-
tion for mine, metallurgical, machine tool, and other equipment:

The Czechoslovak factories and research institutes wilt acquaint Soviet experts
with the technology of production, for example, of turbines for high heads, high-
pressure pumps, the production of heat-treated steel, diesel engines, equipment
for the manufacture of artificial leatherand with the application of light ferroconcrete
constructional units."

Some interesting observations may be made about the exchange. There is
little question that Czechoslovak diesels, electric locomotives, and other equip-
ment sent to the Soviet Union are of top quality. Skoda diesels compete in
the world market against Western-made diesel engines. On the other hand,
some of the Soviet grants seem out of place. In 1957, for example, the Soviet
Union sent instructions for the manufacture of calculating machines and steel
tubes— two of the most backward fields in the U.S.S.R. To be sure, it also
gave assistance in open-hearth furnaces and coke ovens—areas in which Soviets
have made design progress based on classical Western processes. 19

The Skoda Works at Pilsen provides an excellent example of indirect U.S.
assistance via an East European communist country to the Soviet Union. The
Skoda plant is the most important single industrial unit in Czechoslovakia and
a prominent manufacturer of diesel engines, armaments, and heavy industrial
equipment. Czechoslovakia itself is the fourth largest world producer of diesel
engines, of which 80 percent are exported, the largest buyer being the Soviet
Union.

Under terms of the 1956 scientific and technical cooperation agreement
with the Soviet Union, Skoda sends technical assistance to the Soviet Union
in the field of diesel engines and specialized machine tools for making ball
bearings, lathes, and drills, together with heavy equipment for forging and
pressing. This type of equipment is a specialty of the Skoda plant, which also
has an agreement with the Simmons Machine Tool Corporation of Albany,
New York. Simmons is an old, established machine tool company specializing
in the design of large automatic and numerically controlled special -purpose
machines. Under the agreement Simmons equipment is built by Skoda in Czecho-
slovakia and marketed under both the Simmons name and specification in the
United States and also as a joint Simmons-Skoda line. Included in the Simmons-
Skoda line are such machine tools as heavy-duty lathes (40-inch to 13-
foot-diameter swing), vertical boring mills (53-inch- to 60-foot-diameter swing),
horizontal boring mills (five-, six-, eight-, and ten-inch bar diameter), rotary
tables from 78.74 by 78.74 inches to 14.9 by 18 feet, planer-type milling

" Ibid., p, 19.

'> See p. 123 below.

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance 85

machines, and roll and punch shaft grinders. 20 In 1961 an electronic computer
valued at $68,600 was exported to the Skoda Works in Pilsen in Czechoslovakia
for use in payroll processing and stock control.

Thus it may be seen that a prominent East European communist organization
supplying both armaments and specialized heavy equipment to the Soviet Union
is able to take direct advantage of the most advanced U.S. technology. Thus,
indirectly, advanced U.S. technology is made available to the Soviet Union.

The nature of Czechoslovak exports to the U.S.S.R. indicates the technical
assistance provided. In 1957 the Czechs installed a large turbocompressor
refrigerator plant at Stalingrad. The plant is one of the most modern in the
world with a capacity to supply 30 ice rinks. 21 In the same year the following
were shipped: several small rolling mills; two rotary cement kilns with a capacity
of 500 tons every 24 hours; Tesla BS 242 electron microscopes; and 40 cooling
plants. One of the most interesting contracts in 1958 was to supply the U.S.S.R.
with 55 complete automatic cement packing plants, each unit capable of filling
1000 bags of 50 kg every hour. 22 Between 1945 and I960 Czechoslovakia
supplied the U.S.S.R. with equipment for 2! complete sugar mills. 23 In 1959,
20 pig slaughtering lines, 60 diesel electric shunting locomotives, seven vessels
for a pressure of 320 atmospheres, another 140 refrigerator units, and similar
equipment were sent. 24

SPECIALIZED ASSISTANCE FROM YUGOSLAVIA

Much of Yugoslav trade with the Soviet Union (Table 6-3) is in specialized
metal commodities and fabricated metal units, partly restricted under export
control laws for direct sale to the U.S.S.R. by Western countries. The most
prominent Yugoslav example is that of copper. During the decade of the fifties
copper was on export control lists for the U.S.S.R.; Yugoslavia, a one-time
exporter of copper to the United States, then became a net importer of U.S.
copper and channeled its own copper production to the Soviet Union in the
form of copper products and wire.

A letter to Congress from Frederick G. Dutton, an assistant secretary in
the Department of State (dated July 30, 1962), indicated that during 1957 and
1 958 Yugoslavia made a number of exports to the Soviet Union of items prohibited
under the Battle Act, Title 1. These shipments included semifinished copper

20 Thomas' Register, 59th edition (1969), vol. VII, p, 988; the agreement is reported in European
League for Economic Cooperation, Economic Industrial. Scientific and Technical Cooperation
Between the Countries of Eastern and Western Europe (Brussels. 1967), p. 43,

" Czechoslovak Foreign Trade (Prague), no. 2, 1957.

21 Ibid., no. 6, !958.
23 Ibid., no. 1, 1959.
" Ibid., no. 4, 1959.

86 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

products valued at $5.3 million, cable valued at $1 million, electric motors
and generators valued at $355,600, machine tools valued at $175,400, and
a small quantity of lubricating oil. On January 9, 1959, the President directed
continuation of U.S. assistance to Yugoslavia despite these breaches in the
CoCom limitations.**

Table 6-3 COMMODITIES SUPPLIED BY YUGOSLAVIA TO THE

U.S.S.R, DURING JANUARY 1960-SEPTEMBER 1961

Commodity

Copper rods
Copper plates
Copper tubes and piles
Tubes, pipes, plates,

and sheets of

copper alloys
Castings and forgings

of copper alloys
Welding electrodes
Electric translormers
Power cables
Installation material
Installation wire

for power current
Winding wire
Low-tension cable
Other electric

equipment

January-December 1960

January-September 1961

Weight,
kilograms

153.709

Value,
thousands $ '

Weight,
kilograms

206.0

Source: Statistika Spotjne Trgovine SFR Jugoslavia za 1960 oodinu
*$1 =300 dinars.

Value,
thousands $•

27,686

26.0

129,234

127.0

12,847

16.0

28,929

23.0

6,267,976

7,445.0

4,885.762

5,213.0

998,000

1,707,130

12.524,760

40,818

1,537,677

245.0
1,191.0
6.273.0

101.0
1,306.0

1,471,946

507,333

10,501,015

73,195

516,283

364.0

1,191.0

4,800.0

563.0

695,183

3,450,044

13,223

858.0

1,711.0

71.0

372,899
1 ,491 ,037

423.0
665.0

POLISH ASSISTANCE IN SHIPBUILDING

The COMECON technical agreements provide for Polish specialization
in shipbuilding, marine diesel engines, and auxiliary-ship plant technologies
This technology is subsequently sent to the U.S.S.R. as finished products of
Polish industry, i.e., ships and engines, as well as in the form of technical
documents and prototypes.* 8

I! U.S. House of Representatives, op. cit. n.3, 2d session, pi. 3 (Washington, 1962), p. 662
See chapter 21 for Polish ships supplied to U.S.S.R.; see also U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding,
(Annapolis, Md.), January 1970.

For example. "... the Polish auxiliary industry which supplies equipment for shipbuilding
actively participates m the works concerning unification and specialization of the production
shipbuilding equipment, which are carried out in the Engineering Commission of COMECON "
Polish Technical Review (New York), no. 2, August 1964 p 21

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance

Table 6-4 WESTERN LICENSE AGREEMENTS FOR SHIPBUILDING

TECHNOLOGY WITH POLISH SHIPBUILDERS (IN FORCE AS OF 1964)

Polish company

Western licensee

Technology

Marine Equipment Plant

(at Rumia)
Marine Equipment Plant

(at Rumia)
ZAWO (at Slupsk)

Hydroster Works

Gdynia Yards

Gdynia Yards
Cegielski

Zgoda

Burmeister & Wain

(Denmark)
Sulzer

(Switzerland)
Fiat

(Italy)
Gustav F. Gerdts

(West Germany)
Baader

(West Germany)
C. Plath

(West Germany)
AEC (U.K.)
Sulzer

(Switzerland)
Sulzer

(Switzerland)
IMO (Sweden)

A/B Separator
(Sweden)

Heat exchangers lor marine

power plants
Silencers for main and

auxiliary engines
Oil, water, and air coolers

for Ceo, ielski marine eng ines
Automatic steam traps for

marine boilers
Fish processing plants

Electronavigation equipment

Gyropilots

Electric power generators

BH-22, BAH-22

Vertical and horizontal

screw pumps
Oil separators

Source: Polish Technical Review, no. 2, 1964, pp. 15-21; no. 3, 1967, pp. 9-11.

The first Polish oceangoing ship was built in 1948 — the year of the takeover
by the Polish Workers' Party — and since then the industry has expanded at
a very rapid rate. In 1964, for example, there were no fewer than 90 plants
in Poland making shipbuilding equipment, and Poland has been the leading
foreign supplier of ships to the Soviet Union. It is, then, an important channel
for indirect technical transfer of Western technology to the U.S.S.R.

Polish shipyards are a major supplier of ships for the Soviet merchant marine;
in fact, three-quarters of Polish exports to the U.S.S.R. consist of rolling stock
and ships, 27 and the level of ship purchases has been maintained over a period
of many years. In general, Poland sells twice as much machinery to the U.S.S.R.
as she purchases from the U.S.S.R.

Main diesel engines produced by Polish marine engine builders in 1960
were of two types: Burmeister & Wain, produced by Cegielski, the largest
Polish engine builder, and Sulzer-type diesels produced by Zgoda. Referring
to the Sulzer RD engines, the Polish Technical Review states:

Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, 1937-
1962 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 301.

88 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

The RD engines are of comparatively new construction; however exploitation
has already confirmed their high value. The best proof ... is the fact that the
Sulzer firm took in 1963 the first place in world production of engines of this
class. The exploitation results of RD engines produced with great care by H.
Cegielski show that they equal the generally known and valued Swiss products. 28

In addition, a wide range of other marine equipment, including all major
shipboard mechanical equipment items, has been produced for Polish companies
under foreign licensing arrangements; some of the more important agreements
are summarized in Table 6-4. This Western technology has been transferred
to the U.S.S.R. in two ways: as components of finished ships and as the
export of component parts of Polish manufacture. Soviet use of this equip-
ment is exemplified by Soviet ships on the Haiphong supply run to North
Vietnam in the mid to late 1960s. Further, in the same period Polish-built
ships were leased to Red China or used directly by the Polish Government
to assist North Vietnam.

EAST GERMAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE U.S.S.R.

H. Mendershausen has cited the following examples of Western exports
to East Germany that are utilized in Soviet end products 29 : copper sheet and
tubes, special steel valves, measuring instruments, plastic sheet, nickel wire,
bronze alloy used in mobile and stationary liquid-oxygen plants for Soviet missile
sites at Karaganda, ball bearings from Switzerland for hammer crushers for
use in Soviet cement plants; aluminum-plated metal and glass for electronic
tubes from the U.S.A.; germanium from West Germany for machinery; crank-
shafts and valve springs from West Germany for marine diesei engines; and
electrical parts for Soviet electrical equipment.

Mendershausen concludes that machinery imports from the West in great
part equip East German production facilities and so make possible the highly
developed East German metal fabricating industry and its extensive export pro-
grams. For example:

The machinery-building divisions of this industry are the mainstay of East Ger-
many's export trade. Heavy and general machinery, vehicles, and ships bulk
large in export to the Soviet Union and the bloc countries. i0

The Krupp concern of Essen has concluded seveial agreements with East
European countries which significantly increase their abili'y to produce machinery

" Polish Technical Review, no. 2, August 1964, p. 22,

" Horst Mendershausen, Dependence of East Germany on Western imports (Santa Monica: RAND

Corp., July 17, 1959), Report no. RM-2414. pp. 36-39.
30 Ibid., p. 31.

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance

for Soviet trade. One agreement with Hungary was for a $12 million plant
to produce machine tools and truck engines in Budapest; the output from this
plant is marketed throughout Eastern Europe. Another agreement provided for
manufacture of machines from semifinished iron and steel in Poland; Krupp
furnished the machinery but retained its ownership and sent technicians. Compen-
sation in this case is in the form of part of the plant's production. 31

AN EXAMPLE OF INDIRECT TRANSFER
OF A TECHNOLOGY; MARINE DIESELS

The East European shipbuilding yards are major suppliers of ships to the
Soviet Union. These yards are also recipients of significant technical
assistance — in all major ships' components — from West European countries.
Thus indirectly the Soviet Union again is a recipient of European technical
assistance. Marine diesel engines may be taken as an example to illustrate
this process of transfer. 32 (See Figure 6-1 .)

The Burmeister & Wain company of Copenhagen, manufacturer of marine
diesels, has a technical-assistance agreement with the U.S.S.R. to build B &
W marine diesels at Bryansk. 33 The company also has a technical-assistance
agreement with Polish shipbuilding organizations for Burmeister & Wain
engines. 34 Thus Stocznia Gdanska, most of whose output goes to the U.S.S.R.,
produces the B & W model 63-VT2BF-140 under license; a total of 355,000
hp was produced in 1968. 35 The two other Polish engine builders, Cegielski
and Z.U .T . Zgoda, have technical-assistance agreements with Sulzer of Switzer-
land to produce Swiss Sulzer diesels up to 15,000 bhp (Cegielski) and 3000
bhp (Zgoda). 36 These agreements, concluded in 1956, are for production of
the RSAD type, now the RD-76. 37 Cegielski also has a technical-assistance
agreement with Fiat of Italy. 38

Ships built in East Germany have marine diesels built either by VEB Diesel-
Motoren-Werke Rostock or VEB Maschinenbau Halberstadt; both plants have
technical-assistance agreements with M.A.N, of West Germany 39 to produce
(he M.A.N, model K6Z 57/80 marine diesel.

The four marine engine builders in Yugoslavia also have agreements with

ni European League for Economic Cooperation, op. cit. n.21, pp. 44-45.

38 The Soviets provide the Poles with hard currency to purchase ship equipment of this type

on their behalf.
13 East-West Commerce (London), VI, 2 (February 10, 1959).
» Ibid., VI, 9 (September 28. 1959).
3S International Shipping and Shipbuilding Directory , 1968, {80th edition; London: Benn Brothers),

p. 455.
** Ibid.

37 Harbron, op. cit. n. 16, p. 112.

38 Ibid., p. 109.
" Ibid., p. 199.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Datelopmeni , 1945-1965

Figure 6-1 INDIRECT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE lIS.S.R. VIA EASTERN
EUROPE: THE CASE OF MARINE DtESlL ENGINES

Switzerland

Denmark

Germany

United Slates

Sweden

Italy

POLAND

Zgoda— Sulzer
Ceglelski — Sulzer
Stocznia Gdanska— B & W

EAST GERMANY

Karl Liebknecht — prewar
8uckau-WoH Werke

VEB Diesel-Schiffsmotoren
—Junkers

VEB Diesel-Motoren-Werke
-MAN.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Skoda — Simmons

YUGOSLAVIA

Jugoturbina — A.E.G. and
Stal-Laval

3 Maj — Sulzer

Titovi— Fiat and B & W

Uljanlk— B & W

SOVIET UNION

Sources: John D. Harbron, Communist Ships and Shipping (London, 1 962) ; International
Shipping and Shipbuilding Directory, 1968 {80th edition; London: Benn Brothers).

Patterns of Indirect Technical Assistance

Western countries. Titovi Zavodi Litostroj manufactures B & W and Fiat engines
under license; "Uljanik" Brodogradiliste I Tvornica Dizel Potora at Pula man-
ufactures B & W marine engines under license; the 3 Maj plant manufactures
Sulzer marine diesels under license; 40 and the Jugoturbina plant manufactures
Sulzer and A . E.G . turbines under license . These plants provide the total Yugoslav
marine-engine building capacity, and are the source of engines for Yugoslav
ships built on Soviet account.

It is particularly interesting that B & W (which provides technical assistance
for the Bryansk plant in the U.S.S.R. and in the Yugoslav, Polish, and Finnish
plants building engines on Soviet account) depends on U.S. technology for
its engine-designing facilities. In 1967 Burmeister & Wain installed extensive
computer facilities in its electronic data processing department for "extensive
calculations for shipbuilding and design and construction of diesel engines.'" 11
This equipment comprised a Univac 1107 system with central processing and
two Univac 1004 computers. Thus diesel engines for Soviet ships are designed
with the aid of American computer equipment. 42

" International Shipping and Shipbuilding ..., op. cit. n. 35, p. 458.
" Shipping World and Shipbuilder (London), July 20, 1967, p, 1249.
" Seep. 318.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Western Equipment and Soviet Foreign Aid

On the assumption that Soviet construction work abroad will throw light on
Soviet engineering and technology without the screen of censorship, attention
should now be given to the most important of Soviet foreign aid projects — the
Bhitai steel plant in India and the Aswan Dam in Egypt. Both projects were
heralded as triumphs of Soviet engineering, and without question each has been
a key factor in the economic development of the rec.p.-ent country. Indeed,
Aswan will have a fundamental influence on Egypt unparalleled in that country's
thousands of years of recorded history.

Both projects had higher priority than any but military projects. The Soviet
engineers and equipment utilized were the finest that coulc be obtained in the
U.S.S.R.; in both cases the Soviets preferred to undertake construction using
only Soviet equipment, and in the case of Aswan this was written into the
first Soviet- Egyptian agreement. In Bhilai and Aswan, then, we have not only
two prominent examples of modern Soviet engineering but also reasonably free
access to uncensored information on Soviet construction methods and their re-
sults. 1

THE BHILAI STEEL PROJECT IN INDIA 2

In January 1945 the Indian Government appointed a panel of iron and steel
industry experts to consider expansion of the Indian steel industry. The recommen-
dations of the panel included construction of a major integrated plant at Bhilai
in Madhya Pradesh. Construction started in 1955 with $130 million of financing
from the U.S.S.R. to be repaid by India in 12 annual installments at 2.5 percent
annual interest; capacity was planned as 1 .3 million tons of ingot steel annually
with possible expansion to 2.5 million tons.

A significant feature of the Bhilai project was that 90 percent of the erection
work was done by Indians under the supervision of Soviet engineers. In June

1 The best available technical description is a special supplement of Indian Construction News

(Calcutta), VIII, 10 (October 1959).
1 Ibid., pp. 46-49.

Western Equipment and Soviet Foreign A id 93

1959 about 60,000 Indians were employed under 700 Soviet engineers and
854 Indian engineers.

All civil engineering work at Bhilai was handled by private contractors,
the leading company being Hindustan Construction Co,, Ltd., which had a
contract for more than 80 percent of the excavation and concrete work, in
addition to installation of underground communications. The company supplied
from its own equipment resources the central batching plant, shovels, scrapers,
bulldozers, cranes, and dump trucks. Photographs in Indian Construction News*
indicate clearly the American origins of this equipment — Le Tourneau-
Westinghouse, Northwest, Euclid division of General Motors, and so on.

An article by N. B. Lobotsky, Deputy Chief Engineer at Bhilai, comments:
"Civil work is of paramount importance in constructing a steel works, and
very often it is progress of civil work which determines a further success of
various kinds of erection and special work." 4 Thus although Bhilai was designed
by Gipromez (and is therefore a typical American layout), 5 Indian companies
undertook the basic civil engineering, including the massive excavation needed
for iron and steel works and the placement of 600,000 cubic meters of concrete
in foundations and construction of concrete buildings.

In short, the excavation and concrete work — those project phases which
later, at Aswan, were to cause the Soviets acute embarrassment — were under-
taken at Bhilai by private Indian contractors. Ultimately the problem was similarly
resolved at Aswan: 93 percent of excavation was handled by Egyptian contractor
Osman Ahmed Osman, although originally it had been planned as 100 percent
Soviet work."

The Bhilai installation consists of three large standard blast furnaces, six
large open hearths, and a merchant rolling mill. It utilizes the very simplest
of iron and steel manufacturing techniques, producing only a narrow range
of mild-carbon steel products. Its output may be described simply as production
of the maximum tonnage of a limited range of the simplest steel shapes. Capacity
is 770,000 tons of steel products annually comprising the following:'

Hails 110,000 tons

Heavy structural 284,000

Sleeper bars 90,000

Rounds & squares 121,000

Flats 15,000

Billets 150,000

770,000 tons

Ibid., p. 40.

Ibid., pp. 42-43.

See above, p. 128 (below).

Supplement, Indian Construction News. op. cil* n.l, p. 26.

William A. Johnson, The Steel Industry of India (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1966), p, 157, Johnson also points out that the ability to roll heavy sections for long rolling

periods means little downtime and reflects favorably in output figures. The actual capacity

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The plant produces mild-carbon steel shapes only — it does not produce flat-rolled
products, wire, or alloy or tool steels, all of which require extensive finishing
facilities including pickling, annealing, cold-rolling and other equipment,
facilities in which the Soviet Union is noticeably backward.

Furthermore, even for this limited product range there are numerous restric-
tions imposed by the equipment; one of the most far-reaching in terms of Indian
development is the small range of rolled sizes. The Bhilai mill can be compared
(Table 7-1) with the Monterrey mill in Mexico, a small plant producing only
240,000 tons of steel products a year, but roughly in the same categories,
and supplying a similar market in an underdeveloped country. Monterrey, how-
ever, produces a far greater range of sizes and offers a greater choice of products,
although its smaller mill is confined basically to the types of steel products
produced by Bhilai. The notable point is that although Bhilai has three times
greater capacity than Monterrey, the Mexican mill can supply a greater range
of sizes for every finished product, and this applies particularly to angles and
flats.

Table 7-1 COMPARISON OF PRODUCTS FROM BHILAI MILL (INDIA)

AND MONTERREY MILL (MEXICO)

BHILAI

MONTERREY

Type ol

steel

No. oi

No.ot

product

sizes

Range ol sizes

sizes Range ot sizes

Ralls

24-1 OS lb/yd

11 12 -112 lb/yd

Beams

100x50-600x210

13 76 -331x1 52mm

Channels

41x32-400x100 mm

10 76x35- 300x60mm

Angles

40x40x5 -
80x80x12 mm

128 19x19x3-

152x102x25mm

Flats

50x8 - 100x20

227 12x3 -355x5 1mm

Rods

6.8, 10 mm

11 6-3Smm

Rounds and

20-63 mm

51 6 -101 mm

squares

Sources:

Bhilai mill:

Hindustan Steel, Ltd.,

"List of Products 1rom Bhilai Steel Plant."

supplied by Bhilai Steel Plant, Public Relations Dent., January
1969.

Monterrey mill:

Cia. Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey, S.A., Manual

para constructors (Monterrey,

Mexico, 1959).

This interpretation of Bhilai's limited capabilities is shared by W. A. Johnson,
who comments: "Bhilai rolls the simplest of products, heavy sections, which
require less reprocessing than the lighter sections rolled by Durgapur and the
flat-rolled products by Rourkela."*

of the plant is well in excess of rated capacity;
the plant to fulfill its targets wlih ease.
See Table 7-2.

.e., there is a built-in excess capacity, enabling

Western Equipment and Soviet Foreign Aid

£§

■s a

C(0

i- CT O OJ o o «

t- eg 0> N Ul i- t-

t- pj mo o

evi m o **

i i

Sr«

I I

I I I | I I

I S* I I

■ , CO CJ , . o

o
■o

oconn

T" — CJ

1 I irt

E 1 Sg

tn *l r*

1 1 1 J £ 1 1

= » s il =

._ ™ *i T-i C ° T5
■= l2 a> = W S °

-s

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

Training of engineers and skilled workers for Bhilai was divided between
the U.S.S.R. (about 26 percent, mainly engineers), Bhilai itself (about 25 percent,
mainly operatives), and private and Indian Government firms (the remainder). 1 '
(See Table 7-2.)

Therefore, Bhilai may be described as a steel mill producing a very limited
range of the simplest of steel products, with a typical American layout. Further,
the civil engineering work and some of the training during construction were
handled by private Indian contractors.

THE ROLE OF EGYPTIAN CONTRACTORS
AND FOREIGN EQUIPMENT IN BUILDING THE ASWAN DAM

Construction of the Aswan High Dam was financed by the Soviet Union
between 1958 and 1963 to the extent of $552 million at 2.5 percent interest.
This loan was disbursed as follows: 10

December 27, 1958 $100 million repayable over ten years for construction

of the first stage of dam
August 27, 1960 S22S million repayable over ten years for the second

stage of dam construction
Summer 1963 $170 million for additional construction work

June 18, 1 963 $57 million for the hydroelectric power equipment

Total $552 mitlion

A series of international disputes, combined with Gamal Nasser's persistent
determination to build the dam, led to the initial 1958 Soviet offer, which
was promptly accepted by Egypt. The original German design, drawn up by
Hochtief-Dortmund in the early 1950s, was inherited by the Soviets and studied
in Moscow. Major changes were proposed in May 1959. These changes were
considered by an international consultant board previously appointed by the
Egyptian Government; this board in turn strongly advised against two of three
Soviet proposals. The Soviets ignored further advice from the international board
— as their contract gave them every right to do — and proceeded to plan and
build according to their own ideas.

There is little question that the Soviet design changes made sense, although
as finally built the dam looks little different from the original German elevation

' This chapter is limited to chiefly [he examination of two project!; but our hypothesis might
well be tested with respect to all overseas Soviet projects, although these were noi numerous
before 1960. For example, it is reported that the Soviet-built hoiel a] Inya Lake (Burma) has
Otis elevators and Westinghouse air conditioning: see Victor Lasky, The Ugly Russian (New
York: Trident 1965), pp. 21-2.

10 B. R. Slokke, Soviet and Eastern European Trade and Aid in Africa (New York; Praeger,
1967), p. 83.

Western Equipment and Soviet Foreign Aid 97

design. The main Soviet changes involved work methods and shifting the axis
of the dam about 600 yards south; in fact, the sluicing method of moving
sand suggested by the Soviets (and rejected by the international board) worked
well in practice.

The Soviet engineers insisted that Aswan should be an example of state
enterprise and therefore initially refused to subcontract to private Egyptian com-
panies. Also, rather than adhere to the ten-year schedule planned by Hochtief-
Dortmund, the Soviets reduced the construction schedule time to eight years.

The first years of work involved only the operational sequence of drill,
blast, dig, load, and dump. The equipment needed for this sequence included
drills, excavators, and dump trucks, and these items the Soviets supplied
immediately in quantity." Equipment problems began almost at once; by mid-
1961 only 900,000 cubic yards of rock excavation was completed, instead of
a planned three million yards. Soviet trucks broke down, Soviet-made tires
were slashed by the granite rock, and while the old-fashioned Ulanshev excavators
held up (except for the bucket teeth) the Soviet drills did not — so the Aswan
Dam project headed into a major construction crisis. 12

After a great deal of government-level discussion the excavation and concrete
contracts were let to two private Egyptian companies: General Enterprises
Engineering Company, run by Osman Ahmed Osman, and the Misr group. 13
The Misr contract covered the concrete work on the tunnels and the power
station. The Osman contract, granted to Arab Contractors, Ltd., was of
fundamental importance. Only one million yards of the 14 million cubic yards
to be moved had been excavated by the Soviets; the Osman company handled
the other 13 million yards under this contract. In other words, 93 percent of the
Aswan Dam rock excavation was handled by a private Egyptian company, not
by the Soviet construction force. 1 *

Studies by Osman's Egyptian engineers pinpointed the Soviet dump trucks,
only 77 percent as efficient as Western models, as the key to the problem.
Subsequently, 54 British Aveling-Barford 35-ton dump trucks were hastily
imported to supplement the 100 Soviet 25-ton dump trucks already at work.
There was continual friction between Soviet and Egyptian engineers, 15 but the

" Construction equipment supplied by the U.S.S.R. included 16 electric excavators (4 to 5 cubic
meters shovel capacity), 90 small excavators, 160 dump trucks of 25 lo 30 tons capacity,
1600 dtilling machines of various sizes, 75 bulldoiers, 150 trucks, 140 passenger cars, 100
buses, 80 cranes of various capacities. SO movable air compressors, 15 tugboats, 13 Hooper
barges of 200 to 500 tons' capacity, and 11 sets of equipment for hydraulic movement of
sand. The High Dam, Miracle ofXXth Century (Ministry of the High Dam, Cairo Information
Department: January 9, 1964), pp. 16-17.

12 T. Little. High Dam at Aswan: The Subjugation of the Nile (London: Methuen, 1965).

13 Arab Contractors. Ltd., with the Aswan Dam contract is a subsidiary of General Enterprises
Engineering; the latter is partially financed by the government but operates as a privately owned
company .

'* Little, op. cit. n.12, pp. 100-4.
11 Ibid., p. Ill,

98 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

private contractors held to their schedule. In the face of Soviet objections,
overruled by Nasser, Soviet equipment was supplemented by foreign compres-
sors, Atlas Copco (Sweden) drills (with Swedish engineers to supervise the
drilling work), and two Ruston-Bucyrus excavators. A British engineer from
Dunlop of the United Kingdom was brought in to find a solution for the shredding
Soviet truck tires, and workmen were set to chipping away sharp rock edges.
At one point late in 1963, "the U.A.R. Government begged Aveling-Barford
to give them extraordinary priority by allowing more dump trucks, then at
sea and bound for another destination, to be diverted to Egypt." 16 At the final
ceremony, however, this British and Swedish equipment was hidden away from
inquisitive eyes. 17

There is no question that injection of private Egyptian companies using
imported Western equipment into the Aswan Dam project turned a crisis into
a schedule met on time. 18 A similar problem had been avoided at Bhilai in
India by using imported Euclid dump trucks operated by the Hindustan Construc-
tion Company from the start of construction.

OTHER SOVIET PROJECTS IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD

It is notable that the Soviet Union has not undertaken to construct large-scale
industrial projects elsewhere. Such socialist -sponsored projects have been han-
dled by East European nations, although sometimes the financing has been pro-
vided by the U.S.S.R. in a three-way arrangement.

In Syria, the largest communist project under way at the end of the 1950s
was a petroleum refinery constructed by Czechoslovakia at Horns. Built at
a cost of $15 million financed on long-term credits, and having a capacity
of one million tons, the plant has Czech equipment and supervision although
some Russian engineers supervised parts of the construction. 19 East Germans
and Bulgarians erected other projects in Syria in the 1950s while Soviet material
assistance appears to have been confined largely to armaments.

In the Far East, although large Soviet offers of assistance were made in
1958 to Indonesia, the only two completed bloc projects in 1 958 were a Czecho-
slovak tire factory and an East German sugar plant. 10

18 Ibid.

" Ibid., p. 213.

" "The violent overhaul that the project needed was led by an Egyptian, Osman Ahmed Osman,
forty-eight, the prime contractor and a master at getting big projects done under primitive
conditions. Over the objections of the Russians, Osman supplemented their faulty equipment
with better British and Swedish gear ... Osman became the hero of Aswan." Fortune .
January 1967, p. 130.

" U.S. Dept. of State, The SinoSoviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries
(Washington, 1958), p. 55.

20 Ibid., p. 79.

Western Equipment and Soviet Foreign Aid

In general, at the end of the fifties there had been large Soviet offers, 21
but except for Aswan and Bhilai, actual assistance had been confined mainly
to military supplies.

Thus Soviet construction under its technical-assistance programs appears to
generate more propaganda than transfer of indigenous Soviet technology. Bhilai
had all civil engineering handled by Indian firms, and much training was handled
at Bhilai or by private Indian Government firms. The chief Soviet contribution
was in supplying equipment for a simple integrated facility with restricted rolling
capabilities, and that based on typical American layouts. At Aswan the Soviets
started excavation, but after 7 percent of the work was completed the civil
engineering was contracted to two private Egyptian companies utilizing imported
Swedish and British equipment.

These two large-scale projects, both of which received the highest nonmilitary
priority, confirm the general conclusions of this study concerning weaknesses
in Soviet engineering and technology.

Raymond F. MikeseLL and Jack N . Behrman, Financing Free World Trade with the Sino-Soviet
Bloc (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1958), p. 158. See Appendix Table II for a list
of such offers from January ! 953 Co 1958.

Part II

Technical Transfers and Their
Role in Soviet Industry

CHAPTER EIGHT

Western Origins of Mining
and Excavating Equipment

Four fields of mining and excavating activity have been selected for consideration
in this chapter: underground coal mining, the most important mining activity
in the Soviet Union; iron ore beneficiation, important because of the nature
of Russian iron ores; peat excavation, a typically Soviet industry; and the develop-
ment of earth excavating equipment.

At the end of the 1920s imported German mining machinery was largely
replaced by imported American machinery and still later by duplicates of this
American machinery, in some cases manufactured in the U.S.S.R. under
technical-assistance agreements with U.S. manufacturers. This practice has
extended historically and in terms of equipment beyond the four mining activities
considered in this chapter. A typical example, which also reflects the U.S.
origins after 1930, may be found in production of dredges. By July 1932,
some 22 new American Yuba-type dredges were sent to various placer gold
fields in the Soviet Union; 1 these included three of 13.5-foot capacity, twelve
of 7.5-foot capacity, and seven of 3.5-cubic foot capacity. The larger dredges
were capable of handling 566 tons of sand per hour and were used in the
Lena, Alden, and olher Siberian Fields. Steam and electric thawing apparatus
was installed by American engineers hired from Alaskan gold mines, and five
American-design cyanide plants were built in Siberia. U.S. hydraulic nozzles,
steam shovels, cranes, scrapers, heated sluices, and other equipment also were
imported.

Beginning in 1930 attempts were made to manufacture such equipment in
the Soviet Union. In an earlier agreement with the Union Construction Company,
an American firm, drawings and specifications had been supplied for gold
dredges, and a similar agreement was made in 1932 with the Yuba Manufacturing
Company, also American, for platinum dredges. A section of the Krasnyi
Putilovets plant was set aside for the manufacture of the large Yuba dredge
and three or four smaller dredges a year were manufactured at Votkinsk and
Irkutsk. The production program of Soviet plants called only for duplication

1 Far Eastern Review (Manila, Shanghai) April 1933. p. 168.

103

!04

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

of U.S. and German equipment. For example, the production program of the
Irkutsk plant in 1933 called not only for American-type dredges and power
excavators, but also for 60 Black model ore crushers, 20 Simons model ore
crushers, 2000 Koppel ore cars, and 2000 Anaconda ore cars.

These imports and Russian domestic copies were supplemented by heavy
equipment imports under the Lend Lease program (see Table 8-1) and the
October 1945 "pipeline" agreement.

Table 8-1

Lend Lease
category no.

LEND LEASE EXPORTS OF MINING AND EXCAVATING
EQUIPMENT TO THE U.S.S.R.

Description

Total exports

(arrived,
after losses)

V-4

V-49

V-50

V-S1

V-52

V-59B

Total

Crushing, screening, and mixing machinery
Mining and quarrying machinery
Earth, rock boring, and drilling equipment
Welt and blast-hole drilling machinery
Excavating and dredging machinery
Mine locomotives

$6,048,000
1 ,763,000
8,963,000
9,023,000

31,050,000
1,133,000

$60,000,000

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the
U.SSfi. (Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945).

In 1945 300 Russian coal mining engineers were sent to locate and dismantle
equipment in the German brown coal region. This equipment was transferred
to the Moscow brown coal mining basin. Some equipment went elsewhere;
for example, eight single-bucket excavators were sent to Tashkent. 1 Excavating
equipment totaling 200,000 to 220,000 cubic meters daily capacity was removed
to the U.S.S.R., as was coal mining equipment with a daily capacity of 40,000
to 45,000 tons and briquette-making capacity of 16,000 to 18,000 tons daily. 3

Major imports of mining equipment have continued since World War II.
One major U.S. mining equipment manufacturer, Joy Manufacturing Company
of Pittsburgh, received a Lend Lease contract from the U.S. Government in
1944 to supply 600 long wall coal cutters for the Donbas mines and has continued
to sell equipment for the coal and potash mining sectors since that time. 11 In

! Robert Slusser, ed . , Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany (New York; Research Program
on the U.S.S.R., 1953) p. 84.

3 Ibid., p. 85.

4 U.S. Senate, Easi-Wesi Trade, A Compilation of Views of Businessmen, Bankers and Academic
Experts; Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 2d session, November 1964
(Washington, 1964), p. 81 . The company name is omitted in the testimony but the facts suggest
it was the Joy Manufacturing Company.

Mining and Excavating Equipment 105

1963 the company received a $ 10 million contract — the eighth — for 30 continuous
miners for potash mining, 5 and the following year it received another $5.5
million contract for combines, loading equipment, and self-propelled trolleys
for potash mining. 6 Company representatives subsequently made an interesting
statement before Congress concerning Soviet copying of their equipment designs:

The Russians have copied our machines, but apparently there is not high enough
priority on coal mining machinery in Russia to make a real effort in copying
even for their use within the U.S.S.R. We know this because they continue
to buy from us machines of which we know they have made copies. 7

Recent Soviet technical manuals have descriptions and photographs of these
"Soviet- Joys." For example, the self-propelled trolley VSD-10 manufactured
at the Voronezh mining equipment plant from 1966 onward is a copy of the
Joy self-propelled trolley. 8

Where other countries have the preferred technology the Soviets are aware
of it. For example, Canada is the traditional world leader in asbestos milling
and processing equipment; Soviet mills were provided technical assistance by
Canadian companies in the 1920s and 1930s s and in more recent times Canadian
firms have continued to keep Soviet asbestos mills abreast of Western technology .
In 1964, for example, Lynn MacLeod Engineering Supplies, Ltd., of Canada
supplied $7.8 million in asbestos processing equipment for the Urals asbestos
mills with technical assistance and company technicians for installation of the
equipment.' It is interesting to note that a U.S. embargo on one component
was overcome quite simply: "...the company eventually decided to use a
Canadian-built product made under a licensing agreement with a U.S. com-
pany." 11

Therefore we can trace a history of import of foreign mining equipment — with
U.S. equipment usually the preferred equipment— and only partially successful
domestic duplication of this equipment. Lack of total success in duplication
is of particular interest in those sectors which are of relatively greater importance
in view of Russian resource conditions; peat recovery and iron ore beneficiation
are two such sectors and are considered below.

s Congressional Record, House of Representatives . August 23. 1963.

* Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1964.

T U.S. Senate. East-West Trade, op. cit. n. 4. p. 82. A notation is added that copies of the
companies' equipment were on exhibit at the permanent industrial exposition in Moscow.

8 For the VSD-10 see Gornye mashiny dlya dobychi rud (Moscow, 1968), and compare to the
Joy self-propelled trolley in A . S . Burchakov e t a! . , Tekhnologiia , mekhanizaisiia i avtomatizatsiia
proizvodstvennykh proisessov podzemnykh razraboiok (Moscow, 1968), p. 329.

» See Sutton 1, pp. 108-12; and Sutton II, pp. 184, 368.

10 Wail Street Journal. February 19, 1964, 12:6.

" Ibid.

106 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Dev.-lo\nent. 1945-1965

FOREIGN ORIGINS OF UNDERGROUND
MINING EQUIPMENT IN THE COAL INP-VSTRY

The coal mining industry, by far the most important of all mining industries
in the Soviet Union, is mechanically almost completely basec m foreign technical
developments. Fortunately, we have a series of excellent reports by the National
Coal Board of the United Kingdom that describe this technical diffusion from
the West,' 2 although this was not the prime purpose of the repons. Furthermore,
in the words of one NCB report: "It must be appreciated , . . .hat the Report
emphasizes what is best in Soviet mining technique and does not elaborate
on much that was seen which was well below the standard of modern British
practice." 13

Of the 391 million tons of coal produced in the Soviet Union in 1955,
about 319 million tons was hard coal mined underground, only 7.5 million
tons was open-pit mined, and the balance was brown coal. A large number
of power-loading machines were in operation in the late 1950s, and Table 8-2
gives the total number of such machines, mostly face power loaders based
on the frame-jib design, held in stock and in use in Soviet coal mines in the
late 1950s with their Western prototypes. The in-use number is about twice
that utilized in British mines in 1956-57.

Underground mining equipment in the Soviet coal industry is based com-
pletely on foreign models. 14 The variations, described below, are essentially
either simplifications of foreign models or models which omit ancillary equipment
or functions forming part of the original foreign machine.

The most commonly seen coal face cutter loader in the Soviet Union is
the Donbass 1. There were 1411 in stock in 1956, and according to Soviet
literature this model was widely used in the late 1960s.' 5 There are six variants
of the Donbass, all manufactured at Gorlovka— the Donbass 1 ; a more powerful
version, the Donbass 2; the Donbass 6; a Donbass thick-seam machine; and
the Gomyak, the thin-seam version. The Donbass 7 variant has a picked drum
• 'rather similar to that recently developed for the Meco-Moore. ' ' 16 The Donbass
in all its variants is essentially the British Meco-Moore. The main difference

i! Report by the Technical Mission of the [U.K.] National Coa! Board, The Coat Industry of
the U.S.S.R.. pi. I (London. 1957); pi. 2 of ihis report consists of appendices

,s Ibid. , pi. I, p. t.

'- 1 This conclusion is confirmed under current conditions (1969) by Vasiliy Strishkov of the U.S.
Bureau of Mines, and is consistent with the National Coal Board reports: "The mining equipment
and processes used in the Soviet mineral industry are standard— usually patterned on early
American and West European models"; and "Studying, copying, and extensive application
of Western technological progress and equipment in the Soviet mineral industry will be the
main trend in the improvement of mineral industry technology." Letter to writer May 6
1969, from U.S. Bureau of Mines.

15 V. N. Khorin«a/.. Ugal'nyi kombain "Donbass-IG" (Moscow. 1969).

14 U.K. National Coal Board, op. cit. n. 12, p. 26.

Mining and Excavating Equipment

107

Table 8-2 POWER LOADING MACHINES IN SOVIET COAL MINES
(AS OF APRIL 1, 1956)

' 2 3

Number ol Machines

Percentage

Type ot machine Held

In use

in use

Western prototypes

COAL FACE MACHINES

Donbass 1 1411

954

83.61

Meco-Moore

Donbass 2 1 1

Donbass 6 6

3
2

27.27
33.33

Meco-Moore (more

powerful Donbass 1 )
Meco-Moore

Gornyak 414

265

64.01

(thick-seam version!
Meco-Moore

(thin-seam version)

UKT1-2 177
UKMG 142
Shakhter 31

112
66
60

63.28
46.68
74.07

Coimol (or) Korfmann
U.K. multi-jib design
Meco-Moore variations

2242

1462

OTHER POWER LOADING MACHINES
Heading loaders:

PK-2m (brown coal)
ShBM-1 (tunneler)

191
26

116
17

60.75

60.73
65.39

Dirt loading:

UMP
PPM 2-3
EPM 1
PML5
PMU

217

620

493

1608

1075

133

401

312

1303

858

61.20

64.68
63.29
72.07
79.81
42.88

4045

Coal loading machin es:

All types
(including GNIZ-30)

777
49

2895

534
38

70.32

68.86
77.55

826

572

69.25

Joy Continuous Miner
Soviet prototype

Conway Shovel

Eimco -21

Eimco -40

U.K. galhering arm loader

Source: United Kingdom. National Coal Board, The Coal Industry of the U.S.SA., Report
by the Technical Mission (London, 1957), p. 24. Column 5 added from text.

is that the Russian Donbass cuts one way only, and is then flitted back along
the coal face in a new track, while the original Meco-Moore machine is turned
at the end of each cut. The Meco-Moore was originally designed in 1930 by
Mining Engineering Co. .Ltd., oftheUnitedKingdom.lt was developed through-

108 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

out the 1930s and received a stimulus in 194! from increased wartime demand
for coal. As of September 1956 some 155 Meco-Moore cutter loaders were
in operation in the United Kingdom compared to 1224 Russian Donbass models
based on a prototype Meco-Moore. 17

In describing the less common coal face machines, the U.K. National Coal
Board team reported that the UKMG cutter loader was "basically similar to
our multijib design," with a slight difference in the cutter chains, and with
no separate loading mechanism. 18 The same team reported with reference to
the UKT 1 and 2 cutter loaders that "the general design of the machine is
similar to the Colmol or Korfmann — and it loads coal in a similar manner — but
it is single ended and there are no proposals in hand for making it double-
ended." 19 Other cutter loaders under development were the K-26, described
as similar to the Dosco," and the A-2 plow of the Lobbehobel type with
a support system similar to the Dowty Roofmaster. 21 Vasiliy Strishkov, a U.S.
observer, comments on coal plows:

In 1950, West Germany introduced a high-speed coal plough. But coal ploughs
were not introduced in the Soviet Donets basin mines until 1962. It took 12
years for the U.S.S.R. to study, copy, and produce coal ploughs. "

Similar observations were made on other machines. The PK-2m brown coal
cutter loader is described as similar to the Joy Continuous Miner (supporting
the company's own observations) except that the cutter head swings horizontally,
not vertically." The most popular loaders are the rocker-arm type corresponding
to the Eimco-21 and Eimco-40, with a smaller unit, the PPM-2, equivalent
to the Conway Shovel. Of the PMU-1 the report noted: "This is railmounted,
and the significant difference between it and British machines is that two con-
veyors are used.""

The winding systems in coal mine shafts use Ward-Leonard controls, the
most modern being at Gorlovka, but no automatic winders, except one Ward-
Leonard, have been seen." A report of a French Cement Industry delegation
noted that Ward-Leonard 250- to 300-kw controls are made at the Urals plant. 2 "

R. Shepherd and A. G. Withers, Mtchaniud Culling ami Loading of Coal (London- Odhams

Press, 1960), p. 311.
'" U.K. National Coal Board, op. cil. n. 12, p. 28
'• Ibid., p. 29.
"> Ibid.

" Ibid., p. 30.
11 Strishkov, loc. cil. n. 14.

13 U.K. National Coal Board, op. cil. n. 12, pp. 32, 34, 41.
" Ibid., p. 43. See also Cornye .... op. cil. n. 8, for a Russian description of these machines

with place and date of manufacture.
" U.K. National Coal Board, op. cil. n. 12, p. 58.
'" Llndustrie cimenliire en U.S.S.R., Compie rendu de mission 9-28 avril 1960 (Paris, I960),

p. 33.

Mining and Excavating Equipment lG g

Flotation machines used in coal concentration plants are to a great extent
based on French and U.S. designs and imports. As of 1964 there were 230
such machines operating in the U.S.S.R. 2 ' Of these, 104 were Fm-2.5 or
FF-4 based on the French "Minemet," while eight were apparently Minemet
Mode! NS-1500. These units are built in France by the firm of Minere et
Meto, and in the U.S.S.R. at Novo-Irrr,inskoi. 2s Another seven units were
Airlift; the remaining 77 machines were Giprokoks Model 51-52 and KhGI-
57— apparently also based on Minemet models. 29

Plants manufacturing and repairing coal mining equipment were noted as
modern and well equipped. In the case of the Prokopevsk Lamp Works, the
NCB delegation noted "a large proportion of the equipment was seen t'o be
of Continental or American manufacture." 30 Of the Rutchenkovsky Zavod the
delegation said: "The majority of the machines installed are of American and
Continental manufacture." 31

In sum, in underground coal mining, the largest mining industry in the
U.S.S.R., we find almost complete technical dependence on Western equipment
—although a great deal of research and experimental work has been undertaken
in Soviet research institutes.

BENEFICIATION OF IRON ORE

The Soviet Union has made considerable investment in upgrading facilities
for iron ore, particularly to convert low-grade ores into blast-furnace charge.
A brief summary of these developments suggests great dependence on Western,
and in this case primarily German and American, practice. The 1959 report
of the American Steel and Iron Delegation 32 concluded that "the equipment
is standard— usually patterned after early American models."" In the late fifties
there were 40 iron-ore beneficiation plants in the U.S.S.R., and the more
advanced were visited by the delegation, Where magnetic separation can be
used, 'they have definitely settled on rotary kilns developed originally by the
Lurgi company in Frankfurt."" The standard 150 by 1 1-foot kiln has a capacity

" /wj 3 " Bed ™ n ' 1 ^ a "'°""- V * "•""him- Mit, obogashdwenih ugliu (Moscow, 1968). p. 5.

21 Ibid., pp. 82-83.

30 U.K. National Coal Board, op. dr. n. 12, p. 62

" ',t d a ' P ' "' I hC C ,'° Se WMCh mainlaine ' d °" 'he U.S. coal mining industry is apparent in

ri«M , « I \ V,\ K - K'anetsov. Ketonstruktsiia . mekha^isih i av,a mMk u,siU,

snaknt za ruoeztiom (Moscow, 1968).

32 S '"L in ' ht ' S ™'" ""'""■ Re P°" of lhe A n«rican Steel and Iron Ore Delegation's Visic Co

» Wrf TiS " '^ ^^ I958 (NeW Y ° rk: Am "' Can ' r0n Md S,eel ' ns,i,ule ' '^

" 'bid.', p. 57!

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

of 1000 tons per day. For nonmagnetic ores, i.e., oxidized ores, the Soviets
have decided on reduction roasting followed by separation. For this purpose
two pilot Lurgi-type kilns served as pilot plants and it was planned in the
late 1950s to build 50 similar kilns in the Krivoi Rog basin alone, 35 thus stan-
dardizing on Lurgi kilns for both magnetic and nonmagnetic ores.

For sintering iron ores, the German Lurgi-type machine is used as the stan-
dard. It is based on drawings for a 537-square-foot machine purchased from
Lurgi and similar drawings for a 805- square-foot Lurgi machine from Czecho-
slovakia, the Czechs having passed on their purchased Lurgi drawings, 36

Crushers for iron ore are patterned after American models; the 60-inch primary
crushers, although strengthened, are "definitely patterned after an American
model." 37 Cone crushers are of the Symons type with both long and short
head varieties. 36 Most of the pumps for sand pumping "are patterned after
a well-known American sand pump."" Internal drum filters "look very much
like American types"; however in the late 1950s the Soviets intended to replace
these with magnetic -type vacuum filters developed in Scandinavia. "The standard
magnetic separator for wet work "is the American-type belt machine with a
55-inch belt." 41 The delegation report comments that at one of the plants the
manager "took some pains" to point out the name plates on the machines
(i.e., "made in the U.S.S.R."), but the report noted that "very few original
developments in the concentrating equipment were seen.' M2

" IbiJ.. p. 58.

■" I Ibid., p, 109-10. No essential differences between ihe Soviet and the Lurgi sintering plant*,
were seen. Sinter comprises about 60 percent of toial furnace feed in the U.S.S.R. "In 1928
Ihe Russians built a Swedish-type sintering plant equipped with movable pans (apparently what
is known as the Hoimberg system), and in 1931 the first continuous Dwight-Lloyd type plani
was built in Kerch. Experiments showed that the continuous system had about 30 percenl
advantage over the Swedish system. Since that time all plants built in the Soviet Union were
of the continuous Dwight-Lloyd type." Ibid., p. 107.

; " Ibid., p. 58.

a " ibid.

" Ibid.

" Ibid., p. 59.

" Ibid. It should be remembered that the delegation visited only a few "advanced" plants. The
position appears to have remained the same in 1963. Although the Indian Iron and Steel Delegation
did not specifically mention origin of Russian processes, those processes described by thai
delegation are similar to those mentioned in the earlier American report. See National Productivity
Council India, Iron and Sleet Industry in U.S.S.R. and Ctechoslovakia (New Delhi: National
Productivity Council, 1963), pp. 44-45.

Other comments by the U.S. delegation include (at Magnitogorsk): "Plant equipment observed
is based on original American models. The cone crusher is a 7-foot Nordbcrg ... Wet magnetic
separators are all of the American Crockett belt type ... seldom used in new installations
in the U.S.A." (p. 78). And (at the Kuznetsk concentrator): "The group was shown an automatic
regulating and recording device for controlling the pulp density of the classifier. In design
it appeared to be similar to one developed by Masco." "There are four magnetic separators
for each section, all of them being of a modified Crockett belt type." "There are two filters
per section. These are of the Dorrco internal drum type ... manufactured in East Germany."
Two Lurgi kilns were being installed. American Iron and Steel Institute, op. cil. n. 32.

Mining and Excavating Equipment

111

THE PEAT INDUSTRY IN RUSSIA

The Soviet Union has large deposits of peat and is the most important
industrial user of fuel peat in the world. Six methods of production are used:
elevator, scraper elevator, dredge-excavator, hydraulic (hydropeat), hydraulic-
elevator, and milling.

The elevator and scraper elevator methods account for a small percentage
of production. The dredge-excavator method was in use before the Revolution,
as was the hydropeat method, developed by two Russian engineers. The
hydraulic-elevator method combines the hydraulic method with an elevator instal-
lation. The milling method is undertaken with cultivators and milling machines
towed behind tractors. 43

Although the peat industry is primarily a Russian industry it has seen a
good deal of transfer of technology. (See Table 8-3.) In the 1920s unsuccessful
attempts were made to use foreign machines in bulk drying, and the Typermas
machine was developed on Caterpillar tracks. For machines used in excavating
large canals, foreign excavators and dredges manufactured by Marion, Weser-
Hutte, and other foreign firms were the basis of Soviet excavators P-075, LK-
0.5A, and E-505. H

Table 8-3

THE PEAT INDUSTRY METHOD OF EXTRACTION
(1913 TO 1950)

(tonnage expressed

(given as percentage of total)
1913 1930

1000 gross tons)

1940

tons

)5Q

Method

tons

; %

Hydropeat

—

1797

21.7

9050

28.2

9040

25.3

Hydroelevator

—

1.1

1240

3.9

1000

2.8

Milling

—

186

2.2

5130

16.0

8280

23.2

Excavator

—

0.5

961

3.0

5960

16.7

(bagger)

Elevator

1537

92.2

4054

48.8

9649

30.1

7350

20.6

Cutting

131

7.8

2139

25.7

6025

18.8

4070

11.4

Percentage

25.5

51.1

—

68.0

mechani-

zation

Total

1688

8306

32,055

35,700

production

Source: G. Kazakov, The Soviet Peat Industry (New York:

Praeger,

1956), pp.

217-18.

George Kuzukov.Sowtv Peal Resources (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953),

pp. 140-47.

George Kazakov, The Soviet Peat Industry (New York; Praeger, 1956).

112 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The standard Instorf elevator installation has been used since 1927. The
Soviet SE-3 scraper-elevator installation, first built in 1938, consists of a dragline
excavator combined with parts and motors from the standard elevator machine.

Mechanization of the bagger operation was undertaken by use of Ekelund
excavators and other foreign machines, such as the Wieland. This was followed
by the development of Russian designs — the Pankartov and the Biryukov baggers
which in turn were replaced by the Instorf excavator, which is the standard
excavator.

After 1950 the TE.P-2 excavator was introduced. This is a single-row mul-
tibucket excavator mounted on Caterpillar tracks and with a processing unit
patterned on a Jeffrey crusher used in the Canadian peat industry.

The hydropeat method uses a water jet to flush out the peat and incorporates
equipment of foreign origin — for example, the Ludlow type water valves, and
NF-14 pumps patterned after American pumps. 45

In peat loading, the UKL machine for loading peat onto rail cars is modeled
on the U.S. Joy loader. In milling peat, equipment of German origin is used
in addition to Randall-type harrows. 48

THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET EXCAVATORS

We know from the Gorton Papers at the Hoover Institution that in the
early 1930s Soviet planners consulted American engineers on the most suitable
types of Western excavators to be copied and then proceeded, with U.S.
assistance, to study, copy, and produce these machines in series. 47

In 1931, for example, the Machine Building Trust collected data from those
organizations using draglines and finally settled on five models; specifications
of these models were then circulated to U .S . engineers for comments on suitability
and numbers needed for 1932 and 1933. By 1932 choice had settled on five
specifications: 48

Model I: 4-cu. yd. bucket {3 cu. meters); total weight 12-13 tons, boom length 26-36 (8-1 1

meters); dumping radius. 15-16 ft. (4.5 to 5 meters); 30-40 hp on crawlers.
Model II: 0.97-cu. yd. bucket (0.75 cu. meter); boom length, 21 ft. (6.5 meters); dumping

radius, 36 ft. (8 meters); weight, 35 tons.
Model 111: Shovel dam shell bucket and crane; weight, about 65 tons; crawlers boom 25

It. (7.6 meters); bucket 1.5 cu. yd. (1,15 meters).
Model IV: Shovel clam shell bucket and crane; weight, 120 tons crawlers; boom, 46 ft.

(14 meters); dumping radius, 53 ft. (10 meters).

" Ibid., pp. 76-85.

" Ibid., p. 108.

47 Sutton II, pp. 294-95.

" Gorton Papers, Hoover Instillation Special Collections.

Mining and Excavating Equipment

113

Figure 8-1

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET TRACTORS AND
EQUIPMENT FROM THE CATERPILLAR D-7 TRACTOR

CATERPILLAR
MODEL D-7
{first produced
in 1936)

CHELYABINSK

S-80

(1946- )

MULTIBUCKET
EXCAVATORS
Models ER-4, ER-5, ETR-152

BUSHCUTTER
Model D174B

CHELYABINSK
S-100

MULTIBUCKET

EXCAVATORS

Models

ER4A (2). ER-7AM (2),

ER-7E (2), ER-10 (2),

ETP-301 (2), UER-1 (2)

BULLDOZERS
Models
D-493; D-271;
D-290; D-259A

BORERS

Models

MZS-13 drill (1);

BS-4 drilling rig (1);

VVPS-20/11 pile-driver (1)

SKIDDING TRACTORS

CRANES

Models:

Lumber-loader KMZ-P2 (3)

Telescopic erecting mast (1)

Sources: P.S.Neporozhnii, Electrification and Power Construction in the U.S.S.R. (Je-
rusalem: Israel Program tor Scientific Translations, 1965), pp. 135-37; Ya. B. Lantsburg,
Spravochnik molodnogo mashinista keskavatora. 2d edition (Moscow, 1968), p. 27.

114

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Model IVa: Dragline lor rocks, 3.2 cu. yd. (2.5 meters); weight. 120-130 tons; dumping
radius, 36 ft. (l 1 meters).

These became the Soviet standard dragline excavators, and are based on the
U.S. Marion and various German machines.

The Caterpillar D-7 tractor, first produced in the United States in 1936,
became the Soviet S-80 in 1946 and the S-100 crawler tractor in the 1950s.
The S-80 and the S-100 were then used as base models for a wide range of
other Soviet equipment used in industries ranging from mining and lumber
to construction. Figure 8-1 illustrates the origins of this equipment in relation
to the Soviet S-80 and S- 100 tractors. The ER-4, ER-5, and ETR- 1 52 multibucket
excavators were based on the S-80 tractor' 19 and were replaced by another range
of multibucket rotary excavators, the ER-4A, the ER-7AM, the ER-7E, the
ER-10, the ETR-301, and the ISER-l, all constructed on a C-100 tractor base.
The two remaining models of multibucket rotary excavators are based on the
T-74 tractor (the ETR-141) and the T-140 (the ETR-I3I). 50

Bulldozers D-493, D-271, D-290 and D-259A— including most bulldozers
produced in the U.S.S.R. — are based on the S-100 tractor base. 51 The MZS-13
drill, the BS-4 drilling rig, and the VVPS-20/11 pile driver are mounted on
an S-100 tractor. 5 * A telescopic erection mast is also mounted on a S-100
tractor chassis; and in the lumber industry numerous pieces of equipment, includ-
ing the KMZ-P2 lumber loader, are based on the S-100. 53

In sum, then, the range of mechanical handling equipment used in a wide
range of industries is based on a single tractor chassis, the S-100 (earlier the
S-80), derived from a prewar Caterpillar tractor model, the Caterpillar D-7.

*• M. I. Kosiin, Ekskavatory; Spravochnik (Moscow, 1959).

50 Ya. B. Lantsburg, Spravochnik molodaogo mashnista keskavatora (Moscow, 1968), p. 27.

" M. D. Artamonov, Tiagovye i dorozhnyc mashiny na lesozagoiovkakh (Moscow, 1968), p.
303-6.

" P. S. Neporozhnii, Electrification and Power Construction in the U.S.S.R. Jerusalem: Israel
Program for Scientific Translations, 1965), pp. 13S-37.

" Alexis J. Pashin of Yale University has concluded on the basis of personal observation that
"all the major equipment" in the logging industry "was either of foreign manufacture or copies,
with some relatively slight modifications." This observation was made in 1958, but Pashin
considers it holds good for 1968. Pashin also adds: "The same applies to the equipment we
saw In the sawmills, plywood plants, and pulp and paper mills. All the major pieces of equipment
were either of foreign make or obvious copies." Letter to writer, February 19, 1968 .

CHAPTER NINE

Western Assistance
to the Nonferrous Metal Industries

CANADIAN ASSISTANCE FOR NICKEL PRODUCTION

The first Russian nickel plant started production in February 1934 at Ufa
in the South Urals with a capacity of 3000 tons annually. The Ufa plant, based
on oxide ores, uses methods similar to those in the nickel plants of New Caledonia
and Germany. It also processes oxidized nickel ores. The second Russian nickel
plant started operations in 1935 at Rezh, near Sverdlovsk; this plant is also
based on oxide ores and uses a similar process to produce nickel matte, which
is transferred to the Ufa plant.

A third nickel plant, also based on nickel oxide ores, began operating in
the 1930s in the Orsk and Aktyubinsk raions. The Orsk plant has a capacity
of 10,000 tons of nickel per year and utilizes four Dwight-Lloyd sinter strands,'
with electrorefining "similar to Canadian and Norwegian practice." 2

The Pechenga plant, formerly called Petsamo, processes one quarter of
Soviet nickel. This plant was developed and built by Petsamon Nikkeli Oy,
a subsidiary of International Nickel Company, and taken over by the Soviets;
it has three electric furnaces with a capacity of 1800 tons of concentrate per
day with electrorefining at Monchegorsk.

Norilsk (started in 1940) and Monchegorsk (started in 1950) are also based
on sulfide ores and Canadian practice, i.e., concentration by flotation, smelting
to matte in electric furnaces, converting, and separation by flotation and electrore-
fining. These plants refine about one half of Soviet nickel, using processes
based on International Nickel patents, while electrorefining at Monchegorsk
is similar to Canadian and Norwegian practice.*

' Germany. Wehrmacht, Oberkommando: Microfilm T 84-127-8116, Captured German Docu-

merits. . 1A£ ^,

2 J k. Boldt. Jr., The Winning of Nickel (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967).
» U S Patent 2 419 973 of 1947; U.S. Patent 2,425.760 of S947; and U.S. Patent 2,432,456
of 1947. The flotation separation of copper nickel ores is attributed in Soviet literature to
I N Maslenitskii and L. A. Krichevskii, although it is clearly based on International Nickel
patents. Compare the flow sheet in Journal of Metals. XII, 3 (March I960); K. Sproule
el at.. "Treatment of Nickel-Copper Matte." and 1. P. Bardin, Metallurgy SS5R (1917-IVi/)
(Moscow, 1958; Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1961).

115

116 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

THE COPPER MINING AND SMELTING INDUSTRY

The technical assistance provided by American engineers to the Soviet copper
mining and smelting industry was described in a previous volume. 4 No new
locations had been established by the early 1960s, when production of refined
copper reached an estimated total of 416,000 tons per year. 5 This capacity
was achieved by expanding the already large plants built by Arthur Wheeler
Corporation, Southwestern Engineering Corporation, and German firms in the
1930s; the Sverdlovsk refinery is still the largest Soviet refinery, followed by
the Balkash refinery.

Copper is a subsector for which the Soviets have released very little hard
data; it is surmised that major problems exist within the industry. For example,
the Soviets are processing both oxide and sulfide ores by the same techniques;
consequently, the recovery rate from oxide ores doubtless has been very low.
There is also evidence that the metal content of the ore is declining, probably
reflecting inadequate exploration methods. The recovery rate may also be declin-
ing.

This deficiency apparently has been offset by metal irrports. Between 1954
and 1959 the Soviet Union purchased almost 550,000 tons of unwrought copper
and copper wire from Free World countries— about 20 percent of total supply.
This purchase was apparently necessary despite 391,71 1 it,?.-, of copper under
Lend Lease, i.e., about seven years' supply at estimated 1940 rates of production,
and in addition to over one million miles of copper wire and cable. 6 Imports
rose at the end of the fifties to 150,000 tons in 1958 and 125,000 tons in
1959, and remained at high levels in the 1960s. 7

Export control at first limited the form in which copper could be imported,
but after August 1954 CoCom removed restrictions on wire of 6 millimeters
and less in diameter; in August 1958 CoCom removed embargo on all forms
of copper. Soviet copper exports to satellite countries have been balanced by
imports of goods from those countries containing an equivalent amount of copper.

ALUMINUM PRODUCTION IN THE U.S.S.R.

In contrast to the Free World practice of using only bauxite ores for the
production of aluminum, the Soviets use both bauxite and nonbauxite (nepheline,
alunite, and sillimanite) ores — probably because of geological conditions rather
than by technical choice. The nonbauxite deposits are low grade but can be

* See Sutton II, chapter 4.

5 Confidential source.

" U.S. Dept. of Stale, Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R,

(Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation. 1945).
7 Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik, 1918-1966 (Moscow, 1967).

Nonferrous Metal Industries

117

openpit mined and are near power sources; the major factor militating against
the use of nonbauxite deposits is the difficulty met in developing a usable
technology. About 30 percent of Soviet aluminum is probably derived from
nonbauxite ores which also yield byproducts for use in manufacture of cement
and caustic soda. (See Table 9-1 .)

Table 9-7 MINES, ALUMINA PLANTS, AND ALUMINUM PLANTS

IN THE U.S.S.R. (WITH ALUMINUM PLANT PRODUCTION)

Annual plant

Type of

Alumina

Aluminum

production
(1000

Mine

ore

plant

metric tons)

Goryachegorsk

Nepheline

Achinsk

Stalinsk

Krasnoyarsk

Irkutsk

160

n.a.
n.a.

Arkalyk

Bauxite

Pavlodar

n.a.

Boksitogorsk

Bauxite

Boksitogorsk

Volkhov

Nadvoitsy

Kandalaksha

25
20
20

Kyakhta

Sillimanite

n.a.

Irkutsk

Severouralsk

Bauxite

Krasnoturlinsk

120

Kamensk

Stalinsk,

Zaporozhye
Yerevan
Sumgart
Stalingrad

100

Zaglik

Alunite

Kirovabad

n.a.

Source; Confidential.

The conventional Western methods, i.e., Bayer and lime-soda sinter proces-
ses, are utilized for production of the 70 percent of alumina produced from
bauxite. Development work on a process for producing alumina from nepheline
goes back to at least 1929 s but such a process was not in full use until the
mid 1950s; up to 1955 all production of alumina was still from bauxite, in
spite of claims that Volkhov utilized the nepheline process in 1932. 9

The standard electrolytic method of reducting alumina to aluminum is used
in Soviet plants, although there has been some discussion of a new electrothermal
technique 10 at Irkutsk by which sillimanite is reduced directly to aluminum
and silumin. It is likely that a percentage of equipment now in general use

" The Leningrad Institute of Applied Chemistry was working on the problem in 1929, apparently
with help from American engineers. F. N. Stroikov, "Alumina from Nepheline" (mimeo-
graphed), is in the Stanford University Engineering Library. Presumably this translation was
made for use by American engineers. See also Bardin, op. cit. n. 3, on the metallurgy of
aluminum. A limited-edition review by Theodore Shabad, The Soviet Aluminum Industry (New
York: American Metal Market, 1958), also has useful information.

' See Sutton II, pp. 57-60.
'* izvestia, December 20, 1960.

1 18 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 9-2 ALUMINUM AND MAGNESIUM WORKS REMOVED

FROM GERMANY TO THE U.S.S.R., 1945

Name of

Annual

Extent removed

German plant

Production

capacity

to U.S.S.R.

Aluminiumhutle

Aluminum

35,000 tons

1 00 percent

Bitterfeld der I.G.

metal

(1943)

Fartjen Industrie A.G.

(Aluminiumwerk GmbH),
Bitterfeld

Alumin ium-Schmelzwerk,
Bitterfeld der

Aluminum
metal and

not available

80 percent

Metall-Gesellschaft A.G,,
Bitterfeld

castings

Alumin iumwatzwerk,

Rolled

35,000 tons

80 per cent

Bitterfeld

aluminum

(1943)

Aluminiumwalzwerk,

Rolled

10,000 tons

Part

Aken

aluminum

(1943)

Leipzlger Lelchtmetall-Werk

Aluminum

10,000 tons

Part

Rackwitz {Bernard Berghaus

and

(1944)

Co.), nr. Leipzig

magnesium
metal

Leichtmetallhutte, Aken.

Magnesium

8,000 tons

Part

(I.G. Farbenindustrle A.G.)

metal

Leichtmetallhutte

Magnesium

12,000 Ions

Part

(Magnesiumwerk), Stassfurt

metal

Magnesiumwerk und

Magnesium

5,500 tons

80 percent

Elektronbetriebe der I.G.

metal

Farbenindustrle, Bitterfeld

Aluminiumwerke

Aluminum

70,000 tons

Part

Carl Ziegmann, Fischbach

metal

Aluminiumhutte Lautawerke,

Aluminum

100,000 tons

Part

Lauta

metal

Aluminium-Prazisionsgub A.G.,

Rolled

Part

Potsdam-Babel sberg

aluminum

Alumin ium-Schmelzwerk

Aluminum

Part

Lautawerk. Lauta

foundry

Havelschmelze Velten,

Aluminum

Part

Alum in ium-Schmelzwerk

foundry

Veltner Leichtmetallgieberel

Aluminum

Part

GmbH, Velten

foundry

Sources: G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend tier Demontage; Sechs Jahre

Reparationspolitik ,

(Bremen: F. Triijen, 1951); Great Britain, Ministryol Economic Warfare

Economic Survey

of Germany (London: Foreign Office, n.d.).

is from Czechoslovakia; it was reported in the early sixties that the Czechs
had "financed construction' ' of aluminum plants in the Soviet Union and received
aluminum in exchange."

In the production of more sophisticated aluminum metals, recourse is certainly
to Western technology. For example, in 1969 the Glacier Metal Company (a

' ' AlfredZauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland. Czechoslovakia, and East Germany , 1937-1 962
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 225

Nonferrous Metal Industries 1 19

member of the Associated Engineering group in the United Kingdom) installed
a Soviet plant under an $8.4 million contract for the production of tin-aluminum
bimetal strip for automobile and tractor bearings. li

After World War II the Soviets removed fourteen German alumina and
aluminum-metal rolling and casting plants totally or in part to the U.S.S.R. 13
(See Table 9-2.) The most important alumina plant was the Vereinigte
Aluminium-Werke A.G. plant at Lauta; it used the Bayer process (100,000
annual metric tons) with a small capacity using the Goldschmidt process (8000
metric tons annual capacity).

REMOVAL OF THE GERMAN MAGNESIUM
ALLOY INDUSTRY TO THE SOVIET UNION

During World War II almost all the German magnesium alloy industry was
concentrated around Bitterfeld, near Leipzig in the Soviet Zone of Germany,
where it was founded in the late nineteenth century by I. G. Farben. The
capacity of this industry in 1943 was 31,500 tons per year.'" Most of the
magnesium smelting, casting, and rolling capacity was therefore in pi ants operated
by I. G. Farbenindustrie, and most of it was removed to the U.S.S.R. 15

The industry was not damaged in World War II, and was visited by various
Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS) teams in June 1945;
their reports give an accurate indication of the technical state of the industry
as it was taken over by the Soviet forces. The Metallguss Gesellschaft at Leipzig,
partly removed to the Soviet Union, was a foundry casting light metal alloys
and producing high-grade magnesium-alloy castings for aircraft engines as a
licensee of l.G. Farben. Production averaged 400 metric tons per month of
aluminum castings and 150 tons per month of magnesium-alloy castings; four-
fifths of the output went to parts for Junkers engines and the balance for BMW
engines. 16

The Leipziger Leichtmetall-Werk GmbH at Rackwitz, near Leipzig, was
a fabricator of aluminum and magnesium alloys with a capability of producing
200 metric tons of magnesium-alloy sheet per month and 50 tons of magnesium-
alloy extrusions per month. The extrusion shop had four large presses and
the capability to draw duralumtnum wire. Two l.G. Farben plants, one at Aken
and the other at Stassfurt, each had the capability to produce 12,000 tons of

2 Wail Street Journal, November 1, 1969, 14:4.

3 G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend tier Demomage : Sechs Jahre Reparationspolitik (Bremen: F. Triijen,
1951).

4 Great Britain, Ministry of Economic Warfare. Economic Survey of Germany (London; Foreign
Office, n.d.), p. 90.

5 Harmssen, op. tXt. n. 13, pp. 94-95.

1 Edward Johnson and Robert T. Wood, The Magnesium Alloy Industry of Eastern Germany,
CIOS Report no. XXXI11-21, p. 6.

120 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

magnesium per year; both plants contained presses and extrusion equipment
for aluminum tube.

The most important magnesium works was the I.G. Farben plant at Bit-
terfeld— also largely removed (80 percent) to the Soviet Union. The ClOS
team reported on this plant as follows:

'For many years in Germany the l.G. Farbenindustrie plant at Bitterfeld had been
the fountainhead of research and development work on magnesium alloys and
by far the most important producer. It can be said that these works is the birthplace
of the modern magnesium industry. Many of the techniques used in fabricating
magnesium alloy and much of the physical, chemical and engineering data on
magnesium and its alloys originated in Bitterfeld."

There were two press buildings at Bitterfeld, each containing extrusion as
well as forging presses. These major equipment items gave the Soviets a signifi-
cant capability in magnesium forging. The older press building of Bitterfeld
contained the following equipment:

a) 6000-ton Eumuco forging press

b) 3500-tons Schloemann extrusion press capable of extruding ingots up
to 350 mm. in diameter

c) 1000-ton vertical tube extrusion press made by Hydraulic Duisberg

d) 300-ton forging press

e) 600-ton forging press

f) 5 small old extrusion presses

The new press building at Bitterfeld contained even more significant equip-
ment:

a) A 5000-ton Eumuco extrusion press for ingots up to 450 mm in diameter

b) A double-acting air hammer made by Eumuco rated at 8000 meter-
kilograms

c) Forging rolls by Eumuco for propellers

d) A 15,000-ton forging press made by Schloemann

e) A 30,000-ton forging press made by Schloemann 19

This equipment can be used for the production of large magnesium and aluminum
forgings, such as aircraft engine bearers and aircraft landing wheel forgings
for use in the aircraft and space industries.

Massive use of this German technology generated some criticism in the
1950s. For instance, one Soviet metallurgist, B.S. Gulyanitskii, commented,
"After the end of the War, Soviet specialists had the opportunity to acquaint
themselves in detail with German and Japanese magnesium industry Some

17 Ibid., p. 41.
16 Ibid.
" Ibid.

Nonferrous Metal Industries

121

workers of the magnesium industry showed a tendency to redesign the national
magnesium industry, completely imitating German technology." 20

Thus we may conclude that Soviet nickel and copper smelting and refining
processes are derived from Canadian, American, and Norwegian practices.

About 70 percent of Soviet alumina is produced by the Bayer and lime
soda processes, and about 30 percent by a Soviet process based on nepheline;
major difficulties have accompanied the use of the latter process. There were
extensive removals of aluminum rolling and magnesium rolling and fabricating
equipment from Germany at the end of World War II, and since that time
imports of equipment have originated in Czechoslovakia and in Free World
countries.

ibid.

CHAPTER TEN

Western Assistance
to the Soviet Iron and Steel Industry

BLAST-FURNACE DESIGN AND OPERATION SINCE 1950

The U.S.S.R. relies heavily on blast furnaces to produce pig iron. Since
Soviet industry generates comparatively little scrap, steel plant input is predomi-
nantly liquid pig iron from blast furnaces; by contrast, the United States practice
i uses pig iron and scrap in various proportions depending on location and relative
prices.

M. Gardner Clark has discussed the development of blast-furnace design
in the U.S.S.R., 1 where until 1955 there were three basic furnace designs.
The first, developed in about 1930 by the Freyn Company of Chicago, had
a capacity of 930 to 1000 cubic meters and a nominal daily output of 1000
tons of pig iron. The second (1935-36) basic design was by Gipromez, with
the earlier assistance of the McKee Corporation of Cleveland as consultants,
and had a capacity of 1 100 cubic meters. The third basic design of 1300 cubic
meters came shortly thereafter and was worked out completely by Gipromez.
During World War II there was a temporary reversal to a 600-cubic-meter
design, and although a 1500-cubic-meter furnace was designed during that period
by Gipromez, postwar construction continued in the three basic designs of the
1930s.

According to P. A. Shiryaev, 1 only one operating furnace in 1951 had
a useful volume of 1370 cubic meters, i.e., the third, all-Gipromez, design.
In other words, up to 1951 all Soviet blast furnaces except one were of the
basic 1930 design, for which the McKee and Freyn firms acted as consultants.

In the late 1950s there was considerable discussion in Soviet engineering
circles concerning larger furnaces with capacities of 1513, 1719, and 2286
cubic meters (the last designed by Giprostal), and Shiryaev has tables on the
technical and economic efficiency of such designs. 5 According to the calculations

' n Ci ',i^I CUu ?' The Econom >" of Soviet Site! (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1956), p. 64-69. '

1 P . A Shiryaev , ' The Economic Advantages of Large Types of B last Furnaces - " i n Contemporary
Problems of Metallurgy. A. M. Samarin, ed.. (New York: Consultants Bureau, 1960), p.

• ml

122

Soviet Iron and Steel Industry 123

of Shiryaev and Ramm, there is little doubt that the large design (2286 cubic
meters) is efficient in terms of cost. However, as was pointed out by American
consultants in the 1930s, large-capacity blast furnaces have problems not reflected
in the theoretical calculations; in particular, there are raw-material feed problems
and physical problems connected with the ability of coke to withstand increased
stack pressures. The Russians have built seven of the larger design, each produc-
ing 3000 tons of pig iron per day 4 although designed to produce 4000 tons
per day. s

BLAST-FURNACE INNOVATIONS

Metallurgists have known since 1871 that raising blast furnace gas pressures
substantially increases the rate of smelting. Application of top pressure began
in both the United States and the U.S.S.R. during World War II, and widespread
adoption of the technique came in both countries in the early 1950s. According
to data in an article by V. G. Voskoboinikov, adoption started in the United
States, but the U.S.S.R. quickly caught up, and by 1956, 51 furnaces with
high top pressure were operating in the U.S.S.R. against only 28 in the United
States." Rapid adoption in the U.S.S.R. was undoubtedly due to the fact that
output could be increased 5 to 10 percent with a comparatively small investment
and simple equipment modifications; introduction was helped by a concentrated
research effort.

Early studies in Belgium and at the U ,S . Bureau of Mines noted two offsetting
drawbacks to the use of oxygen in blast furnaces (as distinct from its use in
open-hearth furnaces) — the cost of oxygen, and the detrimental effect on furnace
linings. According to M. Gardner Clark, the Soviets repeated these tests in
the 1940s, came to the same conclusions, and dropped this line of development.
Later, in January 1963, the Voest Company of Austria received $10 million
in lieu of patent rights for use of the Linz-Donawitz oxygen refinement process.

Direct reduction can be achieved by a number of comparatively recent proces-
ses — there are more than 30 variants — that circumvent the blast furnace. Their
useful features are lower capital costs, lower minimum capacities, the ability
to use noncoke fuels, and the ability to use low-grade ores. Although Germany
had commercial direct-reduction operations before World War II, the process
did not make headway until the 1950s.

The early German plants were moved to the U.S.S.R. in 1945, and the
U.S.S.R. has since purchased further direct-reduction plants.

* Wall Street Journal . April 17, 1963. 14:3.

5 N. G. Cordero, ed. h Iron and Steel Works of the World, 3d edition (London: Quin Press,
1962), p. 771.

* V. G. Voskoboinikov and L. 1. Slephushova, 'Blast Furnace Operation at Increased Gas
Pressures" in Samarin, op. cit. n, 2, p, 190.

124 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 10-1 DISPOSAL OF 29 KRUPP-RENN DIRECT-REDUCTION PLANTS

Plant
no.

Original location

Date
built

Dare moved
to U.S.SB.

1
2
3

5 to 29

Barbeck

Frankenstein

Watenstedt-Salzg Itter

Czechoslovakia

Japan, Korea, and Manchuria

1935
1935

1941
1943
1935-45

1945

1945
Still in place
All in Korea and
Manchuria moved to
U.S.S.R. in 1945-46

Source: The Krupp-Renn Process, lor Production of Iron Withou
Fine-grained Fuel and for the Economical Processing ol Low-c-
(Essen, n.d).

Metallurgical Coke Using
«?e High Silica Ores

CONTINUOUS CASTING OF STEEL

Soviet attempts to apply continuous casting on a wide scale in an attempt
to circumvent the blooming-mill stage demonstrate clearly both the political
pressure for innovation in the Soviet Union and one of the pitfalls implicit
in centrally decreed innovation.

Continuous casting of metals has been under development since Sir Henry
Bessemer's original patent in 1858; by eliminating the need for the soaking
pits and the blooming mill it offers the promise of large savings in capital
costs and greater metal yields. The B. Atha Company in the United States
produced file steel by continuous casting from about 1890 to 1910, but up
to 1950, commercial applications of continuous casting were limited mainly
to nonferrous metals, and particularly to aluminum. (All U.S. aluminum today
is continuous-cast.) The first large-scale Western commercial steel installation
was for alloy steels at Atlas Steel in Welland, Canada, in 1954, and by 1959
a total of 25 plants were operating on a development or commercial basis in
at least 12 countries. In 1959 the U.S.S.R. had three development plants and
probably three in production. 7 These were plants of the Junghans-Rossi type. 8

The advantages of continuous casting are numerous if the process can be
used on a production scale. Quality of cast slabs and blooms is good, although
considerable difficulties have been encountered with continuous-cast rimming
steels. The yield is excellent, with a ratio of liquid steel to slab of about 94
to 97 percent, compared with the conventional yield of 85 percent using a

* In 1963, one source stated only three plants were operating in the U.S.S.R. This is probably

conservative, but see Wall Strtet Journal, April 17, 1963,
9 Institute of Metals Journal (London), March 19S8, p. 182; Metal Progress (Cleveland. O.)

May 1959. p. 106.

Soviet Iron and Steel Industry 125

blooming mill. Capital costs are decidedly lower, especially in small plants;
both capital and operating costs for a blooming mill may be four times greater
than with continuous casting.

In the early 1950s Soviet weaknesses in certain areas of iron and steel
production became pressing. Rolled flat products (i.e., sheet and strip steel)
comprised 20 percent of total rolled products in 1940 9 and increased to only
25 percent by 1955. By comparison, in the United States the 1940 ratio was
over 45 percent, and in 1955 probably over 60 percent. A number of studies 10
have indicated that the percentage requirements of flat- rolled steel products
increases with industrialization. In other words, the relative demand for sections
(e.g., bars and structurals) declines, and the relative demand for sheet steel
(for use in automobiles, appliances, galvanizing, pipe, and tinplate) increases
as industrial development progresses. However, flat-rolled products require a
much greater investment in processing and finishing facilities (pickling, annea-
ling, cold rolling, skin pass mills, galvanizing, and tinning lines) than do section
products. Apart from the magnitude of the investment involved, there are indica-
tions that the Soviets have not fully appreciated the technological gap they
have to bridge between hot-rolled sections and flat cold-rolled products."

The prospect of having to make substantial investments in rolling mill equip-
ment and new techniques prompted a search for less expensive alternatives.
Continuous casting was one promising alternative, which was recognized by
Gipromez and other design bureaus; development work on the process began
at the Central Research Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy in Moscow in 1938.
The Krasny Oktyabr Works (1951), Novo Tula (1955), and Kirov (1956) con-
tinued this work. In 1956 continuous casting was presented to the Twentieth
Congress of the CPSU as a possible means of leap-frogging Western technology;
the lower capital costs would avoid heavy investment in blooming mills, sim-

■ R. H. Jones, The Roads to Russia (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). p. 20.
Soviet production of steel was 20 million tons in 1940 and only 8.8 million tons in 1942;
2,589,766 ions of sceel were sent between 1941 and 1945 under Lend Lease. Although this
appears only a small fraction of Soviet output, Jones comments, "Appearances are deceiving.
Most of the Lend Lease steel comprised specialty steels such as high-speed cold steel, cold-finished
bars, hot-rolied aircraft steel, tinplate. steel wire, pipe and tubing, and hot-rolled sheets and
plates. More than one-fifth of the Lend Lease steels included railroad rails and accessories.
In other words, Russia imported specially steels, freeing her mills from the expense and time
involved in their production." Jones adds that the $13.2 million worth of equipment for their
steel mills enabled the Soviets to increase the output of carbon steel ingots by 2.5 million
tons per year.

10 Various reports of the Economic Commission for Europe and Economic Commission for Latin
America (United Nations).

" For example: "Of the cold-rolled sheets from rimming steel ingots ai the Novosibirsk plant,
50 percent of the sheets were classified in the second grade ... due to ... small scabs ...
measuring 0.5-3 mm wide and 200-300 mm long with a thickness of up to 0.2 mm." G.
V. Gurskii, "The Continuous Casting of Steel" \t\Samarin, op. cit. n. 2, p. 285. No Western
mill would classify this defect as a "second"; laminations of this magnitude are classified
as scrap.

126 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

plified construction would reduce lead time required for development of more
powerful blooming mills, and excellent yield offered the promise of increasing
steel output per ruble of investment. ' * There is no doubt that by 1 956 considerable
progress had been made in solving problems connected with continuous casting
of tonnage steels, but by Western engineering standards the process developed
was not suitable for application in large plants. Western engineers were in
general agreement that the process was then limited to alloy steels with a high
hot strength. Inland Steel, for example, considered the process, and Iron Age
reported: "In 1956 . . . Inland decided in favor of conventional equipment and
against continuous casting . . , there was not sufficient time available to master
all the problems." 13

In 1956, then, continuous casting was under consideration in both the West
and the U.S.S.R. for large-tonnage plants. Engineering opinion in the West
was against adoption; on the other hand, the process was adopted in the Soviet
Union.

Stal' reports that by 1961 ten installations had been brought into use, including
pilot plants and single-strand units with limited capacity. 14 A rough estimate
is that probably about one-half million tons was poured by continuous casting
in the U.S .S ,R. in 1961 , with an absolute maximum of one million tons; directives
of the party congress had called for 12 to 15 million tons to be poured by
this method in 1961 . By 1962 no Soviet plant was entirely dependent on continu-
ous casting; i.e., the soaking-pit blooming-mill stage was retained in all steel
plants. The cost to the Soviets in trying to meet the goals set by the party
must have been considerable because of the investment in continuous casting
plants, the continued demand for blooming mills and soaking pits which neces-
sitated running two methods simultaneously in the same plant, and the lead
time lost in blooming-mill development. In particular, it was known in 1956
that continuous casting was not suitable for rimming steels, which are preferred
for reasons of quality in flat-rolled products, and for which Soviet production
capacity is notably weak. By 1962 the problems connected with rimming steels
had not been solved in either the U.S.S.R. or the United States.

"Capital investment for the construction of continuous pouring installations is repaid in less
than one year. With continuous pouring there is no need for blooming mills [or] the building
of such costly premises of open-hearth plants as the mold yards and shops for ingot stripping.
Continuous pouring of steel will become widespread in the sixth five year period. It was pointed
out at the 20th Congress of the CPSU that if 12-15 million tons of steel are poured by the
new method in 1960, which is fully feasible, this will yield an additional million tons of
rolled stock (by cutting down losses and waste) and a saving of 2,000 million rubles." Laiar
Roitburd, Soviet Iron and Steel Industry (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House , 1 956) .
Iron Age, May 18, 1961.

S. K., "The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU and the Soviet Iron and Steel Industry,"
Stal' (English version), no. 7, July 1961.

Soviet and Steel Industry 127

STEEL ROLLING TECHNIQUES IN THE SOVIET UNION

Although there was no attempt after World War II to remove complete
iron and steel plants under reparations to the U.S.S.R., there was a great deal
of selective removal — particularly of rolling mills and finishing equipment. The
Huttenwerk Salzgitter A.G. was dismantled between 1945 and 1950; 15 in fact,
Alfred Zauberman estimates that four-fifths of East German metallurgical capac-
ity was dismantled 18 (although this may have been restricted to specialized
units). Plate rolling mills, tube facilities, coal washing plants, and special steel
facilities in Manchuria were completely dismantled," but blast furnaces were
not removed and other facilities were only selectively removed.

Well after the war the U.S.S.R. was still turning out a large proportion
of its limited production of steel sections on hand-bar mills; in 1956, for example,
only 53 percent of rolled steel sections was produced on modern mills, leaving
47 percent to be produced on the old-type "in-train" hand mills. These figures
indicate a considerable lag in technology. The hand-bar mill is very limited
in both speed and capacity; continuous and semicontinuous mills have replaced
"in-train" mills almost completely in the West. The only use for the hand-bar
mill in the United States during the last 50 years or so has been possibly in
limited rollings of special products; e.g., it is probably used for wrought iron.
Even in Europe such mills are rare.

By far the weakest part of the Soviet iron and steel industry is in the production
of flat-rolled products, i.e., hot- and cold-rolled sheet and strip as well as
coated sheet and strip. For such production the choice of techniques is essentially
between continuous or semicontinuous sheet and strip mills (including Steckel
mills) and the obsolete hand-sheet mill or pack mill. 18 In 1960, the United
States had 39 continuous wide hot-strip mills, all with extensive additional
cold-rolling and finishing facilities; at the same time Japan had five, the United
Kingdom four, and Mexico two wide strip mills. In 1960 the U.S.S.R. had
only five continuous or Steckel-type mills. lb

This lack of wide strip rolling facilities is reflected in the composition of
Soviet steel output. The share of sheet steel in ail rolled products was 25 percent

15 Germany, 1945-1954 {Cologne; Boas International Publishing Co. [1954?]), p. 493.

,s A Ifred Zauberman, Mrtar™/ Progress in Poland .Czechoslovakia ,<wd East Germany . 1937-1962

(New York: Oxford University Press. 1964), pp. 174, 187.
17 Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Assets in Manch\iria to the President of the United

States, July 1946 {Washington, S946).
,B The hand-sheet mill has a few uses in the West today; it is used in the United Kingdom

and Belgium for blue planished sheets, and in the United Stales probably only for high-silicon

electrical sheets.
19 Based on Iron and Steel Institute, Production of Wide Steel Strip {London. 1960), p. 75.

128

Western Technology and Economic Development, 1945-1965

in 1955, but of this only 23 percent came from continuous or semicontinuous
milts.

Table 10-2 suggests a heavy dependence on Western technology in the five
wide strip mills operating in the U.S. S.R. in 1960: three are of Western manufac-
ture. The first Russian-built continuous sheet mill was installed not in Russia
but at Nowa Huta in Poland. 10 The tinplate mill for this plant was supplied
by U.S. firms "financed from American credit." 21 The reported operating
troubles of the Russian-made mill 2 * would suggest in the context of our study
that the Soviets installed their first mill in Poland to avoid domestic production
interruptions from an inadequately engineered mill.

Table TO-2

ORIGINS OF SOVIET CONTINUOUS WIDE STRIP MILLS
AS OF 1960

Width,

Type

inches

Origin

1 . Zaporozhtal

Continuous

U.S. (United)

2. Kuibyshev

Continuous

U.S. (United)

3. Magnitogorsk

Continuous

U.S.S.R.(Kramator)

4. Chelyabinsk

Semicontinuous

German (Steckel)

5. Voroshilov

Continuous

96(7)

U.S.S.R. (?)

Source: Great Britain, Iron and Steel Institute, Production of Wide Steel Strip (London,
1960).

Note: There is also ev Idence of an old 50- inch German sem icont inuous m ill (from repara-
tions) at Nizhni Tagil. A prototype Kramator reversing mill with furnace coilers is located
at Lipetsk.

Thus it is concluded that there is a heavy Soviet dependence on Western
technology in the production of flat-rolled steel from continuous and semicontinu-
ous mills. It should be noted that the development, construction, and operation
of this type of mill requires far greater technical sophistication than do the
facilities for pig iron or steel production. "Shock" methods applied to wide
strip mill scheduling would be chaotic, as shock methods cannot be applied
to the more sophisticated technologies where tight control of specification is
easily lost and a delicate balance must be maintained between the subsystems.

THE STEEL PIPE AND TUBE INDUSTRY

The two basic techniques in pipe and tube manufacturing are the seamless
and welded tube processes. The earliest seamless techniques were variants of

20 M. Gardner Clark, "Report on the Nowa Huta Iron and Steel Plant Named After Lenin,
Near Cracow, Poland" (Ithaca; School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornel) University,
September 1957), mimeographed.

11 Zauberman. op. cil. n. 16, p. 193.

" Clark, op. eii. n. I.

Soviet Iron and Steel Industry

129

the Mannesman skew rolling principle using a mandrel; present-day Stiefel mills,
plug mills, and continuous seamless mills are based on Mannesman rolling
principles and account for about 60 percent of Soviet tube production. The
push-bench techniques, now obsolete, and the extrusion process for small-
diameter special-alloy tubes are also of German origin.

The second main group of manufacturing techniques is a variant of the
welded seam process, and accounts for the remaining 40 percent of Soviet
tube output. The Fretz-Moon technique of continuous butt welding originated
in the United States in the early 1920s; submerged electric-arc welding for
large-diameter tubes and electric-resistance welding (ERW) were developed at
a later date, although ERW did not come into widespread use until after World
War II.

Most techniques in use in the world today conform to one of these two
basic Western methods, one German and one American. An examination of
Soviet methods indicates that all plants use one of these methods (except Lipetsk,
which uses a spun-cast process of unknown origin). Moreover in 1962 Soviet
pipe and tube plants not only were based on Western technology but to a great
extent were using Western equipment. The Soviet heavy-machinery-building

Table 10-3 PROCESS

USED IN SOVIET PIPE AND TUE

3E MILLS IN law

Plant

Process

Product

Taganrog

Pilger

Oil Pipe

Novomoskovsk

Pilger

Large-diameter oil pipe

Zhdanov

—

Seamless p ipe and tube to
14 inches

Dnepropetrovsk

Stiefel

Seamless tubes

Dnepropetrovsk

Pilger

—

(Karl Liebknecht}

Nikopol

Stiefel 1
Mannesman f

Small-diameter tube

Pervouralsk

Stiefel

Tubes for oil and chemical

Rockrite )
Fretz-Moon 1

industry

Chelyabinsk

Oil and gas pipes to 38
inches in diameter

Stiefel

—

Pilger

—

Electric resistance

—

Weld mill

—

Kamensk-Uralskiy

Draw bench type

Pipe to 75 mm diameter

Viksa

Electric weld mill

—

Lipetsk

Spun cast

—

Rustavi

Mannesman (U.S.-built)

—

Sumgait

Seamless mills

—

Novosibirsk

Electric weld mills

Source: Economic Commission for Europe. The European Stool Pipe and Tube Industry
(Geneva, 19SS); M. Gardner Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1956); M. G. Cordero. Iron and Steel Works of the World, 3d edition
(London: Quin, 1962).

130 Western Technology and Soviet Economic DevMopment , 1945-1965

plants do not appear to have completely mastered the art of building tube-rolling
machinery, or else it has been found more advantageous to import Western
equipment. There has been a limited development of new techniques, in effect
modifications of the basic methods, by TsKBMM, and "authors' certificates"
have been awarded to some Soviet designers, but the scope of this work is
not extensive.

Table 10-3 indicates the process used in 15 Soviet tube and pipe plants.
In 1960 the Soviet Union apparently could not produce a tube mill of any
type capable of manufacturing steel tube greater than 400 mm in diameter. 23
This observation is confirmed by examination of the equipment contained in
the most important Soviet tube mills. The Chelyabinsk tube mill, the largest
in Europe with a production in excess of one million tons of tubes and pipes
per year, has equipment completely of Western origin. Chelyabinsk has four
Fretz-Moon mills for production of butt- welded tube between 3/8 and three
inches in diameter; the strip heating furnaces in the Fretz-Moon mill were built
from Salem Engineering drawings, and the leveling and uncoiling machines
were made by Aetna Standard Company. 24 The Stiefel mill shop produces
tubes between three and four inches in outside diameter using the standard
Stiefel mill. The Pilger mill shop produces large-diameter seamless tubes from
12 to 22 inches in outside diameter; the piercer is a rotary-type Mannesman
followed by two Pilger mills built by Eisenwerk Witkovice in Czechoslovakia.
The worn rolls are built up by welding with Krupp welding rod." A newer
plant, completed in 1959, produces welded pipe up to 820 mm (32.3 inches)
in diameter by the U.S. submerged-arc process, and is the first plant of its
type in the Soviet Union. 2 *

Another important Soviet tube mill is at Rustavi (all Soviet seamless tube
capacity is located at either Nikopol or Rustavi). The report of the 1956 British
Iron and Steel Delegation indicated that the Rustavi mill was "orthodox in
design and layout and generally typical of works built about 30 years ago." 2r
The Nikopol mill was originally installed by a U.S. firm in the 1930s." In
1956 two Russian-built electric-resistance welding mills also were installed in
Nikopol; these have piercers of the Mannesman type followed by plug or Stiefel
mills.

" V. L. \gtt.Tekhnicheskii progress v chernoi metailurgii SSSR ; Prokatnoe i trvbnoe proizvodstvo
(Moscow, 1962). This is an excellent compendium of technicoeeonomic information.

" Iron and Steel Making in the V.S.S.R.. with Special Reference to the Urals Region. A Report
to the British Iron and Steel Federation by a British Steel Delegation, (Rochester, Kent: Staples,
1956), p. 66.

" Ibid., p. 67.

" Ibid., p. 65.

57 The Russian Iron and Steel Industry, A Report Prepared by a British Steel Mission to the
U.S.S.R., Special Report No. 57 (London: Iron and Steel Institute, April 1956), p. 19. The
reader should also see Yu. F. Shevakin, Stony kholodnoi prokaiki trub (Moscow, 1966); and
L. I. Spivskovsltii, Ekonomika trubnoi promysklennosti SSSR (Moscow, 1967).

" See Sutton II, p. 74.

Soviet Iron and Sleel industry 131

SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO METALLURGY

According to J. H. Westbrook, writing in 1961 after a visit to seven Soviet
metallurgical laboratories, 21 * the Soviets are more interested in exploiting the
properties of compounds than in improving or understanding their nature. Says
Westbrook:

In the superalloy field, despite a large amount of research on nickel, cobalt,
and iron-based superalloys, Soviet scientists are apparently without any unique
advances or developments of their own. This observation is even more surprising
in that they have had full knowledge of both the empirical and theoretical develop-
ments of the Western world. Most of their work is descriptive — it has not been
(and, in most instances, cannot be) correlated with particular models of deformation
or fracture. 30

Westbrook then identifies three areas in which the Soviets have made unique
contributions in the field of materials processing, although a decade later there
is contradictory evidence as to whether the Soviets have been able to maintain
their position in these fields:

1 . friction welding

2. electroslag melting (for ingots of special alloys)

3. powder rolling

Westbrook also notes that laboratories in the early sixties were well supplied
with equipment of foreign origin: "... they have a considerable amount of
foreign- made equipment as well as Russian of foreign designs. " 31 After pointing
out that his delegation saw Russian-built copies of General Radio Variacs,
Simpson meters, Du Mont oscilloscopes, and L & N recorders, Westbrook
continues: ". .. they appear to concentrate on one design, their own or that
of someone else, and then build and use large numbers of identical units." 32

Soviet work in electroslag welding (where, unlike arc welding, the heat
is obtained by passage of electric current through a bath of molten slag) came
to fruition in about I960 with the attainment of an ability to weld parts up
to a thickness of 2% inches using one electrode. 33 The process was immediately
licensed to the Swedish firm Esab. 34 Russian work in friction welding by V.
I. Vill led to publication of his textbook Friction Welding of Metals by the
American Welding Society in 1962, although there is some question whether
the Soviets have maintained any significant advance over current U.S. knowledge

2S J. H. Westbrook. "High Temperature Materials in the Soviet Union," Metal Progress (Cleveland,

O.), February 1962,
™ Ibid.
31 Ibid.
" Ibid.

33 Welding Journal (London), February 1959. pp. 132-34,
31 East-West Commerce VI. 3 (March 3i. 1959), 8.

132 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

and methods." Continued Soviet imports of furnaces for heat treating of metals
from the 1930s through the 1960s also suggests that Russian work in metals
processing has been somewhat uneven. 3 *

Thus we may conclude, as have other observers, 37 that at the end of the
1960s Soviet technology in ferrous metallurgy industries is an adaptation of
Western technology, although much Soviet work and effort have been devoted
to developing this technology.

The classical blast furnace has been increased in volume and top pressure
has been introduced. Sintering strands are Dwight-Lloyd to Lurgi drawings;
coke ovens are modified Koppers-Becker 38 ; and direct reduction is Krupp-Renn.

In steelmaking we find expansion in the size of the classical open-hearth
furnaces with indigenous technological improvements. Oxygen convertor practice
is Austrian and continuous casting Junghans-Rossi; blooming mills are basically
United and Demag. Rolling techniques and finishing facilities in general are
backward (except where modernized by imported equipment) and approximate
the U.S. level of the 1930s.

Appreciation is due E. Strickland for this information; see U.S. Patent 3,460,734 of August

12 1969
1 A 'number of controlled-atmosphere heat-treating furnaces have been supplied from the United

States and from Birlec, Ltd., in England; see East-West Commerce. IV, 9 (September 30.

1937). 14, and V. 11 (November 29, 1958), 3. .

' Clark op cit n 1, p. 272; "We can say lhat the spectacular technical progress of the Soviet

iron and steel industry in recent years has been almost exclusively in the realm of adoption,

modification and improvement of inventions and innovations pioneered by the Western world.
■ See pp. 141-43.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Western Origins of Petroleum
and Allied Industries

THE TURBODRILL: AN INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT

In the field of oil well drilling the turbodrill is a distinct Soviet innovation
and quite different in principle from the U.S. rotary drill. In the 1960s over
80 percent of Russian oil well drilling was undertaken by the turbodrill method,
which utilizes a hydraulic drive at the bottom of the drill hole in contrast to
mechanical transmission through a string of steel pipes used in the rotary process . '
It appears, however, that the method has not proved completely satisfactory:
in 1960 it was recommended that development work be resumed on rotary
drilling, a recommendation no doubt dictated by overheating problems with
turbodrills as geological conditions necessitated ever deeper holes.

Russian turbodrills were tested by Dresser Industries of Texas specialists,
who concluded that the drills did not offer any advantage over prevailing U.S.
rotary techniques. Robert W. Campbell, whose work on the economics of the
turbodrill is by far the most exhaustive, concluded:

There is no denying that the turbodrill did make a very great contribution to
the improvement of Soviet drilling performance, and the conclusion of our critique
is not that the turbodrill was a mistake. Rather it is lhat the turbodrill could
have made an even greater aid to improved drilling performance if the designers
of this technology had better understood the correct economic criteria for design
decisions. 2

The interesting point is that while the Soviet Union was converted to the
rotary technique in the 1920s by American companies, 3 a decision was made
in the 1930s to convert to the indigenous turbodrill, and to a lesser extent
to the electrodrill 4 (rarely used outside the U.S.S.R.). This decision, defective

1 The best teehnicoeconomic discussion of Soviet drilling practice in English is RobenW. Campbell.

The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); see especially

the appendix to chapter 5. "Economics of the Turbodrill."
1 Ibid., p. 120.

' Sutton I: Western Technology . . . 1917 to 1930, pp. 23-25.
* The electrodrill in a Russian development similar to the turbodrill and dating back to the

1920s; in the 1960s it accounted for no more than ! percent of total Soviet drilling footage.

133

134 Wesrern Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

on economic grounds (vid. Campbell), left the Soviets with major technical
problems in the face of increasing deep-drilling requirements.

On the other hand, the work that has been done in the U.S.S.R. on rock
bits, both core and cone types, follows American practice. For example in
1940 the Carter Oil Company in the United States began work on cone bits,
first on a four-cone version and then on a three-cone version. Testing was
started by Carter in 1948 and the technology was licensed to The Hughes
Tool Company in 1956 although no tool based on the Carter principle has
been made commercially. 1 The Soviets started experimenting with a two-cone
bit in 1950 that had a "striking resemblance" to Carter's tools and methods. 6
The first Soviet bit No. DV-5 had a diameter of ten and three-quarter inches
in working position and less than six inches collapsed, and "the Soviet method
of lowering, connecting, disconnecting, and raising the retractable bits closely
followed the Carter technique." 7

U.S. ORIGINS OF REFINERY PROCESSES

Refinery capacity was expanded during World War II with significant
assistance from Lend Lease. 8 Initial Russian requests for refinery equipment,
handled by President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, included "crude distillation,
cracking and stabilization plants; an aviation lubricating oil plant; a high-octane
gasoline unit; and gasoline absorption plants." 9 These facilities were approved
by September 1942 and required $41 million in equipment plus the services
of 15 U.S. engineers. 10 Russian representatives inspecied the ten "newest"
refineries in the United States, and a program was established for training Russian
engineers and operators in the use and maintenance of the equipment. 11

At least 150,000 tons of equipment was sent un^er the program to build
four new refineries, two with catalytic cracking and alkylation equipment; equip-
ment for the production of 100-octane aviation gasoline was later added to

1 Petroleum Week (Chicago). Augusi 14, 1959, p. 25. Comparand diagram* in [he lext of

this article.
6 Ibid.
1 Ibid., p. 29. For details of the continuing Soviet interest in U.J. rotary drilling technology

and bits, see N. N. Kalmykov, Burovaia tekhnika i tekhnologiiu zu rubezlwm (Moscow, 1968).
" Sutton I, pp. 35-40. and Sutton II, pp. 81-90, for data concerning pervasive U.S. assistance

in 1928-44.
' U.S. Dept. of the Interior, A History of the Petroleum Administration for War. 1941-1945

(Washington. 1946). p. 269.
10 U.S. Dept. of State, Report on War Aid Furnished by ihe United States to ike U.S.S.R.

(Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945), p. 16. The figure of S41 million is 100

low; final figures were probably closer to S100 million for refineries. See U.S. Dept. of the

Interior, op. err. n. 8, p. 270, and add subsequent shipments under the "pipeline agreement."
" U.S. Dept. of the Interior, op. cil. n. 9, p. 270-71.

Petroleum and Allied Industries 135

the other two refineries. 15 In all, U.S. assistance was provided for seven refineries
between 1942 and 1946. Between $14 and $15 million worth of equipment
was shipped for refineries at Gurtev, Orsk, Kuibyshev, and Krasnovodsk, with
an unknown amount of equipment for refineries at Syzran, Sterlitamak (Novo
Ufa), and Moscow. 13 These American acquisitions became the basis for Soviet
construction.

The Soviets have standardized the design of domestic-built refineries, and
new capacity comprises completely integrated units with attendant secondary
facilities. The Type A standard refinery has an annual crude oil charge of
about 2,8 million tons and the more common Type B has an annual crude
oil charge of 6.6 million tons; these are multiples of the smaller Type A unit.
(See Table 11-1.) One refinery, that at Omsk, consists of three Type B standard
units. Design also includes standardized process schemes dependent on the
specification of the available crude oil:

Type I : For crude oil under 1 .9 percent sulfur, producing fuel and lubricating
oils — atmospheric and vacuum primary distillation, thermal cracking, catalytic
cracking, catlytic reforming, lubricating oil production, and asphalt production.

Type II: For crude oil with less than 1.9 percent sulfur, producing fuel
only — atmospheric and vacuum primary distillation, thermal cracking, catalytic
cracking, and catalytic reforming.

Type III: For crude oil with over 2.0 percent sulfur — atmospheric distil-
lation. M

The 1960 U.S. Oil Delegation was able to acquire sufficient data to construct
flow diagrams and so isolate the standard process schemas described above.
The basic flow sheets are those of Lend Lease installations known to have
U.S. equipment, e.g.. Novo Kuibyshev (Type A), Novo Ufa (Type A), Novo
Baku (Type B), and Syzran (Type B). Further, R.E. Ebel has described Novo
Ufa as "U.S. wartime design," 15 and according to the Petroleum Administration
for War Kuibyshev and Syzran were destinations for U.S. Lend Lease instal-

11 Ibid,, and U.S. Depi. of Slate, op. cjt. n. 10, p. 16, appendixes A and B "'Pipeline Agreement."
There was a significant amount of other petroleum assistance both in export of petroleum
products and in oil field equipment.

13 U.S. Dept. of Ihe Interior, op. cit. n.9, p. 270. The figures given in this source for Syzran.
Sterlitsmak, and Moscow are incomplete; they do not take account of shipments under Ihe
"pipeline agreement" of October 1945. A rather interesting example of the attempt to imitate
American practice is the reprinting in book form of the standards of the American Petroleum
Institute, particularly those relating to pumps, compressors, tubes, and casing. See Rukovotlstvo
po trubain ueftianogo sortamettta i ikh soedineniium. primeniaetnym zo rubezhom (Sprovochttoe
posobie) (Moscow: Standurdy Amcrikanskogo Neftianogo lnstituta, 1969).

H Impact of Oil Exports from the Soviet Bloc. A Report of the National Petroleum Council,
vol. II, October 4, 1962 (Washington, 1962). pp. 143-44. Also see Chemisette Techitik {Berlin),
XIII, 7-8 (July- August 1961). 473-76.

11 Robert E. Ebel, The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet Union (New York: American Petroleum
institute, June 1961), p. 1 18

136 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

lation. 16 Thus we can trace domestic Soviet refinery construction to U.S. design
and technology.

Table 11-1 MAJOR SOVIET REFINERIES BUILT BETWEEN 1945 AND 1960

Vearof
probable

Year of

Final capacity
(mBon

Origin of
refinery

Refinery

start

finish

metric tons

Novo Baku

1948

1952-53

7.1 (increment

1950-60)

25.0

Type B standard

Kuibyshev No. 2

1947

1950

U.S. Lend Lease

(Houdry)

Novo Ufa

194a

1951

12.5

U.S. Lend Lease
(Houdry)

Chemilovsk

1950

1955

12.5

n.a.

Syzran

pre-1946

1950

7.0

U.S. Lend Lease

Salavat

pre-1946

1954

3.2

n.a.

Novo Ishimbay

1953

1955

2.6

Type A standard

Novo Gorki

1951

1958

2.6

Type A standard

Omsk

1949

1955

18.9

3 of Type B
standard
Type B standard

Stalingrad

1946

1957

6.6

Perm

1951

1958

6.6

Type B standard

Fergana

1949

1958

6.6

Type B standard

Novo Yaroslavl

1953

1960

6.6

TypeBslandard

Ryazan

1952

1960

6.6

Type B standard

Angarak

1954

1960

12.6

2 o1 Type B
standard

Kritovo

1958

1960

2.6

Type A standard

Pavlodar

1956

1960

6.6

Type B standard

Polotsk
TOTAL

1958

1960

6.6
149.7

Type B standard

Source: Impact of Oil Exports from the Soviet Bloc:
Council (Washington, DC, 1962), vol. 2, p. 150.

' A Report of the National Petroleum

Just after World War II part of the German Leuna-Merseburg brown-coal
synthetic gasoline plant was installed at Dzerzhinsk (Gorki) to produce avgas
and nitrogen. 17 In 1953 East German companies supplied equipment for a synthe-
tic gasoline plant, at Lake Baikal, producing 20,000 barrels per day.' 8 In 1956
two refineries in the Arctic Circle near the Taimyr Peninsula installed U.S.
equipment. 19

A considerable quantity of oil processing equipment has been imported by
the U.S.S.R. since World War II from Czechoslovakia, including sufficient

" U.S. Dept. of the Interior, op. cit. n. 9, p. 270.

17 Petroleum Refiner (Houston), vol. 35, no. 9. p. 421 . See p. 139 below

18 Ibid.
11 Ibid.

Petroleum and Allied Industries

137

capacity for several refineries, presumably for the standard Soviet Types A
and B. Until June 1957 Czechoslovakia had manufactured and shipped the
following units: 20

Four cracking plants

Two AVT plants

Four GFU plants

Five thermal cracking units

Eleven AVT plants

1 .460,000 tons/yr.
4,380,000 tons/yr.
1.460,000 tons/yr.
t, 825,000 tons/yr.
12,045,000 tons/yr.

Moves to upgrade early U.S. technology were made in the first part of
the 1960s. In 1963 Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, reported that
the U.S.S.R. wanted to purchase a complete oil refinery in the United Kingdom
and was prepared to pay $280 million for the installation. 21 In 1966 a contract
was let to a French company, Societe Gexa, for a gasoline plant; no further
data were given except that the contract was valued at $13 million. 22 Presumably
this acquisition will become the basis for further domestic construction in the
refinery sector.

DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL GAS UTILIZATION

The Soviet Union has rich resources of natural gas located some distance
from consuming centers; this focuses attention on the development of a transmis-
sion system to move gas to the larger cities, and particularly to the industrial
areas. Although writers do not agree on the exact figures, it is apparent that
the length of pipelines in operation increased from about 4000 kilometers in
the mid 1950s to about 40,000 by 1966." Campbell has said: "In the Soviet
Union the length of the city distribution network is only about two-thirds of
the transmission system, whereas in the United States it is about double the
length of the transmission system." 24 This implies, as Campbell points out,
a low domestic utilization of natural gas.

Two factors of interest for this study are the diameter of the pipeline, as

10 Czechoslovak Foreign Trade (Prague), June 1957.

11 Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1963, 2:3 .

12 Wall Street Journal. June 27, 1966, 9:3.

There is a discussion of this question in Campbell, op. cit. n. 1, chapters 7 and 10. Also
see, J. Chapelle and S. Ketchian, URSS, seconde producteur de petrole du monde (Paris:
Publications de Hnstitut Francais du Petrole Collection, Science et Technique du Petrole No.
4, 1963), pp. 258-63, for details on pipelines, maps, and listing of gas deposits. An incisive
first-hand description of the situation in 1961 is contained in American Gas Association, Inc.,
"U.S.S.R. Natural Gas Industry," the report of the 1961 U.S. delegation to the Soviet natural
gas industry. There is more information on city distribution methods in National District Heating
Association, District Healing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Pittsburgh 1967)
" Campbell, op. cit. n. 1, p. 208.

138 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Drrrlopment, 1945-1965

the Soviets have definite restrictions on size of pipe rolled, 2 -"' and the use of
compressors. The longest lines have been built with irrported pipe. The first
line, Saratov-Moscow (843 kilometers), completed in 1946, had U.S. Lend
Lease assistance; the 1951 Dachava-Kiev-Moscow line was built with 20-inch
(720-mm) pipe supplied by A. O. Smith in the United Status" and as of 1962
it was the only pressure- welded line in the Soviet Union. The ivloscow-Stavropol
line (1020 mm) utilized pipe purchased from Phoenix-Rheinrohr in West Ger-
many, 27 and Swedish welding rods.

The inability to produce requisite sizes of compressors <ias been a major
drawback and has forced reliance on either imported comp.essors or the use
of field pressure, thus reducing the effectiveness of transmission systems. The
first line, Saratov-Moscow, with daily capacity of 80 million cubic feet, was
equipped with 24 U ,S. compressors of 1000 hp installed in six booster stations. 28
Campbell points out that lines have operated without compressors and cites
the intention to install seven million kilowatts of compressor capacity on 26,000
km of line built between 1959 and 1965 (actually there was only one million
kilowatts of compressors in the 28,500-kilometer system as of January 1 , 1964). 2!l
The problems facing the Soviets in the field of compressors, and particularly
in securing the desired mix of compressor types, are described by Campbell;
suffice to note for our purpose that the original standard compressor 10GK.-1
is a copy of the U.S. unit supplied for the Saratov-Moscow line, 50 and other
mechanical units appear to be based on American types. For example, the
1961 American Gas Association Delegation reported a turbine unit in one new
station: "The machine is very similar, except for its combustion system, to
our Westinghouse W-52 PM- 5000 hp units"; and then the report adds the
comparative data for the two units. 31 Further, while commenting on possible
use of gas turbines, one Russian reportedly stated

... he would like to obtain information on gas turbine experience from a mainte-
nance and operating standpoint in the United States. The only gas turbine with
which they have had any extensive experience was a Brown-Boveri. 32

The overall conclusion of the American Gas Association Delegation was:
"In general it can be stated that the techniques of recovery, transportation,
and utilization of natural gas in the U.S.S.R. are far behind those in the United
States."" This conclusion was confirmed in 1970 when an agreement was

15 See chapter 10.

" American Gas Association, Inc., op. cit. n, 23, p. 10.

" Ibid., pp. 12-13.

38 The Oil Weekly (Houston), November J, 1945, p. 5.

" Campbell, op. cii. n. 1, p. 154.

30 Ibid.

11 American Gas Association Inc.. op. cit. n. 23, p. 28.

31 Ibid., p. 25.
!1 Ibid., p. ii.

Petroleum and Allied Industries 139

signed with the Mannesmann-Thyssen concern of Essen, Germany, to supply
1.2 million metric tons of 52-inch-diameter pipeline for a total value of $327
million to carry natural gas from Siberia to Germany. Production of 52-
inch-diameter pipe was not possible in the U.S.S.R. in 1970. 3 *

THE GERMAN HYDROGENATION PLANTS

Soviet removals from the German petroleum industry after World War II
were concentrated on a relatively few German plants for the production of
liquid fuels and lubricating oils by the hydrogenation of brown coal. In general,
liquid fuel plants were only partly removed.

The largest unit, a hydrogenation plant near Szczecin, Poland, with a capacity
of 600,000 tons per year, was removed to the U.S.S.R. 35 The only unit in
Germany reported as completely removed was the Brabag (Braunkohle-Benzin
A.G.) at Magdeburg-Rothensee, 3 " with a capacity of 220,000 tons per year
including 120,000 tons of aviation fuel/" A smaller plant, Mineralolwerk
Lutzkendorf (Wintershall A.G.), was 80 percent removed; 38 this plant was
a producer of primary products from petroleum residues and tars, with a capacity
of less than 50,000 tons per year. 3 " The dozen or so other synthetic plants,
although not greatly damaged by Allied bombing,'"' were only partially
removed.'* 1

In Austria the oil fields were not dismantled, but they were operated on
Soviet account until the 1950s. 42

REMOVAL OF THE GERMAN BROWN
COAL BRIQUETT1NG INDUSTRY

Germany has large deposits of brown coal which requires drying and briquett-
ing before use. The raw material is disintegrated by rollers, pressed to remove
water, and passed through driers into briquetting machines. Since the coal itself

San Jose Mercury (San Jose, Calif.). February 2, 1970.

Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, 1937-

1962 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). p. 154.

G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontage; Sechs Jahre Reparationspolitik (Bremen: F.

Triijen, 1951), p. 94. no. 3.

CIOS XXXI1-107, l.C. Farbenindustrie A . C. Works, Leuna, p. 137M.

Harmssen, op. cit. n. 36, no. 9.

CIOS, op. cit. n. 37.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil, Chemicals and Rubber Diviiion, Team 46, Plan! Report

No. 2 : Braunkohle Benzin A . C. Zeitz, Germany; Braunkohle Benzin A.G. , Boehlen, Germany;

Wintershall A.G., Luetzkendorf, Germany (July 24, 1945).

Harmssen, op. cit. n. 36, pp. 94-106.

Germany, 1945-1954 (Cologne: Boas International Publishing Company. [1954?)), p, 476,

140

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1 945-} 965

contains a substantial quantity of bitumen, cementing material is not required. 43
German production of brown coal briquettes in 1938 was over 44 million metric
tons — about 98 percent of the world's total production.

Russia possesses similar large deposits of brown coal in an area to the
south of Moscow. The German brown coal briquetting plants were therefore
of considerable interest, and 27 major plants from the Soviet Zone of Germany
were removed to the U.S.S.R. (See Table 1 1-2.)

Table 11-2 LOCATION AND CAPACITY OF MAJOR GERMAN BRIQUETTING
PLANTS COMPLETELY REMOVED TO THE U.S.S.R. IN 1944-46

1937

Number

production

(000

German owner

Location of plant

Harmssen

metric tons)

Eintracht-Braunkohlenwerke A.G.

Werminghoff

790

Deutsche Erdfil

Regis-Breitingen

1200

Bab ina-Braunkohlerwerwertung

Muskau

(Hermann-Mine)

Use Bergbau A.G.

Hoyerswerda (Erika,
Anna-Mathilde, and

2772

Renate-Eva plants)

Bergwitzer Braunkohlenwerke

Bergwitz

230

Concordia

Nachterstedt

Riebechsche Montanwerke

Deuben

Profen

2013

Paul

Braunkohlen- und Brikettindustrie

Mtickenberg

1659

A.G. (Bubiag)

Eintracht Braunkohlenwerke A.G.

Welzow

57-58

800

Hallesche Pl&nnerschatt

Senftenberg

267

Total 1937 Production

9,807

Source: G. E. Harmssen. Am Abend 6er Demontage; Sachs Jahre Reparationspolitik,
(Bremen: F. TrfJJen, 1951), p. 78 et soq.

Of these 27 plants, fourteen, with an annual briquetting capacity of almost 10
million tons, were completely removed to the Soviet Union and another ten, with
a capacity of 6.3 million tons, were partly removed. 44 In all, briquetting capacity
of over 16 million tons was all or partly removed and the remainder put into
SAGs to produce brown coal briquettes which were partly exported to the West

U.S. Department of War. Coal Mining Industry of Germany, W.D. Pamphlet no. 31-204
(Washington, September 7, 1944), pp. 1SS-S7.

A.G. SSchsische Werke(SPD # U.Espenhain); Deutsche ErdSl A .G . (SPD # 19, Zipsendorf);
Deutsche ErdSl A .G . (SPD # 20,Gross-Zossen); A.G. SSchsische Werlce (SPD #21, Hirschfel-
de); Werchen-Weiszenfelser Braunkohlen A.G. (SPD # 40, Zeitz); Riebecksche Montanwerke
(SPD # 42, Kupferhamnwr, Obercoblingen); Mitteldeutscher Stahlwerke (SPD #43, Lauchham-
mer); Deutsche Grube A.G. (SPD # 44, Bitterfeld); Michel-Werke (SPD # 46, Witznitz);
Senftenberger Kohlenwerke A.G. (SPD # 62, Meurostolln).

Petroleum and Allied Industries

141

in 1946-48 and partly exchanged for reparations equipment for the Soviet Union.

Other plants with similar processes in Poland .i.e., Oberschlesesche Hydrier-
werke A.G. at BJachownia, I.G. Farben Heydebreck works at Kedzierzynia,
and Anorgana (New Roktta) at Bneg Dolny, also were partly dismantled and
shipped to the U.S.S.R. 45

A typical Lurgi standard low-temperature carbonization plant was that of
A. G. Sachsische Werke at Espenhain, 46 where bomb damage was relatively
light. Operations were easily restored, including the brown coal plant that was
equipped to recover 5-6000 bbl/day of liquid hydrocarbons from coking brown
coal. Built in 1936-40 and completely modern, the plant processed about six
million tons a year of brown coal in a briquetting plant with 37 plunger-type
presses — the largest in Germany. Briquets were then charged into a typical
Lurgi "Schwelerie" (low-temperature carbonization plant), from which about
1.4 million tons of coke was produced annually.

The 1944 output of this plant was as follows:

Brown coal briquets

2,696,000 metric tons

Tar from Schwelerie

297,000 metric tons

Coke from Schwelerie

l ,400,000 metric tons

Fuel oil

42,778 metric tons

Diesel oil

14,699 metric tons

Hard wax

6,541 metric tons

Soft wax

4,676 metric tons

Electrode coke

7,060 metric tons

25 percent crude phenols

32,000 metric tons

Sulfur

22,000 metric tons

Carbolic acid

9,600 metric tons

It can readily be seen that these plants were effective units for converting low-
grade brown coal, first into useful fuels and then by subsequent processing
into various chemicals.

KOPPERS-BECKER COKE OVEN TECHNOLOGY"

Construction of Soviet coke oven batteries before 1933 was undertaken by
German, French, and American companies. 48 No coke ovens or byproduct
recovery equipment, except for prototype items, have been purchased abroad

" Zauberman, op. cit. n. 35, p. 232.

" ClOS XXVH1-23, A.G. Sachsische Werke. Espenhain.

" Readers interested in coke oven accessory equipment should compare the excellent detail in
I. L. Nepomniashchii, Koksovye mashiny, ikh konsiruhsii i raschety (Moscow, 1963), with
any standard Western book on coke oven practice or, for a quick comparison. United States
Steel Corp., The Making. Shaping and Treating of Steel (Pittsburgh, 1957), chapter 4.

41 Described in Sutton II, pp. 1 15-19.

142 Western Technology and Sovier Economic Development, 1945-1965

since 1933; Soviet efforts have been concentrated on duplicating the best of
foreign technology, particularly the Koppers-Becker system developed by Kop-
pers Company, Inc., and its foreign licensees.

Soviet design organizations — particularly Giprokoks — have undertaken con-
siderable work to improve Western coke oven systems. Giprokoks has been
constantly at work since the early 1930s modifying and improving the original
Koppers-Becker designs, and this work forms a distinct pattern based on the
Koppers-Becker system with cross-over flues.

Table 11-3 DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET COKE OVEN CONSTRUCTION. 1945-60

Coking

chamber dimensions,

in mm

Coal charge in

Wimti

chamber volume

Period

(average)

Height

Length

in cubic meters

1945

407

4,300

13,120

20.0

(16")

(UMVV)

(43 '-%")

(716 cu.ft.)

1950

407

4,300

13,830

21.2

(16")

(14'-1W)

(45 '-4 "A")

(748 cu.ft.)

1956-1960

407

4,300

14,080

21.6 m"

(16")

(14'-11A")

(46'-2V«")

(760 cu.ft.)

450

5,000

15,040

30 m J

(17%")

(16--5")

(49 , -4Vb'*)

(1060 cu.ft.)

Source: Walter Farr, "Development of Coke-Oven Techniques in the U .S.S. R. ," Gas Journal

(London), Septembei

■ 12, 1962, p

i. 313.

The first standardization of the Koppers-Becker system was the PK1, which
was followed by a second standardization, the PK-2, again followed in 1942-47
by modifications and improvements of Koppers-Becker and Disticoque designs
of the early 1930s. These comprised first the PK-42 produced in 1942, the
PK-45 produced in 1945, and the PK-47 produced in 1947. The disadvantages
of the Koppers-Becker design were isolated and analyzed, and from this work
and ensuing modifications came the PK-2K system. The new system was first
built on a large scale at Choku in 1947, and with recirculating flues at Kri vorozhye
in 1949; essentially, the PK-2K improved Koppers-Becker system is equipped
with cross-over flues and double-rich gas flues, with recirculation of heating
gases. This design turned out to be satisfactory and was adopted for widespread
application in coke-oven batteries built in the 1950s and later. In 1955 the
design, further modernized, resulted in the type PV R-46, of which the first
operating battery was erected in 1959 at Dneprodzenthinsk .

One of the major changes resulted from an evaluation of the dimensions
of coke-oven chambers. World practice has been to accept an average width
of about 18 inches (457 mm); the Soviet Union early adopted a standard of
16 inches (407 mm). (See Table 11-3.) The first battery of type PK-2K coke

Petroleum and Allied Industries

143

ovens at Khoku was built with 17%-inch wide (450 mm) chambers, and during
1950-51 three further batteries were built with widths of 16 inches (407 mm),
17% inches (450 mm) and 20 inches (510 mm)" By the early 1960s Giprokoks
was investigating the possibility of designing very large coke batteries, i.e.,
eight batteries with a capacity of up to seven million metric tons of coke per
year.

Thus in coke oven practice we find the Soviets in the early 1930s obtained
a cross section of Western technology which was installed in the Soviet Union
by Western companies with Western equipment, and then proceeded to improve
this Western technology. Improvements took the form of a consistent series
of detailed experiments with coke ovens and analysis of operating results, and
changes in oven design were developed on the basis of these results. However,
the basic technology remains that of Koppers-Becker, with modifications to
suit Soviet conditions.

"Development of Coke Oven Techniques in the U.S.S.R.,
12, 1962, p. 311.

' Gas Journal (London), September

CHAPTER TWELVE

Western Assistance
to the Basic Chemical and Fertilizer Industry

The Soviet chemical industry in 1960 reflected a very rapid growth in production
of basic chemicals. Outside these basic chemicals, however — i.e. in such products
as resins, herbicides, mixed fertilizers, plastics, general organics and petro-
chemicals — the overall production range was relatively small and the industry's
progress had been insignificant.

Sulfuric acid is the most important of inorganic acids and probably the most
important of all industrial chemicals; it enters into almost all industries. Its
production in Russia increased from 1 2 1 ,000 tons in 1 9 1 3 to just under 3 ,000,000
tons in 1953, 4,g04,000 tons in 1958, and 8,518,000 tons in 1965. As has
been indicated in an earlier volume, 1 the Soviets have utilized basic Western
or Tsarist processes for the manufacture of sulfuric acid and have duplicated
these processes in their own machine-building plants.

A recent Russian paper on sulfuric acid manufacture indicates that in the
mid-1960s, 63 percent of sulfuric acid production was based on pyrites and
carried out according to a standardized version of Western processes. 2 The
Soviet process (utilizing fiuidized bed roaster, electric precipitator, towers, and
contact apparatus) is similar to contact processes in use in the West. No claim
is made for Soviet innovation; rather the claim is made for the "intensification
of operating units" based on Western processes. For example, "in 1930 the
Soviet Union bought a small unit design (24 tons a day) for sulfuric acid
production by the contact process. During the exploitation of the unit, Soviet
specialists made some improvements, as a result of which its capacity was
increased to 46 tons per day."* This scaling up of a process, similar to that
noted in other industries, has been the sole form of Soviet innovation in sulfuric
acid manufacture.

On the other hand, there is no indication that any great quantity of Western
equipment has been imported for the Soviet chemical industry since World
War II. In 1965 Nordac Limited of Uxbridge in the United Kingdom sold

1 See Sutton II, pp. 109-12.

* United Nations Report E/CN. 11/635, Development Prospects of Bask Chemical and Allied

Industries in Asia and the Far East (New York, 1963), p. 518
s Ibid., p. 519.

144

Basic Chemical and Fertilizer Industry 145

a sulfuric acid concentration plant with a capacity of 24 tons per day of 78
percent sulfuric acid, but this contract appears to have been an exception.

In the production of the basic alkali — caustic soda — there has also been
a rapid increase in Soviet production, from 55,000 tons in 1913 to 101,000
tons in 1933, to 448,000 tons in 1953, to 709,000 tons in 1958, and to 1 ,303,000
tons in 1 965. * The traditional method of making caustic soda involves causticizing
soda ash; this method has been replaced by a more modern method utilizing
the action of an electric current on a brine solution, yielding chlorine as a
byproduct. It is in the newer electrolyte process that we find Soviet dependence
on the West: the Soviet electrolytic cell BGK-I7 is an almost exact replica
of the Hooker electrolytic cell,'

Although electrolyzer cells were on the embargo list in 1960, it appears
that the Soviets were able to purchase sample cells and reproduce them in
the Soviet Union. There is also a report that in 1960 a sodium hydroxide (caustic
soda) plant was purchased in the West as well as a 24-ampere converting plant
to be used in a chlorine unit. 6 Another source states that Krebs et Cie in France
has supplied an electrolytic chlorine and caustic soda plant with a capacity
of 200,000 tons per year. 7

A substantial amount of standard equipment for producing alkali chemicals
was obtained in Germany at the end of World War II. For example, the Deutsches
Solvay Werke, an ammonia-soda works, was completely removed to the Soviet
Union. Various producing plants with Billiter and mercury cells also were partly
removed: the Bitterfeld North plant was 40 percent removed, the Wolfen plant
was 40 percent removed, and the Goldschmidt plant was 80 percent removed
to the Soviet Union. 8

Therefore it may be seen that in the production of sulfuric acid, the large-
tonnage commercial acid, and of caustic soda, the large-tonnage basic alkali,
the Soviets have adopted and duplicated Western processes and in this manner
achieved significant rates of increase in the output of basic chemical products. 9
However, as will be seen in following sections on the production of fertilizers
and other types of chemicals outside this basic limited range (particularly in
the organic chemicals), the Soviets have been forced to purchase capacity and

G . Warren Nutter. The Growth cf Industrial Production in the Soviet Union (Princeton- Princeton
University Press, 1962), p. 423.

Compare SO [Pirn' desiat] let sovetskaya khimicheskaya nauka i promyshlennost' (Moscow,
1967), p. 168; and Charles L. Mantell, Industrial Electro -Chemistry (New York' McGraw
Hill, 1940), p. 419.

* Samuel Pisar, A New Look at Trade Policy Toward the Communist Bloc, (Washington: Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 1961).

' Chemical Week (New York), September 3, 1960, p. 42.

CIOS XXXHI-31, Investigation of Chemical Factories in the Leipzig Area; and G. E.
Harmssen, Am Abend der Demomage; Sechs Jahre Reparationspolitik (Bremen: F. Triijen,

* Chemistry and Industry (London), February 13, 1960.

146 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Develo\nent , 1945-1965

technology in the West on an increasing scale as the economyVeels the adverse
effects of its restricted range of chemical production.

Another aspect of Western purchases has been the acquisition of chemical
apparatus obviously for experimental and prototype use: in 1960 the British
company Griffin & George, Ltd., sold 13 gas liquid chromatographs for
analysis— an area in which the Soviets lag badly. And a vacuum-insulated liquid-
oxygen storage tank was sold by a British company in I960. 10 Moreover there
have been heavy imports of centrifuges and other laboratory apparatus,

Thus the chemical sector lags in both commercial development of new chemi-
cals and manufacture of the intricate apparatus required to research and produce
these new chemicals on a pilot basis. For technical advance in chemistry the
Soviets look to the West."

WESTERN PURCHASE
FOR KRUSHCHEVS CHEMICAL PLAN

In the late 1950s, as we have seen, the Soviets lagged in all areas of chemical
production outside the basics previously described. This lag inspired a massive
purchasing campaign in the West between 1958 and 1967. In the three years
1959 to 1961 alone, the Soviet Union purchased at least 50 complete chemical
plants or equipment for these plants from non-Soviet sources. ' 2 Indeed the
American trade journal Chemical Week commented, with perhaps more accuracy
than we then realized, that the Soviet Union "behaves as if it had no chemical
industry at alt." 13 Not only was the U.S.S.R.'s industry producing little beyond
basic heavy chemicals but, of greater consequence, it did not have the technical
means of achieving substantial technical modernization and expansion of product
range.

According to the general pattern of this "turn-key" purchase program, the
Soviets supplied buildings — largely of prestressed concrete of a standard design
—and associated power stations, together with unskilled labor and Russian
engineer-trainees. The Western firm supplied designs and specifications accord-
ing to exacting Soviet requirements, and process technology, engineering capabil-
ity, equipment, and startup and training programs. These contracts were package
deals that provided even more than the typical Western "turn-key" contract.
Such contracts, unusual in the West except perhaps in underdeveloped areas

10 Pisar. op. cil. n. 6.

11 The reader should consult SO lei . . .. op. cil. n. 5, the official Soviet summary of SO years
of chemical production in the U.S.S.R., with two factors in mind: (a) the extraordinary degree
of omission, i.e., nonstatemem of simple facts, and (b) mentally insert the factor of unstated
Western assistance.

" Chemical Week, March II, 1961, p. 53. For a list see Chemical Week. September 3, 1960,

pp. 42-44.
" Chemical Week, March 11, 1961, p. 54.

Basic Chemical ami Fertilizer Industry 147

lacking elementary skills and facilities, were very attractive and highly profitable
to Western firms: although the Russians are hard bargainers, their plight was
well known in Western business circles.

The overall extent of equipment acquisition for the chemical industry may
be judged from the following figures relating to Soviet purchases of chemical
equipment from West European countries between 1960 and 1963, three key
years in the campaign:

West Germany $93 million

United Kingdom $123 million

Italy $72 million

France $61 million

Holland $20 million"

In the first stage of this program the Soviets placed sizable orders in West
Germany under the 1958 trade agreement for plants to be constructed between
1958 and 1960. The larger plants under this program included an agglomerating
plant from Lurgi A.G. with a hearth area of 75 square meters for sintering
lead concentrates; a plant with a capacity of 6000 metric tons per year and
valued at about $5 million, for the production of paraxylol and dimethyl-
terelphtalate; three plants by Lurgi for the manufacture of detergents from pe-
troleum products; and three plants for whale oil extraction. 15 Between 1961
and 1963 additional plants were supplied for the manufacture of polypropylene,
di-isocyanates, and phosphorus 16 and sodium sulfate; plants for the hydraulic
refining of benzene, dimazine, and atrazine; and two plants for the manufacture
of foils from viniplant." Further plants included an acetylene-from-natural-gas
factory using the BASF process, with a capacity of 35,000 tons per year; a
plant to manufacture phthalic anhydride; and a 5000-ton-per-year plant for the
manufacture of highly dispersed Aerosil.' 8

Between 1961 and 1963 Italian companies, in particular Montecatini, supplied
plants for the manufacture of acetylene and ethylene from natural gas. They
also supplied plants for titanium oxide {20,000 tons per year) and maleic anhydride
ammonia, and probably other units. liJ

Complete chemical plants supplied from the United Kingdom included numer-
ous units apart from those in textiles, synthetic fibers, rubber, plastics, and
fertilizers discussed elsewhere. 20

A particular lag filled by British companies may be noted in pesticides.

" Chemical Week. March 21 . 1964, p. 27.

11 British Chemical Engineering (London), August 1958. p. 452.

" Economist (London), April 1, 1961, p. 54,

17 Seep. 163.

'" Chemical Week, September 3, I960, p. 42.

'" Economist (London), April 1, 1961. p. 54.

2 " For Western plants for these industries, see relevant chapters.

148 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

In 1961 a British consortium, Wycon Services (a joint Fison's Pest Control
and Constructors John Brown unit), contracted for two chemical plants in Ufa,
Bashkir ASSR, at a cost of $6 million. One plant, based on Fison's Harston
works, was designed to produce MCPA, a hormone weed killer. It was to
have the capacity to produce enough weed killer for 1 1 million acres of cereal.* 1
The other plant was to produce DMEU (dimethylol ethyleneurea), a resin used
in the manufacture of drip-dry fabrics; this unit, with a capacity of 12,000
tons per year of resin, was fully automatic and based on Whiffen & Sons,
Ltd., technology." In 1964 the same consortium established a third plant, one
for the production of TRA weed killer with a capacity of 200 long tons per
year. 23

In January 1967 Sturtevant Engineering of Manchester received a contract
for SI. 5 million to build yet another plant to produce agricultural pesticides
with complete technical assistance. 2 * A few weeks later Thomas Swan & Son
of Consett, Durham, was asked to tender a bid for a complete plant for a
"chemical used in road building." 25 A unit for the production of two and
one-half tons per hour of glaubers salts was supplied by Kestner. 28

In 1964 a British company — Power Gas Corpov-ttion, Ltd. — was building
a $14 million plant for the manufacture of acetic acid in the U.S.S.R." In
December 1958 Hydrotherm Engineering, Ltd., of London contracted to supply
equipment including an automatic heating and cooling pis-it (with heat generators,
circulating pumps, and control equipment) to be usco in the manufacture of
synthetic resins. 28

Two plants for the production of sodium sulfate an input for the paper
and pulp industries , were erected by British companies . The first , builtin 1958-59,
utilized the Kestner centrifugal atomization system, and the Kestner Evaporator
& Engineering Company, Ltd., supplied a large spray-drying plant, all motors,
a drier, and conveyer equipment for a plant to manufacture 5000 pounds of
sodium sulfate per hour. 29 Of the second plant, built by Simon-Carves, Ltd.,
in 1962-63, little is known except that Darchem Engineering, Ltd., supplied
180 feet of 54- inch-diameter mild-steel gas main lined vith stainless steel to
Simon-Carves for installation in the project. 30 Also in the early 1 960s, Construc-
tors John Brown, Ltd., this time jointly with another British company, Marchon

11 Economist (London), April 1, 1961, p. 54,

" Ibid., see also Chemistry and Industry. March 18, 1961, p. 349.

» Business Week. May 30, 1964, p. 52.

" The Times (London), January 11, 1967.

" The Times (London), January 20, 1967.

" Chemical Week. Septembers, 1960, p. 42.

» Chemical Week. November 14, 1964, p. 23. Power Gas Corp., Ltd., has a long history of

activity in the Soviet Union; see Sutton 11. pp. 103, 288, 369.
" British Chemical Engineering, December 1958. p. 690.
»• Chemistry and Industry. February 7, 1959, p. 202.
30 Chemistry and Industry, May 12, 1962, p. 869.

Basic Chemical and Fertilizer Industry 149

Products, Ltd., designed, equipped, and started up two plants for the manufacture
of raw materials for detergents under a $15 million contract. 31

Numerous complete plants have been suppl ied from other European countries .
Belgium has provided a plant for the production of acetylene from natural gas
and another for ammonia synthesis. 32 France has supplied numerous plants,
including one for the production of acetic anhydride (20,000 tons per year),
one for the production of phosphoric acid (60,000 tons per year), one for the
production of titanium dioxide (20,000 tons per year), and another for the produc-
tion of detergents. 33

A number of plants have come from unknown origins (i.e., reported but
without data concerning Western origins). In 1960 for example, a plant was
supplied for the production of synthetic glycerin (20,000 tons per year); another
for ethyl urea (1000 tons per year); one for the production of synthetic fatty
acids (5000 tons per year); one for the production of sodium tripolyphosphate;
one for the production of carbon black (in addition to another supplied by
Japan); and two for the production of germanium. 34

The United States has not been a major supplier of chemical plants; however,
it has supplied several for fertilizer and phosphoric acid production. 34 It was
reported in 1965, for example, that the Food Machinery Corporation of San
Jose, California, was to build, maintain, repair, and operate a carbon disulfide
plant in the U.S.S.R. This chemical is used for the manufacture of viscose
rayon, ammonium thiocyanate, formaldehyde resins, xanthates, and carbon tet-
rachloride. 36

The Soviet Union appears to be backward in both the development and
the utilization of pharmaceutical drugs . The U.S. Delegation on Hospital Systems
Planning, which visited the Soviet Union between June 26 and July 16, 1965,
recorded the impression: "Although the important pharmaceutical agents are
available for the treatment of patients, hospital pharmacy is not nearly as signifi-
cant an endeavor as it is in the United States." 37

An earlier visitor to the Soviet Union had reported to the State Department
as follows; "Most of the antibiotics research is applied rather than fundamental
... development (or redevelopment) of products already produced by the
West." 38 George Brown of the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Re-
search in New York also commented that "it was Soviet practice to get the

3! Chemistry and Industry, October 15, 1960, p. 1310.

" Chemical Week, September 3, 1960, p. 42.

" Ibid.

" Los Angeles Times. January 18, 23, and 30, 1965.

" U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Hospital Services in the U.S.S.R.. Report

of the U.S. Delegation on Hospital Systems Planning, Public Health Service, June 26-July

16, 1965 (Washington. November 1966), p. 36.
" Chemical Week. October 3. 1959.

150 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

production facts concerning pharmaceutical drugs from U.S. patents and lit-
erature and then to develop these same drugs through experimentation."

The Austrian company Grill & Grossman supplied a $154,000 penicillin
production plant in I960," and there has been continuing import of medical
instruments and supplies.

PROGRAM FOR EXPANSION OF FERTILIZER PRODUCTION

Up to 1960, Russian output of fertilizers was mostly in the form of low-quality
straight fertilizers; 40 there was no production of concentrated and mixed fertilizers
such as are used in the West, and the use of liquid-nitrogen fertilizers was
limited to the irrigated cotton-growing areas of Central Asia. In the early 1960s
and particularly after the disastrous 1962 harvests resulting from Khrushchev's
New Land plan, a program was begun to step up the production of fertilizers.
Logically it made more sense to spend foreign exchange on fertilizer plants
than on imported wheat.

Part of the expansion program was the purchase from the Joy Manufacturing
Company of Pittsburgh of mining equipment (for potash mining) 41 valued at
$10 million. This was supplemented by the purchase of a modern large-scale
fertilizer production plant in the West. As Ivan Volovchenko, the Soviet minister
of agriculture, put it: "We are scouring Europe for machinery capable of providing
a quiclcstart to the chemicalization of our agriculture, especially by the production
of fertilizers." 42

The program actually was initiated in about 1961 when Werkspoor N.V.
of Holland (see Table 12-1) concluded a contract to build three plants for the
production of urea (carbamide); part of the equipment for these plants came
from the United Kingdom— Power- Gas Corporation, Ltd., supplied three instal-
lations for the crystallization of high-purity urea, each with a capacity of 100
tons per day, by the Krystal process. 43

Also in 1961 a Belgium firm, Societe Beige, was awarded a contract to
provide technology for two ammonia synthesis plants with the equipment to

z * Chemical Week, September 3. 1960, p. 42.

'" The only removal of a fertilizer plant from Germany to the U.S.S.R. in 1945-46 was the

Pieneritz phosphate plant reported dismantled in 1945; sec Germany, 1945-1954 (Cologne

Boas Internationa! Publishing Company, [1954?]). p. 376.
" See chapter 8.

" Wall Street Journal , November 7, 1963, 1:6.
" Chemistry and Industry, June 3, 1961, p. 754. These processes turn up in Soviet technical

literature; see for example, D.S. Petrenko, Proivodstvo suffata ammoniia (Moscow, 1966).

The Simon-Carves vacuum evaporator is described on p. 43, the Power-Gas "Krystal" crystal-

lizator on p. 44. Another aspect of the Soviet response is current publication of technical

material on foreign mixed-feed apparatus; for example, see A .S . Danilin , Proizvodstvo kombikor-

mov za rubeihom (Moscow, 1968).

Basic Chemical and Fertilizer Industry

151

Table 12-1 FOREIGN PURCHASES OF FERTILIZER PLANTS AFTER 1960

Name of firm
supplying plant

Type ot produced
fertilizer

Year of
contract

Annual capacity
(metric tons)

Phosphoric acid

Sodium tripoly

phosphate
Phosphate

fertilizer
Ammonia synthesis
Urea (carbamide)

Union Chimique-Chemische

Bedrijven (Belgium)
Union Chimique-Chemische

Bedrijven

COMECON (Kingisepp)

Society Beige
Werkspoor N.V. (Holland)

Mitsui (Japan) Urea

Montecatini (Italy) Ammonia

Woodall-Duckham Construction
Co., Ltd. (U.K.)

Newton Chambers & Co., Chemical fertilizer

Ltd. (U.K.)

Occidental Petroleum
Corporation (U.S.)

1964

1963

1964

1961
1961

1964
1964

1964

620,500

365,000

1,700,000

two plants
three plants
(total 653,800)

ten plants

■M m l r £?J ! '£! , ? l l V! cal Weekl October 24 and November 14, 1964; New York Times, September
27, 1964; Wall Street Journal , October 18, 1963.

be supplied by another Belgian firm. 4 - 1 Under the 1960 trade agreement with
Italy several plants were supplied for the production of ammonia. 4 *

Then in 1 964 a contract was awarded to Union Chimique-Chemische Bedrij-
ven of Brussels for a 620,500 ton per year plant for the production of phosphoric
acid, and another plant to be built near Kuibyshev with an annual capacity
of 365,000 tons of sodium tripoly phosphate. 46

A joint development with a Soviet "satellite" was reported in the Kingisepp
area, under which the mining and production equipment was provided by the
satellite in return for fertilizer; this program had a starting capacity of 850,000
tons per year and projected expansion to 1.7 million tons per year." Other
such plants were built by Mitsui of Japan and Montecatini of Italy, although
the largest was an announced series of ten fertilizer plants arranged by the
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 48 and built by Woodall-Duckham Construc-
tion Company, Ltd., and Newton Chambers & Company, Ltd., of the United
Kingdom. 41 '

The chemical sector provides an excellent illustration of the link between

Chemical Week . October 24 , 1 964

Ibid.

ibid.

Ibid.

152

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Soviet planning and Western technology and equipment. In 1960 the Soviets
had achieved considerable rates of increase in chemical production by the duplica-
tion of standard Western equipment and processes in' a few basic chemicals — par-
ticularly sulfuric acid and caustic soda. Figures reflecting these impressive
increases tended to obscure the extremely limited range of chemical products.
When practical demand forced manufacture of a wider range of chemicals the
Soviets turned to the West for process technology, complete plants, and equip-
ment.

In 1959-60 orders for more than 50 complete chemical plants were placed
in the West and the trade journals catalogued these acquisitions;" this process
continued throughout the 1960s with the expenditure of several billions on West-
ern chemical equipment to provide everything from penicillin to germanium
processing for transistors and to fulfill a massive program for the production
of mixed and concentrated fertilizers.

The interesting phase of the acquisition has yet to come. Many of the processes
acquired during the 1960s are complex units requiring a great deal of highly
sophisticated technical skill in construction and operation. While automation
will solve the operating problem it may not be easy to duplicate the plants
as has been done with the Solvay process in caustic soda and the Herreshoff-Bauer
system in the manufacture of sulfuric acid. 1 '

" Chemical Week, September 3, I960, p. 42.
" See Sutton II, pp. 110-12.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Western Assistance
to the Rubber and Plastics Industries

SYNTHETIC RUBBERS INTRODUCED AFTER 1945

It was demonstrated in the second volume of this series that although the
Soviets had an early start in synthetic rubber production with the Russian-
developed, sodium-polymerized SK-B butadiene, this lead was not maintained,
and during World War II U.S. plants and technology were imported under
the Lend Lease program to supplement the low-quality and limited-use SK-B. 1
Apart from a small production of Thiokol, the only Soviet synthetic rubber
until the import of Lend Lease plants and technology was a butadiene type
polymerized by sodium.

There was a significant change in the structure of Soviet synthetic rubber
production in the 15 years between the end of the war and 1960. By 1959
only 55 percent of synthetic rubber was polymerized with sodium from alcohol
(SK-B), while chloroprene-using Lend Lease technology and equipment (Dupont-
Neoprene) constituted only about 7 percent of the total; the bulk of the remaining
38 percent came from the introduction of copolymers or styrene-butadiene types
(SK-S), and a small production of nitrile (SK-N) with pilot production of other
types. There was no commercial production in the Soviet Union of butyl and
polyisobutylene types in I960. 2

In terms of tonnage, the Soviet Union produced about 323,000 tons of
synthetic rubber in 1960. Of this total, 177,327 tons was the original SK-B
type based on alcohol , of very low quality and providing products of low wearing
abilities; 104,975 tons was of styrene-butadiene copolymer including the oil-
extended types; 23,256 tons was Dupont-Neoprene (now called Nairit); and
the balance comprised small-scale pilot production of 8075 tons of nitrite (SK-N)
and 8798 tons of other types. By contrast, 99,000 tons of butyl and 38,000
tons of nitrile rubber alone were produced in the United States in 1960.

In brief, the increment in Soviet production of synthetic rubber between

' SeeSufton II, pp. 122-26.
J See Table 13-1.

153

154 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

1945 and 1960 consisted almost completely of copolymers; i.e., it was of the
styrene-butadiene type, in the amount of 104,975 tons. This copolymer was
developed by I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., and was produced in Germany from
1935 onward as Buna-S. Buna-S accounted for 90 percent of German synthetic
rubber production in World War II and was introduced into the United States
under the government construction program of 1942. It was not produced in
the U.S.S.R. during the war.

At the end of World War II the Soviets removed as reparations two large
I.G. Farben synthetic rubber plants from Germany — the Buna-Werke-Schkopau
A.G. and the Chemische Werke Hiils GmbH. The combined capacity of these
plants was just over 100,000 tons of styrene-butadiene copolymers; so a reason-
able presumption is that the Soviet copolymer capacity came from the Schkopau
and Hiils plants. Sumgait and Yaroslavl seem the logical relocation sites in
the U.S.S.R. on both technical grounds (the raw material base is butane from
oil) and intelligence grounds (these are sites known to have received such plants
in the early postwar period.) 3

The remaining increment in production came from the Dupont chloroprene
type. (See Table 13-1 .) Part of the chloroprene capacity came from Manchurian
removals. A new plant opened in 1944 to produce 750 tons per year — the
Manchurian Synthetic Rubber Company at Kirin — was largely removed under
the supervision of two Soviet officials, Major Sherishetsky and Major Diement.
Removals were concentrated on the gas generators; the reaction equipment;
the distillation, polymerization, and catalyst preparation equipment; and the
rolling equipment. 4

Thus in the period 1945 to 1960 the increment in Soviet synthetic rubber
capacity came from Buna-S plants transferred from Germany under reparations,
from Lend Lease capacity, or to a small extent from Manchuria. No new Soviet
types were developed and placed in full production, although a close watch
was kept and research work undertaken on new Western developments. 5 ,

Given this inability to produce modern synthetic rubbers, reliance was placed
both on import of Western synthetics and on plants to produce new types.

3 CIOS no. XXII-22, Synthetic Rubber Plant, Buna Werke -Schkopau AG., and compare to
SO [Piat' desiat] let sovetskaya khimicheskaya nauka i promyshlennost' (Moscow, 1967), p.
346. Also see CIOS no. XXI1-21 Synthetic Rubber Plant, Chemische Werke-Hiils; and Germany,
1945-1954 (Cologne: Boas International Publishing Company), p. 37; "Hiils suffered much
more than other companies from dismantling." Further, see Chemistry and Industry (London).

May 16, 1959, p. 628, for an article of Russian origin that states that the chief type produced j
after World War II was the butadiene-styrcne by continuous emulsion polymerization.

4 Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United \
States. July 1946 (Washington, 1946), p. 188. ;

1 The general impression of Soviet backwardness in the rubber industry is confirmed by Edward !

Lane, Chairman of Seiberling Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio, who, after atrip to the U.S.S.R.,
stated he found industrial methods "very backward and far below ours." Los Angeles Times,
July 20, 1964.

Rubber and Plastics Industries

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156 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Butyl rubber was deleted from U.S. export control in 1959, 6 allowing exports
to the U.S.S.R., and a butyl plant utilizing Western equipment 7 came into
pilot production in the 1965-66 period. 8

In 1960 the Glasgow firm of John Dalglish & Sons, Ltd., implemented
a "package deal" under which the firm supplied and erected in a new synthetic
rubber plant in Siberia a series of machines for de-watering, drying, baling,
wrapping, and packaging of synthetic rubber. This plant had a capacity of
70,000 tons of synthetic rubber per year.*

In 1961 the new synthetic rubber plants at Kursk and Ryzan received equip-
ment installed and supplied by Von Kohorn International of White Plains, New
York. 10

In 1964 a Japanese consortium supplied a plant valued at 55. 6 million to
produce 8000 metric tons annually of robber antioxidants; the consortium included
the Fujinagata Shipbuilding Company, Kansai Catalyst, and Japan Chemical
Machine Manufacturing Company. 11

The Pirelli Company of Italy signed two contracts in 1968 with the Soviet
organization Tekhmashimport of Moscow. The first contract with the Soviet
organization was for supplying a plant, valued at over 800 million lire, for
the manufacture of rubber latex thread. The second contract was to supply
Russia with two complete plants for the manufacture of rubber latex gloves
for surgical and industrial use; the amount of the transaction was about 750
million lire. 12 Pirelli was building about a dozen other plants in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s for such products as rubber tires, elastic
yarns, and synthetic leather. In addition, a contract was concluded in 1967
for a S50 million plant to produce rubber parts for the Fiat 1 24 to be produced
in the U.S.S.R., and negotiations were in progress for another plant to make
tires for Soviet-Fiats. 13

PRODUCTION OF CALCIUM CARBIDE AND ACETYLENE

Acetylene, a major input for synthetic rubber in the U.S.S.R., historically
is produced from calcium carbide. Prewar Soviet calcium carbide capacity was

* U.S. House of Representatives. Investigation and Study of the Administration. Operations.
and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts, Hearings before the
Select Committee on Export Control, 87th Congress, 1st session (October and December 1961),
pt. I, p. 333. Butyl, silicone, and nitrite rubbers were removed from embargo in the third
quarter of 1959. Letter from Office of Export Control to writer. January 29, 1970.

7 Confidential source.

9 G. F. Borisovich, Ekonomika promyshltnnosti sinteticheskogo kauchuka (Moscow, 1968), pp,
32, 37.

' Chemistry ami Industry, December 19, 19S9, p. 1609.

10 Chemical Week (New York). March 11, 1961. p. 53.

11 Chemical Week. November 14, 1964, p. 23.

11 Communication from the Embassy of Italy, Washington D,C.

" Business Week (New York), July 13, 1968, p. 62. See also p. 200.

Rubber and Plastics Industries 1 57

from Miguet-Perrou system furnaces installed in the 1930s 14 and having an
annual capacity of about 80,000 metric tons.

A considerable addition to this capacity was made from reparations equipment
removed from Germany and Manchuria. The l.G. Farben Buna-Werke at
Schkopau, near Merseberg, produced its own calcium carbide by the electric
furnace process for conversion into acetylene, in turn converted into acetaldehyde
and butadiene. 15 Capacity was 298,255 metric tons in 1943' 6 and the plant
was largely removed to the Soviet Union. 17 Other calcium carbide capacity
was removed from the Piesteritz works of Bayrische Stickstoffwerke A.G., 18
which had a 1943 capacity of 155,570 metric tons 19 ; the Miickenberg works
of Elektrochemische Werke Dr Wacker GmbH using the Wacker dry process 20
with a 1943 capacity of 99,015 metric tons; 21 and a small plant at Spremberg,
the Lanza GmbH, with a 1943 capacity of 22,550 metric tons. 22

In Manchuria, at the Manchu Electrochemical Company, Ltd., in Kirin,
the Soviets removed all the equipment from two plants including transformers
and all auxiliary machinery, leaving only the electric furnace shells; 23 calcium
carbide capacity of these plants was about 81,000 metric tons per year. The
removal operation was supervised by Red Army Majors Sherishefsky and Die-
ment, using Japanese technical assistance and local labor. 24

About 500,000 metric tons of calcium carbide was made in the Soviet Union
in 1960 — the same as in 1953 — and the major end use was the manufacture
of acetylene; thus a large proportion of carbide capacity, and so ability to make
synthetic rubber, can be traced to foreign origins. Even if reparations removals
consisted only of machinery removals, excluding the furnaces, these machines
would form the essential core of building efforts in the immediate postwar
period.

As of 1953 there were numerous widely dispersed plants making calcium
carbide — at Kirov, Yerevan, Kirovakan, Pipetsk, Voroshilovgrad, Leningrad,
Kirovgrad, and Zaporozhe." About one-half of the 1953 output of 500,000
tons was for synthetic rubber production, of which about one-third was made
from calcium carbide.

M See Sutton II, p. 156.

11 ClOS no. XXV1H-13, Synthetic Rubber Plant, Buna Werke-Schkopau A .G.
l * BIOS, The Acetylene Industry and Acetylene Chemistry in Germany during the period 1939-45 ,
Survey Report no. 30, pp. 10-11.

17 G.E. Harmssen, Am Abend dtr Demontage ; Sechs Jahre ReparationspoUtik (Bremen: F. Triijen,
1951), p. 106, no. 36.

18 Ibid., p. 106, no. 35.
'" Ibid., p. 106, no. 70.
M BIOS. op. cit. n. 16.
!l Ibid.

" Pauley, op. cit. n. 4, appendix 10.
13 Pauley, op. cit. n. 4,

24 Ibid.

25 S. A. Miller, Acetylene: Its Properties, Manufacture and Uses (New York: Academic Press,
1965).

158

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Acetylene has in more recent times been made from hydrocarbons rather
than calcium carbide; in the United States in 1958 some 40 percent of acetylene
was made from hydrocarbons and other Western countries were moving toward
this ratio. For example, in 1958 Italy produced 35 percent from hydrocarbons;
France and West Germany, 34 percent; and Japan, 20 percent. 28 The Soviet
Union and East Germany continued to produce 100 percent of their acetylene
from calcium carbide, reflecting relative technical backwardness compared to
the more advanced capitalist nations. (See Table 13-2.)

Table 13-2

PRODUCTION OF ACETYLENE FROM CARBIDE
AND HYDROCARBONS, 1858

(000 metric tons)

Percentage

-From

o! total

Country

From carbide hydrocarbons

Total

carbide

U.S.A.

230

150

380

Italy

127

France

115

152

West Germany

255

335

Japan

250

310

East Germany

266

—

266

100

USSR.

170

—

170

100

Source: D.W.F. Hardie, Acetylene, Manufacture and Uses (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 46.

Further, backwardness in acetylene manufacturing technology has been
isolated as the main reason for the generally retarded nature of the Soviet organic
chemicals industry. 17 Although there has been a great deal of research into
various acetylene chemistry fields the knowledge has not been exploited, and
in I960 a U.S. Commerce Department report predicted that "Soviet progress
in plastics, drugs, synthetic rubber, adhesives, and chemical intermediates will
be retarded."**

In 1960 one-half of Soviet acetylene was being utilized for welding and
cutting — compared with only 20 percent in the United States; the balance in
both countries was used for the manufacture of organic chemicals. In other
words, quite apart from the inability to utilize improved methods of production
of acetylene, the end uses of the product itself were not changed. Thus market
pressures making for technical change in the acetylene irdustry apparently were
absent.

28 D. W. F. Hardie, Acetylene. Manufacture and Uses (London: Oxfivc Universiiy Press, 1965),

p. 46.
11 Chemical and Engineering News, November 28, I960, p. 26.
■" Ibid., quoting U.S. Dept. of Commerce report.

Rubber and Plastics Industries 1 59

Evidently a pilot plant built in 1958 using the Russian Grinenko process 2 "
was unsuccessful, because in 1964 three plants were under construction by
Western firms, all using Western processes. One of these plants, with a 35,000-ton
capacity for the production of acetylene from hydrocarbons, was using the BASF
process (formerly known as the Sachsse method); another in Angarsh, Siberia,
was to use the SBA process of Societe Beige de l'Azote; and the third plant,
also with a capacity of 35,000 tons, was built in the Urals by the Italian
firm Montecatini and using the Montecatini process. 30

Consequently, by briefly examining the interlocking nature of chemical pro-
cesses — even in only one field of organic chemistry, i.e., synthetic rubbers
and one of its inputs — we can perceive two weaknesses in the Soviet system.
First there is a technical weakness, i.e., an inability to convert promising research
into practical working commercial systems; second, there is an economic weak-
ness, i.e., the lack of economic forces or pressures to bring about technical
change.

It is unlikely that these weaknesses stem from lack of effort or ability in
research. In October 1963 a group from the Confederation of British Industry
visited the Synthetic Rubber Institute in Leningrad." The group concluded
that it was an institute of "high calibre," the staff was competent, and the
research was "well organized"; further, "the equipment is modern and lavish
with clean and well planned laboratories."

The Institute has an interesting history. Founded in the 1920s by S. V.
Lebedev, 32 it handled the original successful research and pilot production of
sodium-butadiene synthetic rubber. Its function has expanded over the years
and by 1961 the institute was housed in a new building of 5500 square meters
and had established several pilot plants, some able to supply several hundred
tons of rubber for large-scale evaluation. A total of 940 persons worked at
the institute itself and another 900 at the pilot plants. It was noted that there
wasa "wealth of standard equipment" including, forexample, five spectrometers
— one of which was British (Hilger) and one German.

The main purpose of the institute in 1963 was (a) to find synthetic rubbers
to replace natural rubbers in all applications and (b) to produce rubbers with
special properties. The materials under investigation in 1963 included stereorub-
bers, ethylene, propylene copolymers, butadiene acrylonitrile, silicone, and

"" S. A. Miller, op. cil. n. 25, p. 474.

30 ibid. Also see Kirk-Othmer, Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology (New York: Wiley, 1968),
vol. 1, pp. 186-88. The SBA process is reported as (he SBA-Kellogg process, but the Kellogg
company (in the U.S.) denies having built a plant in Siberia in 1964; letter to writer, April
17, 1969. The process referred to is probably one developed by Societe Beige de l'Azote
et des Produits Chimiques du Marly of Liege, Belgium.

31 Confederation of British Industry, '"Synthetic Rubber Institute, Leningrad, 18th October 1963";
typescript of manuscript sent to writer.

3! Sutton I, p. 122.

160

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

polyurethane rubbers. Work was also in progress on a variety of antioxidants,
including lonol (I.C.I.) and Santowhite (Monsanto Chemical Company) as well
as some Soviet developments. 33

Thus in 1963 the Synthetic Rubber Institute had a long operating history,
excellent research facilities, and capable staffing. Yet despite these observations
and despite early work in the field and the successes which fructified in the
original SK-B, there has been a significant lag in Soviet development of synthetic
rubbers.

WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR RUBBER TIRE PRODUCTION

The manufacture of almost all motor vehicle tire production can be traced
directly to equipment of Western origin and, if we take account of the Soviet
practice of working plants on a three-shift continuous basis, it is possible that
all rubber tires in the Soviet Union have been produced on Western-origin
equipment. As of 1960 the tire production capacity of equipment known to
have been supplied by Western firms was about 24 million tires annually. Soviet
civilian production in 1960 was about 16 million tires; closing of obsolete capacity
and production of tires for military use constituted the difference.

Table 13-3 provides an approximate statement of equipment origins for tire
production. A more precise statement relating foreign equipment to individual

Table 13-3

SOVIET TIRE OUTPUT IN RELATION TO WESTERN
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY

Years

Foreign firms supplying
equipment or complete
tire plants

Source

Approximate annual
capacity of this
equipment supply

1931-7

Seiberling Rubber Co.. Inc.*
Francis Shaw & Co., Ltd.

U.S. i
U.K. f

3,000,000 tires

1944-5

Ford Motor Co. "

U.S.

1,000,000 truck tires

1945-6
1946
19S7
1957

Deka-Werke (German

reparations) c
Manchu Rubber Co. -

(Manchurlan reparations) *
United Kingdom 'Rustyta'

consortium (Dnepropetrovsk)*
Chatillon Tire Cord

Germany

Manchuria

U.K.

Italy

300,000 truck tires

30,000 truck tires

1 5 ,000,000 tractor truck
and equipment tires

1959-1960
1968

Simon Handling Engineers,

Ltd., Krasnoyarsk '
Pirelli Co. a

U.K.
Italy

2,000,000 tractor, truck
and equipment tires

Sources; 'Sutton I: Western Technology . . . 1917 to 1930; "Sutton II Western Technology
. . . 1930 to 194S; c See p. 31; "Calculated as 75 percent of the Manchu plant
capacity; 'Anglo-Soviet Trade, supplement to Manchester Guardian, December 7, 1960,
p. 12; 'Mechanical Handling (London), January 1964; a Business Week, July 13. 1968
p. 62.

Confederation of British Industry, op. cii. n. 31 .

Rubber and Plastics Industries 161

plants cannot be made, as Soviet censorship has carefully eliminated from pub-
lished reports data concerning tire sizes produced at each plant (an indicator
by which equipment could be traced back to its Western origins) or any statement
concerning location of foreign-purchased equipment.

The first Russian rubber tire plant was installed by the Seiberling Rubber
Company at Yaroslavl 34 and a second plant was installed by Francis Shaw
& Company, Ltd., of the United Kingdom in the early 1930s." During World
War II a Ford Motor Company tire plant was transferred to the U.S.S.R.
and became the Moscow rubber tire plant. 38 Bought by Lend Lease for $10
million in 1942, it included a power plant for steam and electricity, and was
capable of producing one million military tires per year; most of the plant
had been shipped by autumn 1944. Some American engineers went to Russia
in February 1944 to give technical advice, but in October 1945 the plant still
lacked necessary utilities — water, steam, electricity, and compressed air. 37 The
Deka-Werke, a producer of truck tires, was transferred to the U.S.S.R. from
Germany under the reparations agreements, 38 and the adjustable- size tire-forming
machines — about 75 percent of capacity — with autoclaves and calendars were
removed from the Manchu Rubber Company in Manchuria and transferred to
the U.S.S.R. in 1946. 39

Soviet tire output in 1949 was 5,680,000 automobile and truck tires — about
the capacity of the above-named plants.

In the mid to late 1950s several major contracts were let to foreign firms
to supply complete, highly advanced tire manufacturing plants. The largest
of these contracts was to a consortium of six British firms, known as Rustyfa, 40
and involved a total contract of $40 million.

The first inquiries to British firms for a new, modem tire factory came
in April 1956; concurrent approaches were also made to firms in France, Ger-
many, and the United States. A five-man British mission from the Rustyfa
consortium flew to Moscow in March 1957 to complete negotiations. (One
firm in the consortium, Francis Shaw and Company of Manchester, had already
equipped a Russian tire factory in the thirties.) Dunlop Advisory Service acted
as consulting engineers, and undertook the engineering survey and plans for
the factory. 41

" Sutton I, p. 223.

35 Economist (London), April 13. 1957. p. 171.

36 Sutton II, p. 184.

" Robert H. Jones, The Roads to Russia (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969 ) p

223.
" Harmssen, op. cit. a. 17.

" Pauley, op. cit. n. 4, appendix 10. Plant Inspection Report 2-C.-2.
,0 Other members were Crompton Parkinson. Lancashire Dynamo Holdings, David Bridge, Ltd.,

Mather & Plait, Francis Shaw, Ltd., Simon Handling. George King and Heenan & Froude

were subcontractors; see Peter Zentner, East-West Trade: A Practical Guide to Selling in

Eastern Europe (London: Max Parrish, 1967), p. 80.
41 Economist (London), Apri! 13, 1957, p. 171.

162

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Develabinenl , 1945-1965

The Rustyfa plant at Dnepropetrovsk, with its annual capacity of 15 million
tires, is one of the largest tire factories in Europe. The advanced nature of
the equipment supplied for the plant is typified by the monitoring equipment
supplied. In 1957 the British Iron and Steel Research Association (BISRA)
announced the development of an advanced system of recording plant perfor-
mance; in 1957 Digital Engineering Company, Ltd., a firm licensed to build
and sell the system, was awarded a contract to supply the BISRA monitoring
equipment for the Dnepropetrovsk plant. This equipment comprised 500 monitor-
ing or "detection points," with a centralized counting apparatus and printers
for recording information. Many of the geared motors ;;nd mechanical han-
dling equipment came from Lancashire Dynamo and Cryp-j . Ltd., whose Willes-
den works made the largest single shipment in its history — 298 crated items
— in April 1960 to the Russian plant. 42

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PLASTICS INDUSTRIES

The Russian plastics and resins industry is even more backward than the
synthetic rubber industry. It was reported in I960 by Russian engineers that
the Soviet Union did not have, "and badly needed high-speed, continuous process
production equipment,' 13 that there was no production of polyvinyl chlorides
and foam plastics (among other types), and that there was only small-scale
pilot production of such products as plastic laminates and glass fiber products. 44

This admission by a Soviet plastics delegation to the United States confirmed
reports from an earlier American delegation to the U.S.S.R. While avoiding
overt criticism of the plants visited and indeed any overall conclusions concerning
technical capacity in the plastics industry, individual observations and comments
in the U.S. report suggest that the Soviets were noticeably backward in all
areas except thermosetting plastics for industrial use. The report stated that
the U.S. delegates were "surprised" that there apparently was no production
of such plastics as polyethylene and noted particularly the considerable number
of "plants they were not able to see," such as a caprolactum-nylon plant, 45
a butanol plant, 46 or "any petrochemical operations." 47

Equipment in the plastics products plants visited constituted a mixture of
imported machines (the polyvinyl chloride — PVC — compounding equipment at
Vladimir Chemical, the compression molding shop at Karacharovo, the urea

" Electrical Review (London), April 15, 1960, p. 747.

" Engineering News-Record (New York), 164 (January 21, I960), 56.

" Ibid.

" Report on visit of U.S.A. Plastics Industry Exchange Delegation to U.S.S.R.. Society of

(he Plastics Industry. Inc., June 2 to June 28, 1958 (New York. 1958), p. 2.

" Ibid., p. 59.

" Ibid., p. 61.

Rubber and Plastics Industries 163

resin shop at Carbolit) and Russian-made equipment (the presses at Leningrad
Laminated Plastics, Carbolit, and Karacharovo). Some of the usual comments
about "copying" were made, although this report contains fewer observations
concerning equipment origins than do similar reports from other industries.

Backwardness in plastics was solved in the usual manner, i.e. , by the purchase
of complete plants from the West. In 1959 the West German firm Badische
Anilin licensed production of its process for the manufacture of polyethylene
to the U.S. S.R., 48 and German firms are reported to have sold numerous other
plants, 49 including a polyester glass fiber unit (5000 tons per year); a styrene
and copolymer unit (5000 tons per year); high- and low-pressure polyethylene
plants by Salzgitter Industriebau GmbH (each of 24,000 tons per year); a poly-
propylene unit (10,000 tons per year); a polyvinyl pyrrolidone unit (180 tons
per year); a melamine plant (10,000 tons per year); two plastics foam plants
(3000 tons per year each); a PVC sheet plant; a PVC cable plant (40,000
kg/hr capacity); a polyethylene sheet plant and a processing unit (about SI. 5
million together); and two plants for the manufacture of polyethylene pipe. 50

In the early 1960s a group of six plants was contracted to British companies.
The Simon-Carves, Ltd., firm, a member of the Simon Engineering Group,
received a contract in 1963 valued at $56 million to design, equip, and start
up four polyethylene plants; two had a capacity of 48,000 tons each and two
a capacity of 24,000 tons each, with completion due in 1966. sl Financing
of $36 million was on five-year terms and arranged by Lazard Brothers &
Company, an affiliate of Lazard Freres, the investment bankers of New York. 52
The total capacity of the four plants equaled total British polyethylene capacity
in 1964.

Two gas separator plants to provide ethylene for two of the Simon-Carves
polyethylene plants were ordered from Humphries and Glasgow, a U .K . engineer-
ing firm; these plants had an annual capacity of 120,000 tons of ethylene,
the raw stock for polyethylene. The contract was valued at $16.8 million 53
and used the I.C.I, high-pressure process. Part of the contract was subcontracted
to English Electric, Tube Investments, and Taylor Controls. 54

In 1961 Sterling Moulding Materials, Ltd. , of Cheshire shipped $12.1 million
worth of equipment for Russia's first polystyrene molding powder plant, a facility
with a capacity of 10,000 long tons per year. The company supplied technical
assistance, installation services, and startup of operations for the Soviet Union. 55

" Horst Mendershausen , Depende nc e of East Germany on Western imports (Santa Monica: RAND

Corp.), RAND RM-24I4, July 17. 1959, p. 39.
" See p. 147 above.
10 Chemical Week, September 3, 1960. p. 40.

51 Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1963,

52 Ibid.

" See The Times (London), February 1. 1965, for Russian complaints concerning these plants.
5< Economist (London), May 4, 1963, p. 456.
" Chemical Week, March 11. 1961, p. 53.

164 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1 945-] 965

Another British firm supplied $210,000 worth of plastics mixing equipment
— FKM 300 DK Lodige-Morton mixers made by Morton Machine Company,
Ltd., for PVC and PVA (polyvinyl acetate) powders. 18 Other chemical-plant
orders placed in the United Kingdom included a styrene and polystyrene unit
(20,000 tons per year) supplied by P.G. Engineering and BX Plastics; a cellulose
acetate plant (3000 tons per year) supplied by Industrial Plastics and East Anglia
Plastics; and a styrene foam plant. ST

In 1965 a French firm, Speichim, contracted to build a plastics plant in
the U.S.S.R. using technology licensed from Stauffer & Company, the U.S.
chemicals manufacturer. The process was for the production of vinyl chloride
by cracking ethylene dichloride, and was transferred for a flat fee plus royalties. 58
A unit for manufacture of polyethylene cloth also was purchased in France. 59

In 1964 a Japanese consortium installed a polyvinyl chloride plant at a
contract price of $14 million with an annual capacity of 60,000 metric tons
of PVC. The consortium included Toho Bussan, a subsidiary of Mitsui; Kureha
Chemical for process technology; and Chiyoda Chemical for engineering work. 60
The Sekisui Chemical Company had earlier supplied a plant to manufacture
polyvinyl pipe (1200 tons per year) and polyvinyl fittings (1200 tons per year). 61

In 1969 Berner Industries of New Castle, Pennsylvania, supplied equipment
for a plastics plant, 62 supplementing an earlier installation for plastic pipe by
Omni Products Corp.; 63 the Japanese Mitsui group reportedly was negotiating
another contract for an ethylene plant of 450,000 tons' capacity to use Lummus
technology 6 * (Lummus is an American firm). Valued at $50 million, the plant
was scheduled for construction in Siberia.

We may conclude that while SK-B synthetic rubber is an original Soviet
development, no internal engineering ability was developed to break away from
exclusive use of this limited-use rubber. Thus Soviet chloroprene rubber today
is Dupont, the styrene-butadiene copolymers are I.G. Farben; a plant for butyl
rubber was supplied by Western companies, as was equipment for the production
of other synthetics and rubber antioxidants, and for the processing of finished
synthetic rubber.

" Chemistry and Industry, April 4, 1959, p. 464.

ST Chemical Week, March 11. 1961.

18 Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1965, 10:4.

" Chemical Week. March 11, 1961.

■* Chemical Wetk, November 1 4, 1964, p. 23.

61 Ibid.

" Business Week. September 20, 1969.

« Chemical Week. November 14, 1964, p. 23.

" Wall Street Journal, July 9. 1969. Installations of unreported origin include another PVC

plant and a 3000-ton per year plant for tetrafluorethylene; see Chemical Week. November

14, 1964.

Rubber and Plastics Industries

165

The Soviet production of acetylene, an input for synthetic rubber, was
restricted in the 1950s to the calcium carbide process at a time when the Western
world was moving into production of acetylene from hydrocarbons. The Soviets
then bought three acetylene-from-hydrocarbon plants in the West, each utilizing
a different process.

Rubber tire output has been traced to Western production equipment.
Similarly, in plastics the Soviets have purchased production capacity for
polyethylene, ethylene, polystyrene, and polyvinyl chloride — key plastics in
the modern world. No indigenous large-scale plastics production has been traced,
only pilot operations.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Western Assistance
to the Glass and Cement Industries

WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE GLASS INDUSTRY

The glass industry provides one of the earliest examples of Soviet duplication
of Western equipment after significant import of similar equipment. In 1929
the Lissitchansk glass factory installed 80 Fourcault sheet glassmaking machines. 1
The following April, in 1930, the Gusev glass plant in Moscow, with a capacity
of 10,000 tons of window glass per year, installed ten new Fourcault sheet
glassmaking machines, of which two were imported from Belgium but eight
were Soviet-made copies of earlier imports. 2

Fourcault machines were built from 1929 onward at the Moscow machine
building plant, and an attempt was made to supply the equipment demands
of the glass industry completely from domestic production . 3 However, the Soviet
glass industry appears to have had more than the normal share of problems,
whether equipped with foreign or domestic machinery. The Dagestanskii Ogni
plant, equipped by a U.K. firm with Fourcault machines and with four Owens
bottle-making machines capable of producing 20 million bottles per year, was
able to produce only one and one-half million bottles per year, and this production
was at a cost 11 times greater than estimated with 60 to 70 percent rejects."
In 1930, to help overcome technical problems, Steklostroi employed an American
mechanical engineer. C. E. Adler, a specialist in the design of machinery for
glass factories. 5

Even as late as 1957, however, the industry journal Steklo i keramika (New
York) was reporting numerous problems in the glass and ceramic industries.
In the late 1950s the industry was reported to be greatly in arrears and with
little innovative ability. These observations were coupled with recommendations
that Western technology be adopted. One report specifically mentioned the Dages-
tanskii Ogni works and indicated that there the only design change from the

' Die Chemische Fabrik (Weinhetm, Ger.), II, 52 (December 25, 1929). 541. See also Sulton
1, p. 222, for equipment in the Bely Bychok Plate Glass Works built in 1927.

* Economic Review of the Soviet Union (New York), V, 8 (April 15. 1930). 162.

3 Glass and Ceramics (Washington, D.C.), 1957. p. 379.

' Society of Glass Technology Journal (London), 1928, p. 198.

s Amtorg, Economic Review of the Soviet Union (New York), V, 3-4 (February 15, 1930),
57.

166

Glass and Cement Industries 167

original machines had been a change in the bearings and belt drive — this being
presented as "modern technology."

After World War II major plant facilities from the German glass industry,
particularly the optical grinding and optical instrument industries, were transferred
to the Soviet Union. These transfers included the famous optical plants at Jena
with subsidiary plants at Berlin and Perna in Saxony. These plants were essentially
the only optical glass and instrument manufacturers in Germany and in the
year October 1943 to October 1944 produced a total of 1700 metric tons of
clear transparent optical glass and 28 metric tons of colored filter glass.

The Karl Zeiss plant at Jena, 94 percent transported to the U.S.S.R., 6
was modern and particularly well equipped, with over 100 diamond saws;
two of these were 420 mm in diameter and capable of running at 900 rpm,
giving a surface speed of 20 meters per second. 7 Zeiss manufactured many
lines of optical and scientific instruments including optical comparators and
projectors, micrometers, and lenses and prisms. 8 The main plant was reassembled
at Monino, near Moscow, 9 and utilized Zeiss experts Eitzenberger, Buschbeck,
and Faulstich to develop detector, remote control, and recording gear. Other
optical glass and optical instrument firms removed to the U.S.S.R. included
the Zeiss-Fkon A.G. works at Dresden; Elektro-Optik GmbH at Teltow, Berlin
(100 percent removal); and a number of camera manufacturers. 10

However, the transfer of the Zeiss and similar works did not guarantee
transfer of German technical expertise. In 1930 the Moscow planetarium had
been equippped by Zeiss," and in 1965, twenty years after the Zeiss plants
had been removed to Moscow, the rebuilt Zeiss plant in Jena provided a two-
meter-diameter mirror for solar, planetary, and satellite observations at the
Shemakinskaya observatory. 12 The backwardness in optical, and particularly
spectroscopic, instruments was confirmed by Soviet academician S. L. Man-
del'shtam; "The design and production of these important instruments lags
behind our needs and world quality standards. We are forced to buy abroad,
and these are among the most expensive instruments. " J3

Laboratory glass exemplifies this technical backwardness. Up to about 1930
only one type of laboratory glass was used: type "No. 23" developed by V.

8 G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontage; Seeks Jakre Reparationspolitik (Bremen: F.
Trttjen, 1951), p. 105.

7 CIOS no. XXVII-23. Optical Grinding and Centering Equipment Used by Karl Zeiss. Jena.
1946.

8 Machine Tools, (Washington: U.S. Foreign Economic Administration, Interagency Committee
on German Industrial and Economic Disarmament, July 1945), p. 48.

9 Werner Keller, Ost Minus Wesi=Null (Munich: Droemersche Veriagsanstatt, I960), pp, 283,
357, 365.

'" Harmssen, op. cit. n. 6, p. 105.

11 Amtorg, Economic Review of the Soviet Union. V, I (January I. 1930), 10.

11 Kommunisi (Yerevan), November 3, 1965. p. 1.

13 U.S. Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65; Coals and Purposes, Achievements. Plans,
and International Implications, Staff Report, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
89th Congress, 2d session {Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 351.

168 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Ye. Tishchenko in 1899 and used continuously from 1900 to the present day.
Although having certain disadvantages as well as advantages over standard foreign
laboratory glasses (Jena 1920 and Pyrex), its chemical endurance is such as
to merit its continued use. After 1930 manufacture of four other types was
added to No .23; these types were Pyrex , No . 846, Neutral , and I mpro ved White . ' *
These five varieties provided enough flexibility for laboratory requirements
until the 1950s, when a few additional standard types were manufactured; how-
ever, the varieties manufactured in 1968 mainly consist of the old, established
types including the original No. 23, Jena 20 (German), and Pyrex and Superpyrex
(U.S.), plus imported glass from Czechoslovakia (Simax, Sial, Neutral, and
Palex). 15

In 1963 a British research delegation that was able to visit the three-year-old
Glass Research Institute in Moscow particularly noted one laboratory that ' 'carries
out pilot plant work on glass manufacture on a scale that is equaled by only
two or three laboratories in the whole of the Western world." This laboratory
contained four small glass-melting tanks, but the major equipment was a large
furnace capable of melting 70 tons of glass per day for a new experimental
centrifugal spinner for the production of cone or back section of a cathode-ray
tube for television receivers. The delegation concluded that this machine had
many novel features and "seems to be an advance on other machines of this
type in use in the Western world;" 1 * apparently, however, it never reached
development stage.

Manufacture of window glass, the largest tonnage glass product, exemplifies
the present pervasive utilization of Western technology. The Fourcault process,
imported in the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s soon after it was developed in Belgium,
is the basis for standard Soviet glassmaking equipment. In this process the
glass is drawn vertically in a continuous manner through a partially submerged
"boat" with a narrow slot in the center over asbestos- covered rolls. The Soviet
VVS machine is a replica of the Fourcault process (Figures 14-1 and 14-2),
even utilizing direct translations of the integral parts of the process — for example,
the "boat" is termed lodochka (a literal translation). Although the Colburn
glassmaking process is known and described in Soviet texts,' 7 it is not known
whether the process has been utilized in practice."*

" The Class Industry (New York), XXVI, 5 (May 1945). 228.

11 Spravochnik khimika (Moscow) vol.V, 1968, pp. 333-34,

" Visit to Class Research Institute Moscow on 12th October, 1963. Report by Confederation
of British Industry, London, appendix E4. Unfortunately, no further trace of this machine
has been found in the literature. See chapter 23 for technical assistance tD the television industry:
in 1967 the Soviets bought from France a pilot plant for manufacture of television tubes; The
Times (London), February 1, 1967. Several months later Corning Glass in New York was
reportedly negotiating for supply of glass, on which It holds patents, for color TV tubes to
be used in this system; Wall Street Journal . May 23, 1967, 10:3.

17 For example, I. I. Kitaigorodskii, Tekhnologiia stekla (Moscow, 1967). p. 336.

" This text also describes Soviet utilization of other Western glassmaking processes — for example,
the Danner tube-making principle; ibid. , p. 418.

Glass and Cement Industries 169

Figure 14-1 THE FOURCAULT PROCESS FOR SHEET GLASS MANUFACTURE

CO
CD

"CD'
CD_
CD
CD

Source; Glass Industry, August 1928, p. 175-

In early 1967 the Soviet Union concluded it licensing agreement with Pilking-
ton Brothers, Ltd., of Lancashire, England, to produce float glass in the Soviet
Union. This is a new and revolutionary method of producing flat glass with
a surface that does not need grinding after solidifying. By floating molten glass
on a bed of liquid tin and making use of the solidification at different temperatures
there is no requirement for rollers (as in the Fourcault process), which create
imperfections requiring grinding. The agreement included supply of equipment
by the Pilkington firm to a value of $4.2 million, sufficient to equip a plant
to produce 50 million square feet of flat glass per year. 18

"> Walt Street Journal , March 30, 1967. 16:3.

170 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Figure 14-2 SOVIET VVS MACHINE FOR SHEET GLASS MANUFACTURE

«•

ft?-

1 P/im*9xa

♦ J T njIKitsdn

Source: 1. I. KiSaigorodskii, Takhnotogiia stikta (Moscow, 1967). p, 319.

WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE CEMENT INDUSTRY

By and large the Soviets did not attempt to transport cement kilns to the
Soviet Union under reparations, except for removals from Manchuria. (See
Table 14- 1 ,) The reduction in Manchurian cement capacity due to Soviet removals
was approximately 890,000 metric tons with a replacement value of $ 1 7 .8 million .

Glass and Cement Industries

171

Table 14-1 MANCHURIAN CEMENT PLANTS REMOVED TO THE U.S.S.R.

Soviet

Metric

removal or

tons

Name

destruction

capacity

Notes

Harbin

none

110,000

Chicom territory

Mutanchiang

large

100,000

Chicom territory; Soviets removed
equipment

Changtu

large

140,000

Chicom territory; Soviets removed
equipment

Anshan

small

200,000

Some repairs needed

Miaoling

large

90,000

Equipment removed by Soviet Army.

Dairen

none

210,000

Under Soviet control

Kirin

large

260,000

Soviet Army removed almost all
equipment

Chinhsi

small

150,000

50,000 metric tons capacity
remaining

Fushun

small

210,000

80,000 metric tons capacity
remaining

Liaoyang

small

180,000

90,000 metric tons capacity
remaining

Penchihu

small

250,000

100,000 metric tons capacity
remaining

Kungyuan

large

170,000

Soviets removed all equipment

Antung

large

130,000

Chicom territory; Soviets
removed all equipment

Total

2,200,000 metric tons

Source: Edwin W. Pauley, Report

on Japanese

Assets in Manchuria to the President

of the United States,

July 1946 (Washington, 1946).

The Pauley Mission commented on the removals from six plants in the Fall
of 1945 as follows:

The six planus which suffered major removals by the Soviets were the most recently
constructed and equipped with the newest machinery . The equipment which seemed
to be particularly desired was the crushing, grinding, and pulverizing equipment,
electric motors, generators, laboratory and testing equipment, and inter-plant haul-
age equipment. In one plant (Kirin) an attempt was made to cut the rotary kilns
into sections and remove them. Fabricated fixtures were not ordinarily removed
but they were usually badly damaged. Severe and wholly unnecessary damage
to auxiliary equipment and buildings was characteristic of almost all stripped
plants inspected by the Pauley Mission. There wasa general appearance of complete
devastation, probably due to the haste with which the Soviets were compelled

to operate The nature of the removals has been such that restoration to former

capacity of the plants affected will require almost complete rebuilding of the
entire facilities. 20

Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United
States, July 1946 (Washington, 1946), pp. 217-18.

172 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Equipment removals varied greatly and, as Table 14-1 reveals, extended
even to plants under Chinese Communist control. At Fushun, Soviet removals
were limited to office supplies and equipment, testing equipment, automotive
vehicles, a considerable number of cement bags, and some cement; similarly,
at the Anshan plant only some equipment was removed. At Kungyuan, however,
a complete removal job was undertaken; railroad tracks were laid into the center
of the 170,000-metric-ton capacity cement plant to facilitate loading of equipment
onto rail cars, and parts of the buildings were destroyed to remove machinery.
This was a portland cement plant with a typical dry process; the American
engineer (N.M. Taylor) who inspected the plant for the Pauley Mission reported
that the rock crushers, belt conveyers, and overhead cranes were removed com-
pletely; the drive mechanism from two 70-meter kilns was removed, as was
the drive mechanism from five (of eight) bait-reduction mills . The coal pulveriza-
tion plant, four bagging machines, and the steam turbine generator were also
removed.

At Penchihu only the steam turbine generators and about one quarter of
the electrical control equipment were removed; while equipment at the Kirin
plant, a 220,000-ton-per-year porttand cement producer, was almost completely
removed, including a gyratory crusher, two hammer crushers, three material
dryers, five clinker mills, three cold dryers, one coal mill, two rotary kilns
(only the blowers were taken, the kilns were not removed), two waste heat
boilers, two turbogenerators, 38 transformers, 107 electric motors, and 18
machine tools.

Of a total of 2.2 million tons capacity affected by Soviet removals, about
890,000 tons was completely removed to the U.S.S.R.; the balance suffered
selective equipment removals.

In East Germany only one cement plant was removed — Zementwerk at
Niedersachswerfen.' 1 The great prize in Germany was the Magdeburg works
of Krupp-Gruson A.G., before the war one of the world's leading manufacturers
of heavy machinery and structural steel fabrication; its princ:;)al products included
heavy machinery for crushing and grinding and complete cement manufacturing
plants. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, o-ily about 10 percent
of the equipment in this plant was destroyed and another 10 percent damaged. 22
Consequently, the Soviets received an advanced and ai-T-ost complete plant
for production of complete cement plants. The immediate task of the plant
was to provide a cement- making capacity of six million metric tons per year
for the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviets have standardized domestic production of cement plants
they have continued to buy advanced technology on the world nwket. In 1959-60

!1 Harmssen, op. cii. n. 6, p. 107.

u U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Friedrich Krupp Crusonwerke, Magdebwg, Germany, January
!947.

Class and Cement Industries 1 73

the largest cement plant in the world was built in Siberia by the French company
Societe Fives-Lille-Cail of Paris. The company provided a complete cement
manufacturing installation including two 19-by-575-foot kilns. Construction of
the plant was supervised by French engineers with startup and performance
tests conducted by the Fives-Lille-Cail company. The production capacity is
33,000 barrels of Type I portland cement per day from an unusual mixture
of limestone and nepheline residues. The technology in this plant was certainly
the most advanced in the world at the time the plant was built. For example,
the grinding department, the largest in the world, produced two grades of portland
cement in mills 10 feet 5 inches in diameter and 46 feet long, each unit weighing
260 tons, loaded with upwards of 170 tons of grinding media and designed
to run at 19 rpm through 2500-hp helical reducers. The storage and bagging
facilities reflected the plant's size and included 20 silos with a total storage
capacity of 80,000 tons, i.e., 16 days kiln production. 23

In general, a large number of Soviet cement kilns have been manufactured
abroad, although there is domestic production of standard designs. !4 The extent
of internal use of foreign designs may be broadly gauged from a report of
the French cement industry delegation to the U.S.S.R. in I960. 25

The description of cement plants visited by that delegation suggests they
contain a considerable quantity of Western-manufactured equipment and Western
equipment copied in the Soviet Union. It was reported that the Vorovskoi plant,
built in 1911 and modernized in 1930 and 1945, with a current production
of 325,000 tons, uses four Smidth (Copenhagen) furnaces; the crusher equipment
was Krupp and Smidth with one crusher from the "Urals plant" (probably
Uralmash).

At the Sebriakov plant near Stalingrad, with its annual production of one
million tons of cement considered one of the most modern plants in the Soviet
Union, it was noted that the crushing plant used 12 Wilfley-type pumps, with
furnaces by Tellman in East Germany; the power station equipment was from
Tempella in West Germany, and three turbo-alternators came from Skoda in
Czechoslovakia. The crushing equipment was built in the Urals.

At the Novorossisk plant, founded in 1880 and expanded over the years,
the delegation noted a considerable quantity of equipment of Western origin.
The Novorossisk combinat comprises four plants: the October, with a capacity
of one million tons per year; the Proletariat, with a capacity of 1,150,000
tons per year; the October Victory, with a capacity of 300,000 tons; and the
First of May, also with a capacity of 350,000 tons. The Proletariat plant was
not visited by the delegation, but it reported concentrators with Smidth Folax

" Rock Products (Louisville. Ky.), May 1959, pp. 128-31. See also E. I. Khodorov. Pechi

tsememnoi promyshlennosii (Leningrad, 1968), p. 90
" £. I. Khodorov, op. at, n. 23, pp. 82-83.
" [.'Industrie cimmtiere en U.R.S.S., Compie rendu de mission 9-28 avril 1960 (Paris, 1960).

174 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

equipment. The October Victory plant was not visited. Equipment at the October
was reported to be five Krupp crushers, five crushers manufactured in the Urals,
and five Dorr-type silos of 500 cubic meters; the furnaces were identified as
Tellman (Magdeburg). The First of May plant had four Lepol-type firing units,
two standard Polysius (East Germany) granulators, and one large Polysius
granulator; the plant uses a dry process of the Lepol type with equipment furnished
by Polysius at Dessau and Magdeburg; the bagging machinery is from Smidth.

In the Soviet glass industry, the large-tonnage window glass sector is based
on the Belgian Fourcault process with recent addition, with British equipment
and technical assistance, of a Pilkington Brothers, Ltd., float glass unit. Glass
tubing manufacture uses the Danner process, and laboratory glass production
appears to consist of a limited range of types including a number of U.S.
and Czechoslovak glasses, and, notably, the Russian No.23 Tishchenko for-
mula developed in 1899. Optical glassmaking is technically backward.

The cement industry utilizes a significant proportion of foreign equipment.
The most advanced mills (for example, in Siberia and Sebriakov) utilize extensive
foreign equipment in the kiln and crusher sections. Soviet domestic production
of cement plants is of the standard type with no observable departures from
world practice.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Western Technical Assistance to the Textile,
Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries

TEXTILES AND CHEMICAL FIBERS

Western assistance to the textile industry in the 1920s has been described
in the first volume of this series. 1 In addition to the technical assistance in
the period 1929-1931 provided by Lockwood Greene, a U.S. firm, and French
technical assistance for the manufacture of viscose, there was a large supply
of U.S., British, and German machinery for textile plants. The Kirovsky combine
received textile equipment from the United States valued at $800,000 in 1930, 2
the Krasnayu Sheik textile plant received U.S. equipment in 1928, 3 and the
large textile combine at Ivanovo-Voznesensk received 100,000 spindles, mostly
from the U.K. firm of Tweedales and Smalley of Manchester, with warping
machines from Schlafhorst of Miinchen Gladbach in Germany." The Schlafhorst
company also supplied warping machines for the Shuya Melange textile mill
in 1932.

Some textile mills were also directed by foreign engineers. For example,
in 1930 Samuel Fox was hired as a mechanic at $510.00 per month with a
group of other American mechanics and sent to Baku to erect and start operation
of a textile plant equipped with machinery from the United States. Fox directed
the installation of equipment and later became director of the mill. 5

Textile plants from East Germany were removed to the Soviet Union in
1945-46. Two large artificial silk spinning operations in Saxony (the Pima
and Sehma plants of Fr. Kiittner A.G.) were completely removed to the
U.S.S.R,, 6 and two Brandenburg units, the Premnitz plant of Agea and the
Kurmarkische Zellwoll-AG plant at Wittenberge, both artificial silk producers,
were removed, the former about 50 percent and the latter about 80 percent.'
Regular spinning mills appear to have been only partly dismantled; eight plants

1 See Sutton I. pp. 231-33.

Amtorg, Economic Review of the Soviet Union (New York, II 1 1 (June I 1930) 224
Ibid.. V, 16-17 (September 1. 1930), 351.

* U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861 .5017/lc/684.

* U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861.5017/Living Conditions/144, March 25, 1930.

All data in this section from G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontage- Sechs Jahre
Reparationspoliiik (Bremen: F. Trujen, 1951), p. 109.

175

176 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

in Saxony, three in Thuringia, and one in Mecklenburg were partly removed
to the U.S.S.R. Of the nine weaving mills removed fro;;: Saxony, only one,
the Mechanische Weberei at Grimma, was completely removed. Similarly, only
six finishing operations were affected by dismantling — none was reported com-
pletely removed.

In 1954 an upgrading process began, and a large contract was granted Piatt
Brothers of the United Kingdom for the supply of $19.6 million worth of machin-
ery to equip plants in the cotton, worsted, spinning, weaving, and Finishing
sections of the industry; numerous textile machine firms in York-.hire and Lanca-
shire participated in supply. 7 In 1958-59 Courtaulds, Ltd., supplied machinery
and technical assistance for several rayon and cellulose acetate plants; 8 Fawcett
Preston & Company of Bromborough, Cheshire, secured an order for nine
pulp-steeping presses and two fiber-baling presses to be incorporated in this
rayon plant; 6 and Kestner Evaporator & Engineering Company, Ltd., supplied
Keebush equipment to Courtaulds for installation in the plants. 10

In 1959 a plant for the production of rayon was supplied by Vickers-
Armstrongs (Engineers), Ltd., and Highpolymer and Petrochemical Engineering
Company, Ltd., for a total value of $7 million," with $1 million worth of
instrumentation supplied by Honeywell Controls, Ltd., a subsidiary of the U.S.
firm. 12 A few years later, in 1966, Bentley Engineering Group (a subsidiary
of Sears Holdings, Ltd.) received an order valued at $14 million for knitting
machinery to equip two new knitting mills."

Italian companies also have been prominent suppliers of textile machinery
since World War II. In 1959 Chatillon supplied equipment for a high-
tensile-strength cord fiber plant. 14 Further textile mill equipment was supplied
under a contract with Sniaviscosa, ls and in 1967 a contract was awarded the
Sant'Andrea company of the Bombrini Parodi Delfino group and the Nuova
San Giorgio firm of the IRI Finmeccantca group for machinery to equip a
50,000-spindle mill for the production of mixed woolen and synthetic yarns. 18

A/B Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad of Sweden received an order in 1959
for the "design and complete installation and equipment for a viscose rayon
factory" (annual capacity of 200,000 tons of prehydraulized sulfate viscose
rayon), and machinery was supplied by several Swedish factories. 17

In 1958 a significant international arrangement to supply three synthetic

' New York Times, May 20. 1954, 3:6.

8 Chemistry and Industry (London), August 2, 1958.

9 East-West Commerce (London), VI, 12 (December 8, 1959), 6,

10 Chemistry and industry, December 2, 1961. p. 1968.
1 ' Chemistry and Industry, May 9, 1959, p. 609.

" Electrical Review (London), 167 (August 1960), 308.

13 Wall Street Journal. August 19, 1966, 11:6.

l * Problems of Economics (New York). Ill, 4 (August I960), 23.

15 Ibid.

19 Communication from Italian Embassy, Washington D.C.

" East-West Commerce. VI, 9, (September 28, 1959), 4.

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries 177

fiber (probably rayon) plants to the U.S.S.R. was headed by Von Kohorn
Internationa] Corporation of New York. Under this arrangement equipment was
supplied by the U.K. firms of Baker Perkins and the A.P.V. Company, while
Von Kohorn was ' 'responsible for technical advice connected with the engineering
and machinery part of the contract." 18

Over $30 million worth of machinery was acquired in the United States
in 1960 from a consortium of 40 U.S. textile equipment manufacturers. This,
the largest single order received from the U.S.S.R. since the end of World
War II, provided equipment for a 50,000-spindle mill at Kalinin, to spin, weave,
and finish cotton, worsted, and man-made-fiber fabrics. This order was in addition
to $6-7 million worth of similar equipment previously shipped by Intertex Corpo-
ration, a trading firm representing the 40 U.S. textile machinery manufacturers.
Of the total $30 million, $20 million was paid in cash. 19

Some of the principal equipment — to give an idea of the magnitude of the
arrangements — included the following 20 :

Crompton & Knowles 630 type W-3 looms

Saco-Lowelt VersaMatic drawing frames

S.J. spinning frames (MagneDraft)
Saco-Lowell worsted frames

Whiting Machine Works 20,000 American system worsted spindles

Rodney Hunt One continuous peroxide bleaching range

The 1962 report of an Indian textile delegation' 21 covered nine of the larger
textile mills with spinning departments. These were reported as old instal-
lations — "some of them 150 years and a few about 30 years old." They clearly
represented the two eras of textile mill construction, the first under the Tsars
and the second in the late 1920s and early 1930s by British and German com-
panies. This imported equipment was supplemented by domestic duplicates of
foreign equipment; neither the Indian nor the U.S. delegation noted indigenous
innovation.

Duplication of Western Textile Equipment

In the late 1920s the Soviets started to copy Western textile equipment,
and by 1928 the Shunsk mechanical plant at Ivanovo-Voznesensk produced
its one thousandth automatic loom of the "Northrup type." 22

'" Chemistry and Industry. June 21 , 1958, p. 763.

'* American Machinist (New York), January II, I960, p. 84.

10 Textile World (New York), February 1960, p. 4.

" Textile Industry in the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia (New Delhi: National Productivity Council,

November 1962), Report no, 19.
12 Amtorg, Economic Review of the Soviet Union , III, 9 (April 15, 1928), 161.

178 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

In 1958 the U.S. Cotton Delegation visited the Tashkent textile machine
construction plant, perhaps the largest manufacturer of roving frames, spinning
frames, and twisters in the U.S.S.R. After noting that in the machine shop
"there were many U.S. -made lathes and shapers in operation," the delegation
reported that the plant expected to go into production of a "new apron-type
long draft roving ... an improved Piatt design which the staff had modified." 23

The Indian delegation 44 noted that the blowroom lines in all Russian mills
had the following equipment: porcupine opener, Crighton opener, double por-
cupine opener, and Scutchner with Kirschner beater. Carding machines were
of the "ordinary" type with one mill using "Shirley type of cards." The only
nonconventional (i.e., non-Western) equipment noted was used in the grinding
of flats: "Flats are ground once in three months on Russian -made single flat-
grinding machines. Their flat grinder is different in design and manufacture
from the types common in our country."

In the drawing process "there was nothing particularly striking" and the
mills used the "conventional" process, except that one mill used Saco-Lowel!
combers with heavy laps. Russian ring frames were "ordinary and conventional
models" 25 with conversion to the Blaus-Roth type. In doubling, the Roto-Coner
type machine was "generally used," and for multiple and winding a "similar
type of English and Japanese double diner is used." 28

In 1947 a shuttJeless loom similar to the shuttletess loom weaving machine
produced by Sulzer of Winterthur, Switzerland, was developed by Leonytev
of the Moscow Textile Institute. 27 The U.S. delegation also noted winders
of the Leesonia type 28 and "imperfect copies" of the Franklin Process package
dyeing equipment."

WESTERN DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET
SYNTHETIC FIBER CAPACITY

Soviet production of synthetic fibers is well behind that of the Western
world. In 1965, of a total production of 407,300 metric tons of chemical and
synthetic fibers , only 77 ,900 tons was synthetics; the bulk of the Sov iet production

U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Cotton in the Soviet Union, Repon of a Technical Study Group,

Foreign Agricultural Service (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., June 1959), p, 5,

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 58,

Ibid., p. 59.

Encyclopedia of Textiles (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 242.

U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, op. cit. n. 23, p. 6. See Russian literature for more detail; for

example see A. M. Liberman, Organizaisiia i planirovanie predpriiatii ttkstil'noi

promyshttnnosti (Moscow, 1969), p. 167. for manufacture of Barber-Coleman winders.

U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, op. cit. n. 23, p. 10.

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries

179

was viscose fiber, which accounted for just under 75 percent of all chemical
and synthetic fiber production in 1965. :ln

Although no breakdown by type of synthetic fiber has been traced in Soviet
literature, it is estimated that the Soviets produced the following Quantities of
synthetic fibers in 1965:

Nylon

Polyester

Acrylics

Polyvinyl chloride

65,575 metric tons
7.331
2,851
1,629

77,386 metric tons

This is a significant increase from the approximately 13,500 tons produced
in 1956 (all Nylon 6), but still far below the U.S. production totals. In 1954
for example, the United States produced over 132,000 tons of synthetic fibers'
just under twice the Soviet 1965 production.

Most Western observers comment on the extensive and potentially valuable
research on synthetic fibers undertaken in the U.S.S.R. Writing in 1960 I V
Matstrenko of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 32 described the' work
of VNIIV (All-Union Artificial Fiber Research Institute) while pointing out
Soviet weaknesses in the engineering aspects of synthetic fiber production. E.
M. Buras, Jr., in a detailed two-part summary of Soviet synthetic fibers in
1961, concluded that "if its fiber industry lags in growth, the cause will not
be any lack of research and development capacity." 33

In 1960 the Soviets were publishing papers on synthetics at the same rate
as U.S. authors; Buras points out that "if we were to list references on synthetic
fiber research, about 400 authors in all would have to be cited." 34 This activity
was accompanied by cooperation with Czechoslovakia on 81 projects at 112
laboratories in the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. Further, Buras has outlined
areas of research which the U.S. had hardly investigated and where the Soviets
were deeply mvolved-particularly "elementorganic" polymers with possible
military applications."

1 The Soviets have not always distinguished between synthetics and chemical fibers; a distinction
nas Been maintained where possible throughout this section
These figures were calculated as follows (the Soviets have not published production figures

VmiavtvoSSSR. v !96Sg.: StatisHcheskii ezhegadnik (Moscow. 1969). p. 253; the percentage
(MoscowS)'™^/ [Pia, ' desia * '"sowttiaya khimicheskoya nauka i promvshlennoZr

Industrial and Engineering Chemistry (Washington, D.C.), February I960, pp 44A-48A
Chemical and Engineering News, July 31 1961 p 134
Ibid., August?, 1961, p. 83.
Ibid.

1 80 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Finally a report by two U.S. Army research scientists 36 concluded that
by the end of the 1950s the Soviets had made independent advances in synthetic
fibers; mdeed. they had produced three synthetics with no counterpart in the
West, and were cooperating with satellite countries in this research. Much Soviet
research was being directed to military applications of fibers, and the authors
point out:

A possible threat from Soviet textile research lies, not in the development of
slight y improved counterparts of nylon. Orion, etc., but in the possibility of
a real breakthrough emanating from extensive work in this field of new and
unusual fibers. "

Three new research achievements reportedly were "Enant " a Nylon 7
represented as a new fiber made from cheap raw materials; "Ftorlon " a process
which was said to have better mechanical properties than the Western "Teflon"-
and "Vmitron," which was described simply as a "superior" product 38

Yet desp.te this obviously ambitious and viable research program, we find
that all Soviet large-scale production facilities for synthetics have derived in
greater or lesser degree from the West. 39

Origins of Nylon 6 (Kapron) and Nylon 66 (Anid) Technology

The synthetic fiber nylon, made from benzene, hydrogen, and oxygen with
no vegetable or animal fibers, originated with basic work in the 1920s at Dupont
in the United States. Nylon 6 was developed and patented by Paul Schtack
m Germany and is known in Germany as "Perlon," while Nylon 66 was
selected from among many possible nylons and established on a commercial
scale in the United States in 1938; this nylon requires commercial quantities
of two intermediates, hexamethylene diamine and adipic acid, the latter-as
we shall see later— proving a problem for the Soviets.

Although considerable progress was made in the United States before World
War II and in Germany during the war, the Soviet Union had no capacity

fur^»; nS „ SynthetiC fibefS °- e " com P' ete 'y man-made fibers) at the end
of World War II. The first Soviet synthetic fiber plant was brought into production

" Field f L wL a ,> p L J' ^t iner ; 'l RuSSian and Satdlile Resear<;h a " d Development in the
» lUd . p. 247 " earCh JOU """ (NeW Y ° rk >' 30 " 4 < A P rii »W

" Ibid.'

" ^e S«vte , pul^r d in * t eS1 "V rade J»™ ls - K» «™ple. an editorial entitled
in* soviet Pusle. Skmntrs Silk and Rayon Record (London). 37, 7 (July 1962) ask.

« US' pIUno 6 ™ 3^1% M* 7^"" **"* ^ <° m ™^ ^ev'elopLn r
u.v patent No. 2 242,321 of May 6, 1941 (assigned to I. G. Farbenindustrie A C 1 The
Sovtets make a cla,m for Nylon 6 (Kapron) as a Soviet development in 19^ s « fl^/l
Sovetskau, Emsiklopediia . 2d edition (Moscow, 1949), vol. 9, p 14 "ol mam

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries 18!

at Klin in I948 41 for the production of Kapron, i.e., Nylon 6. Large-scale
production of Perlon (also Nylon 6) started in Poland at Landsberg (Gorzow)
in 1941 with an annual production of 8.7 million pounds of Nylon 6 and one
million pounds of Nylon 66." This plant was owned by 1. G. Farben, assignee
of the Schlack patents, and used intermediates from the Leuna works. According
to A. Zauberman," 3 the Landsberg plant was dismantled and shipped to the
U.S.S.R. in 1944; it is probable that the first Soviet Kapron (i.e., Perlon or
Nylon 6) plant at Klin was the rebuilt Landsberg plant. In fact, the Soviets
may have acquired more than the Landsberg plant. For example, one excellent
source comments:

Much of the work on the production and spinning of synthetic polymers was
done in Eastern Germany, in works which were either not seen at all or which
could be only very superficially examined before they were taken over by the
Russian forces. This may explain the scantiness of the available information about
the spinning of poiyurethane fibres ... vinylidene chloride copolymers . . . [and]
acrylonitrile polymers."

Two other plants at Kiev and Riga (in former Latvia), both producing Kapron
were brought into production in the 1950s, and in 1956 Soviet production of
Nylon 6 was 25 million pounds— which may be compared with U.S. production
of 265 million pounds of all synthetic fibers in 1954. In 1960 Nylon 6 was
the only synthetic fiber in full-scale production in the Soviet Union.

During the 1950s and 1960s a number of plants were built using the Schlack
process of melt spinning and cold drawing the fiber from the condensation
polymer of * -caprolactum; these included Chernigov in the Ukraine, Mogilev
in Soviet Armenia, the Engel plant in Saratov, Darnitsa in Kiev, and the Kalinin
plant.

Kapron production was stressed over other synthetics for two reasons , accord-
ing to A . L. Borisov:" first, there was an improvement in caprolactum production
(the raw material for nylon), and second, the Kapron plants required relatively
lower capital investment. In the fifties there was criticism in the technical literature
concerning the substandard caprolactum supplied by Soviet plants; this quality
problem was overcome by the supply of equipment from Germany for two

E. P. Ivanova, Ekonomika promyshleimosti khimicheskikh volokon (Moscow 1968) p 30
The Soviets include synthetics within the "chemical fiber group'"; the statistics in Ivanova
are tar more detailed for the United States and Europe than for the U.S.S.R., for which data
^ are expressed as percentages computed from an undisclosed base.

Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, 2d edition (New York: John Wiley, 1963), vol. 16.

,t,' 2a " berma ' 1 ' Austria! Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany 1937-1962
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1964), p, 267.

o™'- UrqUhart ' The Ge " nan R "y°" industry During :he Period 1939-1945 (London 1952)

blOS Subcommittee Survey Report no. 33, pp. 25-26.

Soviet State Committee on Chemistry, quoted in Chemical and Engineering News, July 21.

182 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

10,000- ton-per-year caprolactum (from aniline) plants, a caprolactum distillation
plant, two caprolactum continuous polymerization plants, and a 10,000-ton
adiponitrile-hexamethyl-enediamine plant. 46 This equipment — the core of the
caprolactum manufacturing process — was installed at Soviet plants at Kirovakan
(for the Kapron plant at Razdan), the Gubakha plant, and the Lisichansk plant
in Kiev,

Continuing Soviet technical problems with the production of caprolactum
were again eased in 1964 by the purchase of two caprolactum plants from
a British-Dutch consortium. Two Japanese firms, Ube Industries, Ltd., and
the Nissho Trading Company, were also competing for an order finally awarded
by Tekhmashimport to a group including Simon-Carves of the United Kingdom
and the Dutch State Mines for a bid of $25 million . Capacity of the caprolactum
plants was 50,000 tons each per year.' 17

Therefore it may be seen that the enormous increase in Nylon 6 (Kapron)
production in the U.S.S.R. has been dependent on supply from West Germany
and the United Kingdom of key equipment and technical assistance for the
manufacture of its essential raw material caprolactum.

Little practical success has been achieved in producing other nylons, although
much research has been undertaken. Pilot plant production of Anid (Nylon
66) as made by Dupont and British Nylon Spinners was started in 1956 and
small-scale production started at Kursk after Krupp installed German nylon
spinning equipment. Part of the problem encountered in this production appears
to have been a shortage of adipic acid; this lack was only partly offset by
blending the available supply of hexamethylene adipamide salt with caprolactum
(from the German and British plants) and hexamethylene azelaamide to form
a mixed-fiber Anid G-669 and H-669. Another fiber, Enant (or Nylon 7),
has been produced in small quantities only .

Other synthetic fibers produced in commercial quantities are Lavsan, Nitron,
and Kanekalon.

Krupp Construction of the Stalinogorsk-Kursk Lavsan Complex

Between 1958 and 1961 , under a $14 million contract, Krupp of West Ger-
many built a polyester fiber (polyethylene terephthalate) complex of three plants
in the Soviet Union. 48 The fiber produced by this complex is known in the
U.S.S.R. as Lavsan. Its patents are held by Imperial Chemical Industries, and
it is known as Terylene in the United Kingdom and Dacron in the United

" Ibid.

" New York Times, September 13, 1964. In 1967 il was reported that the Soviets were seeking

sis additional caprolactum plants in Germany; Wail Street Journal . April 14, 1967, 4:4,
" East-West Commerce. V. 6 (June 16, 1958), 3; Chemical and Engineering News, July 31,

1961, p. 132. It was reported in 1967 that the Soviets were purchasing six polyester plants.

with total capacity of 60,000 tons per year, in Czechoslovakia; Wall Street Journal, April

14, 1967, 4:4.

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper industries

183

States. The first unit built by Krupp was at Novo Kuibyshev to convert petroleum
stock intop-xylol , which is shipped to a second Krupp-built plant at Stalinogorsk
for conversion into dimethyl terephthalate . This stock in turn is shipped to
the third Krupp-built plant at Kursk, where the raw material is spun into Lavsan
polyester fiber. The project has capacity to produce six million pounds of Lavsan
annually. 49

Polyspinners , Ltd., Construction of the Siberian Lavsan Plant

Imperial Chemical Industries, in a continuing association going back into
the 1930s, has made available to the Soviet Union polyethylene manufacturing
technology and information on manufacture of polyester fibers and petrochemi-
cals. 50 In May 1964 the company headed a consortium known as Polyspinners,
Ltd., which signed a contract worth S140 million— probably the largest British
contract with the U.S.S.R. since the Bolshevik Revolution and itself part of
a larger agreement. The Polyspinners consortium was required to build a combine
in Siberia for the production of a polyester fiber developed from terephthalic
acid and ethylene glycol, i.e., Terylene or Dacron. The contract was guaranteed
by the British Government under its Export Credit Guarantee Program, and
bank credit provided for a 12- to 15-year loan to assist the Soviets in paying
for the complex. Utilizing British engineers as supervisors, the combine was
built at Irkutsk in Siberia with Russian operating engineers trained at 1CI plants
in the United Kingdom. 51 The chief construction companies were John Brown
& Company, Ltd., of Scotland and Stone Piatt of England; numerous other
British companies made up the consortium, some of which were the following: 52

Baker Perkins Chemical

Machinery, Ltd.
Gardners (Gloucester)
Sigmund Pulsometer Pumps
Sharpies (Camberley)
Hydrotherm Engineering, Ltd.

W. P. Butterfield, Ltd.
(Engineering)

Lawrence Scott and Electro-
motors

Aiton & Co., Ltd.

Gibbons Bros., Ltd,

English Electric Co.

Dunford & Elliott Process
Engineering, Ltd.

Pelrocarbon Developments

Loadcell weighing equipment

Large drum blenders

Pumps

Centrifuges

High-temperature heating systems

Stainless and mild-steel pressure

vessels

Electrical machines and control

gear

Agitators

Shell and tube-heat exchangers
Electric motors and switchgear
Rotary louvre pryers

High-purity nitrogen plant

Chemical and Engineering News* July 31. 1961.

Ibid.

New York Times, May 17, 1964.

P. Zentner, East-West Trade: A Practical Guide to Selling in Eastern Europe {London: Max

Parrish, 1967), p. 78.

184 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Purchase of Japanese Kanekalon and Acrylonitriie Plants

The Soviet-Japanese trade agreement of March 1959 included provision
for Soviet purchase of technology and a production plant for Kanekalon, a
Japanese-developed synthetic fiber based on acryl and blended with 60 percent
polyvinyl acetate and 40 percent acrylonitriie. For a total purchase price of
S30 million the Soviets received patent rights, engineering data, and plant
equipment to produce 30 tons of Kanekalon and 15 tons of acrylonitriie daily.
This amount was apportioned three-quarters to the Kanekalon and one-quarter
to the acrylonitriie, the former being supplied by Kanegafuchi Chemical Company
and the latter by Toyo Koatsu Industries. Machinery came from several Japanese
companies: filament spinning equipment from Kawasaki Aircraft; instrumentation
from Yokogawa Electric; and electric motors from Tachikawa and Toshiba.
It is notable that the capacity of the plant was large by Japanese standards;
payment terms provided for 20 percent down and the balance over five years. 53
The agreement included the necessary training of Russian engineers and techni-
cians in Japan. 54

Several years later, in 1965, it was reported that the Asahi Chemical Company
in Tokyo had sold the Soviets "the world's largest acrylonitriie monomer man-
ufacturing plant," at a cost of $25 million."

The other half of the Soviet acrylic fiber capacity has come from Courtaulds,
Ltd., in the United Kingdom. In April 1959 Courtaulds concluded a $28 million
contract for the construction of a complete acrylic fiber plant and related supply
of process technology and technical assistance. This single plant doubled Soviet
1960 acrylic fiber production."

WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY

In 1 930 the Soviet Union had a shortage of paper and wood pulp and both
were imported in substantial quantities; pulp and papermaking machinery was
not produced in the Soviet Union until after 1932." The large pulp and paper
plants built in the Soviet Union before 1930 were with complete American
equipment and technical assistance. The Balakhna plant, with a capacity of
88,200 tons of pulp and 145,000 tons of paper including 133,000 tons of news-
print, started operation in 1928; a second section was activated in 1930. All
equipment— General Electric control units and Bagley Sewall papermaking

■" The Oriental Economist (Tokyo), October 1960, p. 555.

■" Chemical and Engineering News. July 31, 1961.

11 Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1965.

*« Chemical and Engineering News, July 31, 1961 . See also R. W. Moncrieff. Man-Made Fibre*

(New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 695.
17 Za Industrialitstsiiu (Moscow). February 21. 1931.

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries

185

equipment — was imported- The Siaz plant started operating in 1930 with a
capacity of 144,000 tons of pulp per year, again with completely imported
equipment, part from Norway and part from the United States, including Thorne
bleaching towers. 58 The Kondopoga plant started its first section in 1930, and
foreign technical assistance and equipment for this plant was so extensive that
American foremen supervised the mill as late as October 1933. S9

Plants built in the Soviet Union after 1933 and before World War II used
domestic duplicates of foreign equipment, particularly the Fourdrinier machine;
some outside assistance was given during the Lend Lease era, when $367,000
worth of pulp and paper industry machinery was shipped to the Soviet Union.

Table 15-1.

ORIGIN OF SOVIET PAPER, BOARD
AND PULP CAPACITY AS OF 1958

Metric Tons

Origin

Paper

Board

Pulp

Russia (pre-1917)

247,800

8,200

91 ,000

Soviet Union (1917-58)

509,720

26,500

977,750

Manchuria (reparations)

13,000

—

33,000

Baltic States (occupation)

110,500

—

252.000

Finland (occupation)

119,700

45.000

417.000

South Sakhalin (occupation)

1 ,277,000

2,492,000

(Karafuto)

Total (1958)

2,277,720

79,7p0

4,262,750

Source: Pulp, Paper and Board Bills: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (New York:
American Paper and Pulp Association, April 1959), p. 6.

Note: Excludes East German reparations and Lend Lease equipment.

Although these mills provided sizable additions to Russian pulp and paper capac-
ity before and during World War II, the extraordinary increment of capacity
came after Soviet occupation of Finland, the Baltic States, and Karafuto (South
Sakhalin), with lesser increments provided by equipment removals from
Manchuria and East Germany. In 1958 Soviet sulfite, sulfate, and mechanical
pulp capacity totaled 4,262,750 metric tons, of which 91,000 metric tons was
prerevolutionary capacity and 894,750 metric tons built in the Soviet period.
The balance, i.e., 75 percent of capacity, was from Finnish, Baltic, and Karafuto
mills.

A total of 252,000 metric tons of pulp capacity and 110,500 metric tons
of paper capacity was added by mills in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In
Lithuania the Soviets gained the 70,000-ton sulfite pulp mill at Klaipeda; in

Amtorg, Economic Review of the Soviet Union. V, 10 (May 1930), 210.
U.S. State Depi. Decimal File, 861.5017/Living Conditions/726.

186 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Latvia the Sloka mill, founded in 1886, provides a capacity of 60,000 tons

u T^" d 5 °' 000 t0nS 0f paper " Two smaller P U| P mil1 * have contributed
another 25,000 tons to Soviet capacity. In Estonia the Soviets have the use
of four mills: the Tallin mill, founded in 1890, with an annual capacity for
3000 tons of paper and 77,000 tons of mechanical and sulfite pulp; the Kero

Z ' ™ " large mi " With a ca P aci 'y for 40 ' 000 ton * of sulfate pulp and
16,000 tons of paper; and the Turi and Koil mills, each with a capacity for
8000 tons of paper (the Turi mill also has a 5000-ton sulfite pulp capacity)
Former Finnish mills are the Enso (30,000 tons board and 80,000 tons

S nnn Si P ^IS 0, Md "* KeXh °' m ' °° Lake Lado e a " with a ca P acit y
or 100,000 tons of bleached and unbleached pulp; the Sovietskii, Vyborg Lyas-

kelya, P.tkyaranta, Kharlu, and Souyarvi also are former Finnish mills making
Finland s contribution to Soviet pulp and paper capacity 417,000 and 119 700
metnc tons, respectively. The Souyarvi mill has a 15,000-ton board capacity
making a total of 45,000 tons (with the Enso board capacity) obtained from
Finland.

Over one-half ot the total Japanese production of pi 'p wood between 1935
and 1945 was from Karafuto, the Japanese half of the Sakhalin peninsula 6 °
These wood pulp facilities, mainly chemical pulp processes-sulfite pulp and
kraft pulp— were ceded to the Soviet Union at the end ,-.f World War II and
included nearly all Japanese productive facilities in these :vws. The significant
contribution of these former Japanese facilities to Soviet pui F and paper capacity
is indicated in Table 15-2. No less than 1.40 million tons capacity of sulfite
pulp, 1.09 million tons of mechanical pulp, and 1.27 rilion tons of paper
capacity were transferred to the Soviet Union.

The Manchurian pulp and paper industry was removed on a selective basis
to the Soviet Union. One plant, the Manchurian soya bean stem pulp mill
was removed completely, and according to T. A. Rendricki, a U S Army
inspection officer, "This plant was more completely stripped than any I have
seen to date."" The mill produced a high-grade pulp from reeds growing on
the banks of the Liao, Yalu, and Sungari rivers as well as a Maple fiber from
soya bean stalks by a company-developed process. Capacity was 15,000 tons
of kraft pulp and 10,000 tons of paper per year, and equipment consisted of
shredders, cooking and reagents tanks, separators, mixers, and storage tanks «
Absolutely everything was removed by the Soviets except built-in installations
namely cooking tanks, reagent tanks, drying furnaces, separation tanks, and

80 Sf2 T R " ^p 1, ?*, "oot^'P '" d «*«y °fJ<-P"> (Tokyo; SCAP [Supreme Command
R^ no sT" Headqu.tterc, Natural Resources Seciion, September 1946).

Ibid

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries

187

Table 15-2

JAPANESE PULP AND PAPER MILLS ON SAKHALIN

(KARAFUTO) TAKEN OVER BY THE SOVIET UNION

IN 1945

CAPACITY IN METRIC TONS

Location

Built

PULP

MECHA
Paper

iWCAL

Mill

Sul/ite

Sulfate

Mechanical

Board

Korea kov
Yuzhno
Sakhalinsk

Dolinsk

Kholmsk
Tomari

Chekhov
Uglegorsk
Makarov
Poronaisk

Otomari

Toyohara

Ochtai

Maoka
Tomarioru

Noda
Esutoru
Shirutoru
Shikuka

1914

1917

1919
1915

1922
1925
1927
1935

140,000
280,000
280,000

140,000

140,000
140,000
280,000
200,000

140.000
(rayon)

268,000
204,000
280,000
{rayon)

25.000
kraft

264,000
kraft

240,000

20,000

59,000
388,000
281.000

—

TOTALS

1.600,000

—

892,000

1 ,277,000

—

Source: Pulp, Paper and Board
Paper and Pulp Association, April
Lend Lease equipment.

Mills: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, American
1959; Note: Excludes East German reparations and

bases for heavy lathes," according to Rendricks. Dismantling began on Sep-
tember 28, 1945, and the last shipment was made on November 15, 1945. 63

The Nippon-Manshu pulp manufacturing plant at Tunghua, with an annual
pulp capacity of 18,000 metric tons, also was completely removed to the Soviet
Union, 6,1 as was the Yaluchiang paper mill at Antung with a capacity of 3000
tons of printing paper per year. 65

Other plants were selectively removed. The Shinseimei paper plant at
Chinchow lost five carloads of paper felts, conveyer belts, and electric motors,*' 5
while the Kanegafuchi Paper Company lost only 10 percent of capacity 67 and
the Chihua Paper Company was not disturbed at alt. 68

Removals from Germany in this industrial sector consisted only of paper
plants. The most important removal was the Leipziger Chromo- und Kunstdruck-
papierfabrik vorm. Gustav Najork in Leipzig. About 27 plants in Saxony and

" Ibid.

" Ibid., p. 23 1.

"• Ibid., p. 231,

«« Ibid., p. 227.

»' Ibid., p. 231.

"" Ibid.

188 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

another dozen in Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg were also removed
to the Soviet Union.

Considerable equipment has been supplied from Finland for the woodworking
and paper-manufacturing industries. For example, in the 1956 trade agreement
it was agreed that Finland would supply three paperboard-making machines
and four papermaking machines, in addition to two plants for the manufacture
of sulfate cellulose. This was in addition to a large quantity of pumps and
fittings. The Tampella firm, as part of this agreement, received an order from
the Soviet Union "for machinery for a semicellulose plant and a cardboard
factory with a daily capacity of 200 tons for delivery in 1959. The cellulose
plant will use reeds as raw material."" In 1962 the Tampella firm built another
corrugated cardboard mill in the Soviet Union with a capacity of 300,000 tons
per annum. 70 It was also reported:

A/B Defibrator, Stockholm, has obtained an order from the Soviet Union for
Kr32 million (£2,200,000) worth of machinery and equipment for making hard-
board. Delivery is to take place by the end of 1958. The company has previously
sold fiberboard machinery to the Soviet Union."

In 1958 the West German firm of Himmelheber contracted to install in
the U.S.S.R. several plants based on the Behr process pf manufacture of fiber-
board; these were of 50,100 tons daily capacity. 72

By combining the capacity originating in Japan, Manchuria, Finland, and
the Baltic States we arrive at the conclusion that only between one-quarter
and one-third of Soviet pulp, board, and paper capacity in 1960 was actually
built by the Soviets, either with or without foreign technical assistance. In
1960 only 22.4 percent of papermaking capacity had been built in the Soviet
era in the Soviet Union; another 10.9 percent had been built in Russia before
the Revolution; the balance (66.7 percent) came from postwar Soviet acquisition
of facilities in the Baltic States, Finland, and Japanese Karafuto. (See Table
15-3.)

In pulp-making capacity, we find that only 22.9 percent was built in the
Soviet Union during the Soviet era, and only 2.1 percent of 1960 capacity
originated in prerevolutionary Russia; no less than 75 percent of pulp-making
capacity came from Soviet acquisitions in Finland, the Baltic States, and Karafuto.

" East-West Commerce, [V, 12 (December 9, 1957), 4.

T ° Fortune. August 1963, p. 80.

71 East-West Commerce. IV, 6 (June 28, 1957), 1 1 .

" U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forestry and Forest Industry in ihe U.S.S.R.. Report of a Technical
Study Croup (Washington, March 1961), p. 56. Also see pp. 56-57 for use of Western equipment
in the manufacture of fiberboard .

Alexis J. Panshin of Yale University concluded on the basis of his 1958 tour that in the
sawmill, plywood, and pulp and paper plants, "all the major pieces of equipment were either
of foreign make or obvious copies." Letter to author, February 19, 1968.

Textile, Synthetic Fiber, and Pulp and Paper Industries

189

Table 15-3

ORIGINS OF SOVIET PAPER, BOARD, AND
PAPER CAPACITY IN 1960

Percentage

Built in
Soviet era

Percentage

Built in
Tsarist era

Percentage

from
occupation

Total

Paper
Board

Pulp

22.4
33.3
22.9

10.9
10.2
2.1

66.7
56.5
75.0

100.0
100.0
100.0

Source:

Table 15-1.

In board- making capacity, about one-third had been built in the Soviet Union,
primarily with Western technical assistance, and 10.2 percent was inherited
by the Soviets from prerevolutionary mills. Over one-half, i.e., 56.5 percent,
of board-making capacity came from Soviet acquisitions in Finland and the
Baltic States.

Therefore it may be seen that as of 1960 a relatively small portion of Soviet
capacity in this industry had been built in the U.S.S.R. during the Soviet era — and
even this with extensive foreign technical assistance.

The 1 960s saw the beginning of the construction of a gigantic wood-processing
combine at Bratsk in Siberia. The capacity of this combine increased by a
factor of two Soviet rayon pulp output, and by 300,000 tons (or six times)
the amount of paper-board production. The combine has associated sawmills,
a furniture plant, a hard-board mill and various wood chemistry plants. 73 The
rayon cellulose plant utilizes equipment from the EMW firm of Karlstadt,
Sweden; the carton manufacturing equipment was installed by Tampelfa of Fin-
land. ''* The central instrumentation for the pulp plant was provided byA/B Max
Sievert of Stockholm, Sweden; this company supplied installations as built by
Leeds and Northrup and the Foxboro Company (Sievert is the manufacturing
licensee and agent in Sweden for the Leeds and Northrup Company). 75 The
wood pulp plant near Irkutsk has equipment from Rauma Repola Oy of Finland . 7S

Thus it can be seen that the Soviet pulp and paper industry and the textile
industry utilize large proportions of imported machinery. No innovation was
noted in textile production in the fifties and sixties by expert delegations from
the United States and India, and Russian-made equipment then consisted of
duplicates of Western equipment — primarily U.S., U.K., and German. This
duplication apparently was not altogether successful, as large new installations
were made in the 1960s by Italian and American companies.

" Meisalehii (Helsinki), March 3, 1959.

" Chemical Week, (New York). September 24, 1966, p. 39.

" Letter to author from Leeds and Northrup Company, Philadelphia. August 14, 1967.

16 Chemical Week. September 24. 1966. p. 39.

190

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Devekpment, 1945-1965

It seems clear that all developments and equipment in synthetic fiber have
originated in the West, despite significant Soviet research efforts in this field.
Production of Nylon 6, particularly the production of caprolactum, is dependent
on Western equipment and processes from the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Japan. Lavsan utilizes German and Czechoslovak machinery; the largest
Lavsan unit was built by a British consortium (Poly spinners, Ltd.)- Acryl fiber
technology and capacity is from Japan and the United Kingdom.

In pulp and paper we find an unusual situation in that as of 1960 two-thirds
of the Soviet paper capacity, over one-half of board capacity, and three-quarters
of pulp capacity originated in countries occupied by Soviet forces in the for-
ties — the Baltic States, parts of Finland, and particularly Japanese Karafuto.
The new Siberian wood processing combines are heavily dependent on Swedish,
Finnish, and, indirectly, American technology and equipment. There has been
no significant innovation in this group of industries.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Western Assistance to the Motor Vehicle
and Agricultural Equipment Industries

THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY

The Soviet motor vehicle manufacturing industry has a history of production
of a very limited range of utilitarian vehicles in a few large plants built with
considerable Western technical assistance and equipment. These few plants man-
ufacture most of their own components but export some components to vehicle
assembly plants in other areas of the Soviet Union.

There is a high degree of integration between military and civilian models,
partly because military and civilian vehicles require a large proportion of similar
parts and partly because of the need to maintain unification of military and
civilian design to assist model changeover in case of war. This unification
of military and civilian automobile designhas been described by A. N. Lagovskii:

The fewer design changes between the old and the new type of product, the
easier and more rapidly the enterprise will shift to new production, If, for example,
chassis, motors, and other parts of a motor vehicle of a civilian model are used
for a military motor vehicle, of course the shift to the mass production of the
military motor vehicle will occur considerably faster and more easily than if
the design of all the main parts were different. 1

To achieve unification, precise standards are imposed on Soviet civilian vehicles
to enable their conversion in wartime, and as Lagovskii points out, part of
current "civilian'" production of tractors and motor vehicles may be used directly
as military vehicles, 2

Quite apart from the "unification of design" aspect described by Lagovskii,
the Soviets produce both military and civilian vehicles in the same plants, continu-
ing a practice begun in the early 1930s. Accordingly, claims that U.S. technical
assistance to the Soviet automobile industry has no military potential, are not
founded on substance. 3

1 A. N. Lagovskii, Strategiia i ekonomika, 2d edition {Moscow, 196 1), p. 192.

! Ibid., pp. 192-93.

3 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, The Fiat-Soviet Auto

Plant and Communist Economic Reforms, 89th Congress, 2d session (Washington, 1967), p.

42. See chapter 27 for military vehicle production. The installation is commonly known as

the Fiat-Soviet auto plant, although the Fiat technical component is negligible compared with

that of U.S. equipment supplies.

191

192 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

Western assistance to this industry may best be described by examining
motor vehicle plants separately in approximate order of size and by outlining
the Western contribution to the technical design and production facilities of
each.

Table 16-1 lists in descending order of size the major Soviet motor vehicle
plants planned or in operation as of 1971, together with approximate output
and the main features of Western origin; Table 27-1 (see p. 384) identifies
the civilian and military models produced by these plants.

Table 16-1 WESTERN ORIGINS OF AUTOMOBILE AND TRUCK PLANTS
IN THE SOVIET UNION AS OF 1971

Plant

Approximate
Modal Annual

Designation Output

Volgograd
(Togllatti)

VAZ

600,000
(1974
projected)

Moscow Small
Auto

MZMA

300,000

Gorki

GAZ

220.000

Kama

(KAZ?)

1 00,000 »

(projected)

Summary of Western
technical assistance

Three-quarters of equ ipment a
from United States; Fiat
technical assistance in con-
struction and operation

Original Ford Motor Co.
equipment (1930), replaced
by German Opel (1945)
and Renault (1966)

Ford Motor Co. (1930);
Renault (1970);
Gleason Works (1970)

Design and engineering by
Renault (France).
Equipment from a consortium
of U.S. firms: licenses
applied for (1971) by Satra
Corp., Swindell-Dressier,
Ex-Cell-0 Corp., Cross
Company, and (unconfirmed)
Giffels Associates, Inc.

im. Likhachev
Urals (Miass)

Odessa I assembly
Lvov f plants
Minsk

Yaroslavl

ZIL

URAL

OdAZ

LAZ

MAZ

YaAZ

100,000
55,000

21,500

14.400
8.000

U.S. equipment (mostly prewar)
A.J. Brandt, Inc. (1930 plant

moved from Moscow in 1 94 1 )
General Motors (1945)

German technical assistance

(1945-46)
Hercules Motor Co. (1930)

Sources : See Sutton II , Chapter 1 1 ; Kratkli avtomobifnyi spravochnik, 5th edition ( Moscow,
1 968); AutomoOVe industries (Philadelphia), January 1 ,1 958; U.S. House of Representatives.
Committee on Banking and Currency. The Flat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Economic
Reforms, 89th Congress, 2d sess. (Washington, 1967); Leo Heiman, "Inthe Soviet Arsenal,"
Ordnance, January-February 1968 (Washington; American Ordnance Association, 1968);
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, East-West Trade: A Compilation of Views
of Businessmen, Bankers, and Academic Experts, 88th Congress, 2d sess., November
1964 (Washington, 1964); Metalworking News, August 16, 1971.

a Forbes (October 1, 1966) states three-quarters; the figure may be somewhat less, but
is certainly over one-half.

» Will be the largest plant in the world (covering 38 sq. mi.), and its output of heavy trucks
will be greater than thai of all U.S. manufacturers combined. Financing by Chase Man-
hattap Bank and the Export-Import Bank.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 193

Lend Lease provided a significant contribution to the Russian vehicle stock
in World War II and provided the basic designs for postwar domestic production.
Vehicles supplied under Lend Lease included 43,728 Jeeps and 3510 Jeep-
Amphibians; truck shipments included 25,564 vehicles of three-quarter ton,
218,664 of one and one-half ton, 182,938 of two and one-half ton, 586 of
two and one-half ton amphibian, and 814 of five ton. In addition, 2784 special-
purpose trucks, 792 Mack ten-ton cargo trucks, 1938 tractor trailers, and 2000
spare engines were sent. 11

The report of the British delegation visiting the Central Automobile and
Engine Research Institute in 1963 suggests that at that time there was a continued
reliance on the West, but for design and equipment rather than assembled vehicles.
The delegation reported:

The first installation which we were shown was two single-cylinder engines on
which combustion chamber research was carried out; these were old U.S. Universal
crankcases, presumably supplied on Lend Lease during the War, and which had
obviously not been used for some lime. The lack of up-to-date instrumentation
was noticeable, the only instrumenl other than normal thermometers and pressure
gauges being an original type Farnborough indicator. 5

The delegation found no evidence that the extensive staff at the institute,
although obviously capable, was doing any large amount of development work.
The numerous questions asked of the delegation related to Western experience
— for example, on the V-6 versus the in-line six layout — and this, to the delega-
tion, suggested an absence of worthwhile indigenous development work.

German Automotive Plants
Removed to the Soviet Union

During the latter part of World War II much of the German automotive
industry moved eastward into the area iater to be occupied by the Soviet Union,
while the second largest auto manufacturer in Germany, Auto-Union A.G.,
with six prewar plants dating back to 1932, was already located in the Chemnitz
and Zwickau areas. Before the war the six Auto-Union plants had produced
and assembled the Wanderer automobile, the Audi automobile, Horch army
cars and bodies, DKW motorcycles, and automobile motors and various equip-
ment for the automobile industry. It is noteworthy that Auto-Union and Opel,
also partly located in the Soviet Zone, were more self-contained than other
German vehicle manufacturers and met most of their own requirements for compo-
nents and accessories. Although Auto-Union was the only German automobile

' U.S. Dept. of State. Report on War Aid Furnished by the United Slates to the U.S.S.R.

(Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945), p. 19.
s Confederation of British Industry. "Visit to the Central Research Automobile and Engine

Institute, 12th October 1963"; typescript supplied to the writer.

194 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Dev\opment, 1945-1965

producer to produce automobiles during the war, the firrrJ did make a sizable
percentage of tanks and army vehicles (Table 16-2) and in 1944 was the only
producer of engines (HL 230) for Tiger and Panther tanks.

Table 16-2

MODELS PRODUCED BY AUTO-UNION A.G. IN 1945
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION

Model

Maximum

monthly

production

Percentage of total

German production

of this model

600

750

400

1650

1300

1500

800

1000

600

100

1650

100

Full-track truck (R.S.O.)

1 Vj-ton Steyr truck

3-ton hall-truck

Steyr motor

Steyr gear-box

3-ton hall-track motor (HL 42)

Tank engine (HL 230) lor Tiger

& Panther
Army automobile
Light motorcycle (RT 125)
Heavy motorcycle (NZ 250)

Source: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Auto-Union A.G., Chemnitz and Zwickau, Ger-
many, January 1947 edition, (Washington: Munitions Division, 1947). Report No. 84, p.
5. Date of Survey: June 10-12, 1945.

The Siegmar works near Chemnitz, which manufactured tank engines, was
heavily damaged during the later phases of the war. But because all equipment
except twenty machine tools, i.e., 4 percent of the total machine-tool stock,
was repaired within ten weeks the plant was in full operation at the end of
the war. It is also noteworthy that the one-and-one-half-ton Steyr truck, produced
at a rate of 750 per month at the Horch plant of Auto-Union, was specially
designed for Russian winter conditions in early 1 942 as a result of the difficulties
experienced with the German standard army truck in the 1941-42 winter cam-
paign. 6

When the Russians occupied Saxony in 1945, one of their first measures
was to completely dismantle the Auto-Union plants and remove them to the
Soviet Union. 7 When one considers that in these key plants they had acquired
complete facilities to produce tank engines at a rate of 750 per month as well
as a truck specially designed for Russian conditions, it is not surprising that

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Auto-Union A.G., Chemnitz and Zwickau . Germany , 2d edition
(Washington: Munitions Division, 1947), Report no. 84. (Dates of survey: June 10-12, 1945).
G. E. Harmssen. Am Abend der Drmonlagt; Sechs Jahre Reparationspolitik (Bremen: F.
Triijen, 1951), pp. 10 1-2; see also Go-many, 1945-1954, (Cologne: Boas International Publishing
Co., [1954?]).

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 195

Soviet armored personnel carriers to this day bear a distinct resemblance to
German World War II armored personnel vehicles. 8

Full information is not available on the movement of the Leipzig plant
owned by Bussing-National Automobil A.G., a manufacturer of armored cars,
or of the firm's dispersal plants in the Saxony area; however, it was reported
that the Bussing-National Chemnitz plant was 30 percent removed to the Soviet
Union. 3 Three BMW (Bayerische Motorenwerke A.G.)planlsweredismantled
by the Russians and reportedly were completely shipped to the Soviet Union 10
(see Table 16-3). And the Adam Opel A.G. truck plant at Brandenburg, with
a 1944 production of 20,000 three-ton Opel trucks and a capability to produce
its own parts (with the exception of sheet metal, rear axle gears, and brake
cylinders) was completely removed to the Soviet Union."

In the Soviet sector of Berlin, the Ambi-Budd Presswerk A.G., a subsidiary
of the U.S. Budd Company, was the largest single body producer in Germany
before World War II. This plant completely escaped bomb damage. Although
its equipment was dismantled for transportation (including tools and pressing
machines for German passenger automobiles such as the Ford Taunus, the
Hanomag 1 .3 litre, and the Adler Trumpf-junior), it was not removed to Russia.
Instead, "The machines, tools and pressed parts, carefully packed and numbered
... lay for years on the grounds of the works under the guard of a small section
of Russian soldiers." 12 Apparently the Soviets had no requirement for equipment
to manufacture automobile bodies and no reason to invest in transportation
of the 300 specialized machine tools to the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the Ford
Company at Cologne negotiated the return of the tools for the Taunus model
to the Rhine plant of the Ford Motor Company, and Hanomag succeeded in
doing the same for its own equipment. n

Other German automotive producers were completely or partly removed
to the Soviet Union, including Vomag Betriebs A.G. of Plauen in Saxony,
a manufacturer of trucks and diesel engines, and the Auto-Rader plant at Ron-
neburg in Thuringia, with 550 machine tools for the production of wheels
for automobiles and military vehicles . The Bastert Chemnitz plant, a manufacturer
of cylinders, was completely removed to the Soviet Union; the Auto- Bark motor
plant at Dresden was completely removed; and the truck producer Phanomen-
Werke at Zittau was partly removed to the Soviet Union. 14

" Ordnance (American Ordnance Association. Washington) January- February 1968. pp. 372-73.
" Harmssen, op. cit. n.7, pp. 101-2. no. 31.

10 Harmssen, op. cii., pp. 101-2, nos. 78,79, and 80, However, Germany, 1945-1954 (op. cit.
n. 7, p, 216) reports thai the BMW plant was later reconstructed sufficiently to build vehicles
for the Red Army.

11 Harmssen, op. cii. n. 7, pp. 101-2, no. 105.

12 Germany, 1945-1954, op. cit. n. 7, p. 216.

13 Ibid.

" Harmssen, op. cii. n. 7.

196 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 -J 965

Table 16-3

SUMMARY OF GERMAN AUTOMOBILE PLANTS MOVED TO
THE SOVIET UNION IN 1944-50

Name ot plant in Germany

Percentage removed
from Germany
to the U.SSA.

Output, 1939*i5

Auto-Union A.G. Chemnite

95 \

Caterpillar trucks

Plant No. 1

(RSO)-5650

Auto-Union A.G. Chemnitz

100

1^-ton truck -2000

Plant No. 2

HL 230 tank eng ine - 451 9

Auto-Union A.G. Siegmar-SchSnau

100 )

HL230 tank engine -4519

plant

Auto-Union A.G. Audi plant

100

One-halMon truck - 7787

Auto-Union A.G. Horch plant

100

at Zwickau

Steyr motor -30,000
Steyr gear box -24,500

Auto-Union A.G. Zschopau plant

100

Army motorcycles

Auto-Union A.G. Scharlenstein

100)

Parts and electrical

plant

equipment

Auto-Union A.G. Burkhardtsdorf

1007

branch plant (Fa. Max Plau

& Gustav Frisch)

Bussing-National Automobil A.G.

Armored cars

press plant, Chemnitz

BMW (Bayerische Motorenwerke A.G.),

100

DiJrerhof (Eisenach plant)

reported

BMW Diedorf plant

but

possibly

Army vehicles

BMW Treffurt plant

less

Adam Opel A.G. truck plant,

100

Trucks

Brandenburg

Sources: G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontage; Sechs Jahre Reparationspolitik
(Bremen: F. TrOjen, 1951), pp. 101-2; Germany, 1945-1954 (Cologne: Boas International
Publishing Co. [19547], pp. 216, 422; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Division
Industry Report, 2d edition (Washington, 1947), Report no. 4.

In Austria the automobile plants at Graz and Steyr were almost completely
dismantled and removed. 15 These plants produced three models of the Steyr
Type A one and one-half ton truck. These, complete with an eight-cylinder
V-type engine, were produced at the rate of 50 to 60 per day. The Ford plant
in Budapest, Hungary, was not removed but operated on Soviet account. 16

Some of these removals can be traced directly to Russian locations through
subsequent production. These aspects will now be considered in more detail.

F. Nemschak, Ten Years of Austrian Economic Development, 1945-1955 (Vienna: Association
of Austrian Industrialists, 1955).

U.S. Foreign Economic Administration, U.S. Technical industrial Disarmament Committee
to Study the Post-Surrender Treatment of the German Autcmotive Industry (T1DC Project
no. 12, Washington, July 1945), p. 23.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 197

Origins of the Moskvich Passenger Automobile

The Moscow Small Car plant, built by the Ford Motor Company as an
assembly plant for parts manufactured in the United States and later at the
Ford-built Gorki plant, was brought into production in 1940 but produced only
a few model KIM- 10 light cars before World War II. In 1947 the plant reopened
producing a single model, the Moskvich 401, through 1956. That model was
replaced by the Moskvich 402, The 407 came into production in 1958 and
in turn was replaced by the 408 in 1964.

The 1947 Moskvich 401 was, in effect, the 1939 German Opel Kadett
with a few minor differences. ^Product Engineering la concluded that the Mosk-
vich 401 "bears a more than striking appearance to the prewar German Opel
Kadett" — the instrument panel "is identical to the 1939 car," the four-cylinder
engine has the "same piston displacement, bore, stroke, and compression ratio,"
and the same single-plate dry clutch, four-speed gear box, Dubonnet system
front-wheel suspension, and four-wheel hydraulic brakes (derived from early
Chevrolet models).

Differences from the original Opel were a Russian-made carburetor (K-25 A),
which "closely resembles a Carter down draft unit"; the electrical system,
"similar in appearance to the Bosch design"; and a six-volt "Dutch-made bat-
tery." 19 The only apparently unique, noncopied feature was a device for facilitat-
ing brake adjustment. 20

In 1963 the Moscow Small Car plant was visited by a delegation from
the Confederation of British Industry, which reported an annual production
of 80,000 cars produced by 15,000 workers in a plant of 160,000 square meters.
Forge and press work was done in-plant, but castings were bought from supplier
organizations. The delegation noted: "The layout of the plant and the tooting
are not greatly different from Western European plants, but space, ventilation,
and lighting are well below U.S. standards." 11

In October 1966 an agreement was made with the French state-owned
automobile manufacturers Renault and Peugeot to place French technical
assistance and automobile know-how at the disposal of the Moskvich plant.
As a result of this S50 million agreement, the plant increased its output capability

17 A. F. Andzonov, Avtomobit' Moskvich (Moscow, 1950).

18 New York, November 1953, pp. 184-85.

" The domestic Moskvich had a 3-CT-60 battery; Product Engineering probably examined an

export version. The Soviets typically use foreign balteries, radios, and tires on export versions,

and sometimes foreign engines as well (Rover and Perkins diesels).
!0 The Product Engineering article has a photograph of the Moskvich; also see Kra Mi a vtomobil 'nyi

spravochnik, 5th edition (Moscow, 1968), pp. 41-45.
11 Confederation of British Industry. "Visit to the Moskvitch Car Manufacturing Plant, 10th

October 1963"; typescript supplied to the writer.

198 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

from 90,000 to 300,000 automobiles annually; and the Renault company retooled
the plant to produce modern compact automobiles 22 by installing two new produc-
tion lines. 23

77*1? Ford -Gorki Plant

Vehicles produced by the Gorki plant, originally built by the Ford Motor
Company and originally a producer of the Ford Model A and 1934 model
Ford, continued to manifest their American lineage after World War II, and
the plant's original U.S. equipment continues in use to the present day." Produc-
tion of two trucks and the Pobeda M-20 passenger vehicle started in 1946.
The first postwar trucks (GAZ 51 and GAZ 63) were almost exact duplications
of U.S. Army World War II vehicles; indeed, the unusual hood design and
the hubcap design on the front wheels, for example, were precise replicas.
Parts were also made at Gorki for the GAZ 93 and shipped to Odessa to
be assembled; GAZ 93 was a dump truck with the same engine and chassis
as the GAZ 51.

The Pobeda, produced between 1946 and 1955, had obvious similarities
to the U.S. Army world war passenger vehicle, and had an M-20 engine remark-
ably similar in construction to a Jeep engine. The GAZ 69 and GAZ 69A,
produced at Gorki between 1953 and 1956 when production was shifted to
Ulianovsk, are described by the C.I. A. as "Jeep-like vehicles" and indeed
bear a resemblance to the U.S. Army Jeep." The 1 956 model change introduced
the Volga— described as a replica of the 1954 Mercury; 26 those cars, fitted
with automatic transmissions, received a single-stage torque converter with fea-
tures like those in early U.S. models. 87

The Moscow Plant im. Likhachev

The Moscow plant im. Likhachev is the old AMO plant originally built
in 1917, rebuilt by A. J. Brandt, Inc., in 1929-30 ss and expanded over the

" Wall Street Journal , October 17, 1966; and Minneapolis Tribune, October 1, 1966. Other
interesting information concerning the negotiations and Soviet demands is contained in Le Monde
(Paris), June 2, 1966, and V Express (Paris), October 1966, pp. 10-16.

53 The Times (London), February 1, 1967.

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, East-West Trade: A Compilation of Views
of Businessmen , Bankers, and Academic Experts, 88th Congress, 2d session, November 1964
p. 79.

11 The Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant..., op, cil. n. 3.

'" Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1966.

" Automotive Industries (Philadelphia), June I, I9S8, p. 61

18 Sutton I, pp. 248-49.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 199

intervening years. Over lime its name has been changed from AMO to the
Stalin plant and then to im, Likhachev . The plant contains key equipment supplied
under Lend Lease. For example, the crankshaft lathes currently in use were
supplied by a U.S. firm in October 1944. 2 * 1 One or two copies of these lines
were then duplicated by the Soviets in 1948-49. sa

In the late 1950s it was reported that "Likhachjov [sic] does its own design
and redesign and in general follows American principles in design and manufac-
ture"; the same source suggested that the Soviet engineers were quite frank
about copying, and that design lagged about three to five years behind the
United States. The plant's bicycle production techniques were described as
"American with Russian overtones"; 31 the plant had developed the "American
Tocco process" for brazing 52 and many American machines were in use, par-
ticularly in the forging shops. 33

The Urals plant at Miass (known as Urals ZIS or ZIL) was built in 1944
and largely tooled with the A.J. Brandt equipment evacuated from the Moscow
ZIS (now ZIL) plant. The plant started production with the Urals-5 light truck,
utilizing an engine with specifications of the 1920 Fordson; this suggests that
the original Ford Motor Company equipment supplied in the late 1920s was
being used, probably supplemented by Lend Lease equipment.

Smaller plants at Ul'yanovsk and Irkutsk assemble the GAZ 69 from parts
made in Moscow, although in I960 Ul'yanovsk began its own parts production
and Irkutsk and Odessa handled assembly of other vehicles — including the GAZ
51 at Irkutsk and trucks with large bodies for farm and commercial use at
Odessa. Other assembly plants are Kutaisi (KAZ-150 four-ton truck), the
Zhdanov bus works at Pavlovsk (PAZ-651 bus and PAZ-653 ambulance), and
the Mytishchi machine works (building trucks on ZIS- 1 50 and GAZ 5 1 chassis) .

The Odessa Truck Assembly Plant

The Odessa truck assembly plant almost certainly originated from two Lend
Lease truck assembly plants shipped from the United States to Odessa via
Iran in 1945. 34

Nearly half of the Lend Lease trucks supplied to the Soviet Union were
shipped through the Persian corridor route in parts, assembled at two truck

za East-West Trade .... op. at. n. 24. p. 79, Contract No. W-33-008 Ord 586, Requisition

R-30048-30O48A1.
" Ibid.

" Product Engineering. July 14, 1958.
31 Ibid.

33 Automotive Industries, January 1, 1958.
3 * This is inferred from evidence presented in this section; the writer does not have positive

identification.

200 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

assembly plants in Iran, and forwarded by road as complete vehicles with Russian
drivers to the U.S.S.R. About 409,000 trucks were thus sent to the U.S.S.R..
equal to seven and a half months of U.S . production at the peak wartime period.
The two Truck Assembly Plants (TAPs), at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr,
were designed by General Motors and consisted of bolted structural framework
on poured concrete floors; they were equipped with cranes, tractors, trailers,
and battery chargers. Their output was 50 trucks each per eight-hour shift or
about 168,000 vehicles per year from both plants if operated on a three-shift
basis— as they would be in the U.S.S.R. Unitr authorization of November
19443s these , wo p ] ants were di smant ] e( j an d shijped to Odessa. 38

Between 1948 and 1955 the Odessa assembly plant turned out the GAZ
93 dump truck with a GAZ 51 six-cylinder gasoline engine of 70 horsepower,
followed by a modified version model GAZ 93S. Since 1960 Odessa has been
a major trailer manufacturing plant. 37 The GAZ 93 and 93A have a basic
resemblance to the Lend Lease U.S. Army two-anc-one-half-ton cargo trucks.

U.S. and Italian Assistance to Volgograd (VAZ) 3i

The Volgograd automobile plant, built between 1968 and 1971, has a capacity
of 600,000 automobiles per year, three times more than the Ford-built Gorki
plant which was the largest auto plant in the U.S.S.R. until Volgograd came
into production.

Although the plant is described in contemporary Western literature as the
"Togliatti plant" and the "Fiat-Soviet auto plant," and indeed does produce
a version of the Fiat 124 saloon, the core of the technology is American,
and three-quarters of the equipment, 3S including the key transfer lines and automa-
tics, came from the United States. What is remarkable is that a plant with
such obvious military potential 40 could have been equipped from the United
States in the middle of the Vietnamese war, which has been largely supplied
by the Soviets. Had there not been strong Congressional objections, it is likely
that even the financing would have come from the United States Export-Import
Bank.

31 Memorandum 28. November 1944, AG 400.3295, HQ Amet.

3t T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid fo Russia. (Washington; Department of
the Army. Office of the Chief of Military HLslory, 1952), pp. 281, 432, and 494.

" Trailers OdAZ Models 885, 784. 794, 832, 795, 935, 822, and 857 B for cattle and the
refrigerated trailer Model 826. See Kratkii ....op. cit. n. 20, pp. 307-50.

J " The best summary of this project, the largest single unit of assistance in the 50 years since
the Bolshevik Revolution, is Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant .... op. cit. n. 3. This document also
reprints many of the more informative journal articles written while the contract was in negotiasing
stages. The Italian economic daily 24 Ore, May 5 and May 7, 1966, also has details.

M See note to Table 16-1.

*" See chapter 27.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 20 1

The construction contract, awarded to Fiat S.p.a., included an engineering
fee of $65 million; 41 in 1970 at peak construction, 1000 Italian engineers and
technicians were employed on building the Volgograd plant. 42

The agreement between Fiat and the Soviet Government includes:

The supply of drawing and engineering data for two automobile models, substan-
tially similar to the Fiat types of current production, but with the modifications
required by the particular climatic and road conditions of the country;
The supply of a complete manufacturing plant project, with the definition of
the machine tools, toolings, control apparatus, etc;

The supply of the necessary know-how, personnel training, plant start-up assistance,
and other similar services, 43

About three-quarters of the production equipment in Volgograd, including
all key machine tools and transfer lines, came from the United States, Although
the tooling and fixtures were designed by Fiat, over $50 million worth of special
equipment came from U.S. suppliers. This included:

a) foundry machines and heat-treating equipment, mainly flask and core
molding machines to produce cast iron and aluminum parts and continuous
heat-treating furnaces;

b) transfer lines for engine parts, including four lines for pistons, lathes,
and grinding machines for engine crankshafts, and boring and honing
machines for cylinder linings and shaft housings;

c) transfer lines and machines for other components, including transfer
lines for machining of differential carriers and housing, automatic lathes,
machine tools for production of gears, transmission sliding sleeves,
splined shafts, and hubs;

d) machines for body parts, including body panel presses, sheet straighteners,
parts for painting installations, and upholstery processing equipment;

e) materials handling, maintenance, and inspection equipment consisting
of overhead twin rail Webb-type conveyers, assembly and storage lines,
special tool sharpeners for automatic machines, and inspection devices
including surface roughness measuring instruments for paint, fabric, and
plastic materials.

Some of the equipment was on current U.S. Export Control and CoCom
lists requiring clearance and changing of control regulations.

U.S. equipment was a necessity (despite talk of possible European supply
and the fact that the Soviets had made elementary automatic production lines

" Ibid., p. 21.

" The Times (London), February I, 1967.

" Leiser from FiaC S.p.a. to wriier, May 31, 1967.

202 Western Technology and Soviet Economy Development, 1945-1965

as far back as 1940 44 ) because U.S. equipment has proved to be far more efficient
and productive than European, and Soviet automatic lines have been plagued
with problems and deficiencies. 45 Fiat plants in Italy are themselves largely
equipped with U.S. equipment — a measure of the necessity of U.S. equipment
for the VAZ plant.

Table 16-4

EXPORT OF U.S. MACHINERY

FOR THE VOLGOGRAD AUTOMOBILE

PLANT

Description of" industrial

Approved licenses

Year and quarter

machinery

(Million)

196S

2d quarter

Gear manufacturing and testing
Molding and casting line

$9.2 ,

foundry equipment

2.9

$15.6

Crankshaft grinding machinery

2.3 '

3d quarter

Automatic piston machinery

5.1 )

Automatic crankshaft grinders

2.3

> 10.8

Industrial furnaces

1.3 J

4th quarter

Valve grinding line

2.0 )

Metal cutting machinery

1.6

> 6.4

Grinding and honing machinery

0.8 >

1969

1st quarter

Total

Not specified

32.6

32.8

$65.6 million

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Export Control (Quarterly Reports), 1968, 1969.

Some of the leading U.S. machine tool firms participated in supplying the
equipment enumerated in Table 16-4: TRW, Inc., of Cleveland supplied steering
linkages; U.S. Industries, Inc., supplied a "major portion" of the presses;
Gleason Works of Rochester, New York, supplied gear cutting and heat-treating
equipment; New Britain Machine Company supplied automatic lathes. 46

Further equipment was supplied by U.S. subsidiary companies in Europe
and some came directly from European firms (for example, Hawker-Si ddeiey
Dynamics of the United Kingdom sold six industrial robots.) 47 In all, approx-
imately 75 percent of the production equipment came from the United States

" U.S. Senate. Export t>J Strategic Materials to the U.S.S.R. and Other Soviet Bloc Countries,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws, S7th Congress, Isi session. Part 1, October 23. 1961 .
"Appraisal of Soviet Mechanisation and Automation" in testimony by J. A. Gwyer p 84

" Ibid,

,a Forbes. October 1, 1966.

* 7 Schenectady Gazette. August 6. 1969.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 203

and about 25 percent from Italy and other countries in Europe, including U.S.
subsidiary companies. 49

In the late 1960s Soviet planners decided to build what will be the largest
truck factory in the world on the Kama River. This plant will have an annual
output of 100,000 multi-axle trucks, trailers, and off-the-road vehicles. It was
evident from the outset that, given the absence of internal Soviet technology
in the automotive industry, the design, engineering work, and key equipment
for such a facility would have to come from the West. In late 1971 the plant
was under construction with design and engineering work by Renault of France.
A license had been issued for equipment to be supplied by a consortium of
American firms: Satra Corporation of New York, Swindell-Dressier, Ex-Cell-O
Corporation, Cross Company, and according to Metalworking News (August
16, 1971) Giffels Associates, Inc., of Detroit. 49

TRACTORS AND AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY

A report by a technical study group of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
summarized the Russian agricultural machinery position in 1959 as follows:
"Machinery from the U.S.A. has been used as a pattern for Russian machinery
for many years. This is evident from the designs of older machines in particular,
and a few of the new machines." 50

This official statement parallels the findings of this study for the period
to 1960, although the writer was unable to find any new designs that could
not be traced to some foreign, but not necessarily American, origin. (The study
group was interested in U.S. machinery — not European equipment.)

Soviet tractors produced before World War n came from three plants estab-
lished in the early 1930s with major U.S. technical and equipment assistance. 51
The Stalingrad tractor plant was completely built in the United States, shipped
to Stalingrad, and then installed in a building also purchased in the United
States. This unit, together with the Kharkov and Chelyabinsk plants, comprised
the Soviet tractor industry at that time, and a considerable part of the Soviet
tank industry as well. Equipment from Kharkov was evacuated and installed
behind the Urals to form the Altai tractor plant which opened in 1943.

" There are varying reports on the percentage of U.S. equipment. See Los Angela Times. August
11, 1966, and note lo Table 16-1. The figures may be approximately summarized as follows:
all key equipment, three-quarters of the production equipment and one-half of all equipment
used in the plant and supporting operations.

" See p. 192.

10 U.S. Pept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Farm Mechanization in the Soviet
Union, Report of a Technical Study Group (Washington, November 1959), p. 1.

!l Sutton II, pp. 185-91.

204 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1956

Three postwar tractor plants were in operation by 1950, and thereafter there
was no further construction. The Vladimir opened in 1944, the Lipetsk in 1947,
and the Minsk plant and the Kharkov assembly plant in 1950. This was the
basic structure of the Soviet tractor industry in 1960. In brief, additions to
tractor capacity between 1917 and 1960 can be identified in two phases:

Phase I, 1930-33: Stalingrad (1930), Kharkov (1931), Chelyabinsk (1933); U.S. equipment

and design with U.S. models.
Phasell, 1943-50: Altai (1943), Vladimir (1944), Lipetsk (1947), Minsk (1950), and Kharkov

tractor assembly plant (1950); U.S. and German equipment, with

U.S. (and one German) models.

These plants produced a limited range of tractors with a heavy emphasis
on crawler models rather than the rubber-tired tractors more commonly used
in the United States. The 1959 USDA technical delegation" estimated that
50 percent of the current output was in crawler models as contrasted to only
4 percent in the United States; the military implications of such a mix is obvious.
These crawler models, including the heavy industrial tractors S-80 and S-100.
are produced in the older plants built in Phase I in the 1930s.

In 1960 the Stalingrad plant produced the DT-54 and the DT-57 crawlers
at a rate of about 110 per day." Kharkov produced the DT-54 at a rate of
80 per day 54 in addition to 80 DT-20 wheeled tractors and 20 self-propelled
chassis DSSH-14 using the same single-cylinder engine. Chelyabinsk concen-
trated on the production of S-80 and S-100 industrial models, used not only
as tractors but as bulldozers and as mobile base for a wide range of equipment
including cranes, excavators, and logging equipment.

The postwar tractor plants concentrated on agricultural tractors. The Altai,
with prewar U.S. equipment evacuated in 1943 from Kharkov, produced 40
of the DT-54 crawlers per day; Vladimir produced 60 wheeled models per
day, first the DT-24 model and after 1959 the DT-28. Lipetsk produced about
55 of the crawler KDT-35 model per day, and Minsk produced about 100
of the MTZ-5 Belarus and seven Belarus models daily. 55

In general, the Soviet Union in 1960 produced about one-half — a very high
proportion — of its tractors in crawler models and concentrated this production
in two or three types, almost all production being C-100 industrial tractors
or DT-54 and DT-20 agricultural tractors. The remaining models were produced
in limited numbers only.

12 U.S. Depl. of Agriculture, op. or. n. 50, p. 24.

" ibid.

" SAE Journal (New York), February 1959.

JJ Ibid.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 205

The S-80 and S-100 (Caterpillar) Crawler Tractors

In 1951 two Soviet S-80 Stalinets diesel crawler tractors were captured
by the United States Army in the Korean War and shipped to the United States,
where they were sent to the Caterpillar Tractor Company for technical inspection
and investigation. The S-80 was identified as almost identical to Caterpillar
designs built in Peoria, Illinois, between February 1942 and March 1943. As
85 percent of machines in this period were sold to the U.S. Government, it
is a reasonable supposition that the originals were Lend Lease tractors. The
Caterpillar Company investigation concluded the following on the S-80:

It looked like a Caterpillar tractor. It smelled like a Caterpillar tractor. It sounded
like a Caterpillar tractor. It made horsepower like a Caterpillar tractor. 5 *

The Caterpillar investigation provided two clearcut conclusions. First, the
Soviet copy was well engineered; in fact according to Davies, "We feel this
machine is the best engineered of any foreign-made tractors we know anything
about." 5 ' The design had been completely changed over to the metric system — no
small task — and the machine had been "completely reengineered" to conform
to Soviet shop practice, manufacturing standard and domestically available
machines and materials. Although it was concluded that the machine was roughly
finished and probably noisy, Caterpillar investigators expressed a healthy respect
for Soviet engineering abilities. They commented: "The whole machine bristles
with engineering ingenuity."

The second major conclusion was that the Soviet engineers "were clever
in not trying to improve the Caterpillar design — By sticking to Caterpillar's
design, they were able to come up with a good performing, reliable machine
without the usual development bugs. 58

Figure 16-1 illustrates some of the technical similarities of the Caterpillar
D-7 and the Chelyabinsk S-80.

The metallurgical composition of the S-80 component parts varies from
the original — mainly in the substitution of more readily available manganese
and chrome for U.S. molybdenum specifications, and in different heat-treatment
practices which probably reflect Soviet equipment and process availabilities.
However, according to observers the end result is not significantly dif-
ferent — except that the Russian product generally has a rougher finish (except
where finish is needed for functional purposes) — and tolerances are held as

" Lecture by J. M. Davies, director of research for Caterpillar Tractor Company, to the Society

of Automotive Engineers Earthmoving Conference ai Peoria, Illinois, April 10, 1952,
" Ibid.
•* Ibid.

206 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1 945 -1965

Figure 16-1 Comparison of Caterpillar D-7 and Chelyabinsk S-80

(a) TRANSMISSION CASE AND DRAWBAR

This comparison exemplifies differences in manufacturing
practices; where Caterpillar used forgings, the Soviets used
castings — no doubt reflecting lack of forging machines.

(b) TRANSMISSION GEAR

The Soviet gear has the same number of teeth but due to
rough finish has more error in tooth spacing. Russian gear
teeth are hand-finished, not machined-finished.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries
Figure 16-1 (cont.)

207

Possibly because the Soviet forging dies were newer, the
transmission fork is a better job; Caterpillar does a little more

machining.

(d) PISTON

The Russian alloy in the piston has both silicon and copper;
Caterpillar has no silicon. The casting methods differ slightly.

20S Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Figure 16-1 (com.)

(e) WATER PUMP IDLER

Again the Soviet finish is rough, and this may affect life
of the gear.

(f) SOVIET S-80 TRACTOR

V&C30J0ZNOJE £XPOBTNO-(MPORTNOJEC»JEDINENtE

TECHNOEXPORT

(Photographs 16 a-f courtesy of Caterpillar Co.)
Further comparisons of this nature are contained in Product
Engineering, (New York), October 1952; and SAE Journal,
(Society of Automotive Engineers, New York), June 1952;
these compare other parts of the tractor, but in general their
conclusions support the findings indicated in this text.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries

209

close as, or even closer than, on the American counterpart." Comparison of
metallurgical specifications of Russian and American tractor parts from the
Caterpillar D-7 tractor in Table 16-5 illustrates this point.

Table 16-5

COMPARATIVE METALLURGICAL SPECIFICATIONS
IN SOVIET S-80 AND CATERPILLAR D-7 TRACTORS

Soviet S-80

Part

Material

Hardness

Heat Treatment

Miscellaneous

Fuel pump

AISI

Rockwell

Oilp-quenched
and tempered

plunger

52100

A79-82

Fuel pump

AISI

Rockwell

Oil-quenched

—

barrel

52100

A79-26

and tempered

Track pin

Approx.

Case:

Carburized,

Cracks In

bushing

AISI 1020

Rockwell C64
Core:

Rockwell C32

quenched, and
tempered

case

Flywheel

Gray iron,

App-ox.

Brinell

None

Pearl rtic

clutch

high

cast Iron

plant

emanganese

230-250

(center)

Final drive

AISI

Case:

Induction-

Prior structure

gear

1045

Rockwell C56

hardened one

quenched and

Core:

tooth at a

tempered;

Rockwell C20

time

Residual tensile
strength

Final drive

27% Ni

Tip ol tooth:

Carburized, quenched

About 1%C incase

pinion

0.85% Cf

Rockwell C60-64
Core:
Rockwell C22-2S

and tempered

Transmission

2.5% Mi

Tip of tooth:

Carburized, quenched,

About 1.25%

gear

1.04 Cr

Rockwell CS1 -65

and tempered

In case

Caterpillar D-7

Fuel pump

AISI

Rockwell

Oil quenched

—

plunger

52100

A79-82

and tempered

Fuel pump

AISI

Rockwell

OH quenched

—

barrel

52100

A79-82

and tempered

Track pin

AISI

About same

Carburized,

Bushings sometimes

bushing

1020

quenched, and
tempered

sometimes crack
due to soft core

Flywheel

Cast iron

Brinell

None

Peaditic matrix

clutch plant

(0.6%C.)

230-250

(center)

(0.6%Cu)

Final drive

AISI

Case:

Induct Ion-

High compressive

gear

1045

Rockwell 056
Core:
Rockwell C1 8

haidened and

tempered

stress In rim

Final drive

0.55%Ni

Rockwell

Carburized,

pinion

0.50%Cr
0.20%Mo

C59-64

quenched.and
tempered

Transmission

0.55%Ni

Rockwell C59-

Carburized,

Depth of

gear

0.50%Cr

quenched, and

carburized

0.20%Mo

tempered

case Is less

Source: Caterpillar Company

" Product Engineering , October 1952, pp. 134-59.

210 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The parts for which Russian standards were higher are probably accounted
for by the fact that the tractors examined were military tractors made to more
exacting specifications; for example, on the track pins the Russian pin has
a much better uniformity of hardening that the D-7 pin, and the Russian track
link is considerably lighter. 60

Soviet copies are not, then, precise replicas — they are more accurately
described as "metric imitations." Two principles are balanced in the imitation
process: (1) to copy the original Western model as precisely as possible, to
avoid costs of research and development and by close copying to avoid the
pitfalls ironed out in the original debugging of Western development models:
and (2) to convert the model to Soviet metric practice and shop practice — not
always consistent with the first principle.

Thus, the Caterpillar Company research engineers reported:

Not a single Russian pan is interchangeable with the Caterpillar part from which
it was copied. Metric dimensioning is not the only reason, however, because
even the internal parts of the Caterpillar fuel pump (made to metric dimensions
originally) are not interchangeable with the Russian parts. s '

In effect, then, the Russian tractor S-80 was a very ingeniously reengineered
copy of the Caterpillar tractor D-7. The question logically arises: Why spend
so much effort and engineering time on a complete reengineering job? The
answer has to lie in some extraordinary defect in the Soviet industrial system;
if it pays to reengineer a U.S. tractor to metric dimensions with the numerous
problems involved rather than design a new tractor for Russian operating condi-
tions, then something more than cost of research and development is involved.

Wheel-Track Tractors in the Soviet Union

The first mass-produced wheel tractor in :I;C Soviet Union was based on
the International Harvester Farmall. 62 It was produced first in Leningrad, and
after 1944 at the Vladimir factory, with a 22-ho four-cylinder kerosene engine.
In 1953 this wheel tractor model was supplemented by the Belarus, produced
at the Minsk tractor plant; this is a 40-belt horsepower diesel-engined wheel
tractor similar to the Fordson Major manufactured by Ford Motor Company,
Ltd., at Dagenham in England. Finally, in the early 1950s the Soviets produced
the DT-20 Row Crop tractor and the ABC-SH-lfc self-propelled chassis, both
with the same one-cylinder diesel engine and built a* the Kharkov tractor works.

60 Ibid., p. 159.

81 Product Engineering. October 1959, p. 155.

" ! See V. V. Korobov. Traktory aviomobili i sei'skokhozyaisnennye dvigateli (Moscow, 1950).
p. 10.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries 211

The self-propelled chassis and the single-cylinder engine are based on a design
originated by the German firm of Heinrich Lanz A.G. of Mannheim, West
Germany. Before World War n this firm produced the well-known Lanz single-
cylinder two-stroke hot-bulb type engine, which was of great simplicity, able
to perform well on low-grade fuels, and therefore suitable for use in relatively
underdeveloped countries. In the late 1950s the total daily production of the
Lanz engine and associated equipment was approximately 545 per day. 53

Origins of Other Farm Machinery and Equipment

Soviet agricultural machinery and equipment is dependent almost entirely
on foreign prototypes. As late as 1963 a U.S. Department of Agriculture report
commented as follows:

As soon as feasible the U.S.S.R. buys prototypes of new foreign machines and
places them at one of ... 29 machine test stations. If the machine or parts of
it have desirable characteristics, production is recommended." 4

In 1958 a U.S. technical study group sent to the Soviet Union to observe
soil conservation"-"' noted that the Soviet laboratories in the soil science field
had instruments and equipment similar to those in American laboratories. Further-
more, methods of application of fertilizer had been copied from American equip-
ment. For example:

We observed a large number of anhydrous ammonia applicators, for injecting
ammonia gas into soils, at the Middle Asian Scientific Research Institute on
Mechanization and Electrification of Irrigated Agriculture near Tashkent. These
seemed to be copies of ours; in fact, a Schelm Bros, machine made in East
Peoria, Hi., was alongside several Soviet machines. Also exhibited at the Institute

13 SAE Journal, February 1959, p. 51,

" U.S. Deps. of Agriculture, Savin Agriculture Today. Report of the 1963 Agriculture Exchange
Delegation, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 131 {Washington, December 1963),
p. 35. There is some confusion on the part of executive departments concerning this copying!
For example, the following statement was made lo Congress in 1961: "Mr Lipscomb. Does
the Department of Commerce feel that Russia has developed a great deal of their agricultural
equipment from prototypes obtained both legally and illegally from the United States? MB
Behrman. No. sir. 1 don't think that the evidence we have indicates that the equipment that
they themselves produce copies— that they produce copies of equipment which we have supplied .' '
U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Export Control, Investigation and Study
of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and
Related AetsfH.R. 403), 87th Congress, 1st session, October 25, 26, and 30, and December
5, 6. 7, and 8, 1961; p, 403.

" U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Soil and Water Use in the Soviet Union.
Report of a Technical Study Group, (Washington, 1958), p. 23.

212 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

for Mechanization and Electrification wasa crude version of the two- wheel, tractor-
drawn broadcast-type spreader such as is widely used in the United States.""

Drainage research equipment also appears to have been developed from
U.S. models; the conclusion of the delegation was: "Most of [the machines]
appear to be adaptions of American or European types." 67 These observations
relate to a back-hoe ditcher, a wheel-type trencher, and a tile laying machine
(copied from a similar machine made in the Netherlands by the Barth Company),
a pool ditcher, a mole drain device, a ditch cleaner, brush cutters, and a virgin
peatland plow. 68

Other agricultural equipment also appears to have been copied from U.S.
equipment; for example, the fertilizer spreader No. BB-35 is a close replica
of the New Idea, an American model, and the corn drill model SUK-24 is
very similar to U .S. models of such equipment. Examination of a single agricul-
tural machine — the cotton picker — will bring out this process of duplication
in greater detail. 6 "

The Rust Cotton-Picking Machine

The Rust cotton-picking machine, developed and patented by John Rust,
an American agrarian socialist, was the first spindle picker, and in the long
run the most successful; in fact, the Rust principle has been preserved essentially
in its original form in machines currently made by four U.S. companies. The
first Rust patent was filed in 1928. By 1936 ten machines had been built in
the United States, and two of them were sold to Amtorg. 70 Whereas Rust
in the United States was forced to abandon production by 1942 because of
insufficient financing and lack of durability in the machine, the Soviets on
the other hand went ahead — they adopted the Rust principle and started to
produce cotton pickers utilizing this principle in large quantities. 71

ss Ibid,, p. 30.

*' Ibid,, p. 36.

«" Ibid,

90 This duplication may be found even in minor equipment items. For example, compare various
seed drills and their feedwheel mechanisms: Encyclopedia Briiannica 17: "Planting Machinery,"
(Chicago: William Benton, f958)p. 101 1; and V. N. Barzifkin, Mekhanizatsiia set' skokhoziaiss-
vennogo proizvodstva (Moscow, 1946), p. 103.

'° J. H. Street, The New Revolution in the Conon Economy (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957). On
p. 128 Street quotes from Survey Graphic (July 1936) as follows: "John Rust made a trip
there [to the U .S.S.R.) to supervise their introduction in the belief that they [the cotton pickers)
would be used 'to lighten man's burden rather than to make a profit at the expense of the
workers,"

" Sirana Sovetov za SO let: Shornik siatislicheskikh materialov (Moscow, 1967), p. 156.

A good source of lechnicul detail concerning the Soviet cotton picker is 1. 1. Gurevieh, Khlop-
kouborochnuya mushina KhVS-l , 2M : Rukovodstvo po eksplualaisii (Tashkent, 1963). There
is a translation: U.S. Depl. of Commerce TT 66-51114/1966.

Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Equipment Industries

213

By 1940 the Soviets had a park of 800 cotton pickers based on the Rust
principle, whereas the United States, where Rust had initiated, developed, and
built the original machines, had none in commercial production and only a
few in use on a custom picking basis. Only in 1942 did International Harvester
announce it was ready to go into commercial production of machines based
on the principle, producing 12 in 1941 and 1942, 15 in 1943, 25 in 1944,
and 75 annually in 1945-47. In 1945 Allis-Chalmers started work using a modified
Rust principle, but by 1949 only 49 Allis-Chalmers pickers had been manufac-
tured. By 1953 cotton pickers designed on the Rust principle were produced
not only by International Harvester and Allis-Chalmers but also by Ben Pearson,
J. I. Case, and Massey-Harris-Ferguson. Deere attempted to develop the Berry
spindle picker between 1943 and 1946, but abandoned the effort.

In 1953, then, about 15,000 pickers were available in the United States
while the Soviet Union had about 5000 cotton pickers in operation. 72

In summarizing this discussion of the Soviet automotive sector, it may be
said that the Soviet Union was as dependent on Western automobile manufacturing
technology in 1970 as it was in 1917, In 1968-70 U.S. companies installed
over $65 million worth of equipment in the 600,000-autos-per-year VAZ plant;
in 1917 the Baltic and AMO plants, large units for the times, were also equipped
with the latest American equipment. 73 Therefore there has been no innovation
of indigenous Soviet automobile or truck technology.

The Stalinetz S-80 and S-100, both heavy tractors that provide the chassis
for other Soviet equipment, were found to be replicas of the Caterpillar D-7.
Other agricultural equipment, including farm implements and cotton pickers,
is based on American models, although there are a few examples of British
(Fordson Major), German (Lanr tractor engine), and Dutch (Barth tile laying
machine) origins.

71 Sirana Sovettrv up. cit. n. 7 I .

" Sutton I, pp. 243-44.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers

This chapter examines the Western origins of some of the common Soviet
prime movers — diesel engines for marine and truck use and internal combustion
engines, together with steam boilers and steam and gas turbines.

Fortunately, complete and reasonably accurate Soviet data are available on
marine prime movers (diesel, steam, and gas turbine engines) used in marine
propulsion systems. These data, derived from a detailed descriptive listing of
the 5551 ships in the Soviet merchant marine as of July 1967, 1 were subjected
to an exhaustive analysis to determine the types and origins of marine engines
used in Soviet merchant ships. (See Table 17-1.)

Two characteristics were examined: first, diesel, and steam engines by type
and system, i.e., by their technical characteristics; and second, the origin and
date of construction of these engines in order to arrive at an understanding
of the manner in which the Soviet merchant marine had been acquired, i.e.,
the rate of addition of different types of engines, changes in foreign supply
sources, and the extent to which the Soviets may possibly have divested them-
selves of foreign assistance.

Table 17-1 lists marine diesels (if more than four units of a single type
were identified) in use in the Soviet merchant marine in 1967. The table does
not include steam turbines, reciprocating steam engines, diesel -electric engines,
or gas turbine engines; steam turbines and gas turbines are discussed later in
the chapter. The table does include about 80 percent of the marine propulsion
units in use.

The most striking characteristic is the absence of diesel units of Soviet
design. Although a few (reference numbers 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 35) are
listed as of probable foreign origin and three units (reference numbers 9, 26,
and 43) are not identified, there is evidence to suggest that these units are
of Sulzer or M.A.N. design except for reference number 43, which is probably
of Fiat design. Early technical-assistance agreements in the 1920s with the
Sulzer and M.A.N, firms resulted in several "Soviet" diesels manufactured

1 Registr Soyuza SSR, Regi.strovtiyn knigtt morskikh sudov soyuza SSR 1964-1965 (Moscow.
1966). plus annual supplements.

214

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers

215

Table 17-1

TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS

OF SOVIET MARINE DIESELS IN USE IN 1967*

Specification of marine diesels

Country

in use in 1967

Number

Cylinder

Piston

Reference

Engine of

diameter

stroke

Rated

number

design origin

cylinders

(mm.)

(mm J

bhp

Buckau-Wolf G.D.R.

240

360

300

Buckau-Wolf G.D.R.

320

480

400

Buckau-Wolf G.D.R.

320

480

550

Skoda Czechoslovakia

430

2500

Gorlitzer G.D.R.

175

240

200

M.A.N, (probable) Germany

300

500

600

Alco U.S.A.

318

3300

1000

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

500

1100

2900

Not identified —

180

220

150

Sulzer (probable) Switzerland

250

340

300

M.A.N, (probable) Germany

300

500

800

M.A.N, (probable) Germany

300

500

400

M.A.N. Germany

570

800

4000

M.A.N, (probable) Germany

150

180

300

Sulzer Switzerland

760

1550

9600

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

620

1400

600

M.A.N. Germany

700

1200

6000

GSrlitzer G.D.R,

365

550

2000

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

740

1600

13000

Sulzer Switzerland

720

1250

4500

Sulzer Switzerland

480

700

3000

Lang Hungary

216

310

200

Lang Hungary

315

450

1000

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

500

1100

5200

M.A.N, Germany

520

900

1900

Not identified

180

200

150

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

740

1600

11000

M.A.N. Germany

700

1200

5800

Sulzer Switzerland

560

1000

2400

M.A.N. Germany

520

700

4500

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

350

620

2260

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

900

1550

19800

Sulzer Switzerland

500

900

2000

Polar Sweden

340

570

1550

M.A.N. (probable) Germany

150

180

150

Mash. Kiel A.G. Germany

290

420

640

Gotaverken Sweden

760

1500

8750

Burmeister & Wain Denmark

740

1900

9760

Fiat Italy

750

1320

8000

M.A.N. Germany

720

1200

8150

M.A.N. Germany

600

1050

5600

Polar Sweden

345

580

1260

Not identified Italy

540

960

2000

Sulzer Switzerland

760

1550

9100

Source: Calculated from Registr Soyuza SSH. Registrovaya knlga morskikh sudov soyuza
SSR 1964-1965 (Moscow, 1966).

' Includes all units for which more than four engines of a single type were identified.

216

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

in the 1930s and 1940s. 2 No purely Soviet marine diesels have been traced
in this period, 3 so the units mentioned are probably either M.A.N, or Sulzer.
These companies have manufactured units with similar technical characteristics.
Positive identification of foreign origin for the other units in Table 17-1
has been made, and agreements or sales have been traced from the Western
company either to the Soviet Union or to an East European country manufacturing
the design under foreign license and then in turn selling the unit to the Soviet
Union.

The two most common designs are those of M.A.N. (Maschinenfabrik
Augsberg-Nurnberg A.G.) of Augsburg, Germany, and Burmeister & Wain
of Copenhagen, Denmark. The latter company has supplied technical assistance
and designs for large marine diesels, while M.A.N, units are normally less
than 4500 hp. Sulzer in Switzerland, the former Buckau-Wolf at Magdeburg
in Germany, Skoda in Czechoslovakia, and Nydqvist & Holm (Polar) in Sweden
are other commonly found marine diesel designs.

Table 17-2 indicates the number of each of these marine diesel designs
in use in the Soviet merchant marine in relation to geographic origin. One
noticeable disclosure is that, of the 4248 marine diesels in use in 1967, an
extraordinarily large number {2289 or 54 percent) were manufactured in Czecho-
slovakia and that 82 were manufactured at the prerevolutionary Russky Disel
plant in Leningrad. Another common design is that of Gorlitzer in East Germany,
comprising 239 marine diesels in two models.

Table 77-2

ORIGINS

OF SOVIET MAR1

NE UlfcSfcLIs,

BY NUMBER OF EACH DESIGN, 1967

Built

Reference number
in Table 17-7

outside
U.S.S.R.

inside
U.S.S.F).

Total

1,413

—

1,413

519

525

351

—

351

170

252

202

—

202

147

149

142

101

—

: See Suiton I, pp. 35,

332.

1 Ibid.

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers

217

Table 17-2 (cont)

Reference number
in Table 17-1

Built
outside
U.S.SJ1.

Built

Inside

U.S.S.R.

Total

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

—

TOTAL

3418

830

4248

Source; Calculated from Registr Soyuza SSR. Registrovaya kniga morskikh sudov
SOVUZa SSfl 7964-1965 (Moscow, 1966).

Burmeister & Wain of Denmark has been a prominent supplier of diesel
marine engines, and under an agreement signed in 1959 the Soviet Union now
manufactures Burmeister & Wain diesels at Bryansk in the Ukraine, Thus numer-
ous Burmeister & Wain designs figure into Table 17-2, either as units imported
from Denmark (reference numbers 8, 16, 19, 24, 27, 31, 32, and 38) or as
units manufactured at the Burmeister & Wain plant in Copenhagen and, under
license, at Bryansk in the Soviet Union (for example, reference numbers 8,
24,27, and 38).

218

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The most prominent feature of Table 17-2, however, is the relatively small
number (830, or 19.5 percent) of marine diesels actually manufactured inside
the Soviet Union.

Table 17-3 lists the origins of these Soviet marine diesels according to
aggregate horsepower. This listing provides a more accurate reflection of the
importance of each type of unit for the Soviet merchant marine.

In general terms, four-fifths (79.3 percent) of the aggregate diesel generated
horsepower was built outside the Soviet Union. Of a total of 4,633,890 hp,
some 3,672,890 hp was built outside the Soviet Union and only 961,000 hp
was built inside the Soviet Union, and even that portion required foreign technical
assistance.

Table 17-3 OF
BY

IIGINS OF SOVIET MARINE DIESELS AS Uh ISbC,
AGGREGATE HORSEPOWER FOR EACH DESIGN

Aggregate horsepower built

Reference

number

Percentage of this

from Tables

Outside

Inside

design built

wo.

17-1 and 17-2

U.S.S.R.

U.S.SM.

Total

outside the U.S.S.R.

425,000

205:000

630,000

67.5

423,900

—

423,900

100.0

220,400

72.500

292,900

75.2

264,000

—

264,000

100.0

257,400

100.0

110,000

132,000

242,000

45.5

234,000

—

234.000

100.0

207,600

2,400

210,000

98.8

1 93,050

193,050

100.0

1 62,000

—

162,000

100.0

26,000

124,800

1 50,800

17.2

—

142,000

0.0

126.000

—

1 26,000

100.0

121,800

—

121,800

100.0

49.500

99.000

99,000

50.0

1,200

88.200

89,400

1.3

87.500

—

87,500

100.0

76,500

—

76,500

100.0

74.000

—

74,000

100.0

—

64,000

0.0

58,560

—

58.560

100.0

56.000

—

56,000

too.o

50.400

—

50,400

100.0

48.900

—

48,900

100.0

46,800

—

46.800

100.0

45,600

—

45,600

100.0

41 ,400

—

41,400

100.0

40,400

—

40,400

100.0

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers

2(9

Table 17-3 (cont.)

Aggregate horsepower butt

Reference

number

Percentage ot this

from Tables

Outside

Inside

design buUt

No.

17-1 and 17-2

U.S.S.R.

Total

outside the U.S.S.R.

40,080

40,060

100.0

39,200

—

39,200

100.0

36,400

„

36,400

100.0

31 ,000

—

31.000

100.0

27.200

27,200

0.0

1 1 ,400

15,000

26,400

43.2

22,000

100.0

—

19,200

0.0

17,050

—

17,050

100.0

—

14,400

0.0

8,000

—

8,000

100.0

7.000

—

7,000

100.0

6,400

—

6,400

100.0

6,300

—

6,300

100.0

—

3. 4 SO

3,450

0.0

150

1,350

1,500

10.0

3,672,590

961,000

4,633,690

79.3 percent

Source: Calculated from RegistrSoyuza SSR, Registrovaya kniga

morskikh sudov soyuza

SSR 7964-7965 (Moscow. 1966).

The most important design, Skoda of Czechoslovakia, contributes 630,000
hp to the Soviet merchant fleet. The next design in terms of contribution to
aggregate horsepower is that of Buckau-Wolf, contributing 423,900 hp; this is
numerically the most common unit. Other prominent designs are Burmeister
&Wain (the 2900 hp unit) with 292,900 hp, M.A.N, of Germany with 264,000
hp, and Burmeister & Wain (the 1 1 ,000-hp unit), which contributes some 242,000
hp to the total .

The last column in Table 17-3 indicates the percentage of each design built
outside the Soviet Union. While it is obvious from the table that a comparatively
small amount (20 percent) of aggregate horsepower was built inside the Soviet
Union, it may not be so readily obvious that this domestic construction is also
concentrated into a few designs. For example, the 1000-hp unit, originally
an American Locomotive design sent to the Soviet Union under Lend Lease,
contributes 142,000 hp. It is today built only inside the Soviet Union, whereas
other types, particularly Burmeister & Wain designs, are both built in the Soviet
Union and imported.

Table 17-4 shows quite clearly the fact that units of large horsepower are

220 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

not built in the Soviet Union. This table lists construction inside and outside
the Soviet Union in terms of rated horsepower category. It is notable that the
units of 9000-12,000 hp, partly built in the Soviet Union and partly imported,
are the Burmeister & Wain design built with technical assistance under terms
of the 1959 agreement. Otherwise, units built in the Soviet Union are of much
smaller capacity.

Table17A

PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET MAHINt uitbCLO duil.
OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AS OF 1967

(BY RATED HORSEPOWER CATEGORY)

Category as a

Built

Percentage

percentage

Horsepower

rating
category

Built outside
U.S.S.R.
(in bhp)

inside
U.S.S.FI.
(in bhp)

Total
bhp

built
outside
U.S.S.R.

of total
aggregate
horsepower

Less than

891 ,000

235,200

1,126,300

79.1

24,3

1,000
1-1,999

99,950

142,000

241 ,950

41.3

5.2

2-2,999

839.880

277,500

1,117,880

75.2

23.9

3-3.999

126,000

—

126,000

100.0

2.7

4-4,999

502,500

—

502,500

100.0

10.8

5-5,999

187,000

1 24,800

31 1 ,800

59.9

6.7

6-6,999

275.400

—

275,400

100.0

5.9

7-7,999

—

8-8,999

1 92,400

—

192,400

100.0

4.1

9-9,999

144,460

49,500

193,500

74.2

4.2

10-10,999

—

11-11,999

110,000

132,000

242.000

45.5

5.2

12-12,999

—

13-13,999

46,800

—

46,800

100.0

1.0

14-14,999

—

15-15,999

—

16-16,999

—

17-17,999

—

18-16,999

—

19-19,999

257,400

—

257,400

100.0

5.5

Totals

3,672,890

961 ,000

4,633,890

79.3

99.5

Source/ Calculated from Registr Soyuza SSR. Registrovaya kniga morskikh sudov soyuia
SSR T 964-1955 (Moscow, 1966).

Note- This table includes all marine diasels where more than 20 ol a single model were
manufactured or imported. It does not include reciprocaling steam engines, sleam tur-
bines, gas turbines, or diesel-electric drives. ^^_

We may conclude concerning marine diesels that the Soviet Union is still
heavily dependent on Western technology. The significant increment in s.«
of unit built after 1 960 is due mainly to the Burmeister & Wain technical -assistance

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers 221

agreement, although East Germany and Czechoslovakia have also contributed
significantly to Soviet construction of marine diesels. The technical lag is extra-
ordinary when compared to the gigantic increment since World War II in the

Soviet mercantile fleet.

FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TO SOVIET MARINE ENGINE CONSTRUCTION

The Soviet marine diesels actually manufactured in the Soviet Union have
received a considerable amount of foreign technical assistance. Technical-
assistance agreements were made with both M.A.N, and Sulzer in the 1920s,*
and the Soviet Union has continued since that time to receive M.A.N, and
Sulzer technology in addition to new assistance agreements with Burmeister
& Wain of Denmark and Skoda of Czechoslovakia in the fifties and sixties.

An agreement was signed in early 1959 in Copenhagen by Niels Munck,
managing director of Burmeister & Wain, and Mikoyan, who visited the company
on his way back to Moscow from a visit to the United States.* The Danish
company also has a licensing agreement with the Polish engine builders Stocznia
Gdanska, and part of that organization's annual production of 350,000 bhp
of B & W designs goes to the Soviet Union. 6

Under the 1956 Scientific and Technical Cooperation agreement between
the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, the Skoda works sends technical documenta-
tion and technical assistance to the U.S.S.R. on the latest marine diesel designs.
Skoda is also a major direct supplier of diesel engines to the U.S.S.R. 7

The available evidence strongly indicates that all RuSsky Disel (Leningrad)
marine engines are made under the technical-assistance agreement with Skoda
of Czechoslovakia while all diesels at Bryansk are built under the B & W
agreement. Under the COMECON specialization agreements, Czechoslovakia
undertakes development and production of large marine diesels while the Soviet
Union is not listed for that responsibility — nor indeed for any development
or production of marine diesels of any size." Agreements and trade between
the two countries confirm this. The 1956 Scientific and Technical Corporation
required Czechoslovakia to send technical documentation for the manufacture
of the latest designs in diesel engines to the U.S.S.R. Further, Czechoslovakia
is not only the fourth largest producer of diesel engines in the world — far larger

Ibid.

East-West Commerce, VI, 2 (February 1959), 3.

See chapter 6.

See chapter 6 for mare information on (hese indirect transfers.

See Frederic L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System (London: George Allen & Unwin,

1963), Appendix E.

222

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

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Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers 223

than the U.S.S.R.— but also exports 80 percent of all its diesels, and the U.S.S.R.

is the largest buyer. 9

DIESEL ENGINES FOR TRUCK USE

The range of diesel engines for truck use in the Soviet Union is very limited.
Between 1945 and the mid-1960s, when new models YaMZ-236 and YaMZ-238
replaced earlier engines, 10 only four commonly used models were identified.

Three models widely used in trucks and buses were based on General Motors
engines: the YaAZ-M206D, a six-cylinder in-line 180-hp engine; the YaAZ-
M206A, a V-type version of the same engine; and a four-cylinder V type
developing 120 hp mainly for use in the MAZ-200 truck produced from 1947
to 1966 at Minsk. These three basic models, produced at Yaroslavl," have
been utilized for at least a dozen Soviet truck and bus models. (See Table
17-5.)

The only other engine that has been produced is the D-12 type used in
the MAZ-525, MAZ-530, and BelAZ-540 dump trucks. This engine has a
300-hp rating, compared to the 120- 180-hp range of the YaAZ series (see Table
17-6). Its origin is not known, although the Soviets received the Kloeckner-
Humboldt-Deutz diesel engine plant in 1946 under U.S. Operation RAP, 1 *
and Deutz prewar diesels had similar specifications.

The new model truck diesels introduced in the late 1960s (YaMZ-236 and
YaMZ-238) bear considerable resemblance to the U.S. Cummins engine. The
YaMZ-236 has a layout similar in many respects to the Cummins 90° V6-200,
while the YaMZ-238 resembles the Cummins 90° V8-265. 13

A backwardness in truck diesel engines is reflected in Soviet use of European
diesel engines in the few Soviet automobiles assembled in Belgium and sold
on the European market. The Volga automobile was offered with an optional
Rover U.K. diesel engine in 1965; the Moskvich was offered by the Soviets,
also in 1965, with a Perkins U.K. 99 diesel engine.' 4 In 1968 Soviet trucks
sold in Europe also utilized diesel engines supplied by Perkins.

In 1960-61 the Soviets attempted to purchase in the United States over
$40 million worth of specialized equipment for the manufacture of truck engine
blocks." This generated a great deal of controversy in Congress, and ultimately

' Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin (Prague), no. 306 (March 1956), 23.

10 Elapluatshnnye kochestm dvigaielei YaMZ-236 and YaMZ-238 (Moscow, 1968),

11 See Simon I! for assistance to this plant.
!1 See chapter 2.

No confirmation can be obtained from the company on this point, but compare G D Chemyshev
Dvigaull YaMZ-236. YaMZ-238 (Moscow, 1968). pp. 5, 16, with D.S.D. Williams, British
Diesel Engine Catalogue. 6th edition (London, 196S), p. 57.

" S. d'Angclo. cd.. World Car Catalogue (New York; Herald Books. 1965). pp. 228, 356.

15 U.S. House of Representatives. Select Committee on Export Control, Investigation and Study
of the Administration. Operations, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949. and
Related Acts [H.R. 403). 87th Congress. 1st session. October, December 1961 pi. I, p. 220.

224 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-I965

the sate involved only two transfermatic machines to produce V-8 engine blocks;
one unit was valued at $3.4 million and one at $1.9 million, for a total of
$5.3 million. The units were required by the Soviets to produce 225-hp truck
engines.

DIESEL-ELECTRIC PRIME MOVERS

The most important Soviet diesel -electric prime mover is the 2 D 100 unii
utilized in more than 1000 type TE 3 diesel-electric locomotives and more
than 50 merchant vessels. 16 The 2 D 100 power plant is a two-stroke, opposed
piston model with ten cylinders developing 2000 hp at 850 rpm. Design work
started in 1950; the first locomotive with the unit was produced in 1953 and
the first ship in 1954.

The opposed piston principle was deve-oped by Fairbanks-Morse in the
United States, and the Soviet 2 D 100 is a copy of Fairbanks Morse Model
38D 8-1/8 series, although the cylinder diaitri.-r of the Soviet version is 207
mm compared with 206.37 mm in the Fairbat.:^ Morse original. 17

Since no other diesel-electric unit has been identified in current production,
the possibility exists that this unit is used in the Soviet icebreakers of the
"Ledokol" series for which no engine data 6:6 given in the Soviet Register,
and also in numerous Soviet naval units propelled by diesel-electric propulsion
units.

INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES

About 95 percent of Soviet internal combustion engine production in 1959
was represented by two engines, an in-line six-cylinder in the GAZ 51 truck
series and another in-line six-cylinder in the ZIL 150 series. 18 Most of the
remaining production was taken up by heavier truck engines. Table 17-7 sum-
marizes the origins of the major truck and automobile gasoline engines in operation
up to I960.

The original Moskvitch 401, a four-cylinder in-line engine, was a copy
of the 1939 German Ope! engine. Two subsequent versions, the MZMZ 407
and the MZMA 408, were modified versions of the original Moskvitch 401

" For merchant ships see Registr Soyuza SSR, op. cit. n. 1; for locomotives see K. A. Shishkin

el aL, Teplovoz TE-3 (Moscow, 1969).
" Fairbanks Morse. Power Systems Division, Fairbanks Morse SSDS 1/8 Series Opposed Piston

Diesel and Gas Engines (Beloit, Wis., n.d.), Bulietin 380OD8-S3.
'" Barney K. Schwalberg, Manpower Utilization in the Soviet Automobile Industry, Supplementary

Report (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, June S959). p.

16.

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers

225

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226 Western Technology and Soviet Economh- Development, 1945-1965

and the latter was used in the Moskvitch automobile as late as the mid- 1960s.

The GAZ 20 is the four-cylinder U.S. Jeep engine and used in both the
civilian and military versions of the GAZ 20 and the GAZ 69. Its closest
U.S. counterpart is the World War 11 Ford/Willys one-quarter-ton Jeep engine,
and the Soviets presumably based their design on Lend Lease supplies and
equipment.

The GAZ 21 A and UAZ 451 are improved versions of the original Jeep
engine, with somewhat larger displacement (2.445 instead of 2.12 litres) and
a higher horsepower rating (70-75 hp instead of 52 hp). The GAZ 51, the
GAZ 53 with a V-8 engine of U.S. type, and all other GAZ engines, are
built in the Ford-designed and -built Gorki plant, 19 which received a considerable
quantity of new U.S. machinery during and after World War II.

The 5.55-litre displacement engine used in the ZIL-158B, the Ural 353A,
the more common ZIL 150, the ZIL 164 A, the ZIL 157K and the KAZ 606A
has the same engine characteristics as the prewar Fordson tractor engine produced
at Yaroslavl with equipment installed by the Hercules Engine Company in
1934. 20

FRENCH ORIGINS OF MARINE GAS TURBINES

Soviet marine gas turbines are based on French turbines imported in 1959.
Table 17-8 lists all gas turbine-powered Soviet ships built up to 1967 and the
origin of their gas generators and turbines. The typical plant consists of four
free-piston gas generators, 340 by 904 mm, manufactured by S.I.G.M.A. at
Venissieux, 21 and a gas turbine geared to the shaft manufactured by Societe
Alsthom of Belfort, France. 22 The hulls were built and the French turbines
installed at the Baltic Yards in Leningrad.

WESTERN ORIGINS OF SOVIET STEAM TURBINES

Analysis of the Soviet register of shipping suggests that no steam turbines
for merchant marine use were manufactured in the Soviet Union before 1959. "

'" See Sutton 1 and II.

20 Ibid.

21 S.I.G.M.A. is Societe lndustrielleGcnerale de Mecanique Appliquee. a subsidiary or Organisa-
tion Bossard et Michel S. A.

I! Alsthom is Societe Generate de Constructions Electriques et Mecaniques Alsthom, a subsidiary

of Fraticaise Thomson-Houston-Hotchkiss-Brandt S.A. Cie and affiliated with Thomson Electric

Company of New York.
2:1 This statement should be modified by the observation that Soviet Navy ships use steam turbines;

hence the Soviets probably had a capability for manufacturing marine steam turbines before

1959. The statement here applies only to the merchant marine.

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers
labia 17-8

227

ORIGINS OF SOVIET MARINE GAS TURBINES
AS OF 1967

Soviet

registar

number

Gas Turbine

Name of Ship

Date Launched

manufacturer

2126

Pavlin Vinogradov

1960

SIGMA
France (1960)

4465

Umbalas

1962

S.I.G.M.A.
France (1959)

4859

Johann Mahmasta!

1965

S.I.G.M.A.
France (1959)

2197

PechoraJes

1964

S.I.G.M.A.
France (1959)

4345

Teodor Nette

1963

S.I.G.M.A.
France (1959)

Sources- Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1969-70, (London, 1969); Reglstr Soyuza SSR,
Reqlstrovava kniqa morskikh sudov soyuza SSR 1964-1965. (Moscow, 1966).

Note: These five ships constituted the total Soviet fleet of gas turbine-powered ships
to 1967

In 1964 the Soviet mercantile fleet had 45 ships powered by steam turbines.
The acquisitions of these turbines fall into three distinct periods: stage one,
that of foreign purchases only; stage two, that of foreign purchases concurrent
with limited domestic production of steam turbines; and stage three, that of
domestic manufacture of steam turbines without foreign imports.

Stage one extended from 1953 through 1956. In 1953 the Soviets installed
German boilers in a Dutch ship with turbines built in 1919, possibly as a
test bed for further work. Then in 1955 six steam turbines for marine use
were ordered in France and two more in East Germany. Of the French turbines,
one came from Schneider et Cie at Le Creusot (France), one from a subsidiary
of this company (Societe des Forges at Ateliers du Creusot), and four from
Ateliers et Chantiers de Bethune located at Nantes on the western coast of
Brittany. The turbines supplied by Schneider et Cie at Le Creusot were undoubt-
edly of Westinghouse design, inasmuch as Schneider has a licensing agreement
with the Westinghouse Electrical Corporation in the United States and both
companies jointly own a French development company, Societe de Developpe-
ment Westinghouse-Schneider of Paris.

In 1959 the Soviets produced the first domestic (at least nonmilitary) marine
steam turbine, which was installed in a 12,000-ton ship (Soviet Register Number
1602); this was followed by construction of four turbines in 1959, seven in
I960, six in 1961, five in 1962, and eight in 1963. However in 1959, when
the first Soviet merchant marine steam turbine was produced, four turbines
were purchased abroad and installed in ships later added to the Soviet mercantile
fleet. One turbine came from Italy and was installed in the Giuseppe Garibaldi;
this was a geared turbine manufactured by the Ansaldo shipyards in Genoa,

228 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Italy. This company is licensed to manufacture De Laval geared turbines (De
Laval is an American corporation). Another De Laval turbine was installed
in the Trud (Soviet Register Number 4393). This was a geared turbine manufac-
tured by De Lavals Angturbin in Stockholm, Sweden, and also manufactured
under license from the De Laval Company in the United States. Two additional
steam turbines were purchased in Japan. One, from the shipbuilding company
Hitachi, is a Kawasaki turbine with water tube boilers. The second turbine
was purchased in 1960, and is a geared unit manufactured by Ishikawajima
Harima in Tokyo; this company has a licensing agreement with Foster Wheeler
in the United States for manufacturing water tube boilers for marine use.

Thus, between 1958 and 1961 the Soviets purchased four steam turbines
abroad and manufactured another five or six steam turbines within the Soviel
Union. Undoubtedly the initial Soviet steam turbines were compared with
imported turbines concerning operating characteristics.

Up to 1962 we find that the Soviets manufactured an average of five or
six steam turbines per year and since that time all units have been manufactured
domestically. The Western predecessors of these domestic steam turbines arc
not known; they may be Metropolitan-Vickers (a subsidiary of Westinghousc)
under an old agreement, or General Electric, or possibly even Sulzer.

A similar three-stage development process appears to be under way in marine
gas turbines; several gas turbines were purchased in France in 1960 and presum-
ably by the end of the decade of the sixties the Soviets will have started to
manufacture, within the Soviet Union, marine gas turbines according to this
design.

ORIGINS OF MARINE BOILERS INSTALLED
BETWEEN 1945 AND 1960

Between 1945 and 1960 a total of 447 marine boilers of three types (water
tube, fire tube, and combined) were installed in Soviet merchant ships. Of
this total, only 76 (or 17.0 percent) were manufactured in the Soviet Union.
The remainder were imported: 181 (or 40.5 percent of the total) from Finland,
116 (or 25.9 percent) from the East European communist countries of East
Germany and Poland, and the rest from non-Finnish sources in the Free World,
including 46 (or 10.3 percent) from Sweden.

There are several noteworthy observations concerning these boilers. The
large percentage imported, i.e. 83 percent, suggests there was a major Soviet
weakness in this area. The 17 percent Soviet-manufactured boilers also are
of a standard type; between 1949 and 1954 only one type of marine boiler
was manufactured, i.e., of a 174-square-meter heating surface with a working
pressure of 15.0 kg/cm 2 . Between 1955 and 1960 this standard model was
replaced by another of 180 -square- meter heating surface with the same working

Western Origins of Soviet Prime Movers

229

pressure. During this period of 15 years the Soviet Union manufactured only
a single standard boiler model at any one time. The flexibility required in
practice was attained by imports from Eastern Europe and the Free World; 24
larger sizes of marine boilers with greater working pressures were imported
in a variety of models from Finland, Poland, East and West Germany, Sweden,
Italy, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Holland. (See
Table 17-9.)

Table 17-9

ORIGINS OF MARINE BOILERS INSTALLED
IN THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN 1945 AND 1960

Size of
boiler; m !
of heating

surface

Finland

U.S.S.R

Poland

East
Germany

Sweden

Olfter

Free World

countries

Total

718

—

2 (Italy)

495

—

390

—

386

—

287

—

286

—

260
254-6

—

1 (Denmark)

2 (Norway)
4 (FRG)

245

—

3 (U.K.)

235-8
213-9

—

1 (Belgium)

204

—

186

—

180

—

174

—

170

—

6 (Holland)
4 (FRG)

163-5

—

2 (FRG)

150
140

1
128

—

1 (FRG)

1
129

136

—

125

—

2 (Norway)

103

—

181

447

Percentage
ot Total

40.5

17,0

18.6

7.1

10.3

6.2

99.9

Sources : Registr Soyuza SSR, Reglstrovaya kniga morskikh sudovsoyuza SSR 1964-1965
(Moscow, 1966). See chapter 26 for diagram based on these data.

" See diagram, p. 407.

230

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The most significant conclusion is that a detailed examination of one important
class of prime movers — marine diesels, for which we have complete and accurate
data does not produce evidence of useful Soviet innovation. Four-fifths of these
units, whether measured in terms of units or aggregate horsepower, were built
abroad and those built inside the U.S.S.R. had considerable, if not complete,
dependence on foreign designs and for the most part technical assistance in
the form of drawings and sample engines.

The evidence produced for truck diesels, internal combustion engines, and
gas turbines suggests a similar heavy dependence on foreign technology — no
indigenous Soviet work forms the basis for large-scale production of these propul-
sion systems. In boilers we find long-term manufacture of a single mode! of
174 to 180 cubic meters for marine use (boilers are of course manufactured
in other models for nonmarine uses), with flexibility obtained by boilers from
outside the U.S.S.R.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy

SOVIET THEORETICAL WORK BEFORE WORLD WAR II

Russian aptitude for theoretical work in mathematics and physics is well
exemplified in the fields of high-energy physics and atomic theory. As a result
of the work of Petr Kapitsa and other physicists in the decade of the twenties,
Soviet research paralleled Western research in the 1930s. A series of institutes
was established, of which the Nuclear Physics Laboratory at the Leningrad
Technical Institute under Igor Kurchatov was preeminent. Two cyclotrons were
established under Kurchatov (at the same time as scientists at the University
of California at Berkeley pioneered the cyclotron), but two other cyclotrons
were left unfinished until the end of the war.

According to A. Kramish, Soviet scientists had made several major dis-
coveries by 1940 and "the Russians are justified in claiming priority for the
discovery of spontaneous fission." 1 Work was undertaken on methods for quan-
tity production of fissionable materials, i.e., uranium-235 and heavy water,
and methods later used by the United States in the Manhattan Project were
under active discussion and even partly published in the U.S.S.R. before World
War II.

The Nazi attack of June 1941 brought this promising theoretical work to
a halt, and for some years thereafter Russian activity was limited to monitoring
Western progress, particularly the extraordinary progress in the United States.
There is no question that Soviet scientists were at least on a par with Western
scientists in 1940, and in some areas of theory they could have been slightly
ahead.

The wartime monitoring process comprised espionage, not only in the United
States and Canada, 2 but also in Germany. 3 It was later asserted in scientific
circles in the United States that scientific "secrets" could not be effectively
retained, and official U .S. policy, as announced by President Truman in October
1945, was to retain the engineering and industrial techniques but not the scientific

1 M. J. Ruggles and A. Kramish, The Soviet Union and the Atom: The Early Years (Santa
Monica: RAND Corp.. 1956), Report no. RM-1711. Arnold Kramish has also published A tomic
Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford. 1959); this is in great part a reproduction of the material
in RAND report no. RM-171 1 and companion studies.

231

232 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

data within the United States; hence the preparation of the 1945 Smyth Re-
port, which was of some assistance to Soviet work. 4

German wartime efforts in the same field, from the scientific viewpoint,
were on a level with those of the United States. The Weinberg-Nordheim report 5
concluded that German wartime researchers "were on the right track and their
thinking and developments paralleled ours to a surprising extent. According
to this report the Germans knew the correct lattice dimensions for a P-9U
system as well as the required quantity (four tons) of P-9. Their uranium metal
"was about as pure as ours," their theory of the chain reaction "was in no
wise inferior to ours, in some respects it was superior," and the only nonengineer-
ing "secrets" they might not have had was an understanding of the Xeon-135
poisoning problem and possibly of the properties of plutonium-240. 6 It was
primarily lack of heavy water that accounted for inability of the Germans to
achieve a chain reaction; however, their total effort was on a much smaller
scale than the American effort. The report concludes:

We must proceed, therefore, on the basis that anyone knowing what is in the
German reports can establish a chain reaction provided he has sufficient materials.
The Smyth report will give additional very helpful hints. The time when others
can establish a chain reaction is therefore no longer a matter of scientific research
but mostly a matter of procurement. 7

Given vigorous Soviet atomic espionage, the high level of prewar Soviet
scientific work, the American inability to retain scientific secrets, and the availa-
bility of German atomic work, scientists, and equipment to the Soviet Union
{both through espionage and as a result of postwar capture of German reports),
the Soviets had adequate theoretical knowledge of atomic weapons manufacture
in 1945.

What was perhaps as important as the access to atomic bomb research,

1 See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Soviet Atomic Espionage , 82d Congress.

1st session, April 19SI ; and The Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts

Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and

Other Persons in Positions of Trust, of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a

Foreign Power: June 27, 1946 (Ottawa, 1946).
3 A. Kramish, The Soviet Union and the Atom: The "Secret" Phase (Santa Monica: RAND

Corp., 1957) Report no. RM-1896, p. 17 fn.
' U.S. Senate, Nuclear Scientist Defects to United Stales, Subcommittee to Investigate the

Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee

on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1954).
* U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Memorandum on the State of Knowledge in Nuclear Science

Reached by the Germans in 1945, by A. M. Weinberg and L. W. Nordheim (Oak Ridge,

Tenn: Technical Information Service, November 8, 1945), German Series no. G-371.
" Weinberg and Nordheim pointed out their limited access to German reports, but were able

to establish these major propositions.
7 AEC Memorandum, op. cit. n. 5, p. 3.

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 233

the Soviets had access on an exclusive basis to German hydrogen bomb work.
David Irving notes a series of experiments on thermonuclear fusion at the German
Army explosives research establishment at Kummersdorf; the results of these
experiments were captured by Soviet forces and the only document to fall into
Western hands, according to Irving, was a "six-page report among the Atsos
collection . . . entitled 'Experiments on the Initiation of Nuclear Reactions by
Means of Exploding Substances.' " s

Therefore, as the We inberg-Nordheim report concludes, the important restric-
tion to Soviet atomic development at 1945 was not the scientific method of
"making an atomic bomb" but the materials and equipment with which to
undertake the program; i.e., it was "mostly a matter of procurement."*

CONTRIBUTION OF THE ATOMIC SPIES TO SOVIET WORK

The Soviets made persistent efforts during World War II to penetrate Western
work in atomic energy. General L. R. Groves indicates that the major atomic
espionage was carried on by Soviet, not German, agents, 10 and such espionage
has undoubtedly continued since that time. There is a correlation between the
work of the known Soviet agents — Fuchs, Greenglass, May, and Pontecor-
vo— and subsequent Soviet developments in the atomic energy and weapons
field.

Klaus Fuchs, a theoretical physicist, was a member of the inner group
in the development of the atomic bomb in World War II; his work in England
concerned the gaseous diffusion process used in the Oak Ridge plant. In the
United States, Fuchs was intimately associated with both groups (SAM and
the Kellex Corporation) working on gaseous diffusion." According to Karl
Cohen, former director of the Atomic Energy Commission, Fuchs "... had
intimate and detailed knowledge of all phases of the design of the K-25 plant,
including methods of fabricating the barrier, the assembly of the diffuser, and
the planned production rate." 12 At Los Alamos, Fuchs took part in making
the first atomic bomb and in the weapons work involved.

By contrast, both May and Pontecorvo understood the operating problems

• David Irving. The Virus House (London: WiUiam Kimber, 1967). pp. 193-95; p. 194 has
a photograph of p, t of the 1944 German Army report on initial work on an H-bomb. The
full report is probably at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

* AEC Memorandum, op, cil. n. 5, p. 3.

'* Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 141 .

1 ' U.S . Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Soviet Atomic Espionage, 82d Congress,

1st session, April 1951 (Washington, 1951).
11 Letter, Cohen to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in ibid., p. 23. Fuchs also was working

on uranium hexafluoride and the control problems of gaseous diffusion plants.

234 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

of plutonium piles and both worked on the Hanford reactor, which was copied
by the Soviet Union in developing the first Soviet reactor. ,a

Nunn May worked in 1942 at the Cavendish Laboratories in Cambridge.
England, and in January 1943 went to Canada where he was senior member
of the Nuclear Physics Division. Espionage, for which he was sentenced to
ten years in prison, consisted of supplying the Soviets with samples of uranium-

235 and uranium-233. May admittedly also passed on to the Soviets information
that was still classified in 1946. I4

Prior to his defection to Russia in 1950, physicist Bruno Pontecorvo worked
as senior principal scientific officer at the British Harwell Laboratory. The
most significant knowledge possessed by Pontecorvo concerned the Hanford
reactor and the nuclear aspects of the Canadian NRX heavy-water pile at Chalk
River, Ontario — at that time the most advanced reactor of its type in the world. 15

David Greenglass, the fourth atomic spy, was a machinist assigned to the
Los Alamos weapons laboratory, where he worked on high-expolsive lens molds:
"Greenglass testified that he conveyed to Russia a diagram of the atomic bomb,
along with a detailed explanation and related materials in writing." 16

In sum, the Soviets gained a great deal of useful information and technical
know-how from espionage sources; by themselves these data were of limited
use, but combined with other sources they comprised a package with significant
potential.

THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION
TO SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROJECTS 1 '

The widespread impression that the Soviets did not gain useful materials,
equipment, or information from the German atomic research program is
erroneous. 18 (See Table 18-1.)

Ibid. : May p. 2, Pontecorvo p. 2. See also p. 242 below.

Ibid,, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 3.

For the status of the German atomic energy projects in 1945 and also for a measure of the

technology and facilities removed to the Soviet Uni>n, see the G Series of reports at the

Atomic Energy Commission. Oak Ridge. Tennessee. Some 394 reports are listed in Atomic

Energy Commission T1D-3030. German Reports on Atomic Energy. See also BIOS Final

Report 675. Production of Thorium and Uranium in Ge.-< : :an\.

For example, see G. A. Modelski, Atomic Energy in the Cjmmunist Bloc, {Melbourne, 1959).

p, 36. Modelski concludes: "... the Russians may hav kicked up some useful material and

information, as well as some trained men, but the sum rotal cannot have been very large.

German research had not progressed very far during the A-ur and by 1944, far from having

a pile working, German scientists merely envisaged ihi possibility that one might be made

to work."

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy

235

Table 1S-1

SUMMARY OF GERMAN ATOMIC ENERGY PROJECTS
REMOVED TO THE U.S.S.R. IN 1945

Material or project

Location and plant

Status at 1945

Uranium metal reduction

Stocks of uranium metal
and oxides at Oranienburg
plant

Uranium metal refinery

Heavy water
Separation processes

DEGUSSA,
Frankfurt plant (moved to

Berlin in 1944)

DEGUSSA,

Berlin-Griinau plant

Auer A.G.

Peak annual production
5,000 kg (1942);
removed to U.S.S.R.

Peak production of 376 kg
(1945); removed to
U.S.S.R.

Removed to U.S.S.R.

Stocks at Leuna in Silesia Probably removed to U.S.S.R.

Linear accelerator

von Ardenne magnetic
separator

Groth centrifuge

Berlin

Removed with von Ardenne to
U.S.S.R.

Removed to U.S.S.R.

Source: David Irving, The Virus House (London: William Kimber, 1967).

In 1945 the bulk of German uranium ore, the balance of 1200 tons removed
by the German Army from Belgium in 1940, was moved to a salt mine near
Stassfurt in what was to become the Soviet Zone. A British-American mission
attached itself in 1945 to a U.S. infantry division and under "Operation Harbor-
age" seized the mine and the i 100 tons of Belgian ore located nearby. This
uranium ore was removed to the American Zone of Germany. 19

Uranium metal was produced in Germany in World Warr II at two plants
operated by DEGUSSA (German Gold and Silver Extraction Corporation).
Uranium oxide supplied by Auer A.G. in Berlin was reduced by DEGUSSA
at its Frankfurt plant, and by the end of 1940 the company was producing
a maximum of one ton of uranium metal per month. In the United States,
by way of comparison, almost no uranium metal was available until the end
of 1942; when the first chain reaction took place at Chicago, the DEGUSSA
plant in Frankfurt had manufactured over seven tons of uranium metal. 20

Work began in 1942 on a second uranium production plant identical to
the DEGUSSA plant but at Griinau, Berlin. In January 1945 the DEGUSSA
Frankfurt plant was removed to the Auer location near Berlin, where the uranium
metal was being refined. The Soviets occupied Oranienburg and the Auer works,
and so obtained several tons of pure uranium oxide and, more importantly,
the two DEGUSSA uranium smelting plants and the Auer refining plant. In
addition they captured five tons of uranium metal powder, a quantity of uranium

" See Irving, up. it/, n. 8-. ;iUn <cc S. Goodsmil, ALSOS (New York; Schuman. 1947).
" Irving, up cit. n, 8. pp, 75-76.

236 Western Technology and Sovie! Economic Development . 1945-1965

cubes, and about 25 tons of unrefined uranium oxide and uranates. This became
the uranium stockpile for the early Soviet atomic bomb program. 21

Unlike the American program, for which the ultrapure graphite necessary
for use as a moderator was produced by several firms, the German atomic
project was not able to use graphite as a moderator and thus came to be dependent
on the use of heavy water. Part of the Norwegian heavy water plant, captured
by the Germans and then destroyed by British Commandos, was duplicated
by I . G . Farben at Leuna. The Leuna plant was later subjected to heavy bombing,
but the surviving drums of heavy water were transported to the I. G. Farben
plant at Myrow in Silesia and presumably captured there and removed to the
Soviet Union. "

By the time the war ended the Germans had seven isotope separation processes
under consideration, excluding the gaseous diffusion process used in the United
States, and at least two of these had been brought to the equipment stage.
Manfred von Ardenne had developed a magnetic isotope separator similar in
concept to the magnetic process that was then used at Oak Ridge in the United
States and later built at von Ardenne's Berlin laboratories. Also, a prototype
centrifuge with an operating speed of 50,000 revolutions per minute was buill
by Groth; although the early models failed, it seems that this centrifuge process
had practical possibilities for isotope separation. In 1945, von Ardenne's labora-
tory at Berlin, complete with a Van de Graaf machine, a cyclotron, and the
prototype electromagnetic isotope separation equipment, was removed with von
Ardenne himself to the Soviet Union.

The Germans also built several subcritical piles. The first German pile
was at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Biology and Virus Research in Berlin.
This was a heavy-water pile, and according to the American intelligence mission
which inspected it in July 1945 after much of the equipment had been removed
to the Soviet Union, it appeared to have been excellently equipped when compared
to the primitive setup that Enrico Fermi used at Columbia University in the
United States.

The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was stripped of all its equipment, including
a high-voltage linear accelerator, and moved to the Russian atomic project at
Obninchoye. 23

Another pile, built at Leipzig, was destroyed in a 1942 explosion, and
a third pile was located at Haigerloch. In the late summer of 1944 all uranium
pile research was removed to Stadtilm in Thuringia in what was to be the
Soviet Zone. Later, in 1945, some pile research was moved south.

It is interesting to note, then, that while in 1944 and early 1945 rocket
development projects under Werner von Braun moved westward into the future

" ibid., p. 263.

22 Ibid., pp. 157. 178. 191-92.

Ibid., p. 264

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 237

U.S . and British zones, the movement of atomic energy projects (metal reduction,
uranium ore, and pile research) was eastward into the future Soviet Zone, and
there most of it remained when the war ended.

Finally, the Soviets rounded up the uranium project scientists and most
went, under good contracts, to the Soviet Union. Among these men were von
Ardenne, an expert in the separation process and something of an equipment
genius, and Nikolaus Riehl, an expert in the processing and refining of uranium
metal; both worked for about ten years on the Soviet atomic project. "

The German nuclear scientists were settled at Sukhumi and remained there
from 1945 until some time after 1955. The sanatoriums along the Black Sea
coast were converted into nuclear research institutes where the German groups
were installed and projects started. For example, Heinz Barwich was the leader
of 18 scientists working on theoretical questions concerning control problems
in the diffusion process of isotope separation. 25 Associated in this work was
Yuri Krutkov, who was technically known as a "prisoner-engineer" and had
been released from a prison camp for this purpose. Another group at Sukhumi
was the von Ardenne team working with R. A. Demirkhanov on instrumentation
for nuclear energy and later on ion sources and mass spectrography. Although
the Sukhumi laboratories are today of secondary importance, they formed the
key section for the development of atomic energy in the Soviet Union in the
forties and fifties and employed many German engineers. Some of the personnel
have since returned to Germany, but others are still in Sukhumi.

Methods for the mass production of uranium-235 were developed at Sukhumi.
The Soviets undertook duplication of both the barrier method (already established
in the United States) and the centrifuge method of isotope separation. Doctor
Zuehlke specialized in the barrier question. The manufacture of metallic barriers
was divided into two groups: those working on flat barriers and those working
on tube barriers. Max Steenbeck, another German-scientist, was one who concen-
trated for a number of years on the ultracentrifuge method for separating uranium
gas. 28

In summary, at the end of World War II the Soviets obtained from Germany
not only scientists and expert technicians (the Germans were then on the threshold
of achieving a chain reaction) but facilities for ore processing, reduction, and
refining of uranium metal and oxides, two working isotope separation processes
and operating equipment, advanced laboratories and equipment, and several

" Ibid., p. 263. Irving also lists aboul a dozen other Germans, key members of the German
atomic energy project, who went to the Soviet Union.

" See Dr. Barwich testimony to U.S. Senate. Nuclear Scientist Defects .... op. cil. n. 4, pp.
10 et seq.

!s See ibid. , for usefulness of U.S. reports to German work in the U.S.S.R. Also see U.S.
Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and
other Internal Security Laws, 84th Congress, 2d session, (Washington, 1956), pt. 21.

238 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

subcritical piles. In addition they located and removed small stocks of heavy
water, uranium metal, and uranium oxides.

The Soviets failed to obtain from the Germans any information on the gaseous
diffusion separation process, the use of graph it',', as a moderator, or knowledge
of a chain reaction in practice. Nor did they obtain any operational atomic
weapons technology, although they did acquire ireful German research work.
These technologies could only have come from th« United States or from Great
Britain (for the gaseous diffusion process).

Probably the most accurate estimate of Soviet capability in atomic develop-
ment at the end of World War II was made ;-.-, November 1945 by Major
General L. R. Groves, testifying before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic
Energy. General Groves was director of the Manhattan Project during World
War II, and at that time was more knowledgeable than i.ny other person concerning
the industrial and technical features of production of atomic materials and atomic
bombs. He made a statement relative to the Soviet Union as follows:

I testified before the House Committee in response to i direct question on that
point, that one nation could catch up and produce a bomb, if they did it in
complete secrecy, probably within from 15 to 20 years — more likely the latter.
If they did it without secrecy and with a great deal of help from the United
States and from England and Switzerland— and I say Switzerland because she
is a manufacturer of precision machinery — it would be done in five to seven
years, probably seven. 27

Under questioning from the committee, General Groves elaborated on the
assistance that would be needed. This would have to include engineering develop-
ments, i.e. , the design and manufacture of and the specifications for metallurgical
processes. Groves commented on the fact that at the Hanford Engineering Works,
the Dupont Company had over 10,000 subcontractors, "each of them supplying
a different material . . . they were supplying subassemblies." 28 At least 50 percent
of these 10,000 subcontractors required some special "know-how." With all
the technical resources of American industry it had taken 18 months to build
this kind of equipment, and according to General Groves, in 1945 such resources
could have been obtained only in the United States, England, and Switzerland,
with possibly some parts in Sweden. Switzerland was isolated by General Groves
because it has been a center of high-grade machine tools of special design:
"You find a great many [Swiss machine tools] in this country [i.e., the U.S.A.)

21 U.S. Senate, Special Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 179. Creating
a Special Commission and Investigating Problems Related to the Development, Use and Control
of Atomic Energy. 79th Congress. 1st session, November and December 1945 (Washington.
1946), pts. 1-3; idib.. 2d session. January and February 1946 (Washington, 1946). pts. 4,
5.

2 » Ibid., pts. 1-3, p. 67.

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 239

particularly in any plant that has been in operation for a number of years and
has accumulated a number of special Swiss machines." 29

It is quite clear that in 1945 the Soviets with outside help of a detailed
nature, would have required five to seven years to reproduce the American
achievement, and (hat such assistance could only come from one of three coun-
tries — the United States, England, or Switzerland. General Groves's testimony
is entirely consistent with evidence provided in this study concerning Soviet
technical backwardness.

INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC PROGRAM

The conclusion of the Weinberg-Nordheim report is supported by Klaus
Fuchs's statement that he could do no more than explain to the Soviets the
principle upon which a bomb was based: " ... it was up to the Russians to
produce their own industrial equipment." 30 Neither could any other of the atomic
spies provide more than information on scientific and technical principles. The
key question after taking atomic espionage into account, then, is this: Where
did the Soviets get the industrial ability to manufacture an atomic bomb? This
achievement is infinitely more important than transfer of scientific information;
it is also more difficult to assess.

Klaus Fuchs indicated that he had been "astonished" when the Soviets
"succeeded in making and detonating a bomb so rapidly," and he added that
although scientifically they were sufficiently advanced, he "could not have
believed that commercially and industrially they had developed so quickly." 31

Certainly the overall conclusions of this study and General Groves's expressed
views raise similar questions about Soviet industrial ability. In 1945-46 the
U.S.S.R. was technologically backward and heavily dependent on the West.
Even though priority there is traditionally given to military objectives, the extra-
ordinary effort required — one that strained even American technical resour-
ces — was far beyond purely Soviet industrial abilities in the 1940s and 1950s.

It is therefore suggested, in line with the Weinberg-Nordheim report and
the comments of Klaus Fuchs, that the essential question to be answered about
Soviet atomic weapons development, and about the Soviet atomic energy program
in general, is what was the source of the industrial capability to manufacture
atomic materials, including atomic weapons. The argument, outlined below,
is that the technical capability came by various routes from the West.

The basic raw materia! for atomic reactors is uranium ore converted into
uranium metal — the metal being the raw material for pile operation.

18 Ibid., p. 69.

M Allan Mooreliead, The Traitors. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952). p. 141.

11 Ibid.

240 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

In January 1943 the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested eight tons
each of uranium oxide and uranyl nitrate salts. 32 A. Kramish indicates that
if this was processed into metal it would yield "just about the right amount
of material necessary to duplicate the United States experiments at Chicago." 33

In March 1943 two licenses were granted to the S. W. Shattuck Chemical
Company of Denver, Colorado, for shipments to the Soviet Union: one was
for 200 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate, and
one for 500 pounds each of urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate. Granting
of these licenses was followed in April 1943 by a license for 25 pounds of
uranium metal and in November 1943 by a license for 1000 grams of heavy
water. These licenses were granted by the Lend Lease administration to the
Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States. General Groves comments:

There was a great deal of pressure being brought to bear on Lend Lease apparently
lo give the Russians everything they could think of. There was a great deal of
pressure brought to give them this uranium material. ,4

However, it seems unlikely that the Soviets obtained sufficient reactor materi-
als from U.S. sources. Soviet requisition No. R- 12045 of February 4, 1943,
for uranium oxide was not filled, and so far as the allowed 25 pounds of uranium
metal is concerned, General Groves comments:

We didn't stop [the] shipment for a very good reason. We were anxious to know

if anybody in this country knew how to make uranium metal We were willing

that the Russians have 25 pounds ... it would be worth more than that to us
to find out how to make uranium metal. 31 '

Later, on March 31, 1944, Lieutenant General L. G. Rudenko wrote to
Secretary' of War Stimson to the effect that the Soviet Union was "in most
urgent need of the following materials for its war industry," i.e., eight tons
of uranium nitrate, eight tons of urano-uranic acid, and 25 pounds of uranium
metal. Again, these quantities were sufficient to duplicate U.S. work. 36

The only Soviet receipt of uranium metal from the United States was two
pounds of inferior material. However, in June 1948 the Canadian Radium &
Uranium Corporation of New York City did ship to the Soviet Union 500
pounds of black uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate— and the

12 U.S. Congress, Soviet Atomic Espionage, op. clt. n. II, pp. 184-92.

™ Kramish. RAND Report RM-IS96, op. eit. n. 3., p. 63.

"US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Regarding

Shipment of A tonsic Materials to the Soviet V nion . 8 1 st Congress , 1 st and 2d sessions , December

1949-March 1950 (Washington, 1950). p. 940.
" Ibid., p. 942.
36 Ibid., p. 1044.

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 241

Atomic Energy Commission did not become aware of this shipment for five
years. 37

Of far greater value than uranium metal or oxides supplied from the United
States and Canada was the Soviet capture of the Auer A.G. plant at Oranienburg,
just outside Berlin, together with German uranium metal and oxides. The Auer
plant produced uranium metal for the German atomic program. 38

SOVIET URANIUM MINING IN SAXONY: WISMUTH A.G.

German uranium ore was mined in Saxony. As soon as American forces
evacuated the Saxony area of East Germany, Soviet geologists prospected the
old mines around Oberschlema. Subsequently, a corporation named Wismuth
A.G. was formed to reopen the mines and develop the uranium content. The
chief German adviser used by the Soviets for this project was a Nazi named
Schmidt, a former mine inspector and an expert on the Saxony mines. Released
from a Soviet concentration camp for this purpose, Schmidt was provided with
an excellent salary and privileges on the understanding that the mines were
to come into active production.

By 1951 there were ten producing groups of mines within the Wismuth
corporation comprising a total of between 65 and 70 individual uranium mines.
(See Figure 1 8- 1 .) In addition there were subsidiary organizations for the construc-
tion of mining equipment, a warehouse for technical equipment, a uranium
processing point at Aue, and auxiliary units for equipment of repair, lumber,
assay, and other mining operations. Electrical equipment, compressors, and
electric pumps were supplied by former East German companies. 3 '

A German mining engineer, Hans Scherbel, has described the working condi-
tions for the 300,000 Germans who worked around the clock in these mines:
"The equipment was incredibly primitive. The shaft had no elevator. You had
to climb 250 feet down on ladders. The miners had to make this climb twice
daily.'" 10 Concerning construction of a new shaft at the Filzteich pond at
Schneeberg to mine a pocket of high-grade ore, Scherbel comments that the
operation was conducted "in a manner that can only be described as criminal.

37 Ibid., p. 969.

5 " Irving, The Virus Home, p. 250, says the plant was bombed "and completely destroyed."
Reference to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveys suggests that few of these "completely
destroyed" plants were in fact put out of action for long. Reference to the bombing records
would determine the state of the plant as occupied by the Soviet forces.

" See Nikolai Grishin, "The Saxony Uranium Mining Operation (Vismui)" in Robert Slusser,
ed. , Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany (New York: Research Program on the U .S ,S . R-,
1953). p. 127. This is an excellent description of the Soviet uranium mining operations in
Saxony as of 1950.

" "The Secret Mines of Russia's Germany." Life. XXIX. 13 (September 25. 1950), 83.

242 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

Figure 18-1 THE SOVIET URANIUM MINES IN SAXONY

51-1

GERMANY

* NigdQrsBtfit; 51
• Pirna

* Stollberg

Schr»oet»rga) • ObetscNema
Neu SlMH • • *"•

• FieiMig

• Say<Ja
4 Qlbarnhjiu

I Amabarg

• EitHJdstock
JoharngoOTgenstatf

Mius

Source: Robert Slusser, ed., Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany (New York:
Research Program on the U.S.S.R.. 1953), p. 137. Map data are from annex 1, pp.
154-55.

A diagonal shaft had been driven from the surface downward under the pond
. . . floods periodically swept through the shafts below." 41

The reopening of the mines was successful, and output increased from 135
tons of ore in 1946 to about 900 tons in 1948; the output stabilized at this
figure, and after processing was shipped to the U.S.S.R.

THE FIRST SOVIET REACTOR

The feasibility of a nuclear chain reaction was demonstrated at the University
of Chicago in 1942; the Soviets had no need, therefore, to duplicate initial
American work. The first Soviet reactor had the same functions as the fourth
U.S. reactor at Hanford, i.e., to test materials and produce limited quantities
of fissionable material. A. Kramish has pointed up the technical similarities
between the first Soviet PSR reactor and the Hanford reactor, concluding that

Ibid.

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy

243

a reactor physicist would deduce that "the Soviet reactor was practically a
carbon copy of the American 305 reactor buiit at Hanford during the first phases
of the Manhattan Project."" (See Table 18-2.)

Table 18-2 COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE

AMERICAN HANFORD AND SOVIET PSR REACTORS

Hanford 305

First Soviet reactor
(PSR)

Start-up date
Power
Diameter
Lattice Spacing
Loading
Rod diameter

1944

10 watts

18-20 feet

avj inches

27 tons of uranium

1.448 inches

1947

10 watts

19 teet

8 inches

25-50 tons of uranium"

1.2 to 1.6 Inches

Source: A. Kramish, The Soviet Union and the Atom: The "Secret" Phase. RAND Report
RM-1896, p. 64.

'Soviet estimate.

Kramish also points out that the Soviet PSR reactor was completed many
years before the declassification of data on the Hanford 305 reactor and observes
that "the similarity of construction is interesting. Is it coincidental, or were
details on the 305 reactor obtained through espionage?""

The first Soviet power reactor (VAM-1), as distinct from a materials testing
reactor, began operation in June 1954, and was promptly claimed as the world's
first atomic power station.'' 4 This was not an altogether accurate statement;
the first nuclear reactor to generate electric power was operated in the United
States in 1951. The first full-scale power reactor was the Calder Hall unit
in England, which began operation in October 1956 with a reactor generating
ten times more power than the 5-MWe net capacity of the Soviet 1954 reactor.
The first authentic industrial reactor, the Shippingport pressurized water reactor,
was built in the United States in 1958.

The original 5-MWe Soviet power reactor VAM-1 was the only Soviet
power reactor from 1954 until 1964. In that year two more power reactors
came into operation, the AMB-1 graphite water reactor of 100 MWe and the
VVPR-1 pressured water dual-purpose reactor of 210 MWe. Therefore, although
they had an extensive program employing 31,400 persons, the Soviets in 1965
had only three power reactors in operation generating a total of 315 MWe.
By way of comparison, France in 1965 had five power reactors generating
350 MWe and the United Kingdom was far ahead with nine reactors generating

Kramish, RAND Report RM-1896, op. cil. n 3, p. 64.

Ibid,, p. 65.

For a brief description see G. Oslroumov, Pervitin r mire (Moscow, 1956).

244

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

1395 MWe. Germany and Italy had no reactors at all in 1960, but Germany
by 1965 had one reactor generating 50 MWe and Italy had three generating
607 MWe. This comparative development is of some interest in view of the
early Soviet start in generation of electric power by use of atomic energy and
the claims made for atomic energy in the early 1950s by Soviet scientist.
(See Table 18-3.)

Table 18-3

COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT
OF ATOMIC POWER REACTORS

Net installed capacity
I960 f965

Manpower employed in

Country

Plants MWe

Plants

MWe

nuclear energy at 7965

Soviet Union

France

Germany

Italy

United Kingdom

1
3

5
85

373

3
5
1
3
9

315

350

607

1395

31,400

37,500

9,676

3.500

38,632

Source: John W. Shartall, Atomic Handbook (Londor

i: Morgan, 1965), pp. 9, 13-14.

The position was even more distinctive at the end of 1969, when a map
in Pravda™ pinpointed only four operating atomic power reactors in the Soviet
Union, with none under construction. This total obviously includes the original
three brought into production between 1954 and 1964 together with the Siberian
dual-purpose reactor brought into production sometime after 1965. This may
be compared with developments in the United States, where in June 1969 a
total of 13 power reactors were in operation and another 79 were on order
or under construction," 6

It appears that Soviet atomic energy development has been held back by
lagging development of instrumentation and computers. The history of atomic
reactors and digital computers is intertwined. Development for both began at
about the same time during World War II and considerable support was given
to computer development by early atomic energy researchers; the AVIDAC
at Argonne, the ORACLE at Oak Ridge, and the MANIAC I at Los Alamos
were products of this early cooperation. 47 By 1959, "over 300 nuclear reactor
codes had been programmed in the United States for digital computers, ""
including such major problem areas as burn-up, age diffusion equations, and
kinetic responses of reactors. Soviet backwardness in computer technology is
noted elsewhere. 49

Pravda. November 14, !969.

Business Week. June 14, 1969.

Ward C. Sangren, Digital Computers and Nuclear Reactor Calculations (New York: John

Wiley & Sons, i960), p. 3.

Ibid., p. 10.

Seep. 318 below.

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 245

The 1963 U.S. atomic energy delegation to the Soviet Union had an unparal-
leled opportunity to see Soviet atomic development at first hand; the delegation
report substantiates the evidence of Soviet technical weakness in atomic energy. 50

For example, the delegation reported; "Equipment in the hot cells, such
as viewing devices and manipulators, was not as good as that found in equivalent
U.S. installations." 51 The delegation also reported: "An example of Soviet
instrumentation was a transistorized television camera in a radiation cell. This
was the only piece of completely transistorized equipment that the delegation
saw during the trip." 52

Only one project, the 70-GeV proton synchrotron then under construction
at Serpukhov, appeared to strike the delegation as outstanding:"

The delegation formed a generally favorable impression of the project and person-
nel. The plant iayout appeared to be sound, and factory-made equipment looked
as if it were of high quality, e.g., canned rotor pumps. Standard field construction ,
however, was of a poorer caliber. For example, the masonry work was not done
as carefully as might be expected. The few examples of stainless-steel welding
seen, however, looked competently done.

On the whole, the project seems well conceived and is being executed with
adequate competence. 54

Inasmuch as the Serpukhov operation was singled out for comment, a brief
study was undertaken of the origins of the Serpukhov equipment.

CERN ASSISTANCE FOR THE SERPUKHOV
PROTON SYNCHROTRON

The European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN) was established in
Geneva, Switzerland, in 1954 to provide for nuclear research collaboration among
European countries. On July 4, 1967, an agreement was signed in Moscow
relating to scientific and technical cooperation between CERN and the Soviet
Union for construction and operation of a 70-GeV proton synchrotron at Ser-
pukhov. It was to be capable of the highest energy acceleration in the world.
Discussions concerning the possibilities of such collaboration had been initiated

50 Further evidence for the 1950s is in Medford Evans, The Secret War for thcA-Bomb {Chicago:

Henry Regnery Company, 1953)
11 Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union, Trip Report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Delegation,

May 1963 (Oak Ridge, Tenn.; AEC Division of Technical Information, n.d.), p. 25.
" Ibid., p. 7.
11 Ibid,, pp. 54-55, Concerning the preinjector for the 70-BeV machine, !he delegation observed:

"This was perhaps the most interesting and surprising piece of equipment of the tour."
" Ibid., p. 65.

246 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

by Victor F. Weisskopf while he was director general of CERN in the mid-
1960s. 55

The main features of the technical-assistance agreement were as follows: 1 "

1. CERN provides a fast-ejection system for the Serpukhov accelerator
which becomes the property of Serpukhov; "CERN will be responsible
for the design, construction, testing, and installation of the system (inclu-
ding its magnets, their vacuum tanks, and the associated supplies and
controls), and for commissioning the vast ejected proton beam at the
accelerator,"

2. CERN provides radio-frequency particle separators which will be used
at Serpukhov, "and will be responsible for the design, construction,
testing, and installation of these items of beam line equipment and for
commissioning at the accelerator."

The Soviets for their part agreed to make available necessary technical
information to build the extraction system and the separators, and also
to establish at Serpukhov the buildings and supplies of electricity, cooling
water, etc., and generally provide services such as workshops and stores.
Also the U.S.S.R. has the responsibility to operate the accelerator and
provide the beams which are necessary for the program.

3. CERN has the right to propose a succession of electronics experiments
to be incorporated in the experimental program and the 70-GeV
machine.

4. CERN Institute for High-Energy Physics inSwitzerland will collaborate
in bubble-chamber physics, and Soviet scientists will join teams working
at CERN "in preparation for the start of bubble-chamber physics at
Serpukhov."

In October 1966 the French Government agreed to send to Serpukhov a
large hydrogen bubble chamber (with a volume of 6000 litres) developed at
the Saclay Laboratory in France. Under the agreement, French scientists were
to participate in the bubble-chamber experiments with Soviet scientists. 57 This
provision is interesting in fight of the comment of the U.S. delegation report
that "only one specific item of experimental equipment was mentioned, namely,
a large hydrogen bubble chamber." 58 The report did not state the origin of
the bubble chamber.

Two factors bring Western assistance to Serpukhov into focus: first, the
technical complexity and cost of these machines increase with size; and second,
because of its technical complexity the Soviets would have been unable to
build the Serpukhov unit without CERN assistance. Indeed the Soviets started

ss CERN Courier (Geneva). VI] 7 (July 1967). 23. V. F. Weisskopf was among the small
group iif physicists who in 1939 made the historic and voluntary agreement to restrict publication
of information concerning nuclear developments. At present (1969) Weisskopf is chairman
of the High-Energy Physics Advisory Panel of the Atomic Energy Commission.

5B CERN Courier, Vtl, 7 (July 1967). 22.

" Ibid . p. 122.

*" Atomic Energy in the Suviet Union. i>\>. cii. n. 51 . p. 77.

Western Assistance to Soviet Atomic Energy 247

excavation for a 6-GeV machine at Erevan in 1960 and only completed it
in 1967, a little before the 70-GeV Serpukhov unit started. At that time the
most powerful accelerator in the United States was the 1 5-Ge V proton synchrotron
at the Argonne National Laboratories in Chicago; the CERN machine of 24
GeV started in 1959, and then the largest Soviet installation, at Dubna, was
rated 10 GeV.

Therefore Western techniques and instrumentation enabled the Soviets to
claim the most powerful high-energy accelerator in the world. 59 Although such
machines are generally regarded as basic research units, it has been argued
by physicists in the high-energy field that accelerators do have a technical spillover
effect of some magnitude. For example, R. R. Wilson in the 1968 Richtmyer
Lecture acknowledged the assistance given by the accelerator to the nuclear
power industry and noted also,

. . . the kind of unexpected hut immediately practical developments (hat accompany
any intensive technological activity ... the high-power transmitting tube . . . fast
pumps ... high-vacuum techniques ... particle counters ... flip-flop circuits. 60

In a survey of Soviet technology the field of atomic energy poses a paradox
of some magnitude.

General Groves's opinion in 1945 was that the Soviet Union would require
15 to 20 years to construct an atomic bomb. This view is supported by such
diverse sources as Klaus Fuchs and this study. The Soviet Union in fact required
four years to achieve a "nuclear explosion."

Today we find that while the Soviet Union has some first-class scientists — the
physicist Lev Artsimovich is one whose name comes to mind — it is obviously
weak in converting nuclear science into practical systems. We see the evidence
in restricted development of power reactors. Western observations of Soviet
project instrumentation, assistance required for the Serpukhov proton synchro-
tron, and the backwardness in computer technology.

Given this relative technical backwardness both in 1945 and today, the
paradox is in the Soviet Union's ability to achieve an advanced nuclear weapons
capability. This is not an economic question of how resources were shifted
but a question of engineering capability. It is therefore suggested as a working
hypothesis that even in nuclear weaponry, in the development of controlled
thermonuclear reactions and all fields of nuclear science and technology requiring
extensive computer backup and instrumentation, there has been a large — and
yet unrecorded — transfer of equipment and technology from the West. 81

SB The existence of the Serpukhov machine also gave U.5. scientists a useful means to prod

Congress into appropriating $250 million for the 200-CeV unit under construction at Weston.

Illinois, in 1970,
" n CERN Courier. Vlll. 7 (July I96H). 156-57.
61 This chapter is restricted by the limited open data available on most aspects of atomic energy.

It should be viewed as little more than a preliminary to the study of the transfer of Western

assistance to the Soviet nuclear program.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Western Origins
of Soviet Railroad Locomotives

While there is little question that the Soviet railroad system has made gigantic
strides since the early 1930s, there was stil! a high degree of technical dependence
on the West at the end of the 1960s. 1

As of 1960 more than 31,000 steam locomotives were still in use in the
Soviet Union. This was considered undesirable (despite the excellent working
characteristics of the locomotives), and efforts were directed to the electrification
of high-density lines and the use of diesel-electric locomotives on low-density
lines. Gas turbines and diesel-hydraulic locomotives were in an experimental
stage . The 1 960 U .S . Railroad Delegation concluded on the basis of its observa-
tions that this motive equipment "showed no radical departure from familiar
designs but is rather an adaptation or copy of designs of engines and components
found in the United States and Western Europe— without regard for patent
considerations." 2

Special-purpose cars were rarely used, customers being enjoined to conform
their requirements to standard box, flat, fink, gondola, or refrigerator cars.
Although many of these were two-axle u.nitj, they were being replaced by
four-axle units. As far as signals and communications are concerned, the 1960
delegation commented: "Observations confirmed that the systems in service
in the United States during the years frorr> '.bout 1930 to 1945 have been
reproduced and manufactured for use on the Soviet railroads." 3

A number of wagon and locomotive construction and repair plants were
removed from Saxony and Thuringia to the U.S.S.R. in 1945-46. The wagon

1 See Sutton I and II for data concerning early Western teinnical transfers.

2 Association of American Railroads, Railroads of the L.S.S.R., Report on the Visit of the
United States Railroad Exchange Delegation to the Soviet Union during June 1960 (Washington,
n.d.), p. 9. The wide use of foreign locomotives as lac. as 1962 may be gauged from an
observation by J. N. Westwood, on leaving Sebastopol: "As the train moved out through
she suburbs it was easy to fancy that this was not Russia but Czechoslovakia, for it was only
after several miles thai I saw a Russian-built locomotive. Not only were the passenger trains
Skoda-hauled but switching and local freight were in the care of new Czech-built 750-hp diesel
switchers (class ChME2)." Trains {Milwaukee, Wis.), July 1962, p. 44.

> Railroads .... op. err. n. 2, p. 11 . See Sutton II, pp. 205-6, for assistance of Union Switch
and Signal Company (Subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric) in the 1930s.

248

I i

Western Origins of Soviet Railroad Locomotives

249

construction plants at Stassfurt and near Halle were partly removed to the
U.S.S.R.; also in Saxony, the Gotha wagon-building plant was about 60 percent
removed and the Ilmenau works was completely removed. In Thuringia the
Wurzen plant was partly removed; Waggon- und Maschinenbau A.G. (Wumag)
at GSrlitz was also partly removed and Waggon- und Maschinenfabrik A.G.
at Bautzen was about 50 percent removed to the U.S.S.R. 1 However, the more
important present-day Russian locomotive and car construction plants are enlarged
Tsarist plants or units built in the 1930s rather than transferred German plants.

AMERICAN ORIGINS OF DIESEL-ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES

By 1960 the Soviet locomotive construction industry had produced three
basic diesel -electric locomotive models in addition to several prototypes (Table
19-1). The three basic production models were based on U.S. locomotives — on
American Locomotive Company (Alco), General Electric, and Fairbanks-Morse
designs. During World War II a considerable number of U.S. diesel -electric
locomotives were shipped to the U.S.S.R. under the Lend Lease program.
These locomotives ultimately became prototypes for postwar Soviet models;
they included the Alco (Soviet Type Da) and the standard Baldwin (Soviet
Db). 5

Table 19-1

DIESEL- ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES
IN THE SOVIET UNION FROM 1944 to 1965

Soviet class

Weight, tons

Dates in use

Western origins

Foreign construction

— 1943 Alco

— 1943 Baldwin Locomotive

Soviet construction based on foreign basic design

TE-1

124 1947 Alco-Da class

TE-2

65 1950-56 Modified TE-1 (Alco-Da)

TE-3

126 1956- Fairbanks-Morse engine

(standard)

Source: J. N. Westwood, Russian Locomotive Types. (Bristol: W. Norman. 1960).

The Soviet TE-1, for which production started in 1947 and continued until
1950, was based on an imported Alco-G.E. diesel-electric road switcher that

G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontagt; Seeks Jakre Rtparationspolitik (Bremen: F.
Triijen, 1951).

U.S. Dept. of Stale, Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to ike U.S.S.R.
(Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945).

250 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

was first delivered to U.S. customers in 1941. Although designed primarily
for road service, it was similar in basic design to a yard-switching locomotive.
The 1000-hp diesel engine operated at 740 rpm, and was turbocharged by the
Buchi system; the electrical equipment for the engine was built entirely by
General Electric, and included the main traction generator, auxiliary generator,
and four G.E. 731 traction motors with Type P control equipment and Westing-
house air-brake equipment. 6 The Soviet-built version of this Alco model (i.e.,
the Da type) had three truck bogies (like the Alco unit delivered under Lend
Lease) and a D-50 six-cylinder four-stroke diesel engine of 1000 tip. About
300 such TE-I models were still in service in I960. 7

The TE-1 was followed by the TE-2, which first appeared in 1948 with
series production from 1951 to 1956. About 1100 were still operating in 1960.
The D-50 diesel engine and generators were the same as in the earlier TE-1.

In 1950 design started on a more powerful locomotive — the TE-3 freight
(and TE-7 passenger version) — with a prototype appearing in 1953 and series
production started in 1956. This locomotive had a 2000-hp ten-cylinder engine
(the 2D 100) based on the Fairbanks-Morse opposing piston design. Today
the TE-3 and the TE-7 are the standard Soviet freight and passenger diesel
electric locomotives."

The TE-3 locomotive unit has been described by an American railroad
delegation as containing

. . . a 2000-hp opposed piston type normally aspirated diesel engine with ten cylin-
ders operating at 850 rpm. This engine appears to be very similar to the Fairbanks-
Morse diesel engine used in the United States."

It is normally used as a two-unit consist providing a total of 4000 hp with
a passenger service modification (the TE-7).

We may conclude, then, that in the 1960s Soviet diesel-electric locomotives
were based on U -S. models of the 1940s; there had been no major improvement
in design in Soviet models over their earlier American predecessors.

Soviet hydraulic-electric locomotives are of Austrian and German origin.
In 1956 the U.S.S.R. imported some Voith (Austrian) 200-hp switchers, and
in 1957 some 400-hp units (Soviet class MG-2) with Voith transmission and
Jenbach mechanical units and engine. These were supplemented in 1962 with
further imports of German 4000-hp Henschel Werke units with Maybach engine

" The Alco-G.E. road switchers are described in Railway Mechanical Engineer (Philadelphia).
February 1942, pp. 62-66.

7 Railroads .... op. eit. n. 2.

* For technical details of Soviet diesel-electric locomotives see K.A. Shishkin e! a!., Teplovoz
TE-3 (Moscow, 1969), which contains numerous construction diagrams and details. For elec-
trical equipment on the 2TE-10L, TEM-2, and TE-3 see Elektrickeskoe oborudovanie
teptovozov {Moscow . 1968).

" Railroads ....op, cir. n. 2, p. 47.

Western Origins of Soviet Railroad Locomotives

251

and Maybach-Mekydro transmission. Soviet production began in 1962 at Kaluga
with 4000-hp units obviously based on these Austrian and German prototypes.
Other experimental hydraulic-electric units, the TGM-10 (1200 hp) and the
T-106 (4000 hp) were built at Bryansk and Lugansk, respectively. 10

The Soviet gas turbine that was in the experimental stage in 1960 used
the body of the TE-3 2000-hp diesel-electric, 11 whereas gas turbine locomotives
in the United States are specially designed overall as gas turbine locomotives.
It would be reasonable to surmise that the Soviet unit was merely a test bed
for an engine rather than the prototype of a gas turbine locomotive.

Tabte19-2

ORIGINS OF ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES IN USE

THE SOVIET UNIOIS

, EARLY 1960's

Builder oi

Rated

Weight,

Year first

mechanical

Builder of

Class

output

tons

built

equipment

electrical equipment

Foreign Construction

2490 kw

132

1954

Skoda
(Czechoslovakia)

Skoda

chS1

2285

1957

Skoda
(Czechoslovakia)

Skoda

F{T)

4550

138

1959

Schnelder-Alathom,
SFAC (France)

S.W.; Jeumont

FP(TP)

4550

131

1960

Schneidsr-Alsthom,
SFAC (Franco)

S.W.; Alsthom;
Jeumont

4730

138

1961

Krupp (Germany)

Siemens-Schukert

ChS2

3430

120

1961

Skoda
(Czechoslovakia)

Skoda

2340

Domestic Construction

VL£2m

132

1947

Tbilisi

VL23

3070

138

1952

Novocherkassk

VL-8 (N8)

4065

180

1953

Novocherkassk

VL-60 (N60)

4065

138

19S9

Novocherkassk

VL-10 (T8)

5070

184

1961

Tbilisi

VL-62

(NO-VL61)

4065

138

1961

Novocherkassk

VL-80

(N80)

6050

184

1961

Novocherkassk

Source: Adapted from Worlds Railways, 1964-65. (London: Odh

ams Press, 1965), p.

240.

W. M. Keller, "What We Saw in Russia," Railway Age (Chicago). July 11, 1966, p. 15.
"O. Are their hydraulic locomotives on the order of the Krauss-Maffci or do they have their
own design? Keller; They're similar to the Krauss-Maffei."

Trains, July I960, p. 27.

252 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

FOREIGN PROTOTYPES OF ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES

From the beginning of the 1930s to the present, Soviet electric-locomotive
manufacture and prototype design has been based almost completely on Western
models acquired from all countries making advarced designs. According to
J. N. Westwood, 12 however, the Soviets have had considerable technical prob-
lems with domestic locomotives based on such foreign designs and therefore
the railroad sector continues to be heavily dependent 0:1 COMECON and Western
technical assistance.

The most common electric locomotives in I960 were the VL-22 and VL-22m
of which almost 2400 were in operation. These can be traced directly to the
General Electric S class imported in 1932, according to Westwood: "It is possible
to trace elements of the present VL-23 design back to the American engines
delivered 32 years ago, and in outward appearance type S is almost indistinguish-
able from the later VL-22m." 13 Also, about 150 types VL-19 and VL-I9m,
based on a Soviet design of the early 1930s and built after World War II,
were still in operation in the early 1960s.

The other standard electric locomotive of the period 1945 to 1960 was
the N class, the prototype of which was produced at Novocherkassk in 1953;
the locomotive was mass-produced at Novocherkassk after 1955 and at Tbilisi
after 1958. About 3 10 were in operation by I960. 14 These locomotives, although
acceptable to Soviet customers, were backward by Western standards; an AARR
report, for example, isolated obsolescent use of tape insulation on the traction
motors:

While a few traction motors of comparable nature may possibly still be in use
in America, none with this type of insulation had been built for railroad use
for twenty-five years or more.'''

The wide application of outdated practices in 1960 may be noted from
the observation that standardized traction motors — the latest DP type — are used
in Classes VL-22, VL-22m, VL-19, and NO electric locomotives, as in all
the main locomotive classes. Moreover, import of foreign component parts
for electric locomotives (for example, mercury rectifiers from Japan under the

12 J. N. Wesiwood, Soviet Railways Today (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), pp. 46-59, has
an excellent description of electric locomotive development, its origins and current problems.
Wesiwood considers that production of the basic N-60 and N-80 models was premature: "The
fundamental problem of railway electrification in the U.S.S.R. is that at a time when more
and more line is rapidly being electrified, there are no completely satisfactory locomotives
in operation." <p. 581.

13 Ibid., p. 46.

" Association of American Railroads, A Report on Diesel Locomotive Design and Maintenance

on Soviet Railways, (Chicago: AAR Research Center, September 1966), p. 80.
15 Ibid., p. 14.

Western Origins of Soviet Railroad Locomotives

253

1956 trade agreement) supports the argument that the Soviets lag in domestic
abilities.

One advantage of import of electric locomotives for line haul use is that
imports are of greater technical sophistication and give better performance than
domestically produced models. Westwood gives the power-to- weight ratio for
several Soviet and foreign locomotives. The Soviet N 60, for example, has
a ratio of 28.1 kw of power per ton of weight compared with 32.6 for the
imported French T class electric locomotives; similarly, the Soviet VL-23 has
a ratio of 22.8 compared to the Czech ChS2 with a ratio of 33.0. Thus Soviet
electrics are decidedly heavier for their power output. 1 * Imports also provide
the basis for further Soviet technical development and, through comparative
performances, afford us a measurement of domestic technical lag.

J. N. Weslwood, "Russian Railroading Revisited," Trains. July 1962, p. 46. See also Novocher-
kasskii eleSttrovozostroiternyi zavod, Eleklromz VL60 k (Moscow: Transport, 1969).

CHAPTER TWENTY

Western Origins of Aircraft
and Space Technology

AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND ENGINE TECHNOLOGY

During World War II the Soviets produced 11 5,596 aircraft and Lend Lease
delivered to the U.S.S.R. an additional 14,018.' The Russian- produced aircraft
were mainly obsolete prewar types and most were one-engine wood and canvas
models with inferior engines. Domestic production was assisted, however, by
a high degree of production specialization. The only Soviet dive bomber, the
Stormovik (IL-2), was in production at three plants; each plant produced about
the same number of lL-2s but no other aircraft. Fighter production was concen-
trated on the YAK-3, the YAK-2 and YAK-6 being advanced trainer versions.
The YAK was produced in six widely scattered plants producing only YAK
aircraft at rates of between 65 and 400 per month.

Two-engined bomber production included the PK-2 (based on the French
Potez) at two plants, and the IL-4 at three plants, only one of which (Kom-
somols'k) produced other aircraft. The LI-2 (or Douglas DC-3) transport was
produced only at Tashkent, and the PO-2 (or De Havilland Tiger Moth) was

R H. Jones, The Roads w Russia (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 969)
According to U.S. Dept. of State. Report on War Aid Furnished by rite [W Sia « '
riteUSS.R (Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1?45). Und Lease delivers or
aircraft to the Soviet Union from June 22.

"194.I . to September 20, 1945, were as follows:

Fighter
planes

P-40

P-39

P-47

P-63

Quantity
delivered

2,097

4,746

195

2.400

Bombers

A-20

(light)

B-25

(medium)

B-24

(heavy)

Quantity
delivered

2,908

862

{force-landed
in Siberia)

Cargo
planes

Quantity
delivered

C-46
C-47

0-52
Observation
Advanced

Trainers
PBN Navy

Patrol planes
PBY-64

707

137

254

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 255

produced only at Kazan. Training aircraft (YAK-6s) were produced at three
locations and the UT-2 advanced single-engined trainer at two locations.

Thus Soviet aircraft production was concentrated on a comparatively few
simple types, each for a single function only. Most plants concentrated on
the production of a single model, although several plants were usually involved
with the production of the important types.

Lend Lease was of great assistance in the development of the Soviet aircraft
industry. For example, Henry Wallace after his visit to the important Komsomolsk
aircraft plant commented as follows:

The aircraft factory in [Komsomolsk], where Slormovik bombers were being
built, owed both its existence and its production 10 the United States. All the

machine tools and all the aluminum came from America It looks like the

old Boeing plant at Seattle. 2

However, according to General G. A. Tokaev: 3

The aircraft industry was lagging well behind the West owing to constant political
interference:, political purges, and the general low level of technical efficiency.
Consequently, at the end of World War 11 the Soviets had not produced a single
jet engine or guided missile.

Work in 1945 and 1946 involved nothing sensational from the design view-
point and in effect consisted in mastering the German aircraft industry that
was developed from 1941 to 1943. The years immediately after 1946, however,
were to show a remarkable expansion in the industry, an expansion achieved
by utilizing German and some British technical assistance in an expert manner.
Technical assistance from the West entered through two main channels — first
from the United Kingdom and particularly through transfer of the Rolls-Royce
Nene, Derwent, and Tay engine technologies; and second (and a much larger
flow) from Germany via the transfer of the wartime German aircraft industry
to the Soviet Union.

The postwar Soviet aviation and space industries have their roots in German
World War II aircraft and rocket developments. In 1945 the Germans had a
large and relatively undamaged aircraft and rocket manufacturing industry that
had been dispersed under threat of continued Allied bombing toward the eastern
regions of Germany— that area later occupied by the Soviets (Figure 20-1).
Over two-thirds of this productive capacity fell intact into Soviet hands 4 and

1 Quoted by Werner Keller, 0« minus West^Null (Munich: Droemersche Verlagsanstalt.
I960), p. 265.

3 G. A. Tokaev, Stiviei Imperialism (New York: Philosophical Library. 1956), p. 56.

* The writer has calculated the capacity in terms of 1944-45 output as 68 percent of the assem-
bly capacity, although this figure varies by type of aircraft produced.

Figure 20-1 LOCATION OF THE GERMAN AEROENGINE PLANTS AT THE END OF

WORLD WAR II.

Source: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Industry Survey, Figure VII-2, based
on data from the German Air Ministry.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 257

was largely, but in some cases not immediately, transported to the U.S S R
These transfers included development and experimental work, but most important
they also included complete production lines for aircraft engines, equipment,
and the V-2 missile. Consequently in both aircraft and rocket industries we'
can trace Soviet developments directly to German wartime research and develop-
ment work and production methods.

Accurate information concerning this transferred productive capacity and
technology comes as a result of an unusual sequence of events which itself
is still subject to debate. In 1945 American and British armies swept 200 miles
into what is now the Soviet Zone and met the Soviet armies on the Elbe-Mulde
river hne rather than on the zonal frontiers earlier agreed upon. Very little,
if any, machinery was removed by the West before this area was surrendered
to the Soviet armies, although dozens of CIOS, BIOS, FIAT, U.S. Army,
and U.S. Navy teams had scoured the factories in the occupied areas assessing
German technical developments. 5 The intelligence results were published in
several hundred detailed technical reports. As some Allied teams were examining
German plants only days before the Soviets took over, we have accurate, detailed
accounts of the equipment and technical information that came under Soviet
authority.

The technical information flowed first to the Central Institute of Aerohy-
drodynamics (TsAGI) and then to design institutes in Moscow, where it was
allocated to various Soviet design teams working closely with deported German
engineers and technicians. German technology was converted into experimental
work, and after choice of design production was carried out at associated produc-
tion units. The Mikulin design team at Plant No. 300, for example, worked
on the Mikulin turbojet and was associated for production purposes with the
Tushino Plant No. 500, Moscow Aircraft Engine Production Plant No. 45
(which produced the Rolls-Royce Nene engine from 1948 to 1956), Kharkov
Plant No. 75, and a plant associated with the Gorki automobile plant and known
as Plant No. 466. In this way, Soviet-German experimental and design teams
were located at specific factories, but the design reproduction and experimental
stages normally were kept apart from the production process.

These flows of technology will be examined as follows: (a) the flow of
aircraft engine technology and production facilities from Germany and the United
Kingdom, (b) airframe manufacturing and design capacity, which came almost
entirely from Germany {although B-29 bomber technology came from the United
States), and (c) space technology, which, again, came largely from Germany.

Reports were issued later by CIOS (Combined Intelligence Objectives Committee), BIOS
(British Intelligence Objectives Committee), and HAT (Field Information Agency Techni-

258 Western Technology and Soviet EcononXc Development, 1945-1965

The German Aircraft Engine Industry
In The Soviet Zone

The capacity of the German aircraft engine industry was more than adequate
for the German aircraft program in the first years of the war, and its production
schedules were maintained almost until the end in 1945. The basic design,
development, and production companies were Junkers, Daimler-Benz, and
BMW. These companies licensed production to additional firms, particularly
in the case of Junkers and Daimler-Benz; BMW licensed only to Klockner
in Hamburg. The largest single unit in the German Air Ministry expansion
program was the Ostmark plant in Vienna, Austria, which covered an area
of 3,000,000 square feet. This plant, although begun in 1941, did not produce
engines until May 1943 and by the end of the war it had produced only 3000
engines in all. 6

Dai mler-Benz operated 1 aircraft engi ne plants (see Table 20- 1 ). The largest
plant was Genshagen near Berlin, which had produced a total of 30,000 aircraft
engines by the end of World War 11 and in December 1944 was operating
at a rate of 700 engines per month. In 1945 part of the principal plant at
Genshagen was moved to a gypsum mine in Heidelburg to set up what was
called the Goldfischwerke. 7 In all, 2500 machine tools were moved to the
Goidfisch works. The Soviets acquired the greater part of both the Genshagen
main plant in Berlin and the Goidfisch underground plant at Heidelburg; according
to G. E. Harmssen. all of the machine tools at Genshagen were removed to
the U.S.S.R. and 80 percent of the Goidfisch underground plant was removed
to the U .S .S -R. at the end of 1945, under U.S. Operation RAP. 8 Total production
of all Daimler-Benz plants in 1944 was 28,669 aircraft engines; since 16,794
of these were produced in plants located in the future Soviet Zone, it is clear
that the Soviets gained control of the greater part of aircraft engine production
of Types 603, 605, and 610. 9

Daimler-Benz produced only reciprocating aircraft engines; gas turbines were
produced by Junkers and BMW. The BMW 003 gas turbine was actually in
production in 1945 and a total of 450 had already been built when the war
ended. 10 Production facilities established for the 003 were much greater than

,: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Division Industry Report, 2d edition (Washington,

January 1947), Report no. 4, p. 96.
' Ibid., p. 28.
K G. E. Harmssen. Am Abend iter Demontage ; Sechs Juhre Reparationspolilik (Bremen: F.

Triijen 1951), p. 102; and Germany. Office of Military Government, (U.S. Zone).

Economies Division. A Yew of Potsdam: The German Economy Since the Surrender (n.p.:

OMGUS. 1946). p. 36.
" For further information see BIOS Report no. 35: Report on Visit to Daimler Bern, at

Snillgart-Unterturkheim.
10 CIOS Report no. XXX-80: Bavarian Motor rVorks-A Production Survey.

Western Origins of A ircrafr and Space Technology

259

the production total indicates, however; the German program envisaged a produc-
tion of 2500 per month by September 1945 from Harz Mountain area occupied
by the Soviets. 11 These plants, built underground at Eisenach and Zuhlsdorf,
were removed to the Soviet Union. 12 Moreover the Munich plant of BMW,
with a production of 500 engines at the end of 1944, was removed to the
Soviet Union under Operation RAP. 13

Similarly, the Junkers turbojet was of special interest to the Soviets. By
March 1945 approximately 6000 of these engines had been built, although the
German Air Ministry was beginning to favor production of the BMW 003
for technical reasons. The Junkers 004 was in production at three centers in
1945— at Maldenstein across the river from Dessau in the Soviet Zone (not
examined by either the British or the American intelligence teams), at Kothen
about 20 miles southwest of Dessau, and at Nordhausen in the V-l and V-2
factories. Junkers was also producing the 012 engine with a similar layout
to the 004, and an 1 1 -stage axial compressor and a thrust of seven thousand
pounds. The 022—a propeller version of the 012— was in the project stage
and designed to attain 500 miles per hour. 14

Table 20-1 REMOVAL OF MAIN
GERMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINE PLANTS IN 1945-46

Type of engine

Location
produced

Total production
1939 - 1944

Total production
Dec 1944

Disposal of
plant In 1945

Daimler-Benz
(603)

Daimler-Benz

(601,603,606)
Daimler-Benz

(601,605.606,610)
Daimler-Benz

(601 ,605)
Daimler-Benz

(605)

Daimler-Benz
(605)

Daimler-Benz

(603)
Daimler-Benz

(601,605,606,610)

Stettin

Berlin,

Marienfelde
Bussing

(Brunswick)
Henschel

(Kassel)
Manfred Weiss

(Budapest)
Steyr

Prague

Austria

(Ostmark)
Genshagen

3582

13,805

13,119

1,189

1,885

311

2,890

30,833

250

600

Probably
removed to
U.S.S.R.
Not known

Not removed
to U.S.S.R.
Not removed
to U.S.S.R.

Probably
removed to
U.S.S.R.

100 percent
removed to

U.S.S.R.

Ibid., p. 62.

Harmssen. op. cit. n. R, no. 78.

Op. cit. n. 8. p. .16,

CIOS Report no. XXX! -66; Notes tin Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Development.': al

Junkers. Dessau taut Associated Factories.

260

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 20-1 (cont.)

Location Total production Total production
Type of engine produced 1939-1944 Dec 1944

Disposal of
plant in 1945

Daimler-Benz
(601.605,606,610)

BMW (801)

BMW (801)
BMW (801)
BMW (132)

BMW (323)

Goldfisch
underground
(Heidelburg)

Allaco-
Munich*

Klockner

(Hamburg)
Spandau

(Berlin)
Eisenach

Zuhlsdorf

17,529

4,206
5,695
4,099,

526

ISO
326

> plan 2500
, ,,,/ month by
■ i '' i4t September '45

Junkers (004,012) Maldestein
(Dessau)

Junkers (004)

Junkers (003)

Kothen

Nordhausen

Magdeburg

80 percent
removed at
end of 1946
82 percent
removed at
end 1946
Not removed
to U.S.S.R.
Probably
removed
100 percent
removed to
U.S.S.R.
100 percent
removed to
U.S.S.R.
100 percent
removed to
U.S.S.R.
100 percent
removed to
U.S.S.R.
100 percent
removed to
U.S.S.R.
100 percent
removed to
U.S.S.R.

Sources: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Division: Industry Report, Number 64
(January 1947), Table VII-1; A Year of Potsdam (n.p.: Office of Military Government for
Germany [U.S. Zone], Economics Division, 1947) p. 36; G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der
Demontage; Sechs Jahre Reparationspolltik ( Bremen: F. Triljen, 1951), p. 102.
'Note: BMW Argus and Franck plants excluded.

The Junkers company had extensive engine manufacturing facilities in the
Soviet Zone. The Dessau aircraft design and production plant produced the
regular Junkers engines and design work on the 012. There was also a Junkers
engine plant at Magdeburg, and a great deal of development work on the 003
gas turbine was handled by underground shops there. The Junkers company
also operated the rear portion of Tunnel No. 2 at the Nordhausen underground
facilities. 11

ClOS Report no. XXX I -36: C L. Fay , Junkers Aircraft and Engines Facilities, May 1945.

Western Origins of A ircraft and Space Technology 26 1

TRANSFER OF GERMAN TECHNICIANS
AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE U.S.S.R.

Continuing the pattern established with the absorption of Junkers technology
after the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, the main channel of aircraft engine production
facilities for the U.S.S.R. was from East Germany to Aircraft Plant No. I
at Kuibyshev. This plant was established essentially with Junkers facilities trans-
ferred from Germany and using Junkers engineers, designers, foremen, and
test pilots. The central function of the plant was to convert the promising German
jet technology into the first Soviet jet fighters and bombers.

The aircraft industry was not removed immediately to the Soviet Union
however. Soviet designers like Tupolev and Guravitch first visited German
aircraft factories and examined prototypes and production methods. The Junkers
company organized for this purpose an exhibition of German secret aircraft
projects and arranged for tours of inspection of the industry. 1 * Equipment was
then removed under the program of OKBs (Osoboye Konstruktorskoye Byuro)-
for example, OKB No. 1 was at the Dessau plant of Junkers.

Nor were the German technical personnel immediately removed to the Soviet
Union." The bulk of the German engineers and scientists were moved by
train to Russia on the night of October 22-23, 1946— in what was probably
the largest mass movement of scientific brains in the history of the civilized
world. 16 Engineers and scientists were not given contracts or other written
agreements; they were divided into small groups of about 15 persons, and about
30 Russian engineers were attached to each German nucleus for study and
work. The Russian groups were changed with some rapidity, and each project
was handled by stages— the draft stage, the technical project stage, and finally
the presentation stage. Whenever a project was almost complete it was canceled
by the Soviets and the related drawings, papers, biographies, and technical
material were turned over. Duplicate work was undertaken by separate all-Russian
groups some distance from the location of the original German pilot groups;
in addition German groups were put in competition one with another. 19

Often the complete working environment of the German specialists was
removed to the U.S.S.R., according to Keller: 2 "

Engineers and draftsmen found the same desks lying ready for them which they

'« Flying (New York), 51,5. (November 1952), ij.

V. L. Sokolov, "Soviet Use of German Science and Technology, 194J-I946" (New York-
Research Program on [he U.S.S.R., 1955; Mimeographed Series no. 73) argues that (he
removal program was carried out hastily; this is not completely in accord with other evidence
Aviation Week (New York), 62. 14 (May 9 1955)

" Ibid.

" W. Keller, fi/j. tit. u. 2. p. 3.16

262 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

had used in Dessau, Oranienburg. Halle, or Leipzig. They were able to find
their old drawings and tracings, technical reports, neatly tied up with labels bearing
Cyrillic lettering.

Most German designers and engineers in the aeroengine industry were sent
to Kuibyshev. 21 They came largely from the Junkers and BMW plants; no
less than 800 engineers and technicians came from these two companies alone
in I946. 22 Among the members of the BMW contingent was Kurt Schell, former
head of the BMW rocket laboratory, and engineers Winter, Kaul, Schenk, Tietze,
Weiner, and Muller. 23 The Junkers group led by Walter Baade was the most
important. Not only was Dr. Baade formerly chief engineer of Junkers; he
had previously worked for ten years in American aeronautical plants and so
was fully familiar with American methods of aircraft construction. With Dr.
Baade was a group of engineers including Freundel, Haseloff, Wocke, Elli,
Lilo, Rentel, Hoch, Beer, Antoni, Reuss, Heisig, and Hartmann. The Junkers
engine team in the Soviet Union was headed by Dr. Scheibe, who designed
the Junkers PI turbine; he was assisted by er.gine designers Gerlach and Pohl,
who at Dessau had been in charge of the engine testing department. Also in
this group were Steudel and Boettger and a h-ge number of personnel from
the turbojet department, including engineers, ic/emen, and skilled workers, »<
Another prominent designer, Ernst Heinkel, v,:.rked in the Soviet Union at
the Kalinin Experimental Station. 25

The Junkers plant itself was rebuilt at Kuibyshev, "almost exactly" as
it had stood in Leipzig. 26

Development Of The First Soviet Jet Engine

The use of German engineers to develop Sovie? jet engines fell into three
stages. The first stage included the reproduction of the Junkers 004 and the
BMW 003 jet engines removed to the Soviet Union with their production equip-
ment. The 004 became the Soviet RD-10, and the BMW 003 was produced
as the Soviet RD-20 on a stop-gap basis until more advanced designs came
along. 27 (See Table 20-2).

:l ibid.

" Aviation Week. 66. 14 (April 8, 1957). 53.

23 Aeronautics, (London), April 1952. p. 46.

21 Ibid.

25 tbitl.

"<■ Flying, 51. 5 (November 1952).

17 Aviation Week. April 8. 1957. p. 54.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology

263

Table 20-2

ORIGINS AND UTILIZATION OF SOVIET JET ENGINES

Thrust,

Weight.

Used

Engine

Max.rpm

Compressor

Western origins

RD-10

2.200

1,650

8,700

Axial

MIG-9
YAK-17

Junkers 004

RD-20

2.250

1,375

10,000

Axial

BMW 003

RD-45F

5,000

1,612

12,500

Centrifugal

MIG-15
1L-28

Rolls-Royce Nene

RD-500

3.600

1,280

14,700

Centrifugal

YAK-23

Rolls-Royce Derwent

VK-1
(Klimov)

6,000

1,930

—

Centrifugal

IL-28

Rolls-Royce Tay

VKIA

7,590

1,960

—

Centrifugal

IL-20
MIG-15
MIG-17

Rolls-Royce Tay

VK-2

5,950

—

Centrifugal

MIG-15

Rolls-Royce Tay

VK-2JA

6,850

—

Centrifugal

MIG-17

Rolls-Royce Tay

VK-2R

7,500

2,650

—

Centrifugal

—

Rolls-Royce Tay

VK-5

8,690

—

Axial

MIG-19
YAK-25

—

AM-2

6.000

4,250

—

Axial

Junkers 022

(Mikulin)

AM-3

19,000

5,000

—

Axial

Badger
Bison

Brandner

AM-5

MIK-205

10.000

3,000

—

Axial

—

(Junkers-BMW team)

MIK-205R

13,000

3,900

—

Axial

—

(Junkers-BMW team)

AM-9

M-209

14,850

5,500

—

Axial

TU-104

(Junkers-BMW team)

22,000

Fish pot

(Junkers-BMW team)

Sources: Text; Aero/Space Engineering, October 1959, pp. 45-50; H. Hooftman, Russian
Aircraft (Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Publishers, 1965); W. Keller, Ost Minus West-NuH (Munich:
Droemersche Verlagsanstalt, 1960), pp. 341-42, 348-49; C. L. Fay, Junkers Aircraft and
Engine Facilities. CIOS No. XXXI - 36, p. 7.

The first project given to the German design groups was a Soviet specification
for a 3000-hp jet engine; essentially this was a development of the Junkers
012 turbojet, which was at the design stage in Germany at the end of World
War II. By 1947 the Junkers 012 had been developed as a 12-burner assembly,
but operating inefficiencies and two blade failures canceled development of
this engine in 1948. 2B The next project specification given to the German design-
ers was for a 6000-hp turboprop to attain a speed of 560 miles per hour
at sea level. Essentially, this engine was developed from the Junkers 022 turbo-
prop engine, with the same general design and characteristics as the 012 but

" ibid.

264 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

modified to provide geared turbine drive to contrarotation propellers. 19 By 1949
the Brandner design teams had essentially met the Soviets' specification and
immediately set to work on yet another detailed specification — a power plant
with 12,000 hp in contrast to the 6000 hp developed by the Junkers 022. The
first (unsuccessful) attempt at this specification was to couple two Junkers 002
power plants together.

Finally, the Type K turboprop was developed by the Junkers-BMW Team
as a 14-stage compressor and five-stage turbine engine; it was a logical develop-
ment from the German engines under development in the latter stages of World
War II. The Type K engines produced by the mid-1950s power the Soviet
four-engine bombers (TU-20 Bear) with four MK-12M turboprop engines of
12,000-hp capacity, and the civilian version, the Rossiya.

The AM series (after Mikulin) developed from the work of a Junkers-BMW
team in the U.S.S.R. under engineer Brandner. The most powerful end result
of this design, the AM-3, was seen in 1958 by an American engineer whose
comment was "The engine is not an outstanding power plant, being of simple
design of very large diameter and developing about 15,000 pounds thrust with
8 compression stages." 30 It is currently used in the TU-104 "Camel," which
was developed from the TU-16 ("Badger").

Rolls-Royce Nene And Derwent Turbojets

In 1946 the Soviets bought 55 Rolls-Royce centrifugal compressor- type tur-
bojets — 25 Nenes and 30 Derwents. These Rolls-Royce engines, simple and
well suited to Soviet mass production methods, introduced the Soviets to the
use of a centrifugal turbojet; Russian turbojets up to that time were of the
axial-flow type based on German designs.

Two versions of the Rotls-Royce engines were produced at Engine Plant
No. 45 near Moscow beginning in 1948 and continuing at least until 1956.
The plant was toured in 1956 by U.S. Air Force General Nathan Twining,
who noted that it contained machine tools from various countries including
the United States and Germany, and had 3000 workers engaged in producing
the Rolls-Royce Nene. 31

The American counterpart in 1951 to this Rolls-Royce engine was the Pratt
& Whitney J-42 Turbo-wasp, based on the Nene but not then in quantity produc-
tion. 32 Thus when the Korean war broke out in 1950 the Russians had thousands
of improved Nene engines in service powering MIG-15s, whereas the U.S.

2 » CIOS XXX1-36, op. eil. n. 15, p. 7.

30 Ordnance, May-Juiie 1958, p. 1084.
" Aviation Week, July 2, 1956. p. 29,

31 Aviation Week, June II. 1951, p. 16. .See also The Times (London) April 28, 1953, p. 9c.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 265

Air Force had only a few hundred F-86A Sabres with comparable engines.
The Soviets had also been able to solve certain turbine blade problems that
were still puzzling Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney engineers. 3 '

By 1951 the Soviets had two versions of the original Rolls-Royce Nene
in production quantities. The first version, the RD-45 that powered an early
MIG-15, was a direct copy of the original Nene and delivered 5000 pounds
of thrust. The second version of the RD-45 delivered 6000 pounds of static
thrust at sea level and 6750 pounds of thrust with water injection.

Significant improvements were made by the Russians in the original design:

Principally (he changes involved the combustion chambers, which have 15 percent
greater area, and the turbine blades which are longer and of wider chord. Compari-
son with the earlier Nene dimensions shows the blade is one-half inch longer
and one-fourth inch wider in chord. Blade profile is still simitar.

Tailpipe area is reported 30 percent greater than that of the original Nene.
The scale-up of internal gas passages was accomplished, however, with no increase
in the 50-in. overall diameter of the original Nene.

Other refinements [are]: an additional ring of perforations just aft of the primary
zone of the combustion chambers for increased dilution of air; insertion of reinforce-
ment rings in the liner perforation in the hot zone of the combustion chambers;
increased gage of metal used in hot zone and liner, improved duplex fuel nozzle.

The refined Soviet engine weighs about 2000 lb as compared to 1715 lb
forthe original Nene. Specific fuel consumption is given as 1. 14 lb fuel/lb thrust/hr.
The engine analyzed did not incorporate afterburning. It was noted that tailpipe
diameter and length were sufficient to utilize a short afterburner which would
boost total thrust a calculated 1000 lb additional. "

The turbine blades in the Soviet RD-45 engines were made of a stainless
steel alloy of the Nimonic 80 type while the burner liner and swirl vanes were
made of Nimonic 75. Parts of the Nene sold to Russia in 1948 were fabricated
from Nimonic alloys— "Nimonic" being the registered trademark of Henry
Wiggin and Company of Birmingham, England. Both Nimonic 75 and Nimonic
80 were developed by Mond Nickel about 1940, and their specifications had
been earlier published by the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom, There
are considerable difficulties in the production of Nimonic alloys, and such dif-
ficulties could be surmounted only with the practical know-how accumulated
by Wiggin."

Several engines from captured MiG-15s were evaluated by the United States
Air Force, and reports were prepared by engineers of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft

Aviation Week, March 12, 1956, p. 264.

The Aeroplane (London), August I, 1952. p. 163.

Ibid.

266 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Division of United Aircraft Corporation, the Wright Patterson Air Force Base,
and Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. 36

The RD-45 (Nene) was produced not only in Moscow but also at Magadan
from 1951, and at Khabarovsk, at Ufa Plant No. 21, and at Kiev Plant No.
43 from 1951 until sometime after 1958.

Soviet Acquisition Of Four-Engine Aircraft

During World War II the United States was unwilling to send heavy four-
engine bombers to the Soviet Union under Lend Lease. Although in April
1944 General John R. Deane recommended U.S. approval of Russian requests
for heavy bombers, the War Department refused on the grounds that the Soviets
could not train a bombing force prior to the spring of 1945 and that certain
special equipment for such bombers was in short supply. 3 '

The official Lend Lease report on war aid therefore lists Russian acquisition
of only one four-engine bomber (a B-24 that force-landed in Siberia), although
the Soviets were in fact able to acquire four others. One of these was acquired
in July 1944 when a U.S. bomber ran low on fuel after a raid against Mukden
in Manchuria and landed at Vladivostok; two others — B-29s — landed at Vladivos-
tok during the war, both having run short of fuel while on bombing raids over
Japan; the fourth, a B-17 Flying Fortress, crash-landed in Siberia in December
1944 and its crew was rescued by Red Army forces. The Soviets retained
all four aircraft. 38

The Soviets then started work on the Tu-4 four-engine bomber and the
Tu-70 civilian transport, and in 1946 Amtorg attempted to purchase from the
Boeing Aircraft Company a quantity of B-29 tires, wheels, and brake assemblies.
The attempt was unsuccessful, but nevertheless when in 1947 the Soviets pro-
duced the Tupolev Tu-70 it was immediately identified as a virtual copy of
the B-29, The similarity was described in Boeing Magazine: 39

The famed Boeing 117 airfoil that the Tu-70 is sporting is an exact replica
of the Boeing B-29 wing. Along with the wing are the Superfortress nacelles:
outline, cooling air intake, auxiliary air scoop, cowl flaps and inboard and outboard
fairings. The cabin cooling air inlet in the wing leading edge between the body
and the inboard nacelle is the same. The trailing edge extension on the flap
between the inboard nacelle and the side of the fuselage are also identical, according
to the evidence provided by the photographs.

36 For a summary of these examinations see Product Engineering (New York), August 1952.
pp. 194-95.

37 Jones, op. cii. n, 1 .

™ Boeing Magazine (Seattle), February 1948; Flying. 42, 6 (June 1948) 28; New York Times.

December 24. 1944, 12:3.
36 Boeing Magazine. February 1958.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 267

The Tupolev Tu-70 uses the Twenty-nine's main landing-gear structure as
well as its fairings and doors. The nose gear also appears to be that of the
Superfortress, with the upper trunnion located closer to the body contour of the
Tu-70 than on the Boeing bomber.

The tail surfaces of the Russian transport also come direct from the Boeing
engineering department. On comparison it is apparent that the vertical tail and
the dorsal outline as well as the leading edge of the rudder are the same on
the two planes. The rudder of the Tu-70 appears to end at what would be the
top of the tail gunner's doghouse on the Superfortress. The shape of the stabilizer
and the elevator is the same on the two ships, and the transport also uses the
inverted camber of the B-29's tail.

Propellers of the Tupolev Tu-70 appear to be original B-29 props, less cuffs.
The hubs are characteristic of the Hamilton-Standard design. Boeing engineers
also report that the drift meter installation of the Russian transport looks like
that of the Superfortress, and the pitot head type and location match.

Tupolev did, however, design a new fuselage for the transport. It sits higher
on the wing of the Tu-70 than does the fuselage of the B-29, and the fuselage
is larger in diameter and a little longer (1 19 feet as compared to 99 feet). While
the transport has a new fuselage, it retains the bomber nose, including the bombar-
dier's plate-glass window.

An interesting question, not discussed in the late forties, was the manner
by which the Soviets were able to advance from their inability to produce four-
engine bombers to their ability to produce a workmanlike design requiring an
extensive period of research and flight testing. Even if the designs were available,
jigs and dies to put the plane into quantity production also were required. The
18-cylinder Wright engines for the B-29 had been extremely difficult to manufac-
ture even in the United States, and had required several years to reach the
desired standard of reliability. Further, the Soviets had no apparent experience
in the production of four-engine bombers; the wartime Tupolev PE-8 was gener-
ally considered not to be a successful design. Moreover we know from Douglas
Aircraft files that in 1940 the Soviets had enormous difficulties in putting the
much simpler DC-3 twin-engine transport plane into production and repeatedly
came back to the Douglas Aircraft Company for aluminum sections, parts,
and technical advice. 40 There is an unknown element of some magnitude (also
found in other technical areas, such as atomic energy) concerning the ability
of the Soviets to produce in the brief span of three years between 1944 and
1947 a usable copy of the complex B-29 U.S. four-engine bomber. 41

<° See Sutton 11: Western Technology . . 1930 to 1945, p. 234.

41 A possible explanation appears in the German intelligence material. It will be remembered
that Vice President Henry A. Wallace on his visit to Komsomolsk Aircraft Factory No. 126
in 1944 commented that the plant looked like the Boeing Plant in Seattle (above,
p. 255). The German intelligence report on Komsomolsk Plant No. 126 indicates that
in October 1943 the plant was producing the Boeing B-17, and makes the notation that it
was receiving materials from the United States.
Another German intelligence report lists no fewer than 371 four-engine aircraft from the

268 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The German Contribution
To The Aircraft Manufacturing Industry

The major design units of the German wartime aircraft industry were removed
to Podberezhye, about 90 miles north of Moscow, 42 and included most elements
from Junkers, Siebel, Heinkel, and Messerschmidt. Professor Walter Baade
of Junkers continued development of the Ju-287K (as the EF-125) after moving
to Podberezhye and followed this with the T-140 and T-150 bombers— jets
capable of carrying an atomic bomb and, according to one report, out- performing
the U.S. B-47. 43 There were 11 major Junkers plants in the Soviet Zone and
six of these are known to have been completely removed to the U.S.S.R.,
including the main Otto Mader works two miles east of Dessau (where Professor
Baade had been located) in addition to the Aschersleben, Bernburg, Leopoldshall,
and Schonebeck plants. 44 We know the condition of some of these plants at
the end of World War II. Aschersleben was a fuselage building plant in process
of changing over to the production of the He- 162; its instrument storeroom
was "virtually intact" and was placed under military guard by the U.S. Army
until the Soviets were able to take it over. 48 Bernburg was intact. Leopoldshall
had been "badly damaged." 46 The condition of the Schonebeck plant is
not known.

In 1944, the outstanding German rocket designer Sanger was working the
Sanger-Bredt project to develop a long-range rocket aircraft. Former Russian
General G. A. Tokaev recalls that in 1947 he was summoned by Stalin to
a Moscow conference concerning the project:

United States in stock in the Soviet Union at November 1944. (This contrasted to the five

presumed to be in the Soviet Union at that time). This stock allegedly consisted of 119 B-17

Flying Fortresses, 129 Consolidated B-24 Liberators, 81 C-56 Lockheed Lodestar, and 42

C-54 Douglas Skymasters.

The German intelligence reports, if correct, would go far to explain the production capability

question outlined above. If indeed the Soviets were producing B-17 bombers during World

War II at Komsomolsk, then this would be with U.S. Lend Lease assistance, and such assistance

might well have given the Soviets sufficient production background and experience to produce

B-29 bombers by 1947. However, if the German data are correct, the official U.S. reports

are erroneous.

According to Anthony Kubek (quoting Isaac Don Levine), the Soviets obtained blueprints

of the B-36 from the United States; see Kubek's How the Far East Was Lost. (Chicago:

Regnery, 1963), p. 46.

Keller, op. cit. n. 2. p. 336.

Sokolov, op. cit. n. 17, p. 31. Methods used to get Baade to the U.S.S.R. are described

in Flying 31,3 (November 1932), IS. This article also describes the German development

of the Type 150 for the U.S.S.R. "Also see Irmgard Grottrup, Rocket Wife (London: Andre

Deutsch, 1959).

Harmssen, op. cit. n. 8.

CIOS XXX1-36, op. cit. n. 15, p. 7-13.

Ibid.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 269

ITr? eX r na !7 of the San * er Project wou.d prove invaluable, partly

^ ob ,1 rf C eXpe " enCe T h reSeaiCh W0Uld gWe OUr «*»*» in solving related
problems and preparmg a base f or future activities. i„ other words , by ^ J

Sanger s thecnes our experts would be able to begin where he had left off"

A group of Soviets was already working on the concept, as was a group

of Germans under Dr. Lange. Stalin then signed a draft decree (reprinted ir,

Tokaev s book) instructing a commission to "direct and coordinate work" in

piloted and rocket planes "and the Sanger project"; for this purpose " a commis-

s.on wassenttoGermany/'Despitesuchhigh-leveleffortshTever.ProfeTsor
banger was never captured by the Soviets

A particular gap in Soviet technology in 1945 was in modem fighter aircraft.
Dr. Siegfried Gunther and Professor Benz, both developers of German fighter
aircraft were moved to the U.S.S.R. Gunther had been chief designator

L 6 Gel^n HF e ,Tv t jet fi8hterS $inCe thC late 1930s ' while Benz <te«8«<«
the German HE 162-Volksjager jet fighter that achieved over 500 mph in 1944

Among the Soviet acquisitions in Saxony was the Siebel works at Halle'

o" 'he Bell 6 xTTnd X ^"T^ """* alrCraft DFS 346 <^ uivalen <
of the Bell X-l and X-2 and the Douglas X-3) was in final assembly; this

work was continued at Halle on behalf of the Russians until October 948
l^ll? S Tt !° ^ ? KB ' 2 C ° mbine at *>*«*»* with workers from
„ the U Ts S einkd L and S,ebd PlantS " F ' i8ht teS,in 8 0f the v ™* »uilt

Mi ch^'l t K W k ^ '" '^ I948 USing a Und LCaSe N0rth Ame ™ a "
Mitchell B-25 bomber and later a Boeing B-29 Superfortress as mother aircraft

•£*«A P WCre German ' iater repIaced ^ Russian Pilots."
Hnv^iir ■ USed , m ^ WaS P ° Wered by various versions of the R °»*-
uTp «fr r 8inCS (S£e TaWe 2 °' 2) and Came from the same ™™ « the
Rhein f f | h,erS - Ge ; man World War II aircraft m Armament was the German
Rheinmetal-Bcrsig feed for a MK-108 gun, but in general the MIG-15 had
far less equipment than the comparable U.S. plane

The aircraft manufacturing facilities removed from Germany contained unique
equipment. Two German Wotan presses of 15,000 tons were removed and

" ^o%It53;4To:^Tr«^2 L 6i d0n: Weide " feld and Nieolson ' 195 "' '■ 1W s «

,s Tokaev, op. cit. n. 47, p, 158

" rflTr (Ge " eV o • Vm '^ll 52) - 256 -"- ™ s ankle has ™* h "«*»■ '"eluding drawings

■• wZa! V1H, J (1953) ^ ''" P ' anIS ^ "^ P,W,UCti0n faeiK,ieS

" ^«* te NL'si w ?' / r«r* e * 1 1 1 ^ 7 ' ,9 i 2 - pp - 1<MS; for «*«-« i « hni ««« ~ *»*■*».

r 1952 0D Tfif) « a? ""■« 1?' * /" S,rUC,Ural de * ailS Me ™* ^«W««. August
1952, pp. 160-62. Also see M. Ourevich, "How I D«ig ned , he Mi l5 .. A D *

(Washington, D.O.July 1951, pp. 17-19. ,Je "'

270 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

at least four copies were made and others developed from these presses." Aircraft
equipment plants included the former Nitsche plant at Leipzig, used in the
U.S.S.R. to manufacture curve potentiometers, and the Karl Zeiss plant, used
for position finders, wind-tunnel parts, and various precision instruments. It
was estimated that in 1954 this segment of German industry supplied between
65 and 75 percent of Soviet radar equipment and precision instruments. 53

In sum, about two-thirds of the German aircraft industry with its top designers
and many technicians and engineers established the postwar Soviet aircraft indus-
try. Attention was focused first on designs for military use and these then
were adapted, sometimes rather crudely, for civilian use; in fact some Russian
civilian aircraft have complete military subassemblies. M

Gradually, by the 1960s, the Soviets attained some design independence,
but whether the resulting aircraft were successful or not — at least in economic
terms — is doubtful. The MIG-21s sold to India were plagued with maintenance
and structural problems. 55 It was reported that a Scandinavian Airlines delegation
that examined the Tu-104 concluded that a Western commercial tine could
not afford to fly them if given away "for free" because of high operating
costs. 56 In the mid-1960s we find evidence of a pattern that was also established
in other industries-a report of a joint French -Soviet project to build an airliner,
the fuselage to be supplied by the French and the engines by the Soviets.' 1 '

THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

Historically, the Russians have had a great interest in rockets. Pyrotechnic
rockets were manufactured in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and
Russian literature on rockets dates from that period. Signal rockets were used
by the Russian Army as early as 1717. Russian theoretical development stems
from the work of K. E. Tsiolkovskii, whose papers, beginning in 1903, inves-
tigated atmospheric resistance, rocket motion, and similar problems. This work
was continued in the Soviet Union during the twenties and thirties (meanwhile
close observation was kept on the work of Robert H. Goddard in the United
States and Hermann Oberth in Germany). In 1928 Tsiolkovskii wrote that the
value of his contribution had been in theoretical calculations, however, and
that nothing had been achieved in practical rocket engineering. Some years
later, in 1936, V. F. Glushke designed and made a prototype rocket engine,

5Z American Aviation. (Washington. D.C.), 19, 1 (June 6, 1955).

" Ibid.

j. Aviation Week, April 2. 1956, p. 31.

■" Aviation Week. November 4, 1963, pp. 33-34.

'" Hans Heymann, Jr., The Soviet Role in International Aviation. RAND Report no. RM-2213

(Santa Monica, December 4, 1957), p. 6.

57 New York Times. October 16, 1966.

Western Origins of A ircraft and Space Technology 27 1

the ORM-65; this rocket used nitric acid and kerosene as a propellant. The
Russians later developed the ZhRD R-3395, an aircraft jato rocket using nitric
acid and aniline as a propellant (during the early 1930s Dupont had provided
technical assistance and equipment for the construction of large nitric acid
plants). 18 And during World War II, Soviet rockets used "Russian cordite,"
which was 56.5 percent nitrocellulose; the nitrocellulose was manufactured under
a technical-assistance agreement made in 1930 with the Hercules Powder Com-
pany of the United States. Finally, under Lend Lease, 3000 rocket launchers
and large quantities of propellants were shipped from the West to the U.S.S.R.

German Rocket Technology At The End of World War II

The major assistance to Soviet rocket ambitions undoubtedly came from
Germany at the end of World War II. This assistance may be summarized

as follows:

1 . The testing sites at Blizna and Peenemunde were captured intact (except
for Peenemunde documents) and removed to the U.S.S.R.

2. Extensive production facilities for the V-l and V-2 at Nordhausen and
Prague were removed to the U.S.S.R.

3. The reliability tests from some 6900 German V-2s were available to
the Soviets — a major prize.

4 . A total of 6000 German technicians (but not the top theoretical men)
were transported to Russia and most were not released until 1957-58.

The German weapons program was in an advanced state of development
in 1945. About 32,050 of the V-l "flying bomb" weapons had been produced
in the Volkswagen plant at Fallersleben and at the underground Central Works
(Mittelwerke) at Nordhausen. 59 In addition, 6900 V-2 rockets had been pro-
duced — 6400 at the underground Mittelwerke at Nordhausen and 500 at
Peenemunde. 80 Rocket fuel facilities had been developed in the Soviet Zone:
liquid oxygen plants at Schmeidebach in Thuringia and at Nordhausen, and
a hydrogen peroxide plant at Peenemunde."

The Germans undertook two and one-half years of experimental work and
statistical flight and reliability evaluation on the V-2 before the end of the
war. There were 264 developmental launchings from Peenemunde alone.* 2 In

58 See Suuon II. pp. IOO-10L

s * U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, op. ell. n. 6, p. 114a.
"■ Ibid., p, 120a.
" Ibid., p. 121

* ! D. K. Huzcl. Peenemunde to Canaveral (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 19621 dd
128-29.

272 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

February 1945 it was decided to abandon Peenemunde, and the base was left
intact; papers and personnel were removed after some deliberation:

To whom, the Russians or the Americans, would fall this treasure of engineering
research and knowledge? It was more than just a question of who would catch
us first, because we still had some element of choice. We had, in point of fact,
already exercised this choice by moving West away from the Russians. 85

Thus it was that 400 top Peenemunde people were at Garmisch-Partenkirchen
at the end of the war. Of these about 118 later went on to the U.S. rocket
program. The data, hidden in the Harz Mountains, were transferred to the
Aberdeen Proving Grounds. 64

Mittelwerke at Nordhausen was visited in June 1945 by U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey teams who reported that the enormous underground plant could
manufacture V-Is and V-2s as well as Junkers 87 bombers. Twenty-seven tun-
nels — a large proportion of the plant — were used to manufacture V-2s. The
plant was well equipped with machine tools and with "a very well set up
assembly line for the rocket power unit." 65 Its output at the end of the war
was about 400 V-2s per month, and its potential output was projected at 900
to 1000 per month. The team commented: "Jigs and fixtures developed for
the fabrication of fuselages and tail units were excellently conceived, consisting
of copper-lined jigs permitting stilus spot welding of the steel sheets and parts
used in this design." 66 The Nordhausen plant was removed completely to the
U.S.S.R.

The United States and Britain were less successful in gaining access to
German rocket testing sites in Poland. The Sanders Mission reached the Blizna
test station only after considerable delays in Moscow, 67 and when they got
there they found equipment had been removed "in such a methodical way
as to suggest strongly to the mission's leader that the evacuation was made
with a view to the equipment being reerected elsewhere. " ss

The Sanders Mission accumulated one and one-half tons of rocket parts
and readied them for shipment to the West. The parts included:

a complete steel burner unit; the framework for a radio compartment; a rear
fin significantly providing for a wireless aerial; and numerous radio and servo-
mechanical components. Of great importance was the finding of a forward fuel

" Ibid., p. 150

" Ibid., p. 222.

es U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Inspection Visits to Various Targets: Special Report

(Washington, 1947), p. 13.
" Ibid.

" D. Irving. The Mare's Nest (London: William Kimber, 1964), p. 278.
"> .Ibid., p. 285.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 273

tank, whose capacity was estimated at 175 cubic feet, sufficient to contain 3900
kilogrammes of alcohol. 69

Unfortunately, when the mission reached home it was found that the rocket
fragments had been intercepted by the Soviets:

The rocket specimens which they had crated up in Blizna for shipment to London
and the United States were last seen in Moscow, the crates were indeed duly freighted
to the Air Ministry in London, but were found to contain several tons of old and
highly familiar aircraft parts when they were opened. The rocket specimens themselves
had vanished into the maw of the Soviet war machine. 70

Many German rocket technicians (as distinct from the top theoreticians in
German rocketry) went or were taken to the Soviet Union. The most senior
was Helmut Groettrup, who had been an aide to the director of electronics
at Peenemunde; 200 other former Peenemunde technicians are reported to have
been transferred as well. 71 Among those from other sites were Waldemar Wolf,
chief of ballistic; for Krupp; engineer Peter Lertes;and Hans Hock, an Austrian
specialist in computers. Most of these persons went in the October 22-23 haul
of 92 trainloads comprising 6000 German specialists and 20,000 members of
their families. Askania technicians, specialists in rocket-tracking devices, and
electronics people from Lorenz, Siemens, and Telefunken were among the
deportees, as were experts from the Walter Raketentriebwerke in Prague.

The Balance Sheet On German Rocket Technology

It is possible to make a reasonably accurate estimate of what the Soviets
did — and did not — gain from German World War II rocket work. Their prize
was considerable in material terms: the Blizna site in Poland (subject of the
abortive Sanders Mission), the Peenemunde facilities (but not the documents),

" Ibid.

70 Ibid. This is inconsistent with Ambassador W. Averell Harriman's report to the State Department
in Washington. Harriman stated that after a "firm but friendly letter to the Deputy Chief
of the Red Army General Staff (pointed out] that neglect to consider U.S. Army proposals
was giving the impression that the Red Army did not want to cooperate; the Red Army made
more favorable and quicker decisions, one of which was that when Anglo-American technical
experts were finally allowed to visit German experimental rocket installations in liberated Poland,
they were given the most complete collaboration and attention." U.S. State Department Decimal
File 711. 61/9-2944: Telegram, September 29/44.

" For material on these transfers see A. Lee, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces (New York:
Praeger. 1959), pp. 229-40; Albert Parry. Russia's Rockets and Missiles (London: Macmillan
and Company, I960), pp. 113-31; and V. 1_. Sokolov, "Soviet Use of German Science
and Technology, 1945- 1946" (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1955),
Mimeographed Series no. 72.

274 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

the main production facilities at Nordhausen, all Berlin production facilities,
and various rocket manufacturing plants in Germany and Prague went completely
to the Soviets. In terms of physical facilities, the West got the documents from
Peenemunde and the Nordhausen area together with only a sample selection
of rockets from Nordhausen. But as far as personnel was concerned, the best
went west. The von Braun group was determined to go west; only Groettrup
and several thousand technicians went east.

In sum, the Soviets got production facilities and the technical level of person-
nel. The West got the theoretical work in the documents and the top-levc!
German scientists and theoretical workers.

With true Bolshevik determination the Soviets concentrated talent and
resources into a rocket program; the result was Sputnik — which came to fruition
in 1957, just at a time when it was essential for strategic reasons for the U.S.S.R.
to convince the world of its prowess and technical ability. The nations of the
West, too, had integrated their acquired top-notch theoreticians and wealth of
documentary material into developmental programs — but with less zeal. They
had undertaken the British tests at Cuxhaven and the U.S. work at White Sands,
but the real propaganda prize had slipped from their grasp.

It is impossible to say which side received "the most." In the long run,
however, because of the indigenous strength of the Western industrial systems
it is probable that the West gained less from the German work.

German Origins Of Soviet Rockets And Missiles

It is not surprising in view of these technical acquisitions that the postwar
rocket and missile industry in the Soviet Union had strong roots in and orientation
toward German developments.

The most important Soviet missile developments have taken place with respect
to intermediate- and intercontinental-range missiles. In essential features these
have been developed from the German V-2, and up to 1959 the developments
were attained with German assistance. (See Tables 20-3 and 20-4.)

Although the original V-2 had only 28,400 pounds of thrust, this was
improved to 78,000 pounds in the Soviet T-I. Then by grouping the T-l and
T-14A rockets that had been developed in a German-Soviet effort into two-
and three-stage versions, the Soviets formed the T-3, T-3A T-3B, and T-4
missiles. The T-3 three-stage ballistic missile became operational in 1960 and
was designed to carry a thermonuclear warhead and to travel 5000 miles.

In addition the Soviets adapted the German Rheinbote and R-4/M air-to-air
rockets as well as the antiaircraft Wasserfall rocket." The German air-surface

Aviation Week. January 14, 1952, pp. 37-41.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology
Table 20-3 SOVIET ROCKETS AND THEIR GERMAN V-2 ORIGINS

275

Liquid fuel models,
with thrust in lb

V-2

28,400

R-10,

41,500

T-1,

78,000

T-1A,

99,000

T-2.

78,000

T-3.

268,000

76,000
268,000
440,000

Sages

Single stage
Single stage
Single stage
Single stage
Two stage

Three stage

Western origin

Captured German V-2

Improved V-2

Improved

R-10(V-2) plus R-14A

(German-Soviet effort)

I V-2 j
I R-10 }

I T-1 '

Developed
trom V-2

R-10(V-2) plus R-14A

T-3A,

76,000
268,000
520,000

Three stage

R-10(V-2) plus R-14-A

T-4,

Golem-1,
Golem-2,

52,800
1 80,000

120,000
242,000

Two stage

n.a.
n.a.

V-2 plus two R-10
(German Sanger concept)

n.a.
n.a.

Sources: Alfred J. Zaehringer, Soviet Space Technology, (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1961), p. 75; U.S. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space
Programs, 1 962-65; Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans, and International
implications, Staff Report, 89th Congress, 2d session (Washington, December 1966)

Table 20-4

SOVIET MISSILES
ANO THEIR GERMAN ORIGINS, IN 1960

Sower missile

M-100

M-1

T-44
Golem-1

Description

air-to-air; early

version unguided,

later infrared

guidance
2-stage surface to

air; liquid-fueled

Boost glide bomber

Underwater to
surface

German origin

Developed in
U.S.S.R. under
Boris von Schlippe

Developed from

Walther-KHW-109-

509 (or the

Rheintochter)
Sanger-Bredt

antipodal bomber
German A-12

underwater

Sources: RAND Corp. Report T-33: Volursus, The Secret Weapons of the Soviet Union
(Santa Monica, February 1964), pp. 3-4; Missiles and Rockets (Washington DC) Julv
20, 1959, pp. 172-6.

276 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

rockets HS-293 and FX 1400 also were taken over. 73 By early 1954 some
German technicians had been separated from Soviet rocket work, and return
of the main group started in 1958. Even today, however, East Germany supplies
the U.S.S.R. with rocket fuel, electrical equipment, and guidance and control
equipment, although this role probably is not decisive.

Asher Lee sums up the transfer of German rocket and missile technology:

... the whole range of Luftwaffe and German Army radio-guided missiles and
equipment fell into Russian hands. There were the two Henschel radar-guided
bombs, the Hs-293 and the larger FX- 1400 ... the U ,S .S .R. also acquired samples
of German antiaircraft radio-guided missiles like the X-4, the Hs-298 air-to-air
projectile with a range of about a mile and a half, the Rheintochter which was
fitted with a radar proximity fuze, and the very promising Schmetterling which
even in 1945 had an operational ceiling of over 45,000 feet and a planned radius
of action of about twenty miles. It could be ground- or air-launched and was
one of the most advanced of the German small -calibre radio-guided defensive
rockets; of these various projectiles the Henschel-293 bomb and the defensive
Schmetterling and Hs-298 (the V-3) are undergoing development at Omsk and
Irkutsk . . . Soon they may be going into production at factories near Riga, Lenin-
grad, Kiev, Khabarovsk, Voronezh, and elsewhere.

Other plants in the same areas produced improved radar based on the Wurz-
burg System; the airborne Lichenstein and Naxos systems were reported in
large-scale production in the 1950s.

U.S. -Soviet Technical Cooperation In Space

In 1955 as German technicians began returning home, the United States
started to make approaches to the Soviet Union on the question of technical
cooperation in space; 74 indeed, in the ten-year period between December 1959
and 1969, the United States made 18 individual initiatives. Any acceptance
by the Soviets would of course have supplemented their gains from German
assistance.

In December 1959NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan offered assistance
in tracking Soviet manned flights; on March 7, 1962, President Kennedy proposed
an exchange of information from tracking and data acquisition stations, and
on September 20, 1963, the President proposed joint exploration of the moon,
an offer later repeated by President Johnson. There was no Soviet response

71 Parry, op. cit. n 71, p. 119; see Chapter 8, "The German Role in Russian Rockets."
See also A. Lee in Air University Quarterly Review (Montgomery, Ala.), Spring 1952, p.

" U.S. -Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal
Year 1970. {Hearings, 9tst Congress. 1st session. May 1969 (Washington, 1969), pt. II, p.
635.

Western Origins of Aircraft and Space Technology 211

to these offers. There followed a series of proposals from NASA itself: on
December 8, 1964, the administration proposed an exchange of teams to visit
deep-space tracking and data acquisition facilities; on May 3, 1965, NASA
suggested joint communications tests via the Soviet Molniya I; on August 25,
1965, NASA, at the request of President Johnson, asked the Soviet Academy
of Sciences to send a high-level representative to the launching of Gemini VI,
and on November 16 of the same year NASA inquired once again about joint
Molniya I communications tests. Four more U.S. offers were made in 1966:
in January NASA inquired about cooperation on Venus probes; on March 24
and May 23 Administrator James Webb suggested that the Soviets propose
subjects for discussion; and in September Ambassador Arthur Goldberg again
raised the question of tracking coverage by the United States for Soviet missiles.
None of these suggestions was taken up. The U.S. emphasis on assistance
in tracking coverage is interesting because this constitutes a Soviet weak area.

The unwillingness of the Soviets to cooperate is exemplified by their response
to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences proposal in March 1967 that the
Soviets provide Luna 13 soil meter experiment data in advance of normal world
reporting "in return for comparable data from future flights in the Surveyor
series." 75 The Soviet data were indeed forwarded— but only after they had
been reported at the International Committee of Space Research (COSPAR)
meeting in London.

Further offers were made in March, April, June, October (twice), and
December 1967 with no Soviet response.

Similar efforts elsewhere have met with the same negative results. For exam-
ple, COSPAR, aware of the possibilities of planet contamination, noted that
an "extremely costly effort has been made by the United States to ensure that
its probes do not contaminate the planets." COSPAR has "repeatedly" made
efforts to obtain similar information from the Soviets "so that the adequacy
of Soviet techniques can be exposed to the judgment of the world scientific
community." 76 Over the entire ten-year period the Soviets have provided only
generalized assurances, and while there was general agreement that Soviet rocket
stages had impacted the planets, "no assurances of any kind have been forthcom-
ing regarding sterilization or diversion from the planets." 77

The only agreement for an exchange of information came in June 1962
after President Kennedy's initiatives; there were limited projects then that appear
to have achieved mediocre success. An agreement to exchange meteorological
information was made but ' 'to date [1969] the Soviet data have not been operation-
ally useful to us." 78 No exchange of data on magnetic field mapping took

71 Ibid.

" Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

278 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

place between 1962 and 1969, and although arrangements have been made
for exchange of ground-based data "these have not been completely successful
either." 79 Cooperative communications using the U.S. passive satellite Echo
II were completed in February 1964: "The Soviets received communications
only, declining to transmit. Technical difficulties of this experiment limited
the results received." In space biology and medicine, a U.S. team spent two
years putting together material, while the Soviet side has failed to respond.
A direct Washington-Moscow bilateral circuit for the exchange of meteorolog-
ical information went into effect in September 1964. Without interruption since
September 1966, the United States has transmitted to Moscow cloud analyses
for one-half the world and selected cloud photographs. Although the Soviets
launched a total of seven weather satellites between 1964 and 1969 "there
have been numerous interruptions in the transmission for data, at one time
for a period of four months." 80 Further, because of insufficient coverage by
Soviet satellites, the Soviet data have been limited, often of marginal quality
and received after the period of maximum usefulness. It is probable in the
light of these results that the Soviet space program is far less technically advanced
than has been generally believed, and fear of disclosing this backwardness inhibits
the Soviets from taking advantage of superior U.S. technology.

We may conclude that although the Soviets produced large quantities of
aircraft during World War II these were for the most part elementary wooden
models with inferior piston engines. 1 " No jet engines or advanced reciprocal
engines had been produced by the end of the war, and Russian aircraft plants
were heavily dependent on Lend Lease supplies, equipment, and technology.

During 1945-47 about two-thirds of the extensive German wartime aircraft
and missile industry was transferred to the Soviet Union, including designers,
engineers, plans, models, equipment, and complete production lines. The most
important categories were Junkers and BMW jet engines, with production lines
and teams of German engineers used in the late 1940s and 1950s to advance
this jet engine technology. This was supplemented by the purchase of 55 Rolls-
Royce engines in 1947 which became the prototypes for another group of Soviet
jet engines. Soviet jets and turboprops in the early sixties were descendants
of these German and British engines.

Although some aircraft are direct copies of Western machines (for example,
the Tu-4 bomber and the Tu-70 civilian version in many ways duplicate the
Boeing B-29), some design independence is recognizable from the mid-1950s

IS Ibid.

"" Ibid,,

" Sutton II. Chapter 14.

Western Origins of A ircrafi and Space Technology

279

onward, although this is not of an advanced nature and dependence is still
a factor. 82

Soviet rockets and missiles can be clearly traced to German V-2 technology
and transferred production capabilities; this observation applies also to air-to-air
and underwater missile weapons.

A popular bui reasonably accurate account of Soviet backwardness in space and aviation in
1958 is Lloyd Mallan, Russia and the Big Red Lie {New York: Fawcett, 1959). This is 'based
on a 14,000-mile, almost unrestricted trip to interview 38 Soviet scientists. Mallan's conclu-
sions, amply supported by photographs, are generally consistent with the material presented
here. Some of the more interesting items: the Remington Rand UN1VAC computer was used
to illustrate an article in Red Siar on Soviet computers (with captions translated into Russian)
(p. 16); Soviet computers had such primitive characteristics as cooling by air blowing over
the tubes (pp. 17, 20, and 24); calculations for the Lunik trajectory were done by use of
a hand calculator made in Germany, not a computer (p. 26); the major equipment at a Soviet
tracking station was an aerial camera that could be purchased at a war surplus store in the
United States for $80 (p. 30); primitive cross-hair techniques were in use (p. 34); there was
a General Electric radio telescope at Byurakan Observatory (p. 44); Mallan saw Soviet copies
of the U.S. Navy space suit (p. 56-57) and the nose-cone spring release from the Viking
rocket (p. 86); German rocket launchers were used (p. 95); there were copies of the C-123.
Convair, B-29 (pp.1 12-120); numerous B-29 parts were used on the Tu-104, which had no
servomechanisms and thus required brute force to fly; there were no radarscopes on the 1L-18
(despite its radome nose, presumably false, p. 121); the ZIL-111 had a Cadillac gold V on
the radiator, and the Moskvitch proved to be a copy of the West German Ford Taunus (p.
135).

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Western Construction
of the Soviet Merchant Marine

SHIPYARD FACILITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet shipyard facilities, in 1944 mostly Tsarist yards, were supplemented
after World War II by reparations equipment from Germany (see Table 21-1)
and import of shipbuilding equipment from the West, particularly from Finland,
the United Kingdom, and Germany.

Table 21-1

SHIPYARDS REMOVED FROM GERMANY
TO THE U.S.S.R. IN 1945^6

Name of yard

Location

Extant removed
to U.S.S.R.

Deutsche Schiffs-und Maschlnenbau A.G.

(Deschimag)
Deutsche Schiffs-und Maschinenbau A.G

(Valentin)
Schiffswerft und Maschinenfabrik

Schiffswerft Uebigau

Schiffswerft Rosslau

Neptunwerft Rostock

Bremen
Bremen

Dresden-

Laubegast
Dresden-

Uebigau
Saxony-

Anhalt
Rostock

Complete ■
Complete '

Part only *
Pari only b
Complete t>
Part only b

Sources: a Germany, Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), Economics Division
A Year of Potsdam . . . (n.p.: OMGUS, 1947), p. 36; »G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend Her
Demontage; Sachs Jahre ReparationspoUtik (Bremen: F. Trajan, 1951), pp. 101-2

Shipyards at Bremen in the U.S . Zone of Germany were completely removed
to the U.S.S.R. on a priority basis under U.S. Operation RAP. 1 The German
submarine yards at Bremen and Stettin, including the torpedo and fire-control
manufacturing plants, were also completely dismantled and shipped to the
U.S.S.R., together with engine manufacturing plants and some "4000 submarine
experts and construction supervisors." 2

1 See p. 26,

2 U.S. Naval Institute. Proceedings (Annapolis, Md.>, October 1945, p. 1225.

280

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine 281

This is of great significance, as the German submarine of 1945 was quite
different from the submarine of 1943; the later units were streamlined, with
revolutionary engines enabling a tripling of underwater speed. 3 These German

! facilities became the nucleus of Soviet postwar construction of submarines and

| naval ships.

j In 1954 this German equipment was supplemented by extensive purchases

■ of shipbuilding equipment in the United Kingdom and Belgium. Under the
| January 1954 Soviet-Belgian trade agreement a total of $100 million in ships,
I floating cranes, and marine boilers was to be supplied from Belgium during
? the years 1955-57. 1 Large orders also were placed in the United Kingdom
i for shipbuilding equipment. For example,

{ Soviet orders are being placed for shipbuilding equipment, Messrs Fielding and

l Plan having recently secured a £2'A million contract for hydraulic equipment,

including joggling presses and large forging and flanging presses. 1

( Moreover, Finnish deliveries to the Soviet Union for the latter half of the

decade of the 1950s contained, among other equipment, five floating docks
and 25 floating cranes and electric bridge cranes. 6

These equipment deliveries were in addition to the extensive use of foreign

■ shipyards — and this particularly applies to Finland and Poland — to build up
i the Soviet merchant marine. Many yards in Western Europe have since about
} 1951 had a large proportion of their tonnage on Soviet account, and a few
i yards have produced almost entirely for the Soviet Union. For example, in

1954 in the Netherlands the De Schelde, Kononklijke Mij N. V . yards in Flushing
produced 100 percent of their output on Soviet account. In Belgium in 1954

! the shipyard Boel et Fils S.A. produced 20 percent of its output on Soviet

account. In Finland in the same year the two major yards Wartsila-Koncernen
A/B (Sandvikens Skeppsdocka) and Wartsila-Koncernen A/B (Crichton- Vulcan)
produced 50 and 64 percent, respectively, of their output on Soviet account.
In the same year in Sweden Oskarshamns Varv A/B at Oskarhamn built 25
percent of its output on Soviet account. And in the same year in the United

. Kingdom the yards of William Gray and Company, Ltd., at West Hartlepool

j produced 20 percent of their output on Soviet account.

In addition, foreign government-owned yards have produced ships on Soviet

1 account. For example the Howaltdwerke in Kiel, Germany, is owned by the

German Government and has been a major source for Soviet ships.'

1 Ibid.

' Raymond F. Mikeseil and Jack N. Bchrman, Financing Free World Trade with the Sino-

Soviet Bloc (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), Appendix.
1 The Motor Ship (London), XXXIV. 408 (March 1954). 549.
" U.N., Treaty Series, vol. 240 (1956), p. 202.
7 Gimnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947-1967 (Stockholm: Almquist and

Wikesell, 1968), p. 94. Merchant Ships: World Built (Southampton: Adlard Coles, annua!).

282 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE

The total tonnage in the Soviet merchant fleet at July 1967 was 1 1,788,625
gross registered tons. Of this total, only 34.4 percent (4,058,427 gross registered
tons) was built in the Soviet Union; the balance of 7,730,198 gross registered
tons was built outside the Soviet Union. 8

The largest single supplier of shipping to the Soviet Union has been Poland,
a country that was not even a shipbuilder before 1950. During the period 1950-66
Poland supplied 379 ships totaling 1,454,314 gross registered tons, to the Soviet
merchant marine. Tabic 21-2 illustrates the number of Polish ships built on
Soviet account in each year during that period and gives their gross tonnage.
It may be observed that the average size of these ships increased quite significantly
at the beginning of the 1960s, when "hundreds" of technical-assistance agree-

Table 21-2 MERCHANT SHIPS BUILT IN POLAND

ON SOVIET ACCOUNT FROM 1 950 to 1 966

Number of

Gross registered

Average size

Year Ships built

tonnage

built, GRT

1950 1

1946

1951 —

—

1952 21

36,036

1716

1953 28

46.657

1666

1954 24

43,240

1800

1955 31

46,470

1499

1956 35

61,295

1751

1957 30

53,985

1799

1958 29

61,876

2133

1959 19

86,887

4573

1960 19

122,053

6424

1961 12

52,808

4400

1962 21

134,991

6428

1963 31

1 67,806

5413

1964 24

159,228

6634

1965 23

175,191

7617

1966 31

203,845

6576

Totals 379

1,454,314

Source: Registr Soyuza SSR, Registrovaya kniga morskikh sudov soyuza SSR 1964-

1965 (Moscow, 1966).

Calculated from Registr Soyuia SSR, Registrovtiyti hiigct morskikh sudov soyuza SSR S964-
1965 (Moscow. 1966). The reader should also examine Soviet Merchant Ships 1941-1968
(Havanl, England: K. Mason, 1969). for detailed material, It should be no!ed, however, that
!hat survey includes only about 2500 ships, whereas this section is based on the Soviet Regis-
ter at July 1, 1967, i.e., it considers a total of 5551 ships.

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine 283

merits between Polish shipyards and West European manufacturers of ship-
building equipment c^-v-t into operation; 9 from an average gross tonnage of
about 1600 tons in the early 1950s, the average Soviet ship built in Polish yards
in the mid-1960s was between 6500 and 7500 tons.

The largest Free V'o.ld suppliers of ships to the Soviet fleet have been
Japan and West Germany. In 1955-56 West Germany supplied 32 ships with
an average tonnage of about 3000 gross registered tons. Thereafter orders dribbled
down to one and two ships per year until 1964, when seven ships of 4700
tons each were delivered, and 1965-66, when eight ships of an average of
16,000 tons were delivered from West Germany to the Soviet Union. Japanese
orders have been concentrated in the years 1962 to 1966 and comprise numerous
22-23,000-ton tankers.

Among socialist countries, Yugoslavia is a prominent supplier of ships to
the Soviet Union; in 1965 Yugoslavia built 11 ships of two types (11,000
tons and 15,000 tons) and in the following year supplied another ten ships
(also 1 1,000 and 15,000 tons). Most of these Yugoslav ships have Burmeister
& Wain diesel engines. 10

Construction in Soviet shipyards has concentrated on standard ships. One
such standard ship is the Leninskii Komsomol,' 1 a dry cargo ship of 12,000
gross registered tons and generally comparable to the U.S. "Mariner" class;
i.e., it is a conventional design ship of a type known throughout the world.
This type of vessel has also been ordered on Soviet account in Japan, Yugoslavia,
Finland, and Poland.

Another standard dry cargo freighter is the 12,500-dwt class built at Nikolaev
with engines based on Burmeister & Wain design; this "Poltava" class became
well known in 1961 as a missile carrier to Cuba.

SOVIET OIL TANKERS AND WESTERN DIESEL ENGINES

The Soviet merchant marine is heavily dependent not only on Western ship-
yards but on foreign marine diesel engine technology. 12 A quantitative expression
of additions to the Soviet tanker fleet in 1964-65, i.e., those tankers under
construction at the very end of the period under consideration, illustrates the
point. 13 In those years a total of 541,201 gross registered tons of tankers was
added and the construction origin of this segment was as follows:

* John D, Harbron, Communist Ships and Shipping (London, 1962), p. 196. The Soviets have

also made hard currency available to the Poles for purchase of Western equipment for ships

built in Poland on Soviet account. Ibid. . p. 109.
'" See A. Sutton. "Soviet Merchant Marine," U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, January

1970, for Western construction of merchant ships on Soviet account -
11 Registr Soyuia SSR. op. ell. n. 8, no. 1602.
I! See chapter 17.
13 Thin is the segment of the- fleet contained in Supplement No. 1 to the Soviet Register. Registr

Soyuza SSR. op. cif. n. 8.

284 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

(or 43.6 percent)

Hulls built in U.S.S.H.

Hulls built in Eastern Europe
Yugoslavia 167,803

Poland 13,218

Bulgaria 3,860

Hulls built in Free World:
Finland 13,439

Japan 75,390

Italy 31,133

236,358 gross tons
184,881 gross tons

119,962 gross tons

(or 34.1 percent)

(or 22.2 percent)

99.9 percent

In general these vessels had main engines manufactured in the country of
hull construction; therefore the geographic distribution of engine construction
is about the same in percentage terms. However, almost all the Soviet-built
propulsion units (229,530 tons) were steam turbines. If we consider only that
portion of tanker fleet additions equipped with diesel propulsion units, the distribu-
tion is as follows:

Main diesel units built in U.S.S.R. 1 J percent (5,372 gross tons)

Main diesel units built in Eastern Europe 59.8 percent (186,337 gross tons)

Main diesel units built in Free World 38 .4 percent ( 1 1 9,962 gross tons)

99.9 percent (31 1 , 617 gross tons)

If we make a further analysis and examine diesel engines by country of
design (not construction) origin (most East European manufacturers have
technical-assistance agreements with Western diesel engine manufacturers; all
Yugoslav diesels in this segment, for example, have Burmeister & Wain main
diesels), then the percentages are:

Main diesels designed in U.S.S.R. 1.7 percent (5,372 gross tons)

Main diesels designed in Eastern Europe 1.7 percent (5,318 gross tons)

Main diesels designed in Free World 96.5 percent (300,981 gross tons)

99.9 percent

(311.671 gross tons)

The most numerous class of Soviet tankers in a fleet of 300 such vessels 1 *
is the "Kostroma" class of 8229 gross registered tons. Between 1953 and
1961 about 58 were built in this class, which is a close copy of the U.S.
wartime T-2 tanker; 15 about 17 of these have Skoda engines imported from
Czechoslovakia and the remainder have a similar engine which is manufactured
at Russky Diesel in Leningrad. According to J. D. Harbron, 16 the "Kostroma"

ibid., al July 1967. See Statistical Note to this chapter for detailed data on 242 (out of 300)
tankers built after World War II.
Harbron, op. dr. n. 9, p. 151.
Ibid., p. 154.

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine 285

class in the early sixties was fully occupied in supplying oil to Cuba and in
Soviet naval supply work.

The remaining tankers can be divided for analysis into three groups — large
tankers in excess of 13,000 tons, medium tankers of about 3300 gross registered
tons, and small tankers of less than 1772 tons. Analysis of these three classes
is contained in the Statistical Note to this chapter (see pp. 295-302) and
includes a breakdown by foreign and Soviet domestic production.

About two-thirds of large tankers in the Soviet tanker fleet as of July 1967
had been built outside the Soviet Union; of a total of 129 such tankers, only
25 had been built in the Soviet Union and all these were powered by steam
turbine rather than diesel engines. Soviet construction falls into two classes:
one class, of 21,255 gross registered tons, includes seven vessels built between
1959 and 1963, and the other class, of 32,484 gross registered tons, includes
the remaining 18 tankers built between 1963 and 1966. All other Soviet tankers
over 13,000 tons were built abroad. Italy built six of 20,000 and 31,000 gross
registered tons; Holland built two of 16,349 gross registered tons; Poland built
seven of a standard class of 13,363 gross registered tons; Yugoslavia built
15 of a standard tonnage (15,255 tons); Japan built 20 tankers of between
22,000 and 25,000 tons; and the remaining two tankers were a Polish-built
standard vessel with East German engines and a Yugoslav-built tanker of 17,86 1
tons with a Swedish engine. This comprised the total Soviet tanker fleet in
excess of 1 3 ,000 tons — and 67.5 percent in tonnage terms had been built abroad.

There were 76 tankers in a medium category (3300 and 3820 gross registered
tons). Of these only 15 were completely built in the Soviet Union; however,
the class does contain one unusual characteristic — a group of 22 tankers with
Soviet diesel engines but built in Bulgaria. The largest group was built in Fin-
land — 28 of 3300 tons with hulls from Finnish shipyards and Danish engines.
The remaining vessels in this group constituted a few built in Finland with
Finnish engines, three built in Finland with Swedish engines, and two tankers
built completely in Japan.

The last group of tankers comprised 89 vessels, all of less than 1772 gross
registered tons, 70.8 percent built outside the Soviet Union. The largest group
built inside the Soviet Union comprised 20 small tankers of between 756 and
802 gross registered tons, for use in the Caspian Sea. Another group of nine
tankers of 1775 gross registered tons had hulls built in the Soviet Union but
Czechoslovak Skoda engines. The largest group of small tankers built outside
the Soviet Union comprised 33 tankers of between 260 and 305 gross registered
tons, with both hulls and engines built in East Germany. A group of thirteen
tankers of 1117 tons was built in Finland on Soviet account in 1954-55 and
powered with Swedish engines.

Therefore it may be seen that as of July 1967 about two-thirds of Soviet
tankers had been built outside the Soviet Union, and the foreign-built segment

286 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

included almost all tankers in excess of 13,000 tons. Even two-thirds of the
smaller tankers, including those for use in the Caspian Sea and for coastal
use, were built abroad rather than in the Soviet Union. Further, a number
of the tankers built in the Soviet Union had engines manufactured abroad,
imported into the U.S.S.R., and then installed in hulls built in Soviet yards.

MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION
OF THE SOVIET FISHING FLEET

Between 1945 and the late 1960s the Soviet fishing fleet was modernized
and greatly expanded; between 1945 and 1961 about 3500 modern large and
medium trawlers and refrigerator ships were added to the fleet. ,T The program
started in the early fifties when orders were placed for prototype fishing vessels
in the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Japan, and, more significantly,
in the United Kingdom and Germany.

The Soviets' first step in 1954 was a $20 million order for 20 modern
fishing trawlers, placed with the United Kingdom firm of Brooke-Marine, Ltd.,
of Lowestoft. 18 In this connection, a U.S. Congressional report 19 notes:

From the specifications they received, the British engineers learned that the Rus-
sians were still designing their trawlers pretty much as they were designed 20
years earlier. They seemed to have no knowledge of what went into the making
of a modern fishing trawler. . . . !0

The series of 20 Brooke-Marine tra wlers embod ied the latest in world technology ,
and "after they were turned over to Russia, the new trawlers were distributed
as prototypes among the shipyards of the U.S.S.R., Poland, and East Germany,
and large-scale production of large, efficient, oceangoing fishing vessels was
launched in earnest in the Soviet bloc." 21

The first vessel in the class — the side- set trawler Pioner — was launched
and delivered in 1956. Its equipment was of the most advanced type: Donkin
& Co., Ltd., of Newcastle-on-Tyne supplied a partially balanced streamlined
rudder actuated by means of electrohydraulic steering gear; an electrically driven
windlass, installed by Clarke-Chapman & Co., Ltd., was capable of lifting
two improved Hall stockless bower anchors from 260 feet at a rate of 30 feet

17 U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, The Postwar Expansion of Russia's Fishing
Industry, Report by the Fisheries Research Institute, 88th Congress, 2d Session, January 1964
(Seattle: University of Washington, S964), p. 6.

'* Commercial Fisheries Review (Washington. D.C.), 16, 5 (May 1, 1954), 68.

" U.S. Senate, op. cit. n. 17, p. 7.

" tbid.

21 Ibid. For details of equipment on Soviet trawlers see Yu. Kostyunin, Rybolovnye iraiy
(Moscow, 1968).

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

287

per minute; the ventilating-heating system was by R.B. Stirling & Co., Ltd.;
and the insulation, of "very high standard throughout," was by Darlington
Co., Ltd.

The most up-to-date navigation aids were installed by Brooke-Marine,
Ltd. — a Redifon radio apparatus, Pye sound reproduction system, Bendix
echosounding gear, a Revometer, Browne standard and steering compasses,
and an eight-way batteryless telephone communication system by Telephone
Manufacturing Co., Ltd. The refrigeration plant was built by L. Sterne &
Co., Ltd., of Glasgow with automatic controls by Matone Instrument Co.,
Ltd., and the fish meal plant by Farrar Boilerworks, Ltd. The main engine
was a four-stroke, eight-cylinder diesel-type KSSDM by Mirrlees, Bickerton
& Day, Ltd., developing 950 shp at 255 rpm. The whole ship was specially
strengthened for ice work. 22

In ail, 20 ships were built to this specification by Brooke-Marine, Ltd.,
for the Soviet Union. (See Table 21-3.)

In 1954 the Scottish shipbuilder John Lewis & Sons, Ltd., of Aberdeen
designed an advanced fishing vessel, the Fairtry, which was hailed in the trade

Table 21-3

TRAWLERS SUPPLIED BY BROOKE-MARINE, LTD
TO THE U.S.S.R. IN 1956-59

Soviet
register

No,

Name

Gross

registered
tons

Date
supplied

2855

PT-200

Pioner

684

1955

2856

pr-201

Akula

664

1956

2857

PT-202

Muksun

685

1956

2858

PT-203

Karas

684

1958

2859

PT-20S

Sokol

684

1956

2860

PI 207

Sever

684

1957

2861

PT-208

Vostok

685

1957

2862

PT-209

665

1957

2863

PT-210

Zapad

685

1957

2864

PT-211

Tunets

665

1957

2865

PT-2li

Rion

685

1957

2866

PT-2'3

Stavrida

685

1957

2867

PT-214

Shongui

685

1957

2868

PT-21S

Kotlas

685

1957

2869

PT-2 j S

Okun

685

1957

—

Adler

685

1958

2158

—

Pelamlde

685

1958

Source: Registr Soyuza S'jfl

Registrovaya kniga morskikh sudov soyuza $SR 1964-

(965 (Moscow,

1966).

12 Data from The Shipbuilder and Murine Engine-Builder (London), February 1956. p. 1 179.

288

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

literature as one of the most interesting ships to have been built in recent years 23
and subsequently became the basis of the Soviet "Pushkin" class. The Fairtry
resulted from experimental work that had been going on since 1947. It was
the largest trawler built to that time and the first specially designed and constructed
for stern trawling and for complete processing of the catch on board . The Fairtry
had a gross registered tonnage of 2605 with a main propulsion unit built by
Lewis Doxford — a four-cylinder oil engine capable of developing 1900 blip."

This advanced design was used by the Russians for their main postwar
class of trawlers. The Soviets placed an order in the Howaldtwerke shipyards
in Kiel, West Germany, for 24 trawlers based on the Fairtry design, and these
trawlers of 2500 gross tons were built on Soviet account between 1955 and
1958. 25 The 24 German-built prototypes became the basis for the Soviet
"Pushkin" class of stern trawlers, first launched in the spring of 1955, and
the other 23 German-built units followed in the next several years.

After being tested in operation the "Pushkin" class became the prototype
for a Soviet-built version — the "Maiakovskii" class; the "Maiakovskii" vessels
of 3170 gross registered tons were of the same overall dimensions as the
"Pushkin" class. Two years later work began in Poland on a modified version
of the same trawler, the "Leskov" class of 2890 gross registered tons and
of similar dimensions to the "Pushkins" and the Fairtry.

There is also an East German version of the Fairtry known as the "Tropik"
class, of 2400 gross registered tons; the first craft in this series, launched in
East Germany in July 1962, was specially built for operation by the Soviets
in tropic areas.

Table 21-4 ORIGINS OF SOVIET STERN TRAWLERS AS OF 1965

Sower
trawler
class

Design
based on

Original

prototype

order

Number

of
copies

"Pushkin"
2,470 GRT

"Maiakovskii"
3,170 GRT

"Leskov"
2,890 GRT

"Tropik"
2,600 GRT

U.K. ■Fairtry,
prototype built
in W. Germany

U.K.'Fairtry'

Polish
modification
of U.K. 'Fairtry'

East German
version of
U.K.'Fairtry'

24
20

65
(to 1965)

Sources: Commercial Fisheries Review (Washington), May 1 , 1 9S4; and author's calcula-
tions based on Soviet sources.

'" The Shipbuilder and Marine Engine-Builder . September 1 954, p.

24 Ibid., pp. 541-44,

!S Commercial Fisheries Review. 16, S (May ], 1954), 69.

541.

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

289

Therefore the numerous Soviet stern trawlers are based on a single British
vessel, the most advanced of its type when first produced in 1954. (See Table
21-4.)

FISH FACTORY SHIPS, MOTHER SHIPS,
AND REFRIGERATED FISH TRANSPORTS

In 1959 an order for 11 "Severed Vinsk" class mother ships was placed
with the Polish Government shipyards in Gdansk. The ships were delivered
between 1959 and 1962 with a gross registered tonnage of 1 1,500; their function
is to serve as supply and base ships for Soviet trawler fleets.

The "Zakharov" class, based on the "Severod Vinsk" design, performs
the functions of processing fish as well as the service functions of a mother
ship; it is also equipped to manufacture fish meal and oil from wastes obtained
during the canning operations. It was built at the Admiralty yards at Leningrad
between 1960 and 1963. The "Zakharov" class ships have a daily canning
capacity of 1600 cases, and one version receives fish from an accompanying
fleet of medium fishing trawlers (SRTs) or from 12 motor boats carried on
board (the motor boats are of a special Japanese Kawasaki design for catching
king crabs with angle nets).

There are also about a dozen classes of refrigerator transport vessels, some
of which have equipment for quick-freezing fish.

Table 27-5

ORIGINS OF REFRIGERATOR FISH CARRIERS AND
PRODUCTION REGRIGERATOR TRANSPORTS

Class

Built

GRT

■■Bratsk"

"Tavriia"

"Pervomalsk"

"Sevastopol"

"Skryplev"

East Germany
Soviet Union

Denmark
Soviet Union

Denmark

2,500
3230
3300
5525
4700

Sources: Commercial Fisheries Review (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1964 supplement, pp.
11-12; Registr Soyuza SSR, Registrovaya knfga morsklkh sudov soyuza SSR 7964-1965
(Moscow, 1966).

These refrigerated transport vessels have been built partly in the Soviet Union
and partly abroad on Soviet account. (See Table 21-5.) The "Bratsk" class
of refrigerated vessels, built in East Germany with a gross registered tonnage
of about 2500 to carry a crew of 91 with a 40-day cruising capacity, was
built after 1960 for the Soviet merchant fleet. The vessels have equipment
installed in the East German yards of Stralsund Volkswerft, comprising freezing
and refrigeration plant with two freezer machines, four air-blast freezing tunnels,
packing departments, refrigerating machines, and refrigerating holds. Capacity

290 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

is about 1800 cubic meters, permitting storage of about 800 tons of frozen
fish.

Another class, built completely in the Soviet Union, is the "Tavriia" class
(3230 gross registered tons), which performs the same function as the "Bratsk"
class. Another is the "Pervomaisk" class built in Denmark on Soviet account
and with Danish engines; these vessels are of about the same tonnage as the
"Tavriia" class and about the same overall length, and there is in general
a distinct similarity between this Danish class and the "Tavriia" class.

The largest class of refrigerator vessels is the Soviet-built "Sevastopol"
of 5525 gross registered tons and about 430 feet in overall length, with a capacity
to handle 100 metric tons of fish per day with equipment consisting of eight
air-blast freezing tunnels each 39 feet long and related storage of five holds
of 5400 cubic meters each; total capacity is 2700 metric tons of fish.

Finally, there is the "Skryplev" class, designated as refrigerator transports
but actually factory ships with a capability of freezing fish and preparing fish
meal and oil. These ships of 4700 gross registered tons and overall length
of about 300 feet were built in Denmark in the early 1950s.

SOVIET OCEANOGRAPH1C AND RESEARCH VESSELS

In 1967 there were approximately 71 research and oceanographic vessels
in the Soviet fleet. The origin of about one-half of these vessels has been
traced. None of those traced originated in the Soviet Union. 27

Several research ships have been built in East Germany on Soviet account.
For example, the Okeanograf was built in East Germany in 1956 and has
Buckau-Wolf diesel engines; the Poliarnik, built in East Germany in 1952, also
has Buckau-Wolf engines; the Akademik S Vavilov, built in East Germany in
1949, has a 350-hp Buckau-Wolf diesel engine; the Zemchug of 422 tons, built
in East Germany in 1950, also has a Buckau-Wolf 300-hp engine; similarly, the
Topseda of 239 tons, built in East Germany in 1950, has a Buckau-Wolf 300-hp
engine.

Some research vessels have been built in Finland. For example the Professor
Rudovits of 626 tons was built in Finland in 1950, and has Finnish engines.
The Zaria, built in Finland in 1952, has an East German 300-hp engine.

Holland built a large 12,000-ton research vessel, the Ob, in 1953 with
a 7000-hp diesel-electric engine made by Schelde-Zulzer.

China built several research vessels for the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s
and fitted them with East German Buckau-Wolf engines. For example, the
Pervenets (442 gross registered tons) was built in 1956 in China. Some prewar

! * Commercial Fisheries Review. 26, 11A (November 1964), Supplement.
21 A list of these vessels is in U.N., Food and Agricultural Organization, Research Crafi
Conference (Seattle, 1968), pt. 2.

We stern Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

291

vessels also appear to have been converted for oceanographic use; for example the
Vitiaz (5710 gross registered tons), built in Germany in 1939 with a Krupp
reversible two-cycle engine of 3600-hp, was converted sometime in the 1950s
for oceanographic use.

Finally , in 1 966 Poland agreed to build ten advanced oceanographic research
vessels for the Soviet Union. These are ice-strengthened to the highest classifica-
tion in the Soviet Registry, 282 feet long, 45-foot beam and 15-foot draft with
a displacement of 3735 metric tons, and propelled by two Sulzer diesels each
of 2400 hp with variable-pitch propellers. 28

Perhaps the most notable feature of Soviet oceanographic vessels is their
navigation and echosounding equipment. This appears to have originated in
large part in the West, although we have data for only about 20 of the approx-
imately 70 ships in the Soviet oceanographic research fleet. For example the
Vitiaz, the converted 1939 German 5700-ton vessel, has the following equipment:

Navigation: 2 gyrocompasses (Course 3 and Course 4)
3 magnetic compasses (2 track, 1 main)
1 Gauss-25 hydraulic log

1 electromechanical log

2 radiolocators (Don and Neptun)

1 Kelvin-Hughes navigation log

2 radio direction finders (Millard)

2 long-distance meteorological stations

Echosounders: 2 Kelvin-Hughes (l0,Q00-mete0

2 Kelvin-Hughes (4500-meter range)
1 Kingfisher tishlocator

The Ob, built in Holland in 1953, similarly has Western equipment:

Navigation: 4 gyrocompasses

2 magnetic compasses

1 Gauss-25 log

2 Zarnitsa and Neptun radar

Echosounders: 2 Kelvin-Hughes (MS 26)

2 Nippon Electric L-5, 2000-meter range

Vessels built in East Germany on Soviet account also have been fitted
with Western equipment. For example, the Zemchug has Nippon Electric
echosounders; the Akademik Vavilov has echosounders made by Kelvin-Hughes
and Nippon Electric; the Potiarnik has Nippon Electric echosounders; the Sevas-
topol has echosounders made by Hughes (type MS 26) and Nippon Electric.

So far as navigation equipment is concerned, we find similar use of Western
equipment. For example, the Okeanograf built in East Germany in 1956 has
a Thomson-type manual mechanical sounding instrument; the Akademik Vavilov,

Undersea Technology (Washington, D.C.), May 1967,

.67.

292 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

built in East Germany, has a Nippon Electric navigation sounder; the Professor
Rudovits has a Lyth magnetic compass.

Therefore we may conclude that Soviet oceanographic research vessels are
heavily dependent on Western sources, particularly for their instrumentation,
even though this instrumentation has been indirectly acquired through East Euro-
pean socialist countries.

So far as underwater sea laboratories are concerned the Soviets are somewhat
backward. An article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings on the Russian
sea lab 29 reviews the Russian Sadeo-2 and concludes:

Quite noticeable under various Soviet programs revealed to the Wesi, is that

living or working depths have been no more than 100 feet One can only

speculate on the apparent Soviet backwardness in this field.

By contrast, the United States had vessels operating to a depth of 36,000 feet
at that time (1969).

WESTERN ORIGINS OF SOVIET ICEBREAKERS

Before World War II the Soviet Union had only two or three icebreakers
(built in Europe between World War 1 and the mid- 1920s). Three modern ice-
breakers were transferred to the Soviet Union in the early 1940s under Lend
Lease. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal attempted to have these icebreakers
returned in 1946, and in a memorandum to the State Department requesting
institution of recovery proceedings Secretary Forresta! commented:

Of particular importance are the three CRs or icebreakers identified as:

U.S. Name U.S.S.R Name

North wind Severny Veter

Southwind Admiral Makarof

Westwind Severny Polus

These are high-powered icebreakers of the most modern design, sister ships (except
in armament) of the two now in commission in the U.S. Coast Guard and of
two others under construction and completing for the Navy. The importance of
an adequate number of high-capacity icebreakers in supporting any operations
in the frigid zones cannot be overemphasized. Three-sevenths of the total war
production of this type are held by the U.S.S.R. 30

The Soviet Register of 1966 lists icebreakers with characteristics similar

!S U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, July 1969, pp. 113-15.
30 U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861.24/5-646.

293

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

to these Lend Lease vessels. Soviet Register No. 38, for example, is the Admiral
Makarov (U.S. Southed); however, this icebreaker .s liste as bu.l in the
Soviet Union in 1941 with an engine built in the Soviet Union in 1939.

n the e^rly 1950s the Soviets contracted with the Wartsila Kon. Sandv.kens
shipyards in Finland for a series of 3000- and 9000-ton icebreakers w, ft diese 1-
cSeoric engines manufactured by Wartsila Kon. Cnchton-Vulcan at Abo in
Finland. These icebreakers are listed in Table 21-6.

T=hto 01 -fi ICEBREAKERS BUILT IN FINLAND

Table 21-6 ^ £*»£ tnnouNT FROM t955 TO 1959

Name

Year built Gross registered tons

Kapitan Belusov 1955 3™

Kapitan Voronir, . 1955 *"»

Kapitan Melekhov 1956 ■""

. ■ . 1 Q«ifl 27ZU

Murtaya 1WWJ a ,„
.. . iKQ 9165
Moskva la3a ^_

(Southampton: Adlard Coles. 1960).

Then in I960 the Soviets produced the Lenin an » to ™ c j"^. *"*
was followed by a series of ten icebreakers adopted from earlier Finnish designs.
T Zt !Twas Lunched in December 1957 as the world's first atomic icebreake.
Its reactors were reported as three and one-half times larger than the first Sov.et
ea"of which generated 5000 kw in June 1954. The main turbines we« : manufa *
u at the Kirov plant in Leningrad, the electric motors «%*£$£
nluit also in Leningrad; and the main generators were manufactured at KHEMZ
Kha^ko a plant originaily designed and built by the Genera, Electric Com-
pany All together, some 500 Soviet plants contributed to the construction of

th£ Xn 1958™ equally large icebreaker, the Moskva, was supplied by Finland
«, t ^Soviet Union; this icebreaker has Siemens-Schuckert P-P^n -chinery
and the same company made most of the electrical equipment." When it was
ton hedTjanuary 1959 at Helsinki, the Moskva was the largest icebreaker
bXin Finland far the Soviets, with eight Sulzer engines generating 22,000

hP ' Between 1961 and 1967, the Soviets launched a series of ten standard icc-
breake'namedlL^/-/ to LeJokoUO" This series has diese.-electnc motors

» W. W*« Skips. 1969- .970. lists .he "Wind" cU» .. «.um=d ,o the United States
" U.S. Naval Institute, Procn-rfin^, November 1959. p. 142.

Vusily Pronchishc

294 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

and is remarkably similar in dimensions to the series of icebreakers built for
the Soviet Union in Finland in the 1950s.

Table 21 -7 COMPARISON OF SOVIET "LEDOKOL" CLASS AND

EARLIER ICEBREAKERS SUPPLIED FROM FINLAND

Characteristic

Overall length, feet
Breadth, feet

Depth, feet
Draught, feet

Propulsion

Displacement, tons

Soviet "Ledokol" class

222.1
59.25
27.23
19.1
Diesel-electric

Finnish "Karhu" class

224.0

55.7
28.10

19.0

Diesel-electric

(7500 shp)

3,370

Source; Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1965; Registr Soyuza SSR, Registrovaya kniga
sudovsoyuza SSR 1964-1965 (Moscow. 1966); A. C. Hardy, Merchant Ships, World Built
(Southampton: Adlard Coles, 1960).

It is a reasonable assumption that the Soviet series of standard icebreakers is
based on the earlier Finnish designs. (See Table 21-7.)

Thus in icebreakers, a class of ship where the Soviets have requirements
considerably greater than any country except perhaps Canada, apart from the
single atomic icebreaker Lenin there is a dependence on designs originating
in Finnish shipyards or on icebreakers built in Finland and the United States.

Construction of the Soviet merchant fleet constitutes a sector for which
precise and accurate information is available — more so than for any other sector.
The problem has been to distill the information into a succinct and meaningful
pattern.

In broad terms, up to July 1967 65.6 percent of the Soviet merchant fleet
was built completely (hulls plus engines) outside the Soviet Union. In terms
of propulsion units, the most common engine is the marine diesel — and of
these, just under 80 percent were built outside the U.S.S.R., but even those
built in Soviet plants were derived from foreign designs, particularly Burmeister
& Wain of Denmark and Skoda of Czechoslovakia.

Marine tonnage built inside the U.S.S.R. is of standard types, often based
on Western prototypes, as in the cases of icebreakers, the "Kostroma" class
tanker, and the "Pioner" class fishing trawler. In other cases, e.g., in oceano-
graphic vessels, equipment is largely of Western origin and construction. Apart
from the Lenin atomic icebreaker there is no vessel in the Soviet merchant
marine that represents indigenous Soviet innovation.

Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

295

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Western Construction of the Soviet Merchant Marine

297

Table 21 -8C

ORIGINS OF MAIN ENGINES IN SOVIET
MERCHANT SHIPS ADDED TO FLEET BETWEEN

1941 AND 1945

7fKl

1942

7943

1944

1945

Total

United States

Germany

—

Norway

—

Sweden

—

United Kingdom
Finland

Hungary

—

— -

Denmark

—

Holland

—

Others

—

Totals

129

Source: Calculated from '

"egistr Soyuza

SSR,

Reglstrovaya kniga morskikh sudov

soyuza SSR 1964-1965 (Mos.

,-;■', 1966).

Table 21 -80

Totals

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET TANKER FLEET
FROM 1951 TO 1967

Hutl and engine
built in
U.S.S.R.

1,198,807

Hull andlor

engine built

outside U.SSB.

Total added

to tanker

fleet

1.496,898

2,695,705

Percentage

buSt outside

US.SJi.

1951

8,229

1,113

9,342

11.9

1952

8,229

14,618

22,847

65.0

1953

24,687

16,570

41,267

40.1

1954

77,798

4,468

82,266

5.4

1955

65,077

20,721

85,798

24.1

1956

60,337

46,820

107,157

43.7

1957

59,532

54,109

113,641

47.6

1958

18,556

35,502

54,058

65.7

1959

90,066

24,663

114,729

21,5

1960

93,707

105,827

199,534

53.0

1961

31,074

56,397

87,471

64.5

1962

42,510

178,879

221589

80.8

1963

87,693

179,065

266,748

67.1

1964

164,205

328,265

492,470

66.6

1965

132,872

242,201

375,073

64.6

1966

234,235

145,857

380,092

38.4

1967

—

41,833

100.0

55.6

percent
average

Source: Calculated 1rom Registr Soyuza SSR, Registrovaya kniga morskikh sudov
soyuza SSR 1964-1965 (Moscow, 1966). __

298 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

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Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

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5 T

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Western Assistance to the
Machine Tool Industry

The Soviet Union is a major volume producer of machine tools. In 1964 the
industry's production was about three-quarters, by value, of U.S. production
of machine tools, slightly greater than the production of West Germany and
equivalent to the combined machine tool output of Great Britain, Japan, and
France , !

Historically, the increase of machine tool output has been significant. In
1928 the Soviet Union produced only 2000 metal cutting tools, and this output
increased to 38,400 in 1945, 156,000 in 1960, and about 200,000 in 1967. 2
However, output does not tell the whole story; this flood of machine tools
is by and large of simple construction with numerous quality defects. One
observer has described the Soviet machine tool industry as follows:

... the bulk of current models turned out by the Soviet industry approach in make-up ,
speeds, rate of feed, etc., the U.S. models made during the late 1930s and during
World War II. Since then the United States has made considerable advance in
machine tool technology. 3

Problems in machine tool quality are described in several sources. J. A.
Gwyer in particular has listed excerpts from Soviet literature on problems of
quality and reliability in the industry .* Lack of high-quality raw materials, reliabil-
ity services, accurate instrumentation, trained Soviet technicians, and similar
factors have led to major problems in quality control .

Another commentator, P. H. Ponta, a member of the U.S. Machine Tool
Delegation to the Soviet Union in 1965, reported that although in general Russian

1 Data in American Machinist (New York), January 18, 1965, p. 133.

2 Strona Sovetov ;a JO let; Sbornik statisiicheskikh materiahv (Moscow, 1967), p. 83.

> J. A. Gwyer, "Soviet Machine Tools," Ordnance. (Washington, D.C.), November-
December 1958, p. 419.

" J, A. Gwyer. "Soviet Quality and Reliability Programs at the Crossroads, K.S.Q.L. Con-
ference Transactions 196&, March 26, 1968. Also see Appendixes 1, 11, and 111 to U.S. Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, Export of Strategic Materials to the U.S.S.R. and Other
Soviet Bloc Countries, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 87th Congress. 1st session.
Part 1, October 23, 1961 (Washington, 1961).

303

304 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

technical ability was "impressive," he found poor quality of workmanship,
very bad material handling, and an extreme neglect of cleanliness and order.
He suggested that the answer to the question of how the large output of Soviet
machine tools can be absorbed lay in the fact that Soviet tools had a shorter
average life than those made elsewhere, and this information, coupled with
what is known about the scarcity of spare parts, implies earlier replacement
than would be normal in the West. An article in Stanki i instrument (Moscow)
in 1965 also points out considerable problems involved in manufacturing machine
tools and suggests ways in which these problems can be overcome. 5

Soviet imports today are not quantitatively as significant as domestic produc-
tion, although they have been in the past." Lend Lease was a major supplier,
providing over $465 million worth of machine tools in addition to about the
same amount of related engines, industrial equipment, electrical equipment,
and machinery not normally included under the category of machine tools. 7
The major machine tool-related categories sent to the U.S.S.R. under Lend
Lease included:

Machine tools, rolling mills,
drawing machines $404,697,000

Welding machinery, testing and

measuring machinery, metal working 15,199,000

machinery
Cemented carbide cutting tools.

metal cutting tools 45.042,000

In 1965 the U.S.S.R. imported 6503 machine tools. Of these, 2249 came
from Czechoslovakia, where the largest heavy machine tool manufacturer is
the former Skoda company {which has a technical-assistance agreement with
Simmons Machine Tool, an old, established machine tool manufacturer of New
York. 8 However, the relatively small quantity belies the value of these more
recent imports. The average unit value of Soviet imports of machine tools is
twice that of exports. 9 By importing prototypes of advanced machines from
the West the Soviets can, with little effort, keep abreast of world developments
in this field. Thus, although the Soviets may lag by a few years at any one
time, the effect over the long run is to keep Soviet machine tools more or
less on an equivalent basis to current world technology.

s American Machinist. July 19, 1965.

8 "It is a fact thai some 300.000 of the very finest high-output machine tools were purchased
abroad from 1929 to 1940, tools manufactured by the best companies all over the world."
G Anisimov, "The Motive Forces of Technological Progress in the U.S.S.R. ai Its Present
Stage of Development," Problems of Economics, (New York), III, 1 (May 1960), 18.

' U.S. Dept. of State, Report on War Aid Furnished by the United Stoles to the U.S.S.R.
(Washington: Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945).

" See p. 84 below.

' Vneshniaia torgovfm SSSR za 1965 god (Moscow, 1966).

Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry 305

SOVIET ACQUISITIONS IN GERMANY

The prize machine-building plant removed by the Soviets from Germany
was in the British Zone— the Dusseldorf plant of Schiess-Defries. It was the
most important German manufacturer of heavy machine tools; the firm was
noted for "crankshaft turning equipment, tool and cutter grinders, horizontal
borers, gear cutters, gun boring equipment, universal milling machines, plane
milling machines, heavy lathes, slotting machines, forging machines, equipment
for railway shops, and special machine tools of the largest size." 10

Two important tool manufacturers in the U.S. Zone were also removed
to the U.S.S.R.— Hahn & Tessky and the Esslingen firm of Bohner & Koehle,
manufacturers of aircraft presses. 11

Toward the end of World War II, the greater part of German industry was
moved eastward to avoid its being bombed. Accordingly, when the war ended
there was a concentration of machine tool and equipment manufacturers in the
provinces of Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg, and Brandenburg, all later to
be occupied by the Soviet forces. The greater number of the 636 machine
tool companies in the area had equipment removed to the Soviet Union. 11 Unlike
other industrial sectors, removals seem to have been complete: probably over
three-quarters of the companies were 100 percent stripped of their equipment
and the remainder were 80 or 90 percent stripped.

Fortunately (for the purposes of this study), a number of the larger machine
tool manufacturing units, particularly those in Leipzig, were visited by CIOS
(Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee) teams just before the Soviet
occupation; consequently, we have an accurate record of their condition and
equipment capability at the time of the Soviet occupation.

One of the largest machine tool plants on the continent, Pittler Werkzeug-
maschinenfabrik A ,G. in Leipzig, was completely removed to the Soviet Union.
This plant was earlier visited by both CIOS and U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
teams. The manufacturing program as of May 1945 consisted primarily in the
production of turret lathes and automatic lathes, and the CIOS team reported

'» U S. Foreign Economic Administration, U.S. Technical Industrial Disarmament Committee
on the German Machine Tool Industry (T.l.D.C. Project no. 11; Washington, 1945), p_43.
One observer suggested an interesting reason for the removal of this important plant from
the British Zone to the Soviet Union: "This company was Oermany-s greatest producer of
large type machine tools such as planers, lathes, and boring mills. They were li.e the com-
pany's plant wasl completely dismantled, including machine tools and bu.ldmgs, by the Rus-
sians 1 learned from an authoritative source that this action was induced and approved by
the British representative then in charge, who was the principal competitor of the Scneiss
Company." F. H. Higgins Collection. Item 1, Memorandum to Director. Industry Division,
p 5 (Hoover Institution Special Collections, Stanford University).

' ' Germany, Office of Military Government (U .S.Zone), Economics Division, /I Year of Potsdam .
The German Economy Since ike Surrender (n.p.;OMGUS, 1946).

" G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontage: Sechs Jahre Reparauonspottt* (Bremen. F.
Trujen, S951), pp. 95-102.

306 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

that the Pittler plant was "very modern" and "only slightly damaged by bomb-
ing"; the treating department was reported to be excellent and the stockrooms
well filled with finished parts. The manufacturing methods appeared to be
efficient, and the smaller turret lathes built in large quantities were assembled
on a conveyer system. 13 Unfortunately the survey teams gave no estimate as
to productive capacity, but they did indicate that, with materials on hand, 800
machines could be completed within a six-month period, which suggests a
minimum capacity of 1600 machines per year.

Another company visited by a CIOS team was Kirschner A.G.-
later completely removed to the Soviet Union. Kirschner was "one of
the largest manufacturers of woodworking machinery on the continent." 14 The
company produced a comprehensive range of wood working equipment, including
horizontal log-band mills and high-speed vertical saw frames for saw mills,
as well as equipment for wood pattern shops such as band saws and a special
coal-cutting machine.

Another machine tool plant removed completely to the Soviet Union was
that of Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Arno Krebs of Leipzig. This company man-
ufactured plane and universal knee and milling machines in the following ranges:
working surface of table from 8-1/2 by 26 inches up to 12 by 47-1/4 inches,
longitudinal travel from 13 to 36 inches, cross travel from 4-3/4 to 13-1/2
inches, vertical travel from 11-1/2 to 19-1/2 inches. In addition, two types
of hand-lever milling machines were manufactured.

The Kollmann-Werkzeugfabrik GmbH of Leipzig was 75 percent removed
to the Soviet Union. This was not strictly a machine tool plant, but specialized
in the manufacture of all types and sizes of gears up to 36 inches in diameter.
It was a modern plant in excellent condition, with a machine shop containing
25 Gleason bevel gear generators, 27 gear grinders, and batteries of gear shapers,
hobbing machines, and milling and grinding machines, together with a large
number of other machines for manufacturing gears. There was also an excellent
heat- treatment department with electric furnaces. The CIOS team commented:
"The excellence of this particular plant has to be seen to be appreciated." 15

The Kbllmann-Werke A.G., Zahnrader- und Getriebebau of Leipzig was
75 percent removed to the Soviet Union. This company was a manufacturer
of gears, with a modern plant built in 1935. In commenting on it the CIOS
team reported: "The plant is in excellent condition, has a large number of
Maag gear grinders, as well as other first-class equipment to manufacture
precision-type aircraft gears." 16

13 See CIOS Report no. XXVII1-10; Andress. el al.. Machine Tool Targets, Leipzig, pp.5-6,
for lists of standard turret lathes, high-speed turret lathes, single-spindle automatic screw
machines, and single-spindle and multispindle automatic machines manufactured by Pittler in
1945.

" ibid.

15 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 13

Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry 30 7

Other companies moved included August Meiselbach, which was 95 percent
removed to the Soviet Union; Meiselbach was a manufacturer of stocks and
dies for use in public utilities.

Kleim und Ungerer of Leipzig, which manufactured sheet feeders for the
printing trade, had 83 percent of its equipment removed to the Soviet Union.
The plant contained a single-spindle automatic feeder, a drilling machine, and
a stock of small turned parts. During the war it produced test machines for
Junkers aeromotors and various parts in subassemblies for elevating antiaircraft

guns.

A woodworking machine tool company completely removed to the U.S.S.R.
was Deutsche Holzbearbeitungsmaschinenfabrik Jacob & Eichorn, a small firm
manufacturing woodworking machines such as circular saws, band saws, planing
machines, and jointing machines.

Conrad Modrach of Gera, a manufacturer of commercial shears, croppers,
presses, and bending machines, was completely removed to the U.S.S.R., as
was G. Weissken, also of Gera, a manufacturer of tool and cutter grinders
and small lathes.

An overall indicator of the magnitude of plant removals in the machine
too! industry is contained in Table 22-1, which lists eight plants removed to
the U.S.S.R. (and approximate extent of removals) together with their ranking
by the Foreign Economic Administration in 1944. Only those classified as
of outstanding importance are included.

Table 22-T GERMAN MACHINE TOOL MANUFACTURERS OF

' a0le " "OUTSTANDING IMPORTANCE-

REMOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1945-46

Percentage
removed

100

Name of
manufacturer

Hille-Werke A.G.

Magdeburger
Werkzeugmasch-
inenfabrik A.G.

100 Werkzeugmasch-

inenfabrik
Hermann Plauter

Not known Billeter & Kluntz

Location

Dresden
(Soviet Zone)

Magdeburg
(Soviet Zone)

Chemnitz
(Soviet Zone)

Aschersleben
(Soviet Zone)

Main product

Relieving lathes, multisplndle
drilling machines, thread
millers, jog borers, diamond
and tine borers, honing

machines, drilling machines,

radial drills.
Auto multicut lathes, turret

lathes, gun-boring equipment,

machinery lor aircraft

and propeller construction

(Junkers plant)
Tool and cutter grinders,

gear cutters, gear hobbers,

thread hobbers, long-cut

milling machines, thread

milling machines
Surface grinders, ball and

face grinders, planers,

openside planers

308 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 22-1 (cont.)

Percentage

Name ol

removed

manufacturer

Location

Main product

Not known

Franz Braun A.G.

Zerbst

Lathes, Irontal lathes,

(Anhalt)

planing machines, drill

(Soviet Zone)

presses, thermoplastic
molding presses

100

Pittler Werkzeug-

Leipzig

Single-spindle bar autos,

maschinenfabrik A.G.

(Soviet Zone)

multisp indie bar autos,
multispindle auto machines,
turret lathes, die heads,
hydraulic pumps, automatic
screw machines

100

E. Reinecker A.G.

Chemnitz

Relieving iathes, crankshaft,

(Soviet Zone)

grinding machines, universal
grinders, internal grinders,
spline grinders, gear
grinders, thread grinders,
tool and cutler grinders,
surface grinders, ball and
face grinders, gear cutters,
thread millers, tooth round-
ing machines, jog borers,
plant milling machines, tap
and Swist drill making, small
tools, measuring instrument
horizontal milling machines

100

Schiess-Defcies

Dusseldorf

See text

(British Zone)

Source: U." S. Foreign Economic Administration, U. S. Technical Industrial Disarmament
Committee on the German Machine Tool Industry, Study of Interagency Committee on the
Treatment of the German Machine Tool Industry from the Standpoint of International Secur-
ity (Washington, 1945), TIDC Project no. 11.

' These are firms identified by the FEA as "of outstanding importance either byvolume
of output or by monopoly of production of a significant item."

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MACHINE TOOLS FROM 1946 TO 1966

An examination of imports and exports of metal-cutting tools (specifically
forges, presses, and the subgroup of mechanical and hydraulic presses) is sugges-
tive of limited Soviet machine tool capabilities.

Firstly, imports of the major category of metal-cutting tools (Soviet foreign
trade classification Group 100) have significantly increased in absolute terms
since 1946. The year 1946 reflects heavy "pipeline" Lend Lease imports and
is therefore abnormal; imports valued at less than 20 million rubles a year
in the late 1940s, when the Soviets were absorbing Lend Lease and German
reparations machine tools, are replaced by annual imports of 70-80 million
rubles in the early 1960s. In specialized fields such as forges and presses we
find proportionately greater import.

Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry

309

On the other hand, exports over the long run show a fairly consistent trend
and average less than half of Soviet imports. In forges and presses we find
that exports are minute (between one-sixth and one-eighth of imports), with
none at all in the category of hydraulic presses. These figures reflect the overall
composition of Soviet machine tool exports (simple lathes and shapers to under-
developed countries-Cuba, India, China, Mongolia, and the newer African
nations) and imports (sophisticated equipment for prototype use and specialized
production machinery from advanced countries— U.K., West Germany, Japan,
and U.S.A.). (See Table 22-2.) The exception to this rule is trade with East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, which comprises large imports and exports.

Table 22-2

SOVIET IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF

MACHINE TOOLS FROM 1946 TO 1966

(in million rubles)

Year

Metal cutting tools

Stanki

metaHorezhushchie

(Group 100)

Forge and press

equipment

Kuznechno-pressovoe

oborudovanie

(Groups 101-103)

Mechanical and

hydraulic presses

(Subgroups

10103-10123)

Imports

Exports Imports Exports

Imports

Exports

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

19S1

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

19S7

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

19S4

1965

1966

40.3
16.3
5.8
5.5
13.7
12.8
13.5
27.3
2S.4
21.9
25.8
28.9
38.9
41.5
56.7
62.5
73.1
78.5
86.7
83.1
76.2

0.4
1.3
3.1
10.1
19.2
17.5
22.7
27.9
13.8
6.5
7.8
7.0
13.9
16.7
12.9
17.2
25.1
25.7
27.6
39.5
57.2

4.9
3.9
2.4
1.6
2.0
4.6
4.3
13.6
14.8
21.0
24.3
25.9
31.4
32.4
34.4
37.5
42.1
43.0
49.0
36.2
32.2

0.3

0.6

0.8

2.0

2.9

3.9

2.3

1.5

1.1

1.6

2.3

2.6

4.7

5.0

5.7

5.3

3.3

4.7

7.4

2.3
1.8
1.5
0.6
0.8
2.8
2.7
5.4
7.4
13.7
17.0
16.7
21.3
21.5
19.2
22.1
24.3
24.1
20.6
18.3
13.7

Source: Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR: StatistlchesKii sbomik, 1918-1966 (Moscow. 1967).
pp. 76-79 (exports), 98-101 (imports).

DUPLICATION OF WESTERN MACHINE TOOLS

Prewar practice continued after the war— much of Soviet machine tool design
was derived fronl Western origins. In 1953 it was reported by an Austnan
Tngineer who haleturned from the U.S.S.R. after working m the ^Sverdhj*
machine tool plat (where he had access to the plant records) that in 1953

310 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

the Soviet Union was still operating "a good deal" with Lend Lease tools."
It was noted that the latest model U -S . and European machine tools were acquired
despite export control laws, and these were sent to "copying offices" and
there stripped, analyzed, and tested, and "exact duplicates [were] made." 16
About 30 to 35 such copying offices existed in 1953 at various machine tool
plants, each specializing in a particular type of foreign machine tool . For example,
all foreign lathe models went to Plant No. 1 15 at Novosibirsk, all foreign
shaper models went to Plant No. 64 at Gorki, and all foreign hydraulic press
models went to Plant No. 101 at Kurgan. In February 1953, Plant 101 was
working on a 150-ton hydraulic press originally made by Merklinger in Ger-
many."

Thus in 1957 it was reported that the Leningrad large jig borer had been
copied from the Hydroptic SIP (optical coordinate jig borer) and an American
trade journal commented; "The machine ... so closely resembles its West Euro-
pean counterpart that even the Sverdlov plant manager calls it the Leningrad
SIP." 20 The Sverdlov Plant im. Lenini also specialized in Keller-type copying
machines. 21

Consideration of the foreign origin factor in machine tool production brings
the Soviet achievement of gigantic runs of machine tools into focus. This point
can be illustrated by a consecutive reading of statements by three independent
observers concerning one Soviet machine tool plant — Ordzhonikidze in Moscow.
Each statement is by itself an accurate but incomplete description of the plant;
taken together, however, the statements point to a significant deduction.

The first description of the plant is by a highly qualified U.S. observer
utilizing Soviet literature:

Machine-Tool Manufacturing Plant im. S. Ordzhonikidze (Stankostroitel'nyy
zavod im. Ordzhonikidze) — hence referred to as the Moscow Plant im. S.
Ordzhonikidze. The plant, one of the largest in the U.S.S.R., specialized in
the production of: automatic transfer lines, unit machine tools, radial drills, boring
machines, assortment of automatic and semiautomatic lathes. The equipment in-
stalled in this plant is not modern by any means. As of 1 January 1956, 23.7 percent
of metal-cutting machine tools was less than ten years old, 71.3 percent ten
to twenty years old, and 8 . 1 percent more than twenty years old. Only 1 .5 percent
of all installed metal-cutting machine tools were represented by automatic and
semiautomatic machines. Presses constituted l.i percent of all machine tools.
During the 1951-55 period, the plant built 18 automatic transfer machines, in
1957 seven machines, and planned for 1958 an output of 16 machines. 21

" iron Age (Middletown, N.Y.), December 17, 1953.

1! Ibid.

" Ibid.

2 " American Machinist , February 25, 195"? . p. 179.

" Ibid., p. 181.

ii J. Gwyer, private communication lo author.

Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry 311

The second description is recorded by an American visitor to the plant:

Ordzhonikidze specializes in making boring equipment. Most of the manufacturing
equipment in the plant was foreign-made and has not been modernized, although
in some areas the operations looked quite good. Here we saw many American
machine tools such as Gardner grinders, different types of Cincinnati machines,
King vertical lathes, Gray planers, and many other familiar types. Some were
of fairly new vintage. Although many machines in this plant appeared to be
old they were still in very good condition, all were running."

The third report, also by an on-the-spot observer, confirms the predominance
of foreign equipment:

In the plant itself, most of the items are imported — some are prewar and others
wartime acquisitions. Very few of the machines we saw in this plant seemed
to be postwar. Amc-ng those noted were two Butler planers and a whole battery
of medium-sized Bi^eter & Klonz machines. There was a Kendall & Gent miller;
a small Cincinnati British-built); a Beliot-Gray planer-miller (this one one of
the few postwar machines); a fairly elderly large Giddings & Lewis floorplate
horizontal boring machine; Milwaukee millers; a Girards radial and a Wotan
grinder. 2J

There is some reference to Russian-built machines: "In the turret lathe section
we noticed quite a fe-v copies of Warner & Swazey machines, but we did
not see any Russian-built copying lathes. ""

The first statement .-^abltshes the age of the equipment; the second and
third statements identify its Western origins and make it clear that in this plant
at least, production, inouriing production of automatic transfer machines, is
based on equipment impcited from the West. In other words, the machines
that build the machines originated in the West.

By their own admission, the Soviets imported 300,000 top-flight foreign
machine tools between 1930 and 1940. " Add to this the large quantities received
under the Nazi-Soviet pact, Lend Lease, German reparations removals from
the occupied countries, and continuing imports since World War II, and it
becomes apparent that the military and industrial machine-building industries
of the Soviet Union could welt be relying heavily on imported equipment.
This supposition is supported by the nature of many of the machine tools impor-
ted larger specialized automatic mass-production units.

» Nevin L. Bean. "Address Before the Detroit Chapter of the National Society of Professional
Engineers." Detroit, February 22. 1956 (DeaAorn: Ford Motor Co., News Dept.) pp. 8-9.

2 * American Machinist, November 19, 1956.

" Ibid. The Russian-built machines included also a horizontal boring machine and large- and
medium-size planers.

'" See p. 304 n. 6 above.

312 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The substitution of numerically controlled machine tools for hand-controlled
machine tools was indisputably the most important metal-machining innovation
in the period 1945 to 1960. In the United States numerically controlled tools
became commercially available in the early 1950s, and by the end of the decade
there were probably several thousand in commercial use. Apart from substantially
improving quality of product and operating control, numerically controlled tools
allow substantial savings in both capital and labor.

Their introduction into the Soviet Union has been very slow, however:
only two prototypes had been produced there by 1960, and at that time it was
projected that only several hundred would be in use by 1965." It is then more
than possible that the numerically controlled units displayed at various exhibitions
abroad are "one-off" items built for the purpose. For example, J. O. Ellison
examined one exhibit model, a Model 1062 shaft-turning lathe that was automated
and tracer-controlled, and published his conclusion in the trade journal /I merican
Machinist." He described this model as a hybrid variation of a family of lathes
based on the 1K62. It was the hybrid nature of the model that led Ellison
to the conclusion that it was a compromise and therefore not "very salable
in the United States"; Ellison added that "the most lasting impression I have
of the demonstration aside from the technical points is that the Russians were
very good showmen. "' s '

BALL BEARING MANUFACTURE CAPABILITY

Ball bearings, of course, constitute a vital part of almost all machines and
of numerous other products, including military weapons systems.

It was previously indicated that ball bearing plants in the U.S.S.R. had
been equipped from the United States. One U.S. firm, the Bryant Chucking
Grinder Company of Springfield, Virginia, was a prominent supplier in the
1930s and 1940s, while Italian and Swedish firms also have contributed a large
proportion of the Soviet ball bearing production capacity. 50 Soviet dependence
on the West for ball bearing technology came to a peak in the years 1959-61.
The Soviets required a capability for mass production, rather than laboratory
or batch production, of miniature ball bearings— 80 percent of whose end uses
are in weapons systems. The only company in the world that could supply
the required machine— the Centalign B — on a commercial basis was the Bryant
Chucking Grinder Company. The Soviet Union had no mass-production capabil-

" U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. Hear-
ings, 87th Congress, 2d session, December 10 and 1 1, 1962, p. 137.
" November 20, 1959, pp. 98-100: "Russia Exhibits Automated Lathe."
28 /iirf.,p. 98.
30 See Sutton, 1: Western Technology ... 1917 to 1945.

■

I Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry 313

\ ity whatever, and its miniature ball bearings were either imported or made

i in small lots on Italian and other imported equipment.

] In 1960 there were 66 Centalign machines in the United States. Twenty-five

j of these machines were operated by the Miniature Precision Bearing Company,

I Inc., the largest manufacturer of precision ball bearings; 85 percent of Miniature

j Precision's output went to military applications. In 1960 the U.S.S.R. entered

'■ an order with Bryant Chucking for 45 similar machines. Bryant did not

j immediately accept the order but consulted the Department of Commerce; the

department indicated willingness to grant a license and Bryant therefore accepted

the order. The Commerce Department's argument for granting a license turned

on the following points: (a) the process achieved by the Centalign is only a

single process among several required for ball bearing production; (b) the

; machine can be bought elsewhere; and (c) the Russians can make ball bearings. 31

The Department of Defense, however, entered a strong objection to the export

' of the machines on the following grounds:

In the specific case of (he granting of the export license for high-frequency grinders
manufactured by Bryant Chucking Grinder, after receiving the request for DOD's
opinion from the Department of Commerce, it was determined that all of the
machines of this type currently available in the United States were being utilized
for the production of bearings utilized in strategic components for military end
items. It was also determined from information that was available to us that
the Soviets did not produce a machine of this type or one that would be comparable
in enabling the production of miniature but! bearings of the tolerances and precision
required. A further consideration was whether machines of comparable capacity
and size can be made available from Western Europe. In this connection, our
investigation revealed that none was in production that would meet the specifications
that had been established by the Russians for these machines. In the light of
these considerations it was our opinion that the license should not be granted. 31

The Inter-Departmental Advisory Committee on Export Control, which
includes members from the Commerce and State departments as well as the
CIA, overruled the Department of Defense opinion and "a decision was made
to approve the granting of the license." 33 The Department of Defense made
further protest and demanded proof as to the capability of either the U.S.S.R.
or Western Europe to produce such machines. No such proof was forthcoming.

The following summarizes the various objections of the Department of
Defense, as then outlined by the official concerned:

1,1 This section is based on U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Export of Ball Bearing
Machines to Russia, Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1961). There are
three parts to these Hearings; they provide a fascinating story of one Soviet attempt to acquire
strategic equipment. See also the Soviet "machine tools Case of 1945"; a microfilm of docu-
ments on this case has been deposited at the Hoover Institution.

32 U.S. Senate, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 267-68.

3 ' Ibid,

314

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

In resume, the following actions were known to me regarding the transaction
of this export license:

(a) I expressed dissatisfaction and suggested that the Department of Defense not
concur in the initial request of the Department of Commerce.

(b) The official memberofthe Department of Defense in this connection concurred
and, at a series of meetings of the Advisory Committee on Export Control,
spoke against the proposal that an export license be granted.

(c) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Supply and Logistics, after review-
ing some of the circumstances, requested that I do whatever was possible to
stop the shipment of these machines.

(d) A letter was transmitted from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the
Secretary of Commerce, approximately November 1, 1960, saying it [sic] spoke
to the Department of Defense and requesting a further review.

(e) At two meetings where the matter was reviewed, the Department of Defense
maintained nonconcurrence in the shipment of the equipment.

As of this writing I am still convinced that it would be a tragic mistake
to ship this equipment. 34

The reference to a "tragic mistake" refers of course to the known fact
that miniature ball bearings are an essential prerequisite for missile production.
Granting the license would give the U .S .S .R. a miniature ball bearing production
capability equal to two-thirds that of the United States.

The relevance of the case for our study is twofold. First, it illustrates clearly
a manner by which the Soviets have acquired a substantial productive capability,
even for difficult technologies, very quickly. Second, as the case was uncovered
only by accident (an official of the Miniature Precision Ball Bearing Company
brought the matter to the attention of Congress), it implies that much "technical
leakage" in the sensitive areas of atomic energy and weapons systems may
well have gone undetected.

COMPUTING, MEASURING, AND PRECISION INSTRUMENTS

The Soviet Union has always had considerable technical difficulties producing
computing, measuring, and precision instruments. Initial production of elemen-
tary adding machines in the early thirties was poor in quality and suffered
from numerous deficiencies; in particular, early models had parts of nontempered
steel and gear teeth were wearing out after just two weeks of operation, 35 The
most common Soviet calculating machines today are direct copies of Western
models; for example, the "Felix," the subject of the above complaints and
the first machine produced in the U.S.S.R., was still in production in 1969

" Ibid.

n Zu itidtistrializutsim (Moscow), Angus! 7, 1930.

Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry 315

and is by far the most common Soviet machine. It is a copy of the Brunsviga
1892 model, apparently without even the modifications introduced into Western
models in I927. 38 The full keyboard calculator of the 1930s— the KSM— is
a copy of the Monroe. Punched-card machinery is Hollerith, although at one
time a technical-assistance agreement was made with Powers. Campbell suggests,
with justification, that the postwar Riazan machine works is the German Astra-
werke which was transferred to the U.S.S.R. Other German plants, including
the Archimedes and the cash register plant at Glasshiitte, were also moved
to the U.S.S.R. 37

In the 1960s, a continuing widespread use of the abacus in the Soviet Union
made the Soviets worry about their image abroad — it hardly seemed consistent
with the age of cosmonauts and atomic icebreakers. It was this concern that
led to an agreement in 1966 with Olivetti of Italy to establish two office equipment
plants in the U.S.S.R. under a $60 million contract, one for the production
of typewriters and one for the production of calculators and other office
machinery. 38

Several of the most important precision instrument manufacturers in Germany
were moved to Russia at the end of World War II. The Zeiss works at Jena,
manufacturers of optical and scientific instruments including micrometers, optical
comparators, angle measuring equipment, and gear testers, was moved completely
to Minino, near Moscow . There with three top German experts, Dr. Eitzenberger,
Dr. Buschbeck, and Dr. Faulstich, the new plant developed detector and remote-
control equipment, including radio-controlled recording gear and rocket guidance
equipment. 3 " The Askaniawerke A.G. at Berlin-Friedeman, a very important
manufacturer of scientific equipment including optical measuring components
such as lenses and prisms, was also moved to Russia. The Siemens & Halske
plant at Siemens Stadt in Berlin (with its electron microscopes) was removed,
and its top staff members were given work in Russia. The three A.E.G. electron
microscopes at the K.W. Institut in Berlin also were removed to Russia."

In the 1960s technical acquisition in the precision instruments field continued

38 See, for example, S. R. Ivanchenko, Schetnye mashiny i ikh ekspluataisiia (Moscow, 1968),
pp. 42, 68, for data concerning the Felix as produced in the 1960s. Compare to Encyclopedia
Briiannica (1958 edition), vol. IV, p. 552 and the Western Brunsviga. For further details
see R. W. Campbell, "Mechanization of Cost Accounting in the Soviet Union," American
Slavic and East European Review (Menasha, Wis.), February 1958. Campbell ascribes the
early Soviet arithmometers (o the 1874 Russian Odner machine produced in St. Petersburg
during World War 1; however the design of the Odner is different from the Felix, although
based on the same principles.

37 Wall Street Journal, December 16. 1966, 7:3. For data on the Soviet-Olivettis see K. A.
Borob'ev, Konstruktsiia. tekhnicheskoe obsluihivanie i remont bukhgalterskoi mashiny
"Askota" klassa 170 (Moscow, 1969).

38 Werner Keller, Osi minus West=Null (Munich: Droemersche Verlagsanstalt, 1960). pp. 283,
357, 365.

18 BIOS Final Report no. 485: R- C. Allen. German Filtration Industry, pp. 18- 18a, 22.
" New York Times. September 13. 1964.

316 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

with foreign purchases. It was reported in 1964 that "recent Soviet purchases
cover a vast range from office equipment to camera shutters." 41 The firm of
Rank-Xerox sold $3 .7 million worth of its equipment, and the Japanese company
Copal Koki signed a contract to supply producing facilities and know-how for
a "sophisticated electric eye camera shutter." 42 Thus there has been a steady
flow of instruments and precision equipment into the Soviet Union through
the means of trade. The exception to Soviet inability in the field appears to
be the various Soviet medical stapling instruments licensed by the United States
Surgical Company and patented in the United States. 43

In the period 1929 to 1940 the Soviets purchased 300,000 foreign machine
tools, while its own output was concentrated in simple drilling machines and
bench lathes of a standard type based on Western prototypes. These were sup-
plemented by almost $400 million worth of Lend Lease machine tools.

Twelve very large machine tool plants were removed from Germany at
the end of World War II— including the important Schiess-Defries and Billeter
& Kluntz (Aschersleben) plants. These acquisitions have been supplemented
by continuing and substantial imports from the West, greater in both quantity
and unit value than Soviet exports of machine tools to underdeveloped areas.

"Copying offices," each specializing in a particular type of machine tool,
have widely duplicated Western imports. Apart from "one-off" items for exhibi-
tion and to impress foreign visitors, Soviet machine tools are duplicates of
foreign models, with occasional slight variations to adapt them to special Soviet
conditions. In numerically controlled machine tools— certainly the most importani
innovation in the period under discussion— only a few prototypes were produced
in the U.S.S.R. by the early 1960s, compared to several thousand in use in
the United States.

The "U.S. ball bearing case of 1961," which brought to light a Soviet
attempt to import the equivalent of two-thirds the U.S. capacity for producing
miniature ball bearings (mainly used in missiles), suggests not only that there
is a major lag on the part of the Soviet machine tool industry but that the
Soviets are in a position to acquire even the latest and most significant of
Western innovations in this field.

In the allied fields of computing, measuring, and precision instruments a
like phenomenon was observed: a general backwardness and dependence on

41 ibid.

" Ibid.

" For example, U.S. Patent 3,078,465 of February 26, 1963. Sales from this license appear
to have been insignificant; in the six-month period ending September 30. 1963, the United
States Surgical Company paid only $495.00 in license fees. Direct sales to the Instrument
Specialties Company were a little better, but not much— five sales totaling $2,g92.62 in six
months. See Supplemental Registration Statement (Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938) as filed in Department of Justice. Washington, D.C.

Western Assistance to the Machine Tool Industry

317

the West for modern technology acquired by purchases from such firms as
General Electric-OHvetti (Italy), Rank-Xerox (U.K.). and Japanese firms.

Thus it is concluded that Soviet innovation in the field of machine tools
and allied industries is almost non-existent (only hybrid machine tools have
been isolated as Soviet innovations). Technological advance is gained by import-
ing prototypes for copying, or where problems have been encountered in domestic
copying, batches of specialized production machines are imported (as evidenced,
for example, in the attempted acquisition of Centalign-B and tape-controlled
machines).

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Western Origins of Electronics
and Electrical Engineering Technology

SOVIET COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1960s

The first generation of computers, developed from U.S. work in World
War II, was based on the vacuum tube, and by present-day standards is slow
(with only 2500 operations per second), of very limited capacity, and relatively
bulky with about 2000 components per cubic foot. The second-generation compu-
ter, based on the transistor rather than the bulky vacuum tube, entered the
U.S. market during the 1950s. With this development, speed was increased
by a factor of ten, to 25,000 operations per second, and the transistor developed
by Bell Telephone in 1948 brought component density up to 5000 components
per cubic foot. By 1960 about 5000 second- generation computers were in use
in the United States and had completely replaced the first-generation computer.
Indeed even some early second-generation units had been removed from service

by 1959.

The third generation of computers, based on microcircuits, was introduced
commercially in 1961 and again increased both speed and capacity by a factor
of ten. The third-generation IBM 360 system has 30,000 components per cubic
foot, can handle 375,000 operations per second, and reduces the cost per 100,000
computations from $1 .38 in first-generation machines to about 3.5 cents. 1

Such, then, is the nature of the computer revolution in the Western world.
The computer in Soviet technology, on the other hand, was still a relatively
insignificant factor in the late sixties, behind not only the United States but
Western Europe and Japan. Even first-rate scientific institutions have lacked
advanced machines. For example, the main atomic energy research institute
in the U.S.S.R., directed by famed physicist Igor Kurchatov, used the first-
generation computer at the Academy of Science for calculations on uranium

■ Fortunr. September 1966, p. 120. An excellent study of the Western origins of Soviet
computers appeared after this manuscript was completed: Richard W Judy, The Case of
Computer Technology" in Slanislaw Wasowski. ed., Ent-Wta Trade ant the Technology
Gap (New York- Praeger, 1970). Judy's study is longer and more detailed than the sectton
included here. There is a substantial unity between his conclusions and those of the author;
for example, Judy states. -'Computer technology in the Soviet Union ,s virtually entirely
imported from the West"; and -literally all significant technological innovations [in .the field)
have occurred in the West."

318

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 319

burnup — at a time when the comparable Argonne Laboratories in the United
States had two second-generation computers. 8

There are several reasons why the Soviets were late in starting computer
production and why their computer technology has lagged behind that of the
West. These factors have been discussed in some detail by Richard W. Judy. 3
By 1957 the party journal Kommunist pointed out that "a number of firms
are engaged in the production of electronic digital computers in the U.S.A.,
England, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France," and went on to
suggest that a socialist economy could utilize electronic computers with even
greater effect than capitalist economies. It was suggested that current deficiencies
in planning, caused by the large number of manual calculations required, could
be overcome by the use of electronic computers capable of operating with an
enormous input and handling this input at a high rate of speed. In particular,
Kommunist urged, the use of computers should be extended from the scientific
field into the planning and management of industry. 4

But if the Soviet dispute over the use of cybernetics in general was resolved,
Soviet progress in the field of computer technology remained notably weak.
At the end of the 1950s the United States had about 5000 computers in use
while the Soviet Union had an estimated 120— about the same number as West
Germany. Judging from the general characteristics of these Soviet computers
as reported by well-qualified observers, the technology was well behind that
of the West and barely out of the first-generation stage even as late as the

1960s.

The only Soviet computer in line production in 1960 was the URAL-I.
It was followed by the URAL-li and URAL-4 modifications of the original
model. With a prototype appearing in 1953 and series production beginning
in 1955, the URAL-I had an average speed of 100 operations per second,
compared to 2500 operations per second on U.S. World War II machines and
15,000 for large U.S. machines in the middle to late 1950s. Occupying 40
square meters of floor space, URAL-I contained 800 tubes and 3000 germanium
diodes 5 ; the storage units included a magnetic drum of 1024 cells and a magnetic
tape of' up to 40,000 cells, considerably less than U.S. machines. URAL-II
and URAL-4 incorporated slightly improved characteristics. 6

In the late fifties the Soviets also had about 30 to 40 BESM-type computers
that were used primarily for research and development, including work on rockets
and missiles. 7 The original version of the BESM had 7000 tubes; the later

1 G A Modelski, Atomic Energy in the Communis! Bloc (Melbourne, 1959), p. 97. In 1964
(he Soviet Academy of Sciences received an Elliott Automation (General Electric subsidiary)
Model 503 computer.

1 See Judy, op. cil. n. 1, pp, 66-71.

' Kommuiiisl (Yerevan), no. 7, 1957, pp. 124-27 .

* Willis H. Ware and Wade B. Holland. Soviet Cybernetics Technology. I: Soviet Cybernetics.
1959-1962. (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., June 1963), Report no. RM-3675-PR, p. 91.

• Ibid., p. 92.

7 Electronics (New York), December 10, 1957.

320

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

version had 3000 tubes and germanium diodes. This computer had some features
common to U.S. computers. 8

Table 23-1

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOVIET
AND WESTERN COMPUTERS UP TO 1968

Average speed

Operational

operations

Storage

Name

date

per second

capacity

STRELA

1953

2000

None

BESMI

1953

7000-8000

1023 words

SETUN

1959

4000

81 words

URAL- 1

1953

100

None

URAL-II

1960

5000

8192 words

BESM-6

1967

1 million

—

General Electric

Installed by

—

2 million

-Elliott, 503

G.E. in Moscow
Academy ot
Sciences in 1964

characters

English Electric
System 4
(RCA technology)

Installed in

23.8 Msec

7.25 million

U.S.S.R. in 1967

characters

International

Installed in

1 .8 M sec

8 million

Computers, Ltd.

U.S.S.R. in 1968

characters

(U.K.) Model 1905E

Sources: Soviet machines: Willis H. Ware and Wade 8. Holland, Soviet Cybernetics
Technology: Soviet Cybernetics, 1959-1962 (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., June 1963), RM-
3675-PR; Western machines: Office Automation (New York, 1962).

One observer has rated the BESM as follows: "One of the most impressive
achievements of Soviet technology.... It cannot, however, properly be consi-
dered as a machine competitive with the IBM-701 or the IBM-704." 9

The URAL series was manufactured at the Penza computing machine plant, l0
which in 1959 was in series production of URAL-I and preparing to change
over to URAL-II. Production methods then were reported to be the same as
those in the United States." On the other hand, Soviet computers were far
less efficient; the STRELA, for instance, was reported to have only a ten-minute
mean free time between errors, while U.S. machines in the fifties normally
operated eight hours without error. 12

A Soviet business data electronic tabulator, the TAT- 102, designed primarily
for mechanical accounting, statistical calculations, and planning, was developed
in the late 1950s and is quite similar to the IBM 604 electronic data-processing

Ware and Holland, <?/>. cif. n. 5. pp, 85-91.

Ncvin L. Bean, "Address before the Detroit Chapter of the National Society of Professional

Engineers," Detroit, February 22, 1956 (Dearborn: Ford Motor Co., News Dept.), p. II.

Ware and Holland, op. cil. n. 5, p. S3.

Ibid., p. 84.

Cimtml EnRincerwjt (New York). V. I 1 (November 1958), 77.

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 321

machine. A machinable; computer, the VPRR, designed to determine operating
conditions for metal caning toots, also was developed; it closely resembles
the Carboloy machine <;e"eloped by General Electric Company in 1955. 13

Software has been copied from U.S. equipment. For example Willis H.
Ware comments:

We were shown about 4;" card punches. About half of these were 90-column
machines and the other !ialf 80-column machines; all were generally similar to
United States designs — We also saw a SOO-card per minute sorter which closely
resembled a corresponding American product. It has electromechanical sensing
of the holes and a set of switches for suppressing specific row selections as
in American sorters. 1 ' 1

Backwardness in computer technology'* has led (as in other fields) to imports
from the Western world. Imports of computers from the United States were,
until very recently, heavily restricted by export control; in 1965 only $5,000
worth of electronic computers and parts were shipped from the United States
to the Soviet Union, and only 52,000 worth in 1966. In 1967 such exports
totaled SI ,079,000, and this higher rate of export of electronic computers has
been maintained since that time. 16

Business relations between International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM) and the Soviet Union go back into the 1930s. In August 1936 IBM
was advised that in the future all its business would be handled directly with
Uchetimport (Bureau for the Import of Calculating Machines and Typewriters)
rather than through Amtorg, the Soviet representative agency in the United
States. According to E. F. Schwerdt, the Moscow representative of IBM,' 7
this rather unusual business arrangement was due to Soviet dissatisfaction with
IBM leasing arrangements and to a desire to purchase rather than lease IBM
equipment. To avoid losing the business IBM proposed an arrangement under
which the Soviets would establish a separate corporation whose sole business
would be the import of IBM machines for rent to Soviet organizations at the
uniform rental fee (in other words, Uchetimport in effect became an IBM agency);
30 percent of the royalties were payable to IBM with a guaranteed minimum
annual payment. IBM was willing to maintain a technical servicing staff in
the U.S.S.R. to be paid by the Soviets. 18 The precise amount and nature of
IBM computer sales to the Soviet Union since World War n is not known,
but it is known that after World War II IBM sales to the Communist world

13 Control Engineering, V. 5 (May 1958).
" Ware and Holland, op. cil. n. 5, p. 85.
'■'■ The BESM-6 machine was Installed al Dubna in 1967 but is not in general use.

16 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Export Control (Washington, D.C., issued quarterly). These
figures calculated from data contained in various issues for the years 1966-68.

17 U.S. Slate Dept. Decimal File, 861.602/279.
'" Ibid.

322 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

came "almost entirely from [IBM's] Western European plants," partly because
the U.S. equipment operates on 60 cycles whereas Russian and European equip-
ment operates on 50 cycles.' 9

The earliest Western computersale that can be traced is a Model 802 National-
Elliott sold by Elliott Automation, Ltd., of the United Kingdom in 1959. 2 °
(Elliott Automation is a subsidiary of General Electric.) By the end of the
sixties Soviet purchases of computers had been stepped up in a manner reminiscent
of the massive purchase of chemical plants in the early sixties. In the last
days of 1969 it was estimated that Western computer sales to all of communist
Europe, including the U.S.S.R., were running at S40 million annually and
these were in great part from subsidiaries of American companies. 21 In 18
months during 1964-65 Elliott Automation delivered five Model 503 computers
to the U.S.S.R., one for installation in the Moscow Academy of Sciences;"
the Elliott 503 ranged in price from $179,000 to over $1 million, depending
on size, and has a 131,000-word core capacity. By the end of 1969 General
Electric-Elliott automation sales to communist countries were four times greater
than in 1968 and this market accounted for no less than one-third of General
Electric-Elliott's computer exports. 23 Another General Electric machine, this
time a Model 400 made in France by Compagnie des Machines Bull, also
was sold to the U.S.S.R.; and Olivetti-General Electric at Milan, Italy, was
also a major supplier of G.E. computers to the U.S.S.R. In 1967 the Olivetti
firm delivered $2.4 million worth of data-processing equipment systems to the
U.S.S.R. in addition to the Model 400 and the Model 115 machines already
sold. 24 The Model 115 is a G.E. information processing system, but has a
wide range of applications. It can be used as a free-standing tabulating unit
or as a peripheral subsystem to other G.E. units.

In sum, General Electric has sold through its European subsidiaries from
1959 to 1970 a range of its medium-capacity business and scientific computers,
including the fastest of the 400 series, which can be used either individually
or as a group.

Perhaps of greater significance are English Electric sales, which include
third-generation microcircuit computers utilizing Radio Corporation of America
technology. In 1967 English Electric sold to the U.S.S.R. its System Four
machine with microcircuits. This machine incorporates RCA patents 25 and is
similar to the RCA Spectra 70 series.

18 Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1966. Thomas J. Watson, chairman of IBM, was in Moscow
in October 1970 with four IBM engineers to discuss the nature or continued IBM assistance
to the U.S.S.R.

20 Electrical Review, (London), no. 165, p. 566.

21 Business Week, December 27, 1969, p. 59.
" Wall Street Journal. Sunt 18, 1965.

" Business Week. December 27, 1969, p. 59.
" Wall Street Journal . February 7, 1967, 14:3.
25 The Times (London), January 24, 1967,

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 323

The largest single supplier of computers to the U.S.S.R. has been Interna-
tional Computers and Tabulation, Ltd., of the United Kingdom, a firm whose
technology is largely independent of U.S. patents. In November 1969, for exam-
ple, five of the firm's 1900 series computers (valued at $12 million) were
sold to the U.S.S.R. 18 These are large high-speed units with integrated circuits,
and without question they are considerably in advance of anything the Soviets
are able to manufacture in the computer field. These machines are certainly
capable of utilization in solving military and space problems.

AUTOMATION AND CONTROL ENGINEERING

Given the Soviet backwardness in computer technology, it is pertinent to
examine briefly the nature and extent of Soviet achievement in the important
fields of automation and control engineering.

The Russian application of the word automation is much wider than in
the West; in the U.S.S.R. it can include such elementary control systems as
automatic level controls and water pumping stations. In the Western definition,
automation designates only advanced mechanization (mainly cyclical operations),
automatic control , regulation, and direction work, including self-optimizing ope-
rations and the concomitant utilization of computers.

The Moscow Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control
held in June and July 1960, provided an excellent opportunity for examination
of the state of automation in the Soviet Union at that time. It was the first
such congress, and it brought together 1111 delegates from 29 countries, with
the U.S.S.R. being represented by 397 persons, the U.S.A. by 137, the United
Kingdom by 78, and a large number in attendance from European socialist
countries. In a period of four and one-half days some 275 papers were read.

The general impression gained by British and American delegates to the
conference was that the papers presented and the visits made did not support
the general understanding of Soviet achievements in space research and nuclear
engineering. For example, Professor H. H. Rosenbrock commented as follows:

It was difficult at first to sel this in perspective. The known Russian achievements
in theory and in the guidance of rockets did not at first accord with the elementary
state of automation in some of the factories that were seen and with the shortage
and out-of-date design of tools such as analog and digital computers. 27

" Business Week, December 27, 1969. The 1900 series has numerous models and the company
has not announced (he model numbers of the machines shipped; models vary greatly in speed
and capacity.

" H.H. Rosenbrock, "A Report of Symposium on Automatic Control," Institution of Mechan-
ical Engineers. (London). I960.

324 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Similarly, a British delegate, D. C. Rennie, made the following comment:

The consensus . . . from the British delegation was that we saw nothing to support
the tremendous achievements of the U.S.S.R. in space research and nuclear
engineering. It would appear that the U.S.S.R. has poured much of its resources
into these fields.

We did not see anything that would justify the opinion that the U.S.S.R.
is ahead of the West. In endeavoring to gauge the potential of any organization,
it is usual to examine carefully the base of the pyramid supporting the spearhead.
In fact, the "base" appeared to be missing. For example, the computers we
saw were far behind those in the West. The instrument engineering in the factories
was inferior to comparable Western equipment. The equipment and components
being developed in the institute of Automation at Kiev, one of the largest and
most important in the U.S.S.R., were far behind the latest techniques in Britain
and the U.S.A. It must be stressed that these opinions are based only on what
we saw. It is conceivable that much of their later developments were carefully
withheld. The writer is of the opinion that this was unlikely. Conversation with
individual Russian engineers gave a strong impression that they were being open. !s

One of the key institutes in the field of automation is, as Rennie indicated,
the Institute of Automation in Kiev, which employs some 2000 persons working
in 40 laboratories in addition to experimental workshops and pilot plants. It
was of this facility that Dr. H. H. Rosenbrock commented: "This, incidentally,
was the first time in Russia that I saw a transistor; all the other equipment,
amplifiers and so on, was valve equipment." 2 "

The papers presented at the conference confirm the rather skeptical outlook
brought back by Western delegates concerning the level of Soviet achievements
in automatic control systems. One conference paper, by General Electric engineer
E. W. Miller on the "Application of Automatic Control Systems in the Iron
and Steel Industry," aroused considerable interest and the author was cross-
examined by the Russian engineers present for more than an hour. A British
delegate commented that from the discussion it was obvious that the Americans
were far ahead of the Russians in this field. 30

The paper that followed Miller's, one on a similar topic by a Russian engineer
(V. I. Feigin on "Automation of a Reversing Mill"), also suggests a much
lower level of technology in the U.S.S.R. For example, the system Miller
described controlled 12 parameters whereas the. Soviet system controlled three
parameters. Although the Russian paper took an hour to present, a delegate

2 " Private, unpublished report by D. C. Rennie, London, Eng.: "Report on Moscow Congress
of the International Federation of Automatic Control," June 27-July 7, I960, p. I. Type-
script supplied by author.

IB Rosenbrock, op. clt. n. 27, p. 55. The 1963 U.S. Atomic Energy Delegation observed only
one piece of transistorized equipment during the whole visit.

:! " Rennie, op. clt. n. 28, p. 12.

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 325

commented that at the end there were no questions or comments from the floor.
The next Russian paper, also on a similar topic, was canceled.

The following day, on June 28, 1960, a paper by D. A. Patient of Baird
and Tatlock (on "Techniques for the Automation of Sampling and Chemical
Analysis") induced considerable Russian cross-questioning. However, the sub-
sequent paper by M. Brozgol,a Soviet engineer (on "The Automation of Electric
Drives"), was described by the British delegate as being in "the widest terms."
The same observer reported that Western delegates "found it extremely difficult
to pin the Russians down to giving precise information in one or another particular
field," and that "the author of {the 'Electric Drives'] paper stated in response
to a direct question that if he had been reporting today, he 'would have mentioned
things which had been developed more recently.' " When pressed for further
information he was not prepared to give it. 31

Attempts by Western conference delegates to visit particular plants were
not successful. H. H. Rosenbrock commented:

No visits were arranged during the conference to chemical plants or process plants
in general. I tried hard while 1 was over there to visit a chemical plant; but
obviously I was not persuasive. a!

Another delegate, W. D. Elliott, commented: "Although I tried for five days
1 was not able to get to see a computer institute." 33

It may be justifiably concluded, then, that Soviet automation and control
engineering is not in an advanced state. This conclusion is entirely consistent
with earlier conclusions concerning the elementary nature of Soviet computers
in the 1960s and the necessity to purchase IBM, General Electric, and RCA
technology to fill a sizable technological gap. Given the fundamental place
of these technologies h weapons systems, this conclusion raises serious questions
concerning the origins of Soviet military computers and control mechanisms.
This question is discussed in chapter 27; at this point the hypothesis is put
forward that Soviet military capabilities also are from the West.

THE NA i'URE OF GERMAN TRANSFERS
IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY

The technical nature of the transfers from the German electrical industry
at the end of World War II provide a plausible explanation for current Soviet
backwardness in control instrumentation and computers. The Germans did not

- 11 thiil., p. 14.

a! Rosenbrock, op. c\ n. 27. p. 55.

" Ibid., p. 57.

326 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

work on computer technology — facilities for the production of industrial control
instrumentation were not in evidence among the numerous plants and equipment
shipped to the U.S.S.R. from Germany.

In prewar Germany the electrical equipment manufacturing industry was
heavily concentrated in the Berlin area. Although there was a slight movement
away from Berlin as a dispersal measure under the threat of Allied bombing,
eastern Germany was by the end of World War II the most important location
for the electrical industry. This is confirmed by several sources. In a report
from Dr. Fritz Luschcn to Albert Spcer in March 1945, in the last days of
World War II, it was reported that since 1943 the industry had been dispersed
to a great extent to Silesia and other eastern areas, and the Soviet advance
had led to "severe inroads on manufacturing space and development work-
shops." 3,1 It was pointed out by Dr. Luschen that although in February 1945
the reduction in floor space was only 7.8 percent, "this trifling percentage is no
index of the significance of the loss, since the most important and specialized
manufacturing development facilities of the entire electrical industry had been
installed in the East."

Furthermore, large stocks of electrical equipment had been lost, including,
for example, 100 repeater stations and radar equipment. The Luschen report
goes on to indicate that Berlin therefore had increased in importance and at
the end of the war included about 50 percent of the German electrical industry.
This reasoning was shared by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey team: 35

A study of the electrical equipment industry in Germany would have been concen-
trated in the Berlin area had the region been available for investigation. This
is inevitable since there is no other area in Germany which i.s comparable in
size and importance within the province of electrical equipment. The Russian
occupation forces in the area did not permit American personnel to enter their
zone of occupation at the time the survey was made.

This concentration in Berlin and eastern Germany enabled the Soviets to
acquire probably 80 percent of the 1944-45 German electrical industry. As
we have already seen, this came about, paradoxically, because of the Allied
advance to the Elbe. The Soviets occupied the whole of Berlin and removed
the electrical plants from all Berlin zones; 36 then when the frontiers were adjusted
on July 1 , 1945, the Soviets occupied and proceeded to dismantle the electrical
industry of Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg, which had been evacuated
by U.S. forces.

" U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, German Electrical Equipment Industry Repart, 2tt edition
(Washington. Equipment Division. 1947). Report no. 48.

" lbiit..p~S.

31 Ibid., p. 9: "Investigation of plants in the Berlin area at the present time [July 1945] would
not yield satisfactory results, as key electrical equipment plants have been removed from Ber-
lin by the Russians."

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 327

What did the Soviets acquire in East Germany? About 65 percent of the
facilities removed were for the production of power and lighting equipment
(about one-quarier), telephone, telegraph, and communications equipment
facilities (just under one-third), and equipment for the manufacture of cable
and wire (about one-tenth). 57 The remainder consisted of plants to manufacture
radio tubes, radios, 3 " household electrical goods and batteries, and military
electronics facilities for such items as secret teleprinters and antiaircraft equip-
ment.

A large number of wartime military electronic developments were made
at the Reiehspost Forscluingsinstitut (whose director went to the U.S.S.R.),
and these developments presumably were absorbed into Soviet capability, includ-
ing television, infrared devices, radar, electrical coatings, acoustical fuses, and
similar equipment. 3 "

Thus although 80 percent of the German electrical and military electronics
industries was removed, the Soviets did not gain computer or control instrumenta-
tion technologies developed after World War II.

WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS

The computer is the heart of modern control instrumentation. There is no
available evidence that direct Western assistance was provided for the early
Soviet computers, STRELA, BESM, and URAL, although the components,
tubes, diodes, and later transistor technologies came from Germany (the repara-
tions removals) and from postwar purchases of electrical equipment. There is,
however, a great deal of Western design influence, and some equipment is
copied from American models.' 10

At the 1955 Russian exhibit of nuclear instrumentation in Paris it was noted
that Russian instrumentation was second to the U.S. "qualitatively and quantita-
tively" and overall "several years behind the U.S. on techniques." The items
exhibited were largely copies; only one photomultiplier was exhibited and the
"RCA people say [it] is a copy of [an] early RCA multiplier" (complete

" Ibiil. For figures on distribution of production from 1943, see ibid., p. 14.

™ See p. 334 below. Removal of at leasl one radio equipment plant was somewhat delayed:
"Of a certain radio-valve plant the Russians seized 50 percent of all the machines and trans-
ferred them to Russia. Then they ordered the management to build new machinery in order
to keep up production. When the new machines were built and run in, they were seized and
taken to Russia. This happened once again and when the plant had reached foil production
again, il was transferred to Russia, lock, stock, and barrel, including management, engineers,
foremen, key workers, and the families of the male and female workers," Aeronautles
(London). July 1951. pp. 35-36.

>■ U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, op. cil. n. 34, contains a summary of the German wartime
military electronics developments; see pp. 67-72,

J " Seep. 319.

328 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

with the RCA pinched neck) . The pocket dosimeters "seemed similar to Argonne
design." 41

At about the same time a review by a "top German scientist" based on
interviews of German electronics engineers returning from the U.S.S.R. con-
cluded that the engineers were returned because the Soviets had nothing more
to learn from them; the Soviets were said to "always have working models
of the latest U.S. equipment," 42 and were at that time testing the latest U.S.
Tacan navigation system. The Loran system was later copied as the Luga sys-
tem. 43 Another observer, Dr. W. H. Brandt of Westinghouse, noted that Soviet
coil winding techniques were parallel to those of the U.S. in World War H, 44
and that the Soviets apparently were having problems manufacturing transistors.
The American trade journal Control Engineering reported a few years later
(in 1958) a visit by a delegation in industrial instrument design:

We saw many examples of dial-type laboratory precision resistance decades, Wheat-
stone bridges, Kelvin bridges, and precision potentiometers, as well as portable
bridges and potentiometers. Designs were strongly reminiscent of American
designs. A few of the dial-type instruments used switching contact designs normally
associated with German precision apparatus, 4 ''

However, N. Cohn of Leeds & Northrup commented: "Not all units were
copies, and the Russians were proud of design advances — from their point of
view — of their own." He then added:" We saw an assembly for measuring
10 to 100 percent relative humidity using wet and dry bulb resistance thermometers
and a self-balancing computing circuit, originally developed in this country
in the 1920s." 46

An exhibit of Russian electronic test equipment in New York in 1959 provided
another opportunity for preliminary observations on this sector of the electronics
industry. 47 Unfortunately no opportunity was given visitors to observe the instru-
ments in operation; consequently it was not possible to compare specifications
with performance. In microwave test equipment, the design appeared adequate
but the specifications were "so much poorer than ours." 18 It was observed
that many instruments were copies, but one unique item was shown — a compact
calibrating signal generator packaged into a compact unit. David Packard noted
that a couple of instruments were "without question" copies of instruments
originally developed by Hewlett Packard Company. 49

Nucleonics (New York), September 1955, pp. 12-13,

Aviation Week. (New York), April 16, 1956, p. 75,

Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. Bulletin (Munich), V (December 1956), 13.

Aviation Week, ApriS 9, 1956. p. 68.

Control Engineering, November 1958, pp. 65-80.

Ibid., p. 74.

Electronic Design (New York), August 17, 1960, pp. 50-70.

Ibid.

■MM

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 329

This backwardness in electronics was still apparent in 1960. The American
trade journal Electronics illustrated Soviet space components and their U.S.
counterparts, and noted the bulky and obsolescent nature of Soviet compo-
nents — without printed circuits and using conventional military-type cables
and plugs for space work. 50 The journal cited an example of an ionization detec-
tor and amplifier used in the 1961 U.S. moon shot in one package six inches
long and the comparable Soviet instruments in Sputnik III — two packages about
two feet long. 51

Where the Soviets are operating modern systems, the origins can be traced
to the West. For example, in 1966 an instrument-landing system valued at
$280,000 was installed at the Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow — the interna-
tional airport — by Standard Cables & Telephone, Ltd., a subsidiary of Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) of New York. 52

in 1967 Le Materiel Tilephonique S.A. of Paris, France, another subsidiary
of ITT, was awarded a contract to equip an all-purpose telephone information
center in Moscow. The contract was for the manufacture and supply of telephone
switching apparatus to give callers information on weather, time, and cultural
events. Although the system was large — employing 500 operators and using
advanced microfilm techniques — it seems unusual that this kind of system would
still be bought in the West. 53

SOVIET RADIO AND TELEVISION RECEIVERS

In late 1953 the U.S. Air Force Technical Intelligence Center made an
"intensive scrutiny" of two Soviet television sets, the Muscovite and the Lenin-
grad, and concluded that Soviet circuitry and design trailed that of U.S. practice
by about ten years. The Muscovite T-l small 7-inch screen television introduced
in 1948 as the first Soviet television set was a "direct copy of a 1939 German
receiver." It was capable of picking up only the single Moscow channel, and
its performance was described as "mediocre." The follow-on unit was the
Leningrad T-2 built in East Germany to Soviet specifications for sale in the

10 Electronics, November 25, 1960, p. 43.

11 Ibid.

" Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1966. Thus ihe pilot on the first Soviet flight to the United
States was able to claim: "Captain Boris Yegorov said that the efficiency of traffic flow
around Moscow was a good deal better than it was around New York, which has been suffer-
ing exasperating traffic delays. *ln Moscow, everything is on time,' said the captain after
his own flight had to circle New York for an hour and 35 minutes and had come within
10 minutes of having to turn back to Montreal." San Jose Mercury (San Jose, Calif.) August
28, 1968.

" Wall Street Journal. July 31, 1967, 7:2. However, Soviet telephone equipment appears to
be of the 1920s era; for example see chart compiled by L. T. Barnakova, entitled
Oborudovanie gorodskikh telefonnykh stantsii (Moscow, 1966).

330 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

U.S.S.R.; this set, with an 8-inch screen, could pick up only the Leningrad
station with a performance rated as "fair." 54

The first color television project is claimed by the Soviet engineer I. Adamian
for 1925. 33 In March 1965, however, the Soviets made an agreement with
France to utilize the French color television system SEKAM in the Soviet
Union.''* This system, with circuits covered by Radio Corporation of America
patents, 57 is used in the Soviet color television receivers Rubin-401, Raduga-4,
and Raduga-5. 5S

IMPORT OF POWER STATION EQUIPMENT

Although Soviet literature stresses the ban that was placed on imported
equipment for electrical generation in 1934, :>s there has in fact been considerable
import of complete power stations and equipment for power generation, par-
ticularly during and just after World War II. Robert Huhn Jones estimates
that the $167 million worth of electrical-plant shipments under Lend Lease
were roughly equal to the capacity of the Hoover Dam or the combined generating
capacity of the states of New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York."" Up to
1944 these deliveries constituted 20 percent of the increment in Russian wartime
power capacity and were in addition to substantial shipments from the United
Kingdom and Canada — sufficient to produce 1.457,274 kw of power, 61 The
program provided complete stations (this accounted for the high construction
cost of $144 per kw):

...[Western firms arci shipping the Russians equipment down to and including
wiring for the plant's lighting system, leaving out only such items as light bulbs,
freight or passenger elevators, metal stairways, and the like. Powerwise we send
the Russians everything a complete station requires. 6 '-

Between 1942 and 1946 the United Kingdom shipped eight complete power

s * Product Engineering, (New York), 1953, pp. 200-1.

" Nauka i zh'Z"' (Moscow), no. 6, 1965, p. 7.

,B Wid.

57 Wall Street Journal. March 23, 1965, 3:2.

3 * A. Bartosiak, Sistenui tsveinogo lelevideniio SEKAM (Moscow, 1968). Dependence on
foreign transistors is implicit in such publications as V. F. Leonl'ev, Zarubezhnye transistory
shirokogo primeneniia (Moscow, 1969) and G. G. Sitnikov. Tranzisrornye felcvizory SSnA
i Yaponii (Moscow, 1968).

511 P.S. Neporozhnii. Electrification and Power Construction in the U.S.S.R. (Jerusalem: tsrael
Program for Scientific Translations. 1966). p. 76.

" Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1969),
p. 225.

S1 Ibid. A few of the units shipped were old and inefficient, such as, for example, the Con-
solidated Edison plant from Long Beach, California, shipped in 1943. See also Sutton II,
pp. 167-68.

62 Electrical World (Manchester. Eng.), August 19. 1944, p. 102.

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology 331

stations to the U.S.S.R. (four of 10,000-kw, two of 12,000-kw, and two of
25,000-kw capacity" 3 ), as well as a mixed power-district heating plant." 4 In
1954 two large contracts were concluded, one with R. A. Lister & Company,
Ltd., for 90 diese! generating stations of 410 kw each, at a cost in excess
of $4 million, and the other and still larger contract with the Brush Group
of companies for diesel generating sets, turbines, and transformers valued in
excess of $12 million. es Motors and alternators were supplied by Crompton
Parkinson later in the same year, 66 and in 1958 a 1000-kw gas turbine (Mark
TA) was supplied by Ruston and Hornsby for mobile generator use." 7 In addition,
large quantities of control instrumentation have been supplied by British firms
—for example, an order for 100 starters from Brookhirst Switchgear, Ltd.,
in 1946 68 and large quantities of power cable and wire from Crompton Parkinson
and Aberdare Cables, Ltd. 80

Other countries have supplied similar equipment. For example, in 1947
the Swedish subsidiary of General Electric supplied a complete power station
for delivery in 1949-52 at a cost of $2 million. 70 In addition there was movement
of electrical power generating equipment from Germany to the U.S.S.R. under
reparations, e.g., the Gensdorf plant, 71 and the removal of the generators from
Siemens-Halske works in Berlin to the Elektrosila plant in Leningrad. 72

THE INCREASE IN ELECTRICAL GENERATING CAPACITY

The only Western delegation to have visited the Soviet Union and returned
to give glowing reports of Soviet technical achievements — and also to predict
that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States within a foreseeable
time period-was the 1960 U.S. Senate power industry delegation. 73 This
delegation report was significantly different from that of two other U.S . electrical
industry delegations™ and to some extent from that of the Canadian Electric
Power Industry Delegation. 75

" Electrical Review (London), vol. 140 (1947), 442.

" Ibid., vol. 135 (1944). pp. 764-70.

" Ibid., vol. 154, (1954), p. 480.

6 " Ibid., vol. 155 (1954), p, 290.

87 Ibid., vol. 163(1958), p. 22.

" Ibid., vol. 139(1946), p. 941.

" Ibid., vol. 155 (1954), pp. 290, 330.

" Ibid., vol. 140(1947), p. 986.

" Seep. 29.

" Keller, Ost minus War 'Null (Munich, 1960), p. 283.

73 U.S. Senate, Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and Public Works, Relative Water

and Power Resource Development in the U.S.S.R. and the V.S.A., Report and Staff Studies,

86lh Congress, 2d session, May 1960.
7 « A Report on U.S.S.R. Electric Developments, 1958-1959 (New York: Edison Electric

Institute, 1960).
" Report of Visit to U.S.S.R. by Delegation from Canadian Elecrric Utilities . May 14 to June

2. I960 (Toronto: September 9. 1960).

332 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

The Senate delegation report suggested that the Soviet Union was catching
up with the United States in the production of electric power; that in 1961
it was constructing large hydroelectric dams faster than the United States; and
that it had not only caught up with the Western world in hydroelectric engineering
but "... in fact they are actually preeminent in certain specific aspects of such
development." 76 The Senate committee that heard the report therefore recom-
mended a massive U;S. Federal program and a study of planning "on a national
basis." 77 On the other hand, the Edison Electric Institute report noted in distinct
contrast:

The economic problems facing the Soviet Union . . . are vast and complex. Even
assuming the [electrification J goa! is reached, however, it is worth remembering
that in 1965 the United States should have a total capability of 245 million kilowatts,
and the present 123-mi!lion-kilowatt gap between Russian and American electric
power capability will have increased by some 10 million kilowatts. 78

The Canadian delegation noted "good" power equipment, impressive plans
and organization, and "outstanding" transmission and hydraulic generation, but
"their achievements in thermal generation and atomic power generation were
not particularly impressive." 7 "

Electrification of Russia has of course been a prime goal of the Soviets. an
However, progress has not been as substantial as planned and certainly not
as substantial in absolute terms as in the United States. The United States
in 1950 had a total generating capacity of 82.8 million kw, including 18.7
million kw, or about one-quarter of capacity , generated from hydropower sources .
In 1958 this total had increased to 160.7 million kw {30.1 million kw in hyd-
ropower), and in 1967 to 269.0 million kw (48.0 million kw by hydropower).
In comparison, the Soviet total in 1950, after installation of the Lend Lease
power station and heavy equipment imports of the 1940s, was 19.6 million
kw (of which 3.2 million was from hydropower sources); this increased to
53.4 million kw in 1958 (10.9 million kw from hydropower) and 131.7 million
kw in 1967 (24.8 million from hydropower).

The total generating capacity in the United States increased by 77.9 million
kw between 1950 and 1958, compared with an increment of 33.8 million in
the U.S.S.R. in the same period. During the next decade, 1958 to 1967, the
United States increased its total generating capacity by 108.3 million kw and
the U.S.S.R. by 78.3 million kw. el (See Table 23-2.)

" U.S. Senate, op. cit. n. 73, p. 1,

' ; Ibid., p. 7.

" A Report on U.S.S.R. Electric Power Developments . op. cit. n. 74, p. 19.

7 ° Report of Yisit to U.S.S.R op. cit. n. 74. Further information on methods of construc-
tion may be obtained from "Excerpts from a Contractor's Notebook," kindly supplied by
Dan Mardian of Phoenix, Arizona, and deposited in she Hoover Institution Library.

"» See Sutton 1. pp. 201-6.

"' See Table 23-2.

Western Origins of Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology

333

Table, 23-2 COMPARATIVE INCREMENTS IN ELECTRICAL POWER
CAPACITY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE U.S.S.R., 1950-67

Capacity

Total electric

power generation

capacity
Hydroelectric

power generation

capacity

/ear

United States
(million kw)
Increments

U.S.S.R.
(mUSon kw)
Increments

Gap
U.SJUSS.R.

1950
195B
1967
1950
1958
1967

82.6

160.7

269.0

18.7

30.1

48.0

77.9
108.3

11.4
17.9

19.6
53.4
131.7
3.Z
10.9
24.8

33.8
78.3

7.2
13.9

63.2
107.3
137.3
15.5
19.2
23.2

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1969
(Washington, 1969), p. 511 ; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR 1967 (Moscow, 1968).

The gap between U.S. and U.S.S.R. generating capacity therefore increased
between 1958 and 1967. The difference was 107.3 million kw in 1958, and
this difference had increased to 137.3 million kw in 1967 . The gap in hydroelectric

power, where the Soviets have placed particular emphasis, increased from 19.2
million kw in 1958 to 23.2 million kw in 1967. Increasing the relative gap
in generating capacity is not an effective way of "catching up" with the United

States.

There are other indications that the position of the Soviets is worsening.
At the end of the sixties the United States had more than 70 atomic generating
stations on order while the Soviets, with only three or four such stations built
and none reported under construction, 82 appeared to be having difficulties with
their construction. There is no indication that in the generation of electricity
by the use of steam (thermal) plants the Soviets have generated any above-normal
efficiency operations. Claims are made concerning the size of turbogenerators
and that, for example, in 1960 several 200,000-kw units had been installed.
The first U.S. 200,000-kw unit was installed in 1929." The reported fuel
consumption in 1958 was 0.97 pound per kw-hr compared with 0.90 pound
in the United States, and the Eddy stone unit under construction in the United
States in I960 was planned for fuel consumption of 0.60 pound per hour. 84
The Soviet emphasis has been on the production of standardized facilities
using reinforced and prefabricated concrete units in the buildings. In this connec-
tion it should be noted that a great deal of General Electric and Metropolttan-
Vickers technical assistance was provided for thermal units in the 1930-40 period,
and in 1944 a U.S. consulting firm— Ebasco Services, Ltd., under instructions
from Lend Lease— prepared a set of drawings and specifications for standardized
designs using the metric system. These designs made "extensive" use of rein-

" 2 See Pravita, November 1969,

** A Report on U.S.S.R. Electric Power Developments, pp. err. n. 74, p. 8.

M Ibid.

334 western Technology an<l Soviet Economic Development. ,945*1965

forced concrete adapted to Russian conditions « In addition „ u ,

g»«i E^c-Emo,,, e,*,, E^rr/risrSp™ 18 ^-
...« »nd = i"„ e ir," ;, n i', e r :tw" k ■* '™ *■"' m """" *< s °™«

The* 1,.< fi, , h e p „ m of Kmfm from electrical e„„(

S;„'S ^-jss;- — "*«-■ - *-» »"'«- s:

-^ «„„ «* ^ wilh ^^ssssrruS

For detailed information on correm standard thermal ataiioar «e P s N«r h ■

Snrnvocnart r,r ,,Wi B tertfc, vWt eWrrnrranl.rti (Moscow, 1069) N eporoar,a,i,

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR

Western Assistance
to Consumer Goods Industries

Consumer goods, the neglected sector under Soviet planning, contains a great
diversity of products and technologies too numerous to discuss in detail in
a single volume. T tl illustrate the problems of the sector, however, this chapter
provides an in-depiW examination of a single food industry, sugar beet production
and refining, followed by a more or less cursory description of Western assistance
to other consumer ^onds industries.

Sugar production was chosen as a case study because in the Soviet Union
beet sugar refining is an old, established industry, larger in its productive capacity
than m any other country, and consequently an industry in which the Soviets
have had both the opportunity and the incentive to develop an indigenous
technology. There was prerevolutionary Russian innovation and development
in the industry; indeed, the Russians claim, probably with justification, that
the first beet sugar plants were established in Russia. Indigenous innovative
activity was continued in the industry after the October Revolution, and in
1928 two refining processes were planned. Innovative activity thereafter appears
to have v i rtual ty ceased— it i s u nl ikely that the Soviets woul d conceal any develop-
ment in this sector— and we find that by the late 1950s the two 1928 refining
inventions were still under development and the industry itself was based on
foreign technology, either imported or duplicated. These developments may
profitably be considered in more detail.

The first beet sugar mill in Russia, and the first in the world, according
to P. M. Silin, was founded in Tula Province in 1802. ' In the same year

P. M. Silin, Tekhnologiya sveklosakharnogo i rafmadnogo proizvodstva (Moscow 1958V
Translated as Technology of Beet-Sugar Production and Refining (Jerusalem: Israel Program
for Scientific Translations. 1964), OTS 63-11073, p. 4. All references are to the translated
version, which is more readily available in the United States. The first beet sugar mill in
the United States was built in 1838 at Northampton, Mass.; it failed. The first successful
U.S. beet sugar factory was not established until 1870 at Alvarado. California; see R A
McGinnis, ed., Beei-Sugar Technology (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1951) The
accuracy of the claim to Russian priority In sugar extraction from beets depends on how com-
pletely the story is told. It is true (as indicated in Silin) that a beet sugar extraction plant
was constructed in the early 1800s in Russia. However, this was done with the aid of govern-
ment subsidies as part of a Russian Government program to introduce foreign farming skills
into Russia. Tsar Alexander 1 sem recruiting officers to Germany, and there is littlequesiLon

335

336 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Ya. S. Esipov developed the lime method of juice purification, a method later
adopted throughout the world, and there followed in 1834 Davydov's develop-
ment of the diffusion method of sugar extraction from beets. In 1852, Ivan
Fomenko introduced at the Balakleya sugar mill the method of boiling massecuite
for sugar crystallization, and two years later engineer M . A. Tolpygin developed
the method of purifying sugar in a centrifuge by using steam and thus began
what became widely known abroad as "Russian sugar washing." As Silin
commented in 1958: "This advanced Russian method is now used in all sugar
mills of the U.S.S.R. and was adopted by the American beet sugar industry." 2

In 1 890 Shcheniovskii and Pointkovskii created a new design for a continuous
separator. In 1907 Ovsyannikov developed continuous crystallization of sugar,
and in 1910 he was the first to apply continuous saturation. This work suggests,
then, a respectable history of technological development in the field. However,
Silin, who lists these Russian inventions and innovations, fails to list any major
innovation after 1917. It is unlikely that the opportunity would have been missed
had such innovation existed, as glorifications of Soviet technology are found
throughout Silin. Silin's sole specific claim for more recent Soviet achievement
is contained in the following sentence: "No other country can compete with
the U.S.S.R. as to the volume of published scientific and technical material
on sugar production." 3

The following section examines Soviet beet sugar processes stage by stage,
with particular reference to the origin of processes in use in Soviet sugar beet
plants at about 1960.

COMPARATIVE TECHNOLOGY IN BEET SUGAR PLANTS

The flow diagram of a U.S. beet sugar refining plant is not unlike that
of a typical Soviet plant (Figure 24-1). 4 To bring out the comparison the major
stages of the refining process are examined in detail. These are:

1) beet washing equipment,

2) the cell method of diffusion,

3) predefecation,

4) thickeners,

5) filter presses,

6) evaporators,

7) centrifugals, and

8) crystallizers.

that German experiments in the extraction of sugar from beets came to their attention. See
W. Keller, Ost minus West=Nult, (Munich: Droemersche Verlagsanslalt. 1960), pp. 160-61;
McGinnis, pp. 1-2; and Silin, pp, 4-5.

1 Silin, op. cii. n. 1, p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 9.

* See, for example, McGinnis. op. cii, n. I. p. 134.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries 337

Comparison of Soviet and Western sugar beet washing units suggests that
Soviet designers not only adopted Western designs but attached a name of
their own to a design that differs little, if at all, from the Western progenitor.
The Dobrovolskii beet washing unit with a Baranov stone catcher is identical
to the Dyer beet washer and sand trap.* Priority of invention in this case is
clearly with Western i nve mors and Soviet units show few van ations from pre- 1 940
U.S. units. (See Figures 24-2 and 24-3.)

Silin's description of the Dobrovolskii unit applies equally to the operation
of the Dyer unit:

The Dobrovolskii washing unit consists of three compartments, the first of which
is the most important. The beets move along a perforated false bottom placed
above the floor of the washer. Dirt passing through the screen accumulates on
the solid bottom from where it is periodically removed through drain hatches
(a) . The arms are arranged spirally, closer to each other i n the first hal f of com part-
ment I than in the second. The increased number of arms increases agitation,
intensifies rubbing of roots against one another and hence improves washing.
Since water level is high and the arms are fully submerged, the water surface
over the arms remains calm. This very important feature permits the straw to
float up to the surface and to be removed through an overflow drain together
with the dirty water {left side of section CD). [See Figure 24-3.) Thus the washer

acts as an additional trash catcher Compartments 11 and 111 act as stone catchers.

They are fitted out with revolving paddles mounted on a shaft placed above
the shaft of compartment I . The paddles rake up the beets from compartment
II and send them over the partition into compartment 111. 8

Beet lifting wheels (which follow the washing units) used in the Soviet Union
are almost exact replicas of the Stearns-Roger beet feeders; the only difference
is in the shape of the flumes. 7

Diffusion is the initial process by which sugar in impure form is extracted
from sugar beets. Soviet cell-type diffusers are clearly of Western design, although
there is a claim to indigenous research work in rotary diffusers. Priority of
invention for rotary diffusers is claimed for the Soviet engineer Mandryko (1928)
who, together with engineer Karapuzov, carried out extensive investigations
in the 1930s "of all types" of rotary diffusers at the im. Karl Leibknecht
plant. 8 Another Soviet claim is that a rotary diffuser "appearing like a prototype
of the present BMA tower diffuser," was tested as early as 1928 by Professor
Sokolov.* Silin adds that "at present" (i.e., 1960) an improved model of a
Sokolov diffuser is being tested and further developed. Another vertical diffuser,

s Ibid., p. 132.

* Silin, op. cit. n. 1, p. 100.

' Compare Silin, op. cil. n. I , p. 96, with McGinnis, op. cit. n. 1. p. 129.

" Silin, op. cit. n. I. P- 174, quoting A. S, Epishin, Sakharnaya promyshlcnnost' . no. 8

(1953). 14.
9 Silin, op. cil.. n. 1 , p. 174.

338 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Figure 24-1 FLOW SHEET OF TYPICAL SOVIET BEET SUGAR PLANT

s£.

zlm LdiaLnk

r"^'rti B r

Cfi

u^^a

*— t '— - i r

Ifl

Source; P.M. Siltn, Technology of Beet-Sugar Production and Refining (Jerusalem:
Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1964), appendix 1.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries

Figure 24-1 (cont.)

339

*jl »7M*t-*n

340 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

IS
(L

a
m

■D

■5

I
3

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries

Figure 24-3 THE DOBROVOLSKII BEET WASHER UNIT

341

Source: Silin, p. 100.

developed by engineer Kundzhulyan,"was in operation at the Zherdevka sugar
factory for a number of years." 10

There is no reason why these Soviet claims should not be accepted as accurate .
It is probable that diffuser designs were developed and tested in Soviet factories
from 1 928 on ward , but what is striking is that no Soviet designs are in production
or use today; neither is such a claim made. " In fact the Sokolov model "tested
as early as 1928" was still being tested in the 1960s.

The most common diffusion operation used in Soviet beet sugar factories
is a duplicate of the Roberts cell. These cells are normally used in 12-cell batteries
installed in two rows of six cells each. Figure 24-4 shows the cross- sectional
elevation of a Robert cell, and Figure 24-5 shows the similar construction of
a Soviet diffusion cell.

In the last two decades, world practice has been to utilize rotary continuous
diffusers rather than cell-type diffusers and it was recently proposed to install
approximately 200 continuous diffusers in the Soviet Union. The most common

"> Ibid., p. 1751
" Ibid., p. 174|

342 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Figure 24-4 CROSS SECTIONAL ELEVATION OF A ROBERTS CELL

JUIC1 VALVm
£U*- CUT VMJT*

iMiil »Hwt :

'W UN»* CBU.

< — - *TWi.* CK1A.

" fl VT. OslT' CIlL

I AL.T«KMATE 'lH UUS

Source: McGinnis, p. 155.

type, the RT (Rotary Tirlemont), is in use in about 80 plants in the world,
including ten in the Soviet Union. This process, developed by the Belgians,
was first installed in the Tirlemont plant in Belgium.

Although the Soviets claim priority of invention for the rotary diffuser and
also for the BMA diffuser (manufactured by Braunschweig Maschinenbau
Anstalt), they appear to use rotary continuous diffusers only on an experimental
basis (apart from the ten Belgium-type continuous diffusers already mentioned).
It therefore appears that although work was done in the late 1920s and the
1930s on continuous diffusers, the Soviet sugar industry is today completely
dependent on foreign models for this method of beet sugar extraction.

Equipment for the predefecation and first carbonation process in the Soviet
Union is carried out in a vertical tank developed by the Central Scientific and
Research Institute for the Sugar Industry (TsINS). 12 This is apparently of
Soviet design and is widely used in Soviet sugar factories; however, Silin points

ibid., p. 195.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries
Figure 24-5 SOVIET DIFFUSION CELL

343

From jnccdlag
diffutlOD «U

Source: Silin, p. 120.

Figure 24-6

Water

JuLct

To Hit eiloriiitw

Ts INS PREDEFECATION TANK

Source: Silin, p. 195.

344

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

out that foreign-made equipment, and particularly the Brieghel-Muller pre-
defecator, is easier to control and gives a more consistent alkalinity gradient.
For example, he comments:

In other predefecators, the milk of lime enters at a number of given points,
creating each time a momentary excess of lime. These points tend to become
centers of harmful overliming. The Brieghel-Miiller apparatus is free of this defect.

It is notable (Figures 24-6 and 24-7) that the TsINS predefecation tank has
the defect described and therefore by Silin's criterion would be inferior to the
foreign Brieghel-Muller defecator.

As for the mud-thickening stage, Silin states that of the many types of
mud thickeners available in the world, the Dorr-type multicompartment type
is particularly widely used in the Soviet Union. It consists of a large cylindrical
tank with a slightly conical bottom, filled with first combination juice. Four
horizontal trays within the tank divide it into five compartments revolving on
a central hollow shaft which carries arms acting as scrapers. Figure 24-8 illustrates
the Dorr multifeed thickener while Figure 24-9 illustrates the multicompartment
thickener made by the Rostov machine-building plant. Note that the Rostov
thickener is an almost exact copy of the Dorr thickener unit. The only Soviet
innovation claimed for this stage of refining is one by engineer Shugunov; this
innovation apparently improved and speeded up the operation of the thickener
by discharging the concentrated muds separately from each compartment and

Figure 24-7

BRIEGHEL-MULLER PREDEFECATOR

Juice outlet

1 DIHiuton Julct

Source: Silin, p. 245

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries
Figure 24-8 DORR MUtTIFEED THICKENER

345

DOMCO
IKED KOUCM

CLtirtO JJCE

0VWLCW KK-

cowrna»*j
coMnurrvCNT

TH«
COMPWITweKT-

COMtWSTHEKT'

feed ctlmct

CLAKTO) JUKI TO_
OvtPWUSW BOH

TRW
COMMITMENT'

-DORHCO MMP

MUD OSCMAHQE

MUD

COWWRTMCNT

Source: McGinnis, p. 248.

by feeding each compartment with a suspension of exactly the same concentra-
tion. 13 The Dorr multifeed thickener has an arrangement similar to that claimed

by Shugunov.

Filtration is required to separate the sediment from the liquid. This is done
by using a filter press, and the common filter press in the Soviet Union is
the Abraham type. 1 - 1 The Soviet filter press is of the standard type; i.e., the
sides of the frames and the plates are Fitted with lugs that support them on
two guide bars. The carbonated juice with the precipitate is then pumped into
the frames through ports connected with the extension holes. It is claimed that
Soviet engineers, notably Gritsenko of the Kagarlyk sugar plant, have improved
the operation of the Abraham filter press.

The next stage on the flow sheet is that of evaporation. The standard
evaporator used in the Soviet Union is the single-pass TsINS evaporator, which

'» Ihid.. p. 219.
u I bid., p. 211

346

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Figure 24-9 ROSTOV MACHINE-BUILDING PLANT

MULTICOMPARTMENT THICKENER

Source; Silin, p. 218.

is described by Silin as "similar to the Roberts evaporator, but [having] longer
tubes." 15 Figures 24-10 and 24-1 1 show that the two units are of very similar
construction; i.e., each is a closed cylindrical steel boiler with a steam chest
at the bottom part of the boiler. In both units, vertical heating tubes are rolled
into the holes of the perforated tube sheets and steam is introduced into the
space between the tube sheets and so heats the vertical boiling tubes. The
juice vapor rises to the top and is conducted outside the evaporator in both
cases. It is quite clear that the Soviet single-pass evaporator is based on the
Robert evaporator.

The production of white sugar consists in separating the sugar crystals from
the mother liquor by centrifugal force. The most common type of centrifugal
separator is the Weston type, which is also used in the Soviet Union. 16

The final process in beet sugar refinement is that of crystallization, which
is achieved by spinning of the second massecuite; the object of this process

" Ibid., p. 274.
'" Ibid., p. 312-13.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries
Figure 24-10 ROBERTS-TYPE EVAPORATOR

347

IJuicc vapor

NoACOQdeottbtc gales

Source,- Silin. p. 273

is to obtain the highest possible yield of sugar in the form of crystals. For
crystallization, the second massecuite is mixed in a mixer crystaUizer while
its temperature is gradually lowered. The standard Western crystaUizer is shown
in Figure 24-12, and the Soviet mixer crystaUizer is shown in Figure 24-13.
The principle in both pieces of equipment is the same.

Thus it may be seen from comparison of individual pieces of equipment
within sugar manufacturing plants in the Soviet Union with similar pieces of
equipment in the West that, first, there is very little if any Soviet innovation;
and second, by and large Soviet equipment more or less exactly replicates Western
equipment. It is also obvious that much thought, preparation, and investigation
have gone into examination of Western processes to choose the most suitable
process and equipment for Soviet conditions.

Consistent with these findings concerning Soviet innovation in the beet sugar
refining industry are the known major infusions of Western technical assistance
and equipment for the industry. In the 1920s German firms reequipped and

348 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Figure 24-11 SOVIET CONSTRUCTION EVAPORATOR

Cndnuu

Source: Silin, p. 273.
Figure 24-12 CRYSTALLIZER BY SUGAR AND CHEMICAL MACHINERY, INC.

Source: McGinnls, p. 358.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries
Figure 24-13 SOVIET CRYSTALLIZER

_3S

349

Source: Silin, p. 319.

brought back into operation the numerous Tsarist-era sugar plants. 17 This aid
was supplemented ii- the early 1930s by technical assistance from the United
States. 18 At the end of World War II a number of sugar plants were removed
from Germany to the U.S.S.R., including 14 complete plants (for example,
Zuckerfabrik Bach at :>tobnitz, Zuckerfabrik GmbH at Zorbig in Saxony-Anhalt,
and the Vereinigte Zuckerfabriken GmbH at Malchin, Mecklenburg). 19

In the postwar years sugar plants were built in Czechoslovakia on Soviet
account — for example, two were shipped to the U.S.S.R. in 1955." In the
late 1950s and the I960? -xtensive purchases were made in the United Kingdom
and in Germany. What is more, an order for $4,2 million worth of sugar beet
equipment was placed i". 1959 with Booker Brothers, Ltd., McConnell & Com-
pany, and Vickers-Arn:.' ongs (Engineers), Ltd. 21 This was followed in 1960
by an order to Vickers .< Booker, Ltd., for two complete sugar plants to be
located in Moscow and the Ukraine valued at $22.4 million and each capable
of handling 5000 tons oi sugar beet per day." In 1961 Eimco (Great Britain),
Ltd., supplied eight rotary vacuum filters, four five-compartment tray thickeners,
and two filtration plants for 5392,000." Then in 1968 Vickers & Booker,
Ltd., supplied a total of $23.8 million worth of beet sugar processing equipment
to equip two complete plants— one of which was to be built by Vickers &
Booker.

17 See Sutton !, p. 235; and Die Chemische Fabrik (Weinheim, Ger.), 1, 42 (October 17,
1928), 615.

18 Amtorg, Economic Review of the Soviet Union (New York), IV, 23 (December I, 1929),

428.
,B G. E. Harmssen, Am Abend der Demoniage; Sechs Jahre Reparattonspolittk (Bremen: F.

Trujen, 1951).
! " Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin (Prague), no. 293 (February 1, 1955).
11 Easi-Wesi Commerce (London), VI, 5 (June 4, 1959), 14.
" Chemistn and Industry (London), February 6, 1960, pp. 154-55. Il is presumed that Vickers

& Booker, Ltd.. is a joint company formed by Booker Brothers and Vickers-Armstrongs (En-

gineers), Ltd.
23 Chemistry anil i miliary, July 15, 1961, p. 1087.

350 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR FOOD-PACKING PLANTS

There has been consistent and substantial Western technical assistance for
Soviet food-packing and canning operations since the 1920s. For example, in
the 1930s at the Kamchatka salmon canneries it was reported,

All the machinery "down to the nuts an J bolts" was American and most of
it had been made in Seattle. Makers included the Smith Cannery Machine Co.
[andj Ihe Troyer-Fox Co. (Continental Can subsidiary or affiliate), and the lighting
installations had been made by Fairbanks-Morse. 8 "'

In the Kamchatka canneries at that time there were also about 14 Americans
working in various positions to train Russians and supervise operations. 26 The
American consulting engineer for the Kamchatka salmon canning industry was
Alvin L. Erickson, who lived in Vladivostok for about three years in the early
thirties, supervising the 15 central canneries that had been established since
1930. These were equipped with the "finest machinery and accessories": accord-
ing to Erickson most were superior to the average West Coast or Alaskan
cannery, "... while some of them are in installation equal to any in the world." 27
Two of the canneries had been equipped with the latest vacuum-type machinery,
each with four lines and a maximum capacity of 9000 cases per day. The
industry also acquired 20 modern trawlers which were in charge of an English
superintendent, and some German engineers were employed in installing new
equipment. 28

An even more comprehensive food processing contract was that received
by the Chicago Kitchen Company, which supplied six architects for six months
to design the Soviet community kitchens. This group prepared the detailed
plans for i 1 model community kitchens which were then duplicated by the
Soviets. 21 *

In the 1950s and 1960s the purchases of complete plants continued. It was
reported in 1957, for example, that

Mather & Piatt, Ltd., Manchester, holds two contracts for the U.S.S.R, including
canning lines for fresh peas and also canning lines to handle both fresh peas
and runner beans. All these lines are complete, i.e., they start with viners, into

Wall Street Journal , March 30, 1967, 20:6.

U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861, 5017/Living Conditions/709. Report no. 689. See also

/589 and 861.7186/1, Tokyo. August 31, 1933. The Stale Department in Washington made

the notation. "The memorandum is not of great interest."

U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861 .5017/Living Conditions/709.

U.S. State Dcpt. Decimal File 861 . 5017/Living Conditions/701.

Ibid.

U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861 5017/Living Conditions/371. This group had the rare

privilege of working in OGPU installations.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries 351

which the complete peas plant is fed, and finish with packaging machinery which
labels the cans, packs the required number into a case, and then seals the flaps
of the case. 10

A year later Yugoslavia concluded contracts with the U.S.S.R. to provide
seven processing plants to manufacture tomato puree, the contract being valued
at $440,000. 31 This continued an earlier contract for 12 complete tomato puree
processing plants and was subsequently followed by a contract for yet another
nine plants valued at S770.000. 32 It would not be unreasonable to suppose
that Yugoslavia and Italy have provided the greater part of the Soviet tomato
puree manufacturing capacity.

In 1967 the Italian firm of Carle & Montanari of Milan supplied equipment
for a plant to be erected at Kuibyshev for the manufacture of 80 to 100 tons
per day of chocolate and powdered cocoa, packed and ready for sale. The
contract was valued at $10 million." In the same year another Italian firm,
S.p.a. Tecmo (Tecnica Moderna) signed a contract valued at $6.4 million to
build and equip a plant at Stupino to produce cardboard packaging; the plant's
capacity was to be 60,000 tons per year of containers for use in automatic
food packing lines. 3 " 1

However foreign assistance apparently is not always utilized industry-wide
after it is attained. For example, the 1963 U.S. dairy delegation visited milk
and dairy products processing plants, and one observer noted:

Based on about 27 years of milk plant experience in this country [i.e., the United
States], 1 must say that [the Soviets'] processing equipment, in terms of bottle
washers, holding tanks, clarifiers, pasteurizers, final bottling, and capping equip-
ment, are many years behind that which we are permitted to use in this country. 55

Considering that ten years earlier, in 1954, the Soviet Union purchased from
U.D. Engineering Co., Ltd. (a United Kingdom firm and a subsidiary of the
dairy chain United Dairies, Ltd.) milk bottling and processing equipment to
a total of $3 million, the conditions encountered in 1963 by the U.S. dairy
delegation are somewhat surprising. 36

30 East-West Commerce. IV, 4 (April 3, 1957), M.

31 East-West Commerce . V, 1, (January 3. 1958), 13.

32 Ibid.

33 Communication from Embassy of Italy, Washington, D.C.

34 Walt Street Journal . November 14, 1967, 12:4,

35 Unpublished report by George D. Scott, vice president of Ex-Cell-O Corp.: "Dairy
Exchange Delegation to Russia, July 7, 1963-August 2, 1963"; typescript supplied by Dairy
Society International, Washington, D.C. The delegation interpreter had the following parting
words for Mr. Scott ;it the Moscow airport; "Mr. Scott, now that you have personally visited
several of our great cilies in the Soviet Union, and have learned the truth. I hope when you
return to America, you will try to incite your people to a revolution against the tyranny of
your capitalistic system." Report, p. 13.

3 « The Times (London), March 24, 1954. p. 4d. For further information see, V. P. Pntyko
and V. G. Luncren, Ma.rJiinv i apparaty moiochnoi promyshleimosli (Moscow, 1968).

352 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

THE WEARING APPAREL INDUSTRY IN 1960

In the early 1960s the clothing industry of the Soviet Union, according
to well-qualified U .S . observers, was very backward. In fact it might be concluded
from reports of these observers that in terms of organization, methods, and
equipment the industry had not advanced very much from Tsarist times.

In mid- 1963 the United States sent a garment industry exchange group to
the Soviet Union, and the report made by one member of that delegation,
Alexander Lerner, President of Phoenix Clothes, Inc., of New York, is a percep-
tive account through the eyes of an expert observer. 37 After the delegation
had visited several clothing factories, Lerner's general conclusion was:

The production equipment, in my estimation, is very antiquated . . . they are very
backward in their supervision and pressing equipment. In their handling of produc-
tion, they are as far back as 30 to 50 years. . . . s "

The report then elaborates and supports this summary statement on a plant-
by-plant basis. The delegation toured the Central Scientific Research Institute
of the Sewing Industries and viewed films of new equipment in operation in
the various factories. These films, however, did not show machines at work,
and Lerner comments:

After all this information was given to us, 1 was very anxious to see some of
these machines in operation. We saw some of them at the different factories,
but they did not accomplish in action what [I anticipated from what] I saw in
the films. Many of the machines [shown in the films] I did not see at all. 39

j Similarly, the Indian Textile Delegation noted that although a great deal

] of development work was apparently under way in the research institutes they

j did not see models or systems actually in operation. 4I)

The first factory visited by the American group was No. 16 in Moscow,

j founded before the Revolution. One of the Institute machines viewed was for

j pressing cuffs and collars by a hot-iron method using a spray of water and

I no steam — a method described in the report as "very obsolete." At this factory

the sewing machinery as a whole was 20 to 40 years old, with perhaps 10

percent of it less than five years old. The second factory visited was No. 2

in Moscow, manufacturing men's suits and slacks. About 80 percent of the

machinery here was 30 to 40 years old and the balance, less than five years

37 Acknowledgement is due Mr. Alexander Lerner for his courtesy in making a copy of his
report available. The complete report has been deposited in the Hoover Institution Archives.

" Lerner report, p. 1 .

" Ibid., p. 3.

40 Textile Industry in U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, Report of Indian Productivity Team {New
Delhi: National Productivity Council, November 1962), Report no. 19, pp. 42-43.

Western Assistance to Consumer Good Industries 353

old, of Russian, German, and Hungarian manufacture. There was no steam
pressing because "they had no way of making steam." The plant operated
on a straight-line system:

We visited their cutting rooms and [were) astounded to see their manner of cutting.
They were using two-, three-, and four-suit markers — Also, even though this
wasn't heavy fabrics, they were only laying it up 14 double spread and less.
They had a tremendous amount of cutlers and spreaders for this operation. There

were three spreaders to each table.

Lerner then mentions the low quality of Soviet clothes:

1 see now why the clothing is being delivered so badly [in] quality of workmanship.
It is simply atrocious. Where they could use automation, they are using the most
obsolete methods. I have been in the clothing business for over 35 years and
1 have never seen such pressing and finishing of garments.* 1

The next plant visited — the Kishinev — was more modern, an improvement
over the Moscow plants with only 65 percent "antiquated" equipment and
35 percent less than five years old. The methods were better; while two-, three-,
and four-suit markers were still in use, the cutting heights were greater— 30
high, and slacks 50 layers high— and there were two, not three, spreaders per
table. The Smitrnov-Lastochkin plant in Kiev had antiquated machinery— about
80 percent old and 20 percent more recent machines. The Ukraine factory,
also in Kiev, had similar equipment and methods. Finally, the Volodarsky
clothing factory in Leningrad was visited, and the systems, machines, and
methods there were found to be similar to those of the plants previously toured.
On its return to Moscow for a promised look at the equipment making
machines for clothing plants, the delegation was informed that the plant was
closed. A visit to a Moscow woolen mill was substituted. This plant was over
100 years old but its machinery was installed after 1917; up to the mid-1950s
it had used all American equipment; some of its more recent machines had
been built in Tashkent. The delegation reported: "The looms are 10 years
old and all German-made. They have ordered 50 percent of their new looms
from Sweden." 44

On the basis of this report by skilled observers it may be concluded that
not only was the Soviet wearing apparel industry backward in 1961; it was
heavily dependent for its current production on imported equipment.

The manufacture of boots and shoes is a consumer sector for which the
Soviets apparently have been unable even to reproduce Western manufacturing
equipment . In 1928 the Lenin shoe factory was equipped with foreign machines"

41 Ibid., p. 7.

" Amtorg. Economic Review of the Soviet Union 111, 6 (March 15. 1928), 104.

354 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

that had been supplied in addition to the concession arrangements previously
described." In the early 1930s foreigners apparently acted as supervisors of
such plants. For example, in 1932 Max Korr, an American, was under a 300-
rubles-per-month contract as superintendent of a shoe factory in Grozny makine
boots for the Red Army. 45

More recently, in 1968, 20 complete shoe production lines for plants in
Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev were purchased for $5.6 million from British
United Shoe Machinery Company of London (a subsidiary of United Shoe
Machinery Corporation of the United States). This order included 2100 machines
to produce shoes by the cemented-sole process, and the equipment was installed
by British engineers. Jfi

In addition, large orders for shoes have been placed abroad. In January
1967 the Lotus Company of the United Kingdom received an order for $2.8
million worth of men's and women's shoes; 37 a few weeks later the Cooperative
Wholesale Society reported the largest single order it had ever received from
the U.S.S.R. — 80,000 pairs of women's shoes, which was 50 percent more
than the previous year's order. JM The British Shoe Corporation also announced
a $490,000 order for 100,000 pairs of women's shoes." Simultaneously , Japanese
firms sold to the U.S.S.R. 1.2 million square feet of "Clarino"— a Japanese-
developed "breathing synthetic material."' 1 '

" See Sutton 1, p. 231.

15 U.S. State Dept. Decimal File 861 .50 1 7/Living Conditions/505.

" Walt Street Journui. March 12, 1968,27:5.

" The Times (London), January 8, 1967.

" The Times (London). January 20, 1967.

" Ibid.

s " The Times (London). January I 1, 1967.

PART III

Implications and Conclusions
of the Study

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Innovation in the Soviet Union

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize verifiable Soviet innovation and
to determine the degree of indigenous innovation that has taken place in the
Soviet Union relative to the import of foreign innovation. Hopefully this summary
wil! throw some light on the organic capability of the Soviet society to innovate.
We may first usefully sum up the innovations found to be truly of Soviet origin.
The first volume of this series isolated several unsuccessful attempts by
the Soviets to develop their own technologies. Tractor production in the mid-
1920s provides an excellent example. 1 Although these attempts failed, there
is no question that considerable effort and resources were placed behind such
innovative experiments.

In the period covered by the second volume, 2 the years 1930 to 1945,
rather surprisingly we do not find continuation of early efforts; rather we see
an abandonment of domestic innovation, but not of basic research effort, and
the substitution of wholehearted adoption of foreign techniques. This policy
led to the widespread practice of copying and duplication, so that by 1945
Soviet industry was a more or less haphazard copy of Western, predominantly
American, technology. The major exceptions to this rule were to be found
in Ramzin's "once-through" boiler (which, however, had been abandoned by
1 945), the turbodrill , and several machine gun and weapons designs. The weapons
designs originated with copies of Western guns, but by 1945 the Soviet stress
on the military sector had provided some indigenous Soviet military
capability — although Soviet technology was still woefully backward in areas
such as fire control and radar. The U.S.S.R. was able to concentrate effort
in this field by virtue of free import of Western advances in the general industrial
sectors, thus releasing scarce design and engineering talent resources for military
work.

In the period covered by this volume (1945-65) we find several groups
of indigenous innovations, although obviously the hypothesis that there has
been an absence of self-generated innovation is generally supported.

Two questions now arise: what is the nature of these groups of indigenous

See Suuon 1^
Simon 11 .

m-35.

357

358

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Soviet innovation? Why have they appeared in only a few fields, and not generally
throughout the industrial structure?

SOVIET INVENTION IN THE WORLD MARKET

Table 25-1 contains a list {from an official Soviet source) of ail Soviet
foreign licensing agreements in force at January 1967.

Table 25-1 COMPLETE LISTING OF SOVIET PATENT

AND LICENSE AGREEMENTS IN FORCE OUTSIDE
THE U.S.S.R. AS OF JANUARY 1967

Country

Number of
Agreements

Description of Soviet Invention Transferred

United
States

Canada

United
Kingdom

Denmark
Italy

Norway
France

17 16 agreements for suture instruments

1 agreement for procedures for producing liquid
cores and mold mixtures
1 Prosthesis of the forearm with bioelectrical

control
3 Computing device for calculating the number

of sheets in a stack of paper (sheet
counting machine)
Prosthesis of the forearm with bioelectrical

control
Machine for wire cell bundling at Ton and
steel plants
1 Liquid core and mold mixtures; procedure

for producing cores and molds thereof
5 Universal system of industrial pneumoautomatic

elements
Optimalizing pneumatic controller
Liquid core and mold mixtures; procedure for

producing cores and molds thereof
Electrodes for arc welding and building up of

gray and high-strength cast iron
Mill for cold rolling of tubes
1 Liquid core and mold mixtures; procedure for

producing cores and molds thereof

18 Continuous steel casting plant
Electro-pulse machine tool for processing to

size of conducting materials, model 4733
Device for automatic control of electrode rod gap
Device for automatic selection and adjustment

of optimal electrode rod gap, model 3P
Rotary unipolar pulse generators
High-frequency unipolar pulse generator
Carbon-graphite material for measuring electrodes,

grade
Machine tool for processing shaped articles made

of graphite-containing materials, measuring

electrodes predominantly, model MA-459

Innovation in the 5 vier Union

359

Table 25-1 (cont.)

Country

Number of
Agr*?ments

Description of Soviet Invention Transferred

Federal Republic
of Germany

Switzerland
Sweden

Japan

Method for electroslag welding and metal buildup
and the device for carrying out the above
method (apparatus A-372 and A-501)

Liquid core and mold mixtures; procedures for
producing cores and molds thereof

Method ol producing the drug luteneurin

Universal system of industrial pneumoautomatic
elements

Optimalizing pneumatic controller

Evaporative cooling plant for open hearth and
heating furnaces

Powder-cored wires

Laminated material for resistors and high-
precision potentiometer

Electroslag remelting of metals and alloys in
water-cooled mold and equipment for its
realization

Method of continuous neutralization of grease

and oil in soap-alkaline medium
Electrodes for arc welding and surfacing of

gray and high-strength iron
Powder wires agreements for 3 turbodrills
Method of dlmecarbine production
Method lor electroslag welding and metal build-
up and the device for carrying out the above

method (apparatus A-372 and A-S01)
Liquid core and mold mixtures;

procedure for producing cores and molds thereof
Method lor production of hydrogen peroxide with

concentration up to 45 percent by weight
Continuous steel casting plant
Method for preparation of fine-granulated

components for the manufacture of Ihe

artificial building material sillcalcite
Electrodes for cold welding and buildup

welding of gray iron
Electroslag remelting of metals and alloys in

water-cooled mold and equipment for its

realization
Digger shield for tunneling in weak ground.

3.6-meter diameter
Mechanized composite mining units (Tula for

complete mechanization of coal mining operations)

Source: Letter from Litsenzintorg (Licensintorg), Moscow, February 18, 1967.

In brief, this listing presents the sum total of Soviet invention that had
the proven potential of competing in the world technical marketplace as of
January 1967. It is not a list of adopted invention, i.e., innovation, but only

360

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

of that Soviet invention which had possibilities of commercial adoption in the
face of competing world technical developments. It is therefore an accurate
comparative guide to the originality of Soviet invention, particularly as Party
injunctions have been to sell Soviet technology abroad wherever possible. Table
25-2 summarizes the information contained in Table 25- 1 on a country-by-country
basis and indicates the degree of duplication of licensing agreements and the
narrowness of the technical areas covered.

Table 25-2 SUMMARY OF SOVIET FOREIGN LICENSING AGREEMENTS AS OF 1967

Number of

Technologies

Suture instruments

Liquid cores

Welding

Country

agreements

and

apparatus

and molds

techniques

Other

United

Kingdom

—

Denmark

—

Italy

—

Canada

—

Norway

—

U.S.A.

—

France

F.R.G.

—

Switzerland

—

Sweden

—

Japan

—

Source. 1 Derived from Table 2S-1 .

The country having the largest number of agreements was France, with
18. The United States was second with 17, and of these 17, 16 were with
U.S. Surgical, Inc., for suture instruments and one was for a core and mold
mixture process with Heppenstal. 3

As we have pointed out, these 62 licensing agreements constitute Soviet
inventions that had potential on the world market at 1967. They do not constitute
innovations, as the existence of a licensing agreement does not necessarily imply
a technology's application in practice. Apart from the small number of such
licensing agreements, analysis discloses some rather remarkable features. Of
the 62 total, 17 were for medical suture instruments (there are duplicates, as

Examination of Soviet tcehniccveconomic literature suggests there was a remarkable lack of
substantive innovation — or even invention — in the late 1960s. See, for example, the
numerous reports in the monthly HiitHrtin' ii-khttikovkiituitrticht'skm infonmitsii (Moscow), and
various appeals in Prttvdti for a higher technical level of invention and innovation. Pure scientific
discovery was somewhat more satisfactory but hardly reflected the proportion of Soviet resources
it absorbed.

Innovation in the Soviet Union 361

the same machine may be licensed to more than one country) and another
nine licenses were in the field of welding metals. Thus more than one-third
of the agreements related to the extremely narrow and specialized aims of joining
together either human tissue or metals. The next largest category is licensing
in seven countries of a process for producing liquid core and mold mixtures.
In sum, a close look at these 62 licensing agreements reveals a remarkable
paucity of Soviet invention tocompete with the hundreds of thousands of processes
licensed on the world market.

INDIGENOUS INNOVATION IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Soviet innovation presents a paradox: an extraordinary lack of effective
indigenous innovation in industrial sectors is offset — so far as can be determined
within the limits of open information — by effective innovation in the weapons
sectors, although some weapons development isakinto "scaling-up" innovation
(see pp. 362-64).

As far back as the 1930s some indigenous innovation was achieved in such
weapons as machine guns and tanks. 4 Such development has become much
more noticeable in recent years. A recent weapons innovation in which Russian
engineers appear to have conquered a problem unsolved in the U.S. Navy
is that of ship-borne radar. Although the U.S. Navy has done a great deal
of work in radar control of ship-launched or shore-launched missiles, it remained
for the Soviet Styx missile, in the fall of 1967, to sink the Israeli destroyer
Elatk at a distance of more than 12 miles with three shots, thus demonstrating
dramatically the effectiveness of a radar-guided surface-launched anti-ship mis-
sile. The U.S. Navy had abandoned research because ship-borne radar in such
a missile must lock onto a target ship and deliver guidance commands; these
commands tend to be swamped by "sea clutter," i.e., spurious signals reflected
from the water when radar operates at a flat angle. Obviously, Russian technicians
were able to overcome the problem. 5

We may deduce from this and similar examples that weapons innovation
can be successfully achieved by a centralized bureaucracy. This is because
weapons i nnovation is predicated upon well-defined objectives. Military planners,
unlike economic planners, can estimate fairly accurately what the next technologi-
cal stage will be for a given weapon and can define a technical objective for
that weapon in clearterms. Work toward such a preordained objective can proceed
along well-established lines. Moreover, military technology developed toward
a specific objective cun be pretested to determine whether it fulfills its objective.

' Sec Suium II, pp. 240-45.

r> Business Week, November 29, 1969, p. 32.

362 Western Technology anil Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

By contrast, economic innovation has no such clearcut technical objectives,
and it does not lend itself to such pretesting. Effective innovation in industrial
sectors results from the positive interaction of a myriad of complex forces;
it can be realistically tested only in a market situation wherein the market itself
determines its success or failure. Soviet central planning cannot anticipate key
variables because it lacks the information network of a free market. Moreover
the system provides little incentive to explore the unknown: central planning
necessarily places its emphasis on known technology, not on revolutionary
technology. Therefore innovation in the nonmilitary sectors is likely to be
imported from market economies.

Thus the Soviets can achieve adequate weapons innovation — given the exis-
tence of a reasonably effective back-up industrial structure — while failing miser-
ably in the economic area of industrial innovation.

Western creation of a viable Soviet industrial structure is therefore also
a Western guarantee of a viable Soviet weapons system. This Western economic
support ensures that weapons systems may be developed and brought into produc-
tion because the output of the industrial sector is the input of the military sector,
which, unlike the industrial sector, has a proved capacity for self- generated
innovation.

SCAL1NG-UP INNOVATION

Review and analysis of Soviet technical achievements outside those offered
for export and weapons systems leads to the conclusion that many such other
achievements are better described as technical progress attained by means of
scaling up Western technologies. This conclusion may be best explained by
considering in broad outline the categories in which the Soviets have made
indigenous achievements and the relationships between these superficially dis-
similar technologies.

Soviet indigenous technical progress is concentrated in three industrial sectors:
iron- and steelmaking (but not steel rolling), electricity generation and high-
voltage transmission, and rocket technology. It may be noteworthy that each
of these three technologies was at one time or another pushed by dominant
party personalities: Stalin, as his name implies, favored the iron and steel industry;
Lenin of course was the force for the electrification of Russia; and Khrushchev
was a force behind the development of rocket and space technology.

Soviet work on blast furnaces has been toward the development of larger
volume furnaces and the application of new techniques to the classic process.
In open-hearth steelmaking the lines of technical progress are somewhat more
complex, In the words of one commentator: "Many things have contributed
to the good results obtained by the Soviets on their open hearths, but 1 feel

Innovation in the Soviet Union 363

that the hot-metal spout and the basic roof setup are unique, and probably
very important." 6

Soviet advances in electricity generation have impressed many observers.
In 1960 a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate noted that the Soviet power program
produced the largest hydroelectric stations in the world — yielding the greatest
amounts of electricity from the largest generators connected by the longest trans-
mission lines operating at the highest voltage. 7 It was also noted that while
in 1960 the heaviest U.S. transmission lines were 345 kv, the Russians then
operated 400-kv lines. These were being stepped up to 500 kv and plans called
for use of alternating-current transmission up to 1000 kv and direct-current
transmission ai 800 kv. The subcommittee concluded:

It is to the Russians' credit that, building on the experience in technology acquired,
they have now caught up with the rest of the world in the general field of hydroelec-
tric development. In fact they are actually pre-eminent in certain specific aspects
of such development."

In point of fact, this Senate assessment was somewhat overstated. It was based
on only a few observations, in themselves accurate but not sufficiently extensive
to warrant the broad conclusions reached.

In rocket technology the Soviets first absorbed the German technology and
then, after about 1960, went ahead on their own with more powerful rockets,
in effect a scaling up of the original German rockets.

There is a common denominator in each of these seemingly unrelated indus-
trial sectors where the Soviets have made indigenous advance. In each case
the Soviets started with a basic Western technology — indeed a classic
technology — that was well established and had a strong technical literature.
The blast furnace dates from the eighteenth century, and the open-hearth furnace
from the nineteenth century. In electricity generation the Soviets adopted the
Kaplan and Francis runner systems, and of course long-distance electricity trans-
mission was started in the 1920s. In rockets the Russians have a strong historical
interest, but in prart^al technology they started with the relatively advanced
German technology of World War II, and above all they had the reliability
trial data from 5700 German tests.

Therefore the essence of each case in which the Soviets have made indigenous
advance is that they ii-st acquired and mastered a known and classic technology.
In each case the considerable power of the Communist Party chose the industrial

* K. C. McCutchcon, "Open Hearth Shops of the U.S.S.R." Journal of Meiah (New York),
November 1958, p. 725.

7 U.S. Senate, Committees on Insular Affairs and Public Works, Relative Water and Power
Resource Development in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.. Report and Staff Studies, 86th Con-
gress. 2d session (Washington, 1960), p. 2.

" "ibid., p. I

364 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

sector for allocation of resources, and indigenous technical progress in each
case has been in effect a logical scaling up of an original classic Western
technology. 9

In each case the process technology has a precise technical framework and
is capable of expansion in size. For example, in blast furnaces Soviet designers
concentrated on increase in cubic volume or on specific developments, such
as high top pressure, to increase output from a given volume. The same applies
to open-hearth steel furnaces, which at a very early date the Soviets expanded
in size to 500 square meters. In electrical generators we find the Soviet effort
concentrated on an increase in generation capacity, and in transmission lines
we find effort concentrated on increase in voltage transmitted.

Not ail Soviet scaling-up efforts are so logically conceived as those cited
above . Sometimes they are neither technically nor economically practical; some-
times size for its own sake seems to be the desired goal. For example, Moscow
has the tallest television tower in the world. With a full height of 1722 feet
this structure comprises a prestressed concrete base 1260 feet high topped by
a 462- foot antenna. Conic in profile, it is 196 feet in diameter at the base
tapering to 26.5 feet at the top. Construction, which took ten years, was inter-
rupted by a debate as to whether high winds would induce oscillations that
would create a safety hazard. The tower is designed to withstand winds of
141 mph, although winds of that velocity occur only about once in 50 years
in Moscow. In such a wind the tower will oscillate 32.8 to 36 feet, while
it is designed for oscillations up to 42.6 feet. 10 What is the end result of this
project? The tower increases television range in Moscow from 30 to 50 miles;
hence the incremental benefit is an increase of 20 miles in range, a benefit
that hardly seems to justify the costs and risks of the effort. On the other
hand, Moscow does have the tallest TV tower in the world.

In a similar vein, at a 1960 chemical exhibition in Europe the Soviets
introduced "what must have been the largest model of a chemical plant ever
to appear at a European exhibition." 11 There was nothing novel about the
plant itself; the model represented a well-established process for making synthetic
rubber. But it was the largest model, and that constituted its novelty.

In each of the cases cited as representative of productive indigenous advance,
there was an expansion in quantitative terms of a known classic technology .
Consequently much Soviet advance actually falls within the category of technical
progress acquired by the application of engineering and experimental resources
to a given known technology. It is not innovation in the sense that innovation
establishes new and formerly unknown technological horizons.

" "Scaling-up" innovulion based on Western processes may be found in other sectors, e.g..

in sulfuric acid production (1000-ton-per-day contact systems) and coke-oven batteries.
10 Engineering News-Record (New York), December 1, 1966, p. 33.
" British Chemical Engineering (London), December 1960, p. 868.

Innovation in the Soviet Union

365

AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGICAL ORIGINS

We may conclude with empirical justification that Soviet indigenous industrial
innovation is limited to two types: (a) scaling up, and (b) the miscellaneous
category exemplified by the suture, welding, and minor industrial applications
licensed for world marketing in 1967 (see Table 25-1).

Obviously, so far as the Soviet economy is concerned, the more important
of these types is scaling-up innovation, whereby the Soviets take a classic Western
process and proceed by dint of investment, research, and development work
to increase the size or capacity of the productive unit. The results of such
technical scaling up may or may not meet the test of the Western marketplace;
there is no recorded case of its export to the West. Only the second category
has led to attempts to export to the West. The returns from these exports are
infinitesimal compared with the resources and talent available within the Soviet
Union.

It now remains to bring together the overall picture from 1917 to 1965.
Table 25-3 identifies origins for technology in 14 major Soviet industrial sectors
in each of the periods examined in the three volumes of this study. Where
Soviet innovation is the main process in use, it is noted in capitalized italics.
Table 25-3 then, is a final summary of the conclusions from the empirical
examination of technology in the U.S.S.R. over the course of 50 years.

Of necessity it is a broad examination. There are indeed many thousands
of industrial processes; Table 25-3 includes only the most important and, for
purposes of further illustration, a select number of lesser importance. There
is no question, for example, that drilling technology is fundamental to oil produc-
tion or that pig iron production is fundamental to iron and steel production;
however, of necessity, numerous less important processes for each industry
are omitted.

Table 25-3 AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF

MAIN SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES
FROM 1917 TO 1965

. Industrial Process

1917-1930

1930-1945

1 945-1965

MINING

Underground
equipment

German

U.S./
German

U.S./U.K./
German

Excavalion

equipment
Crushers
Ore beneticiation

German

U.S./U.K.
U.S.

U.S.

U.S./
Swedish

U.S./U.K./

German
U.S.
U.S./German/

French

Sintering

OIL INDUSTRY

—

U.S.

6 Drilling

U.S.

SOVIET

366 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

Table 25-3 (com.)

Industrial Process

7977-7930

1930-7945

1945-1955

Pumping

U.S.

Pipelines: pipe

U.S./
German

U.S.

German/
Japanese

Piplines:
compressors

U.S./U.K.

U.S.

U.S./Swiss

10.

Refining and

U.S./

U.S.

U.S./French/

cracking

German/U.K.

German/
Czechoslovak

FERROUS METALLURGY

11.

Pig iron

Classic blast
furnace

Scaling-up

SOVIETIU.SJ
German

12.

Steelmaking

Classic open
hearth

Scaling-up

Austrian/
SOVIET

13.

Steel rolling:

U.S./

blooming

German

14.

Steel rolling:
wide sheets

U.S.

15.

Steel ratling:
tubes

U.S./
German

U.S./

U.S.

16.

Continuous casting

U.S./

German/

German

SOVIET

NONFERROUS METALLURGY

17.

Nickel smelting
and refining

—

Canadian

Ca nad ian/Norwegian

18.

Aluminum smelting

German/

U.S. ISO VIET

SOVIEVU.SJ

and refining

U.S.

Czechoslovak

19.

Copper smelting
and refining

CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

U.S.

20.

Basic acids

U.S./German/
Italian

U.S.
German

U.K.

21.

Basic alkalis

Tsarist/
U.S.

U.S./German/

U.K./Tsarist/

Swedish

U.S./German

22.

Fertilizers

Swedish/U.S./

Swedish

U.S. /Belgian/
Dutch/Italian/

German

U.K./Japanese

23.

Synthetic fiber

French

U.K./German/

intermediates

German

U.S.

24.

Agricultural
pesticides

—

U.K.

25.

Synthetic
rubber

Tsarist

SOVIET

German/
U.S./U.K.

26.

Rubber tires

U.S./
German

U.S./U.K.

U.S./U.K.
Italian

27.

Glass

U.S./
German

Belgian/
U.S.

U.K.

Innovation in ihe Soviet Union
Table 25-3 (cont.)

367

No.

Industrial Process

7977-7930

7930-7945

7945-7965

28.

Cement mills

Danish/

Danish/French

German

29.

Coke byproducts

Tsarist

U.S./German

Scaling-up

30.

Pharmaceuticals
MACHINE BUILDING

German

German/U.S.

U.S./Austrtan

31.

General technical
assistance

German/U.K.

U.S./German

(None)

32.

Machine tools

German/U.S.

U.S./German/
U.K.

U.S./German

33,

Ball bearings

Swedish/Italian/

Italian/U.S.

U.S. /Italian

34.

Instrumentation

um men i

U.S./German

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

35.

General technical
assistance

U.S./German/
U.K./German

U.S./U.K./

(None)

36.

Heavy electrical
equipment

U.S./U.K./
German

U.S./U.K.

U.S./scaling-up

37,

Low tension
equipment

U.S./Swedish/
French

U.S./German

German

38.

Instruments
COMMUNICATIONS

German/U.S.

U.S./German

39.

telephone

Swedish/French/
U.S.

Not
investigated

French

40.

telegraph

Danish/UK.

Danish

Not

investigated

41.

radio

U.S.

Not

investigated

42.

television

—

U.S.(black
and white)

French (color)/
German

43.

Computers
PRIME MOVERS

■

—

U.S./U.K.

44.

Steam boilers

Latvian/
German

sower/u.s.

U.S./U.K./
German

45.

Internal
combustion

U.S.

U.S./German

46.

Diesel engines

German

German/U.K.

German/Danish/
U.S./Swiss

47.

Gas turbines

—

French

AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT

43,

Tractors

U.S./German

U.S.

U.S./U.K./
German

49.

Cotton pickers

—

U.S.

50.

Seeding equipment

Tsarist

U.S.

U.S./German

368 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 25-3 (cont.)

No. Industrial Process

1917-1930

1930-1945

1945-1965

TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES

51. Automobile and trucks

52. Railroad locomotives:

53. steam

Tsarist/U.S./
Italian

Tsarist/
German/UK.

54.

diesel-electric

U.S./German

55.

electric

German/U.S.

56.

hydraulic
SHIPBUILDING

57.

Hull construction
Engine design:

German

58.

diesel

German

59.

steam turbine

U.K./U.S.

60.

gas turbine

Trawlers

—

62.

Oceanographic
equipment

AIRCRAFT

—

63.

Aircraft
Aircraft engines:

German

64.

internal
combustion

U.S./German

65.

turboprop

—

66.

pure jet

—

67.

Helicopters

—

68.

Landing and

Not

communication

investigated

equipment

MILITARY INDUSTRIES

69.

Explosives

German

70.

Poison gas

German

71.

Tanks

French/U.K./
Italian

72.

Machine guns

Tsarist/U.K.

73. Submarines

74. Destroyers

CONSUMER INDUSTRIES

75. Clothing industries

76. Boots and shoes

German

Tsarist/U.S./
German
Austrian/
Danish

U.S.

Tsarist/U.S./

U.K.
German
U.S./German

75 percent
foreign-built

German
U.K.

U.K. /French/

German

U.S./German

U.S./ltaiian
U.S./French

U.S./German/
Italian/French

SOVIETiU.S.i

German
U.S.

French/U.S.
Austrian/

German

66 percent
foreign-built

Danish/German/

Swiss
Not known
French
U.K. /German

U.S./Japanese

SOVIET!?)

— U.K./German

SOWFT/ltalian SOVIET!,?)
U.S. U.K./U.S.

U.S.

U.S./U.K./
SOVIET

Data

SOVIET/
Finnish

classified

German/U.K.

Italian/French

U.K./German

U.K./German/
U.S.

Not known

U.K.

Innovation in the Soviet Union 369

Sources: Column 1 — Sutton I: Western Technology ... 1917 to 1930; Column 2 —
Sutton II: Western Technology . . , 1930 to 1945; Column 3 — Sutton Ml: Western
Technology . . . 1945 to 1965.

Notes: (1) Multi-country listings indicate several technical origins, listed in order of
relative importance. (2) In a tew cases, as !or example In the origin ol steam locomotives
in the 1930 to 1965 period, there has been Soviet adaptation of basic foreign or Tsarist-era
designs; these entries are noted SOVIET first and foreign sources second.

The first column in Table 25-3 relates to the period 1917 to 1930. There
was no Soviet innovation in this period, although there were, as described
in the first volume, several attempts in tractors and synthetic rubber to establish
Soviet products. 12 It should be noted that in this period the oil drilling industry
was converted almost completely to the American rotary drilling technique.

The second column in Table 25-3 relates to the period 1930 to 1945. In
this period Soviet innovation was identified in five of the 75 major industrial
processes listed. Although the turbodrill used in oil-well drilling reportedly
has German origins, the Soviets undoubtedly have worked on it extensively
and the drill introduced in the 1930s may aptly be called a Soviet development;
it replaced the rotary technique introduced in the 1930s and by the 1950s was
handling the greater part of Soviet drilling. However, overheating and other
technical problems led the Soviets to consider a return to rotary drilling in
the 1960s. Smelting of alumina from nepheline is a process conducted only
in the U.S.S.R. The original flow diagram and equipment for this process
were designed by an American company, ' 3 but there undoubtedly has been
some Soviet work. Synthetic rubber, butadiene SK-B, is a result of prerevolution-
ary Russian research effort, and production was developed under the Soviets.
The Ramzin "once-through" boiler appears to be a Soviet innovation, as is
the development of some machine guns.

There is no clearcut example in the 1930-45 period of a technology started
and brought to productive fruition under Soviet guidance; each of the five exam-
ples cited above (except possibly the Ramzin boiler) had its origins outside
the Soviet era. On the other hand, the conversion from pilot plant (or equivalent)
to series production was achieved in the Soviet economy.

The last period (1945 to 1965) is of particular interest in that we find that
several of the five "Soviet" processes adopted between 1930 and 1945 were
partly supplanted by Western processes. SK-B was supplemented by Western
synthetic rubbers produced with Western equipment. The Ramzin "once-
through" boiler was limited to small sizes and Western models were introduced
in larger sizes. In turbodrills we find the onset of technical problems and reconsider-

12 See Sutton t. pp. 133 t'f.; Sutton II, pp. 122 ff.
1:1 Sec Sutton II. pp. 57-58.

370 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

ation of a Western method— rotary drilling. Only in machine guns and alumina
from nepheline do we find continuation of a Soviet process started in the second
and continued into the third period. In both of these cases we find some earlier
Western influence: American flow diagrams and assistance in the early thirties
for alumina from nepheline and the use of Western patents in machine guns.
In sum, it is possible to trace only a single industrial process (the turbodrill)
which started, came to development fruition, and went through pilot-plant stages
and then to series production without replacement by a later Western process,
under the Soviet regime. But the turbodrill cannot stand the test of the Western
marketplace (it was tested with this possibility in mind by Dresser Industries
of Texas, and rejected). Synthetic rubber work was started under the Tsars
and is today about 50 percent supplanted by non-Soviet developed synthetics.
Table 25-3 shows the origins of 75 major technologies in three time periods,
or a total of 225 time slots with each slot describing the origins of a technology
at one of the three time periods. This matrix is summarized in Table 25-4.
In the period 1917 to 1930 no major applied technologies originated in
the U.S.S.R. In the period 1930 to 1945 only two such processes originated
in the U.S.S.R., but in another five areas the Soviets developed and applied
some major technology and we find both Soviet and Western processes used.
In the period 1945 to 1965 three processes were of Soviet origin and again
five technical areas used both Soviet and Western processes.

With these data expressed as a percentage of the total 75 time slots included
in Table 25-3, we find that in the period 1917 to 1930 the percentage of Soviet
technology was zero, that in 1930 to 1 945 ten percent of the technologies examined
had ail or some Soviet components, and that in the period 1945 to 1965 elev-
en percent of all those major technologies examined had all or some Soviet com-
ponents. It should be emphasized that this is the most favorable interpretation
possible of the empirical findings. It could be argued, with accuracy, that Soviet
processes in the 1930 to 1945 period were later replaced by Western origin
processes, and that where both Soviet and foreign technologies are used the
Soviet process is either relatively inefficient (the turbodrill) or used to a relatively
small extent (steam boilers).

Innovation in the Soviet Union

371

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

The Level of Technology
in the Soviet Union

Given the conclusions of the previous chapter concerning lack of self-generated
indigenous innovation in the Soviet economy, it must logically follow that the
general level of technology in the Soviet Union at any one time is consistently
behind that of the more advanced Western economies. That observation has
been made by numerous observers and indeed appears to be valid. This chapter
examines the proposition in more detail with respect to selected major
technologies.

A prime source of observations concerning technical lags is to be found
in the reports of industrial delegations sent to the U.S.S.R. under the technical
exchange programs of the last decade. 1 During that period the only delegation
to report on Soviet technology in glowing terms was one unskilled in
technology — a U.S. Senate subcommittee, which reported on Soviet hydroelectric
power developments — and this report was in distinct contrast to the impressions
recorded by U.S. and Canadian electric power industry delegations.

In 1960 the Soviet Union in all sectors (apart from the area of rockets
and guided missiles and other armaments for which resources had been concen-
trated) was well behind, even decades behind, both Europe and the United
States. On the other hand, the delegations seem to agree that in, general the
Russian grasp of theory is excellent. The problem is not one of deficient individual
ability but rather of the system's inability to convert theory into practical industrial
operations; i.e., there is an engineering weakness, not a scientific one. 2

In some industrial sectors which have seen no great change in technology
in this century, Soviet imports of foreign technology essentially reflect a domestic
mechanical engineering inability rather than a lack of innovation per se. For
example, in the manufacture of internal combustion and diesel engines the basic
technology has remained the same; improvements have been in the methods
of manufacturing engines and the efficiency of the finished product. Table 26-1

1 A collection of these reports has been assembled and deposited in the Hoover Institution Li-
brary.

2 There are many other factors that contribute to this inability, of course, including misatloca-
lion of capital and a bureaucratic inertia. But the proximal technological factor appears to
be an engineering weakness.

372

The Level of Technology in the Soviet Union

373

lists imports of engine manufacturing technology by the Soviet Union from
the West from 1917 to 1970; these imports have been supplemented by even
more numerous purchases of industrial machines and equipment. In sum. Table
26-1 analyzes he Soviet engine manufacturing capability. Imports do not reflect
any great c ha n j_e s i n levels of We stern technology , but the acquisition of additional
capacity does reflect improved manufacturing methods and more efficient engines
and therefore suggests a weakness in Russian industrial engineering.

This industrial weakness is effectively hidden from both Soviet and Western
eyes by the protest We GOST identification. In the case of marine diesels, where
we can match GOST identification to Western models (Table 26-2), we find
that there probably are no Soviet-designed marine diesels, or at least no GOST
numbers appear ioi marine diesels that do not have a foreign origin. Therefore
if any Soviet maii.".e diesels exist they have not been recorded in recent Soviet
technical literature.

Table 26-1 TRANSFER OF ENGINE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY
(INTERNAL COMBUSTION AND DIESEL)
TO THE U.S.S.R. FROM 192S TO 1970

Date

Agreement

Origin of
Technology

Western technology
transferred

1926
1926
1929
1930
1930
1930

Sulzer

M.A.N, diesel engines

Fiat S.p.A.

Hercules Motor Co.

A. J. Brandt Co.

Ford Motor Co.

Switzerland

Germany

Italy

U.S.A.

Diesel manufacture
Licensing of diesel engines
Truck engine manufacture
Truck engine manufacture
Truck engine manufacture
Truck and automobile engine
manufacture

1936

Budd Company

U.S.A.

Automobile engine

1944

General Motors Corp.

U.S.A.

Truck engine assembly

1944

Caterpillar Tractor Co.*

U.S.A.

Tractor diesels, KD17-40

1946

Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz

Germany

Diesel truck engines

1946

B.M.W.

Germany

Diesel engines

1946

Daimler-Benz

Germany

Diesel engines

1946

Steyr-Daimler-Pusch

Austria

Truck plant

1956

Skoda

Czechoslovakia

Engine manufacture

1959

Burmeister & Wain

Denmark

Marine diesels

1961

Transfermalic

U.S.A.

V-8 truck engine
manufacture (U.S.)

1961

Perkins

U.K.

Small diesels

1968

Fiat S.p.A.

U.S.A.''

Engine manufacture

1968

Renault/Peugeot

France

Engine manufacture

1970

Renault/U.S. consortium

France/U.S.A.

3- to 11 -ton tractors,

truck trailers, otf-the-

road vehicles

Sources: Sutton I: Western Technology . . . J9I7 to JS30; Sutton II: Western Technology
. . 7930 la T945; Washington Post, March 14, 1970; Business Week, April 18, 1970

and June 1911971 ; Metalworking News (New York), August 16, 1971; 'Not by agreement

with U.S. fini; b U,S. technology supplied indirectly.

374

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 26-2 WESTERN MARINE DIESELS AND SOVIET GOST DESIGNATIONS

Soviet GOST Identification

Western firm or model

6 ChSP 10,5/12.7
16 DN 13/2 x 18.4

6ChN 15/19

12 ChVN 17.5/20.5

20 ChVN 18.5/25

16 DV2 1.6/25/4

16 D VH 22.2/26/6

8 ChR 24/36

18 Ch NV 20/45

6 Ch R 32/48

6 D R 34/47

12 Ch VRN 40/46

8 ChN 38.1/45.7

6 ChRN 45/66

6 DR 52/90
6 DKR 55/100
DKRN 62/115
DKRN 70/120
DKRN 75/132
DKRN 76/150
DKRN 76/150
DKRN 84/180
DKRN 84/160
DKRN 85/170
DKRN 90/155
DKRN 90/160

Cummins JMC 600

Napier-Pielstik

Mercedes-Benz MB-846A

Mercedes-Benz MB-820

Mercedes-Benz MB-518

GMC 567 C

GMC 498

8 DV 136 Buckau-Wolf

VV 45-M.A.N.

R 6 DV 148 Buckau-Wolf

M 46 M-Poiar-Atlas

PC-SEMT Pielstik

KSDM 8 Mirrlees

K6V 45/66 M.A.N.

6 GZ 52/90 M.A.N.

D 55 Cegielskt

62 VTBF 115 B & W

KZ70/120S M.A.N.

C 750S Fiat

760/1500 VGSU Gotaverken

RSAD 76 Sulzer

84 VTBF 180 B & W

KZ 84/160 C M.A.N.

850/1700 VGAU Gdtaverken

RD 90 Sulzer

C 900S Fiat

Source: V. A. Vansheidt, Sudovye dvigateli vnutrennego sgoraniia (Leningrad, 1962),
pp. 538, 540.

In some processes we can determine the borderlines of the "engineering
gap" quite clearly. For example, the Soviet Union purchased enormous synthetic
fiber capacity in the West between 1956 and the late 1960s; indeed, almost
all of its synthetic fiber capacity has been built by British, German, Dutch,
Japanese, and Italian firms. However, the Soviets also pressed forward their
own research in synthetic fibers, and a report published by the U.S. Army
Quartermaster Research and Engineering Command disclosed that by 1960 the
Soviets had developed at least 1 8 synthetic fibers, including three with no counter-
part in the West. These three are Enant (a Nylon 7), Ftorlon (a fluorine
with a copolymer), and Vinitron (a combination of nitrocellulose with chlorinated
polyvinal chloride). Consequently, given the ability to purchase synthetic fiber
capacity in the West, Soviet synthetic fiber research has been directed toward
military uses — lightweight textile clothing highly resistant to chemicals and photo-
degradation, parachutes, ballistic applications, and so on. Thus the Russian

The Level of Technology in the Soviet Union 375

Nylon 7 (Enant), not produced in the Western world, has useful stress-strain
properties and ultraviolet resistance. The Ftorlon, a fluorine-containing fiber,
is reported to have good resistance to chemicals and a much higher strength
than Teflon, the only such polymer available in the United States in fiber form.
Vinitron is a new fiber that will not shrink in water and has good dye characteris-
tics. This and similar Soviet work, including development of heat-resistant fibers
from organosilica fibers, 3 suggests that in textiles at least there is no lack of
ability up to the pilot-plant stage. Like observations can be made for other
industries.

The weakness starts with the conversion from pilot-plant production to full-
scale production. Therefore, in discussing levels of technology it is important
to note that an industrial and engineering journal may report new Soviet technical
developments and even pilot-plant or smalt-batch production; the important factor
to determine is whether the process has been utilized on a continuous basis
for large-scale production (not just series production) over a period of time
(years, not months). It is in this area that we find substantive evidence of
Soviet weakness and inability.

DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY WITHIN A SECTOR

Given a reliance on foreign innovation, the extent and speed of domestic
technological diffusion becomes of paramount importance. It was indicated ear-
lier'' that in the twenties, when a trust consisted only of one or two Tsarist-era
plants, diffusion was not a major problem. A technical-assistance agreement
was made with either the trust or a large and more technically advanced plant;
foreign technique was then diffused among the relatively few plants, as often
as not by foreign engineers. A single capable consulting engineer in a single
plant might, depending on the process, provide considerable information and
know-how in a matter of months; rarely did Soviet plants require more than
a year to acquire a specific technology.

With the increase in the number of plants, however, a problem of diffusion
has arisen. Information on foreign techniques is rapidly acquired and distributed;
but foreign machinery and equipment cannot be purchased for all plants. A
solution has been found in standardization and duplication, 5 but still there are
institutional barriers to rapid diffusion.

These barriers may be exemplified in two areas of technology — numerically
controlled machine tools and large presses. Numerically controlled machine
tools are typical of the complex computer-based technologies for which the

3 The Hosiery Trade Journal (Leicester, Eng.), February 1962, pp. 134-38.

1 See Suuon'l, p. 331.

% Sec Sulion 11, pp. 291-99.

376

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

Soviets have not been able to achieve rapid diffusion. The advantages of acquiring
the technologies are clear; the Soviet problem is one of inadequate inputs, i.e.,
computers and precision machinery:"

Innovation and Economic
effects

Extent of Diffusion
in U.S.S.R.

In U.SA.

Substitution of numerically
controlled for manually con-
trolled machine tools in pro-
duct ion of custom (un it)-bu i It
machines, machines pro-
duced in small batches, and
in large-scale production
requiring frequent change-
overs of tooling and setups.

Economic effects:

a) Reduction of labor skill
requirements

b) Capital saving by 20 to
25 percent

c) High flexibility in produc-
tion

d) Possibility of centralized
planning and control of pro-
cesses

e) Substantially improved
quality of products

f) Possibility of producing
products prohibitively
expensive to produce by
other methods.

Surprisingly slow progress.
Though at least two pro-
totype models, one point-
to-potnt positioning and the
other continuous-path, had
been produced by 1 959 , the
plan for 1960 called for only
1 80 units and that for 1 959-
65 for only several hundred. _
The relative meagerness of
press discussions about
actual experience in use
suggests that use is still con-
centrated in the armaments
sector.

NC machine tools represent
the most important
technological innovation in
U.S. metalworking sector of
the last decade. The indus-
try started experimenting
with the idea in late 1940s.
The first NC machines
became commercially avail-
able around 1954. At the
t ime of the Ch icago machine
tool show in 1 960, more than
60 firms were in the busi-
ness. Since then the number
of firms in the business of
NC machine toots has grown
stead ily and most of the func-
tional types of machine
tools have been adapted to
the system. As yet there are
no stati sties ava liable on the
number of the machines in
use. Estimates vary from
1500 to as many as 3000 in
the early 1 960s.

In metal stamping we find two divergent rates of diffusion for technology
reiating to the same basic process; one technology has made substantial progress
and the other has made very little. It is to be noted that Soviet large presses
have evolved from German very heavy presses removed to the U.S.S.R. at
the end of World War II. This technology amply supplies Soviet needs; hence
it has been well diffused. On the other hand, automatic coil feed for sheet
presses, although it is a development that goes back to the early 1920s, is
largely a postwar innovation; here we find a Soviet deficiency based on inability
to import units in sufficient numbers or to establish the technology within the
U.S.S.R. This is a problem that could be overcome given sufficient direction
of resources into developing Soviet versions of Western presses and feed equip-
ment: 7

U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Eionomic Power. Hear-
ings. 87th Congress. 2d session, December 10 and II. 1962 (Washington, 1962), p. 137.
Ibid.

The Level of Technology in the Soviet Union

377

Innovation and Economic
effect

Extent of Diffusion
in U.SJSB.

In USA.

Application of extra-heavy
presses for stamping large
sections of aircraft bodies
and heavy machinery parts
instead of riveting small
stampings.

Economic effects:

a) Dramatic reduction of pro-
duction cycle

b) Marked metal savings

c) Substantial improve-
ments in quality of products

d) Large labor savings

Substitution of automatic
coil and strip feed presses
for sheet presses in mass-
production industries.

Economic effects:

a) Marked metal savings

b) Large labor savings in
stamping

c) Cost savings in steel mills
because steel rolls are
cheaper to manufacture
than steel sheets

Substantial progress
achieved in recent 2 or 3
years

Thus far very little if any
progress made because of
deficient supply of presses

For ail practical purposes,
the 35,000- and 50.000-ton
presses manufactured by
1957 are considered more
than adequate even today

In U.S.A., automatic strip-
feeding presses have been
used for more than 40 years.
In recent years phenomenal
progress has been made in
adapting the presses to
wider strips, thicker gauges,
and greater speeds. At this
time automotive and house-
hold appliance industries
are using presses with
automatic feeds of steel
coils up to 90 inches wide
and Vt inch thick

In casting operations, to take another example, the rate and extent of diffusion
of technology have varied. In the substitution of mechanical sandslingers for
hand sandpacking, common in the United States, diffusion in the U.S.S.R.
is limited to establishments able to manufacture their own equipment. In the
substitution of machine core making and molding for hand operations, there
has been substantially greater productivity of machines in the United States,
contrasted to "slow progress" in the Soviet Union; in 1957 the Soviet Union
had only about 20,000 molding machines, most of which were "primitive pre-
World War II type." In the application of carbon dioxide techniques and related
processes there has been rapid diffusion in both the United States and the Soviet
Union. In the irtroduction of resin-bonded shell molding and core making there
was rapid introduction in the United States, which slowed down in 1960 owing
to introduction of a competing hot-box method; in the Soviet Union there was
"slow progress" owing to lack of equipment, thermoreactive resins, and fine-
grained sand. Iti two innovations there was rapid progress in both the United
States and the U .>.S.R. — pressure die-casting and semipermanent and permanent
mold casting in ferrous and nonferrous industries.

In only one casting process has there been more rapid diffusion in the U ,S .S .R .
than in the United States — in investment casting, largely by the "lost-wax"

378 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

method. The restriction in the United States is due to the high cost of small
operations and low levels of mechanization possible. The U.S.S.R. probably
produced three times more by this method in 1958 than did the United States.
On balance the U.S.S.R. has a slow rate of diffusion brought about by
equipment deficiencies and lack of necessary input materials. This completely
contradicts the claim that central planning, in contrast to a "chaotic" market
system, can foresee and plan for new material requirements. The history of
innovative diffusion in the Soviet Union suggests that the market system is
infinitely better able to provide new inputs to answer demands for innovative
diffusion.

COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF TECHNOLOGY

The evidence presented in this study suggests that, as a result of the need
to import foreign technology plus slow rates of technological diffusion, the
general level of technology in the Soviet Union should be below that of the
United States and the Western world. Certainly Soviet technological levels cannot
be above or even generally on a par with those of the Free World in areas
where the Soviets rely on foreign innovation. Although there are technologies
specially designed by Western firms for the U.S.S.R., and even some examples
of new Western processes introduced first in the Soviet Union by Western
companies, these do not constituie a general rule — they are exceptions. The
rule is that new technology is introduced first in the Western country and then
after a time lag is made available to the U.S.S.R.

One OECD study B contains a table listing Soviet statements concerning
relative technological levels of the U.S.S.R. and the West between 1959 and
1963. These statements forma useful starting point for consideration of compara-
tive levels of technology.

The first of the groups where leadership is claimed is "high-speed aviation,
space rockets, long-range rockets, atomic energy." This claim is not generally
consistent with the data in this study. By the end of the sixties the Soviets
had fallen behind the United States in rocket technology, although the United
States started its major program only in 1957 rather than 1945. In atomic energy
there is no question that the Soviets lag. 9 They have maintained general equality
in high-speed aviation, but their aircraft are technically inferior in many respects
(e.g., control systems) and have relatively high operating costs.

Leadership is claimed in steam turbines for the electrical industry, when
parity would be a more accurate claim.

The leadership claim in the "extraction of oil" definitely is not supportable:
the Soviet Union is today importing oil technology from Europe and the United

" E. Zakski el a!.. Science Polity hi the U.S.S.R. (Paris. Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development, 1969). pp, 496-99
9 See p. 239.

The Level of Technology in the Soviet Union

379

States. Leadership is claimed in terms of "output per unit volume" of blast
furnaces and open-hearth furnaces; this is acceptable, 10 and is a result of "scaling-
up" innovation. Claims for priority in rolling mill technology are not acceptable,
but a claim for electro-slag resmetting is acceptable on the basis of equality
with the United States. 11

A claimed priority in production of liquid paraffin is limited to pilot-plant
production. The claim of leadership in automatic and semiautomatic welding
machinery design is not supportable (in 1970)— although there has been some

Table 26-3 COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS ON

SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL LAGS AS OF 1970

Western
industrial
delegation "

■~™

Technology

OECDfleporf*

Sutton °

Coal mining — underground

—

Ten years

Ten-year lag

operations

behind "

Atomic energy

"Equal or in

"Competent,"

10-to 15-year

the lead"

"lack of ex-
perimental
equipment"'

lag as of 1970

Blast furnaces

"Equal or in

the lead"

(1959)

No lag (

No lag

Steel rolling

"Equal or in

20- to 30-year

30-year lag

the lead"

lag

(1959)

Ore beneficiation

"U.S.S.R. lagging"

"Patterned

20-year lag

(1960)

atler early
American
models" <

Oil well drilling

"U.S.S.R. equal or

Depth limita-

in the lead"

tions

(1959)

Pipeline compressors

—

"Far behind" a

20-year lag

Large-diameter pipe

—

"Far behind" 9

20-year lag

Chemical engineering

"U.S.S.R. lagging

—

Minimum 30-

(all phases)

(1959)

year lag

Sources; E. Zaleski et al. Science Policy in the US.S.R. (Paris: Organization tor
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969); »See text pp. 372 and 373; « See text
pp. 369-70; ° Private letter from Vasilliy Strishkov. former Russian coal mining engineer,
now with U.S. Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C.; "Atomic energy in the Soviet Union,
Trip Report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Delegation, May 1963 (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: AEC
Division of Technical Information Extension, n.d.); * Steel in the Soviet Union, Report of
the American Steel and Iron Ore Delegation's Visit to the Soviet Union, May and June
1958 (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1959); »"USSR Natural Gas Industry,"
Report of the 1961 U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Natural Gas Industry (n.p.: American
Gas Association, n.d.).

See p.
See p,

I23.
I3I.

380

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Soviet development in the field, 12 Claims of engineering priority in four types
of textile machinery are not acceptable.

In brief, the Soviets' claims of technological leadership were not generally
consistent with the technical data presented in this study or with the reports
made by Western industrial delegations and by individual Western observers.
Table 26-3 compares the assessment made by different observers for a number
of major technologies. The last column is a general assessment, based on the
information available, of Soviet lags.

There is little question that behind continuing efforts to establish a paper
priority for Soviet technology, particularly before politically aware audiences,
is an acute knowledge that the substance of the claims is fragile. Only a superficial
examination of Soviet claims is needed to reject many as absurd or inadequate;
almost any technology can be asserted as superior to all others if care is taken
to choose carefully the parameters of comparison.

In general, the ievel of Soviet technology is substantially behind that of
the West except in those areas (blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, coke ovens,
electrical generators, turbines) where scaling-up innovation based on classic
Western processes has been successful .

See p. 131.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

National Security and Technical Transfers

The major conclusions presented by this study are that Western technology
has been, and continues to be, the most important factor in Soviet economic
development. The technical transfers that have fostered this development have
continued over a period of 50 years. These observations will now be related
to the declared hostility of the U.S.S.R. to the West since 1917, a hostility
such that the United States alone apparently requires annual defense expenditures
in excess of $80 billion (1969) to counter the threat.

That the Soviets have openly and consistently advocated the overthrow of
Western democratic systems from 1917 to the present time is a fundamental
starting point for the development of our national security policies. Rationality
suggests, therefore, that either our policy regarding technical transfers to the
Soviet Union is in error or our inflated annual defense expenditure is unnecessary .
Either there is no valid rationale for much of our trade with the Soviets, i.e.,
for the main vehicle of technical transfers, or there is no valid rationale for
defense against the Soviets. The two policies are incompatible.

The factors to be considered in highlighting this policy conflict are, first,
the direct supply of military goods from the West to the U.S.S.R.; second,
the supply of technology and equipment for Soviet production of military goods';
third, the strategic implications of the technical transfers as seen by both the
Soviets and the West; and fourth, the failure of Western export control and
the reasons for that failure. Finally, analysis of these factors should conclude
with a brief discussion of the relationship between technical transfers and national
security in the light of this empirical study.

We are faced initially with the problem that the term "strategic" has a
limited definition in the West. All technology, goods, and trade are strategic
in the full sense of the word. Western definitions have been restricted, with
obvious consequences. It is proposed to outline first some of the direct military
transfers (i.e., those which would be militarily "strategic" by any definition)
and then some indirect transfers applicable to military ends (but not strategic
in the Western definition), and then to examine the spectrum of transfers in
light of a more accurate definition of the term "strategic."

381

382 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

DIRECT SUPPLY OF MILITARY GOODS TO THE U.S.S.R.

Earlier chapters have described direct supply of weapons and other military
supplies to the U.S.S.R. Before 1930 this was primarily a German transfer.
The Red Army and Air Force were trained by German officers, using German
equipment, and arsenals and plants for the production of weapons were established
with German technical assistance and finance. 1

In the 1930s Soviet sources of supply widened to include Great Britain
and the United States for the early predecessors of Soviet tanks. The United
States, for example, supplied the early tractor plants which doubled as tank-
producing plants, 2 in addition to cartridge lines, 3 a nitrocellulose plant, 4 and
military electronics. 5

Lend Lease of course was a significant provider of weapons to the U.S.S.R.,"
and numerous items supplied under Lend Lease became prototypes for later
standard Soviet military equipment. For example, the BTR-40 Soviet armored
personnel carrier of the 1950s is an almost exact copy of the U.S. M3 Al
scout car. 7 Although the skills of German scientists were used after the war
to develop military electronics, including missile guidance systems, much
technology in this field as well came from the United States. The Soviet search
radar, for example, was based on U.S. Navy type SJ radar sets powered by
magnetron tubes and received under Lend Lease. 8 Gun-laying radar was based
on the British Mark II, and RUS I and RUS 11 radar units of the 1950s were
based on Lend Lease supplies.

More recently, capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo provided the Soviets with
electronic equipment 15 years ahead of anything they possessed at the end
of the 1960s, 9 and persistent espionage in the United States has provided a
steady flow of new military technologies. 10 In the famous 1962 Cuban missile
crisis the ships used by the Soviets were fitted with extra-large hatches to carry
missiles and were powered by engines manufactured by Burmeister & Wain
in Copenhagen, Denmark."

Finally, in 1970 the South African Air Force reported a Russian submarine
taking on fuel from the Soviet tanker Elgava, 1 * a vessel built in Sweden in

1 See Sutton I: Western Technology ... 1917 to 1930.

2 See Sutton II: Western Technology ... 1930 to 1945.
' Ibid., pp. 237-38.

< Ibid., pp. 246-47.

s Ibid., p. 160-63.

11 See pp. 3-11.

I Ordnance, (Washington, D.C.), January-February 1969, p. 396.

" J. M. Carroll, Secrets of Electronic Espionage (New York: Dutton, 1966). pp. 143-44.
" Los Angeles Times. February 8. 1968.

10 For example, missile accelerometers: in Great Britain, the Lonsdale case revealed that the
Soviets had been provided with the Decca Tracking System.

II The Washington Post, February 27, 1970, p. AI4.

12 The Star (Johannesburg), weekly air edition, February 20, 197 1 . p. 1 .

National Security and Technical Transfers 383

1961 and equipped with Danish engines. The South Africans also reported
the Russian ship Bakoeriani in the Indian Ocean en route to East Africa with
a naval patrol boat as deck cargo. The engines of the Bakoeriani are Burmeister
& Wain models built at the Bryansk plant in the Soviet Union under the 1959
technical-assistance agreement between the Soviets and the Danish company. 13
Thus by one means or another— and the greater part of the information
on this topic is understandably classified — the Soviets have received a flow
of Western technologies for direct military use from 1917 down to the present
day.

TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT FOR
THE PRODUCTION OF MILITARY GOODS

It is generally known that an automobile or tractor plant may be used to
produce tanks and armored cars, military trucks, and other military vehicles.
Indeed, one of the major conclusions reached by a U.S. interagency committee
formed to study the war-making potential of U.S. and German automotive
industries was that the motor vehicle industry has enormous military potential:
"The Committee recognized without dissent that [Germany's] motor vehicle
industry was an important factor in her waging of war during the period just
ended. " 14 On the basis of its findings, the committee recommended that the
manufacture of complete automobiles in Germany be prohibited, that the man-
ufacture of certain parts and subassemblies be "specifically prohibited," and
that Germany "should not be permitted to retain in her possession any types
of vehicles of particular military application, such as track-laying vehicles, multi-
axle vehicles, etc."

The committee further listed more than 300 "war products manufactured
by the automotive industry" based on a survey of the U.S. automobile industry. ,5
Therefore after reviewing the U.S. and German automobile industries the U.S.
Government was fully apprised of the industries' clear military potential. For
reasons unknown, these conclusions apparently have been ignored with respect to
the Soviet automobile industry, although by virtue of its Western origins (if for
no other reason) the Soviet automobile industry is essentially no different from
the U.S. or the German industry. It has the same capabilities and potentials. 16

" ibid., p. 5.

" U.S. Foreign Economic Administration. U.S. Technical Industrial Disarmament Committee
to Study the Post-Surrender Treatment of the German Automotive Industry (Washington
1945). T.I.D.C. Project no. 12.

15 Ibid.

18 Shortly before this book went to press, the conclusions of the postwar interagency committee
were brought 10 the attention of the Department of Commerce with specific reference to issue
of export licenses for the Kama truck plant under construction in the U.S.S.R. in 1971 (see
p. 203). The answer of the department was as follows: "The contribution an established

384

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Table 27-1 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MODELS PRODUCED IN

SOVIET AUTOMOBILE PLANTS, 1945-70

Plants

Civilian models

Military Models

Moscow
(ZIL)

Ural
(Mlass)

Moscow Small
Car works
(M2MA)

Gorki
(GAZ)

Yaroslavl
(YaAZ)

Minsk
(MAZ)

ZIL 110. ZIL 111 passenger autos

ZIL 127, ZIL 155 buses

ZIL 150, four-ton truck

ZIL 585, three-ton dump truck

Ural-ZIS-150, four-ton truck
Ural-ZIS-5,

Moskvich passenger auto

Pobeda and Volga M-21

passenger cars
GAZ-69, medical vehicle
GAZ-69 parts for assembly

at Irkutsk, Odessa and

Ulyanovsk

YaAZ-210, 12-ton truck

YaAz-210E, 12-ton truck

YaAz-210A, 12-ton truck

YaAZ-210G and D tractor

MAZ-205, 5-ton truck

MAZ-525, 25-ton dump truck

MAZ -200, 7-ton truck

MAZ-200B tractor

Z!L 1 50 armored truck
ZIL 151 armored truck
ZIL 157 2.5-ton truck

Ural-375T (6x6 wheeled)
Ural-375 (tracked)
Ural-375/BM-24, rocket
launcher

Moskva 402, 4-wheel drive
cross-country Moskvich

M-72 (4-wheel drive
cross-country Pobeda)
GAZ -46, Soviet jeep
GAZ-47, amphibian
personnel carrier
GAZ-56, 1V2-ton military
truck
GAZ-62, 1-ton truck

(4-wheel drive)
GAZ-69A, scout car
GAZ-69, command car
GAZ-69, Shmel rocket carrier
Not known to be
making military
vehicles at this
time
MAZ-57, ammunition carrier
MAZ-63, gun low
MAZ-100, utility vehicle

Sources: Institute for Study of the U.S.S.R.. Bulletin (Munich), III. 1 (January 1956);
Leo Heimann. "In the Soviet Arsenal," Ordnance (Washington, D.C.), January-February
1968; Kratkii avtomobil'nyi spravochnik, 5th edition (Moscow, 1968).

automotive industry can make to the military potential of a country is recognized by the
Department. This factor, along with other considerations, enters into the decision whether or
not to issue any licenses authorizing exports of equipment to a plant such as Kama." Letter
to writer from Rauer H. Meyer, director of the Office of Export Controi. Department of
Commerce, November 12, 1971.

The logical deduction from this official statement is that the findings of the interagency com-
mittee arc known to and are accepted by the administration in Washington. Inasmuch as
licenses for the Kama plant nevertheless have been issued (according to the same letter), we
are forced to the conclusion that the administration is knowingly allowing the export to the
Soviet Union of U.S. equipment with military potential. At the time of this writing, licenses
for the Kama project had been issued to Satra Corporation, Cross Company, Ex-Cell-0 Cor-
poration. Swindell-Dressier, and (not confirmed) Giffel Associates. Inc.. of Detroit.

National Securiry and Technical Transfers 385

The interagency committee's conclusions at the end of World War II concern-
ing the military potential of the automobile industry are supported by data on
the postwar output of the Soviet automobile manufacturing industry. Table 27-1
lists Soviet automobile manufacturing plants and their production of military
vehicles i n the 1 960s . The Western construction of these plants has been discussed
elsewhere in the study.

The vehicles produced at Gorki—to take one example from Table 27- 1— are
basically Ford Motor Company technology. The plant was erected by Ford
in the early 1930s, 17 and additional foreign equipment has been installed since
that time. 18 Among the numerous civilian and military models produced today
by this Ford plant is the GAZ-69, in its civilian version a medical aid vehicle
but in its military versions a one-ton military truck, a scout vehicle, a command
car, and a rocket launcher. Examination of the construction details of the GAZ-69
vehicle confirm that it is a facsimile of American technology; the Katalog deialei
avtomobilei GAZ-69 .CAZ-69A , YAZ450, YAZ-450A, i YAZ-450D 19 includes
diagrams of the various parts of the GAZ-69, and these can be usefully compared
to parts shown in American catalogs — particularly those of the. Ford Motor
Company. Comparison of the oil pump (p. 30), oil filter (p. 36), fuel pump
(p. 46), carburetor (p. 48), mufflers (p. 57), and radiator (p. 66) will make
the point. Variations are mainly in body construction. For example, pages 192-93
provide details of a door construction utilizing wood and a design more common
in World War II German vehicles than in present-day American vehicles.

Thus individual parts and overall design of present-day Soviet military ve-
hicles, including those used for weapons systems (e.g., the GAZ-69 Shmel rocket
carrier) may be traced in the main to American automobile technology sent
to the Soviet Union as normal trade for peaceful purposes.

The more recent U.S. -Volgograd (VAZ) technical-assistance contract of
the late sixties for construction of the VAZ plant" affords an excellent illustration
of the military capabilities of allegedly civilian units. The implications are clear
despite the fact that only very limited data have been released. It is known
that the engine to be produced by the U.S. equipment belongs to "the small
and medium European size class (engine displacerrent, respectively, 73 and

See Sutton I. pp. 246-49.

As recently as spring of 197! :t was reported thai the Gleason Company had been granted

a license for supply of bevel gear production equipment for the Gorki plant. Rochtsrer Times-

Union. June 3. 1971.

Moscow: Mashinostroenic. 1968.

Although this agreement is commonly called the "Fiat deal", the Togliatti plant at Volgo-

grad uses mainly (about three-fourths) American equipment; Volgograd is the Soviet name (i.e.,

presumably, VAZ), and the facility is more accurately called the "VAZ" or "U.S.-VAZ"

plant.

386 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

85 cubic inches)." 21 This is approximately the 1500-cubic-centimeter class or
engine.

Does such an engine have any military usefulness? This is an important
question, since this single plant will have a capacity of 600,000 vehicles per
year, or more than twice the 1968 Soviet production of automobiles. 22 In other
words, by 1975 over one-half of the total Soviet automobile output will come
from this single plant; three-quarters of the plant's equipment, and all of its
key equipment, comes from the United States.

The military possibilities for such a small engine include use as the main
engine on a special-purpose small military vehicle (like the American Jeep),
or as a propulsive uni! for a specially designed vehicle for carrying either personnel
or weapons. The Soviet strategy is currently toward supply of wars of "national
liberation." Small vehicles of the types mentioned constitute excellent means
of transportation to replace the bicycle used in Vietnam.

Soviet interest in such small vehicles goes back to World War II. The
GAZ-46 is the Soviet version of the U.S. Jeep, and we know that such a
vehicle figures into Soviet strategic thinking. For example, General G. I.Prokov-
skii has commented on one advantage of the Jeep as a weapons carrier: "Even
relatively powerful recotlless artillery systems can, at the present time [the late
fifties], be mounted on light automobiles, without reducing the number of men
who can be accommodated." 23

It may be argued that a U.S. Jeep engine is more powerful than the engine
to be built in the U.S.-VAZ plant; it is estimated that the U.S.-VAZ unit
is about two-thirds as powerful as the Jeep engine. But it should be borne
in mind that requirements may be quite different from those of the United States.
In World War II, for example, the Soviets received about 6500 U.S. Airocobras
and promptly discarded armor plate, machine guns, and instrumentation, thereby
reducing the weight by 3000 pounds and significantly increasing the performance
they desired. 24 If the Soviets can strip 20 percent of the weight from an airplane,
could not the same ingenuity be applied to a land vehicle? Certainly the U.S.-
VAZ engine offers opportunities to resourceful Russian military engineers.

However, Russian engineers have no particular need to be ingenious. A
proven vehicle of excellent capabilities utilizing a 1500-cubic centimeter engine
already exists — and the Soviets have all the performance and manufacturing
data. During World War II the Germans developed the N.S.U. three-quarter

J ' U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Bunking and Currency. The Fiat-Soviet Aula
Pltmi und Communist Economic Reforms. 89th Congress. 2d session {Washington, I967J.

" Ibid.

" Major General O.I. Pokrovskii. Science and Teclmoloxy in Contemporary War {New York:
Praegcr. 1959), p. 122. Accompanying Figure 14 in Pokrovskii's book is a photograph of
a U.S. Jeep with mounted artillery weapons and inscription "U.S. 106- mm reeoiiless weapon
mounted on Willys Jeep."

" Aviation Week (New York). July 7. 1952.

National Security and Technical Transfers 387

track vehicle which weighed 3100 pounds laden, including three men. The
ground pressure was only 4.5 psi, and with a turning circle of 13 feet it was
capable of 50 mph. The Germans found this tracked vehicle "invaluable in
wooded country impassable to a vehicle of normal size."" The propulsion
unit was a 1500-cc four-cylinder Opel engine developing 36 bp; this same
engine later powered the Moskvitch 401 and the Moskvitch 402 (Moskva) military
cross-country four-wheel drive version of the 401, produced at the MZMA
in Moscow. In brief, there already exists a tested and usable military vehicle
capable of transporting men or adaptable for weapons use and powered by
a 1500-cc engine. Therefore the numerous statements by U.S. officials to the
effect that the Volgograd plant would have no military capabilities would appear
to be erroneous. 2 "

In 1961 a dispute arose in U. S. Government circles over the "Transfermatic
case" — a proposal to ship to the U.S.S.R. two U.S. transfer lines (with a
total value of $i.3 million) for the production of automobile engines. In a
statement dated February 23, 1961, representatives from the Department of
Defense went or- record against shipment of the transfer lines on the grounds
that "the technology contained in these Transfermatic machines produced in
the United States is the most advanced in the world," and

So far as this department knows the U.S.S.R. has not installed this type of
machinery. The receipt of this equipment by the U.S.S.R. will contribute to
the Soviet military -iid economic warfare potential."

However, this portion was overturned by a new secretary of defense, Robert
McNamara, in Novsinber 1961. McNamara explained his decision in response
to an inquiry from a Congressional investigating committee:

1 concluded that ih- Defense Department should not oppose export licenses

for the transfermatic machines in question My decision was based solely on

the merits of the case as I saw them, from the point of view of alternative sources
and availability of comparable machinery, and was in no part dictated by political
or other policy considerations.

My decision in this case was based on my own knowledge of this type of
machinery and of its alternative sources of supply —

*' "'Its dimensions and small turning circle make ii possible to operaie the vehicle in places,

such as mountain tracks and forests, impossible for ordinary transport." A utomobile Engineer

(London), October- December 1945, p. 481.
30 For example. Eugene V, Rostow, under secretary of state for political affairs, is quoted to

the effect thai the US. equipment for the plant "would not contribute in any way to Soviet

military capability. " U.S. House of Representatives, op. cit. n. 21, p. 42.
27 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Export Control, Investigation and

Study of the Administration. Operation, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949.

and' Related Acts. (H.R. 403). Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st session, pt. 1, October 1961,

p. 217.

388 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

As you know, the transfermatic machines were not be be used for the manufac-
ture of military vehicles, but rather for the production of medium-priced or high-
priced passenger cars.

Your letter asks whether I consulted with other knowledgeable persons before
making my April decision on transfermatic machines. The answer is that I reviewed
this case thoroughly myself. I did not consult formally with other automotive
experts as I had had the benefit of recent and direct experience with the equipment
concerned in private industry. 1H

These Transfermatic machines were in fact for the production of 225-hp
truck engines; 2 * they were considerably more powerful than the units supplied
for the plant at Volgograd and certainly adaptable to military end use.

The final case to be cited in the automotive sector is unfolding as this
book goes to press. In 1970, with a still relatively limited car-truck production
capacity — and all of that derived from Western sources — the Soviets decided
they were faced with an immediate requirement for a plant capable of producing
100,000 three-axle 8- to It-ton trucks a year, the largest such plant in the
world.

The initial Soviet approach was made to the Ford Motor Company, probably
the only organization in the world capable of building such a unit with its
own technical resources. There is no question that Ford was interested. A com-
pany delegation under the leadership of Henry Ford II went to the Soviet Union, 30
and at one point it appeared likely that Ford would build the plant for the
Soviets on a nonparticipating basis. In May 1970, however, Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird questioned construction by an American company on the grounds
that the trucks to be produced would have military end uses. Henry Ford com-
mented at the time that Secretary Laird's contention was "not only highly
misleading but appears to be a gratuitous attack upon my common sense and
patriotism." 3 ' However no one advanced the argument that the proposed plant
could not produce military trucks, and the participation of Ford Motor Company
faded away.

In subsequent months the Soviets tried elsewhere. The Satra Corporation
in New York, which has secured financing for the Soviets in other sectors,
attempted to put together a consortium of U.S. bankers and manufacturers of

2 " Ibid., December 1961, p. 474.

2a Ibid., October 1961, p. 217. William P. Bundy states the 225-hp figure but not the end use.
In 1961 no Soviet passenger car had an engine anywhere close to 225 hp. For a similar and
better documented example, see the final summary of the "ball bearing machines case" also
of 1961: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Export of Sail Bearing Machines to the
U.S.S.R.. Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1961). This is an extraordinary
case — the committee called it "of life and death importance to America and the free world"
(p. 1) — of an attempt to provide the Soviets with a capability for producing miniature ball
bearings, almost all of which are used in missiles.

30 Business Week, April 18, 1970.

JL U.S. Weirs and World Report. May 18. 1970.

National Security and Technical Transfers

389

truck and truck equipment." In August 1970 spokesmen for Daimler-Benz
in Germany, the largest truck builder in Europe, declared that the firm expected
to conclude a contract to build a factory in the U.S.S.R. to produce 150,000
trucks a year in the 10- to 20-ton range." In September 1970 it was the French
Government-owned Renault firm which announced a contract for construction
of the plant, which would be known as the "Kama" plant because of its location
on the Kama River, and which would produce 150,000 diesel trucks annually.
The French Government had assured financing of $127 million for seven years
at 5.95 percent — an extremely attractive package. 3 *

Mack Trucks, Inc., entered into some preliminary discussions in 1971 con-
cerning the supply of technical assistance for the plant;" and in August 1971
the Department of Commerce granted an export license to the Swindell-Dressier
Company of Pittsburgh for $162 million worth of equipment for the Kama
foundry. 36 Another license, valued at $37 million, reportedly was granted at
the same time to Giffels Associates, Inc., of Detroit," although this report
was still unconfirmed in late 1971.

The planned capacity of the Kama plant is greater than that of all U.S.
heavy track manufacturers combined. Three basic models are to be produced:
a 260-hp tractor for a 20-ton semi-trailer; a 2 10-hp tractor for a 16-ton semi-trailer;
and a 160-hp dump truck with a seven-ton capacity. All such civilian units
have clear military utility. Moreover, always in the past the Soviets have used
Western-built plants for military production as soon as the Western engineers
have left for home— from the Ford-built Gorki plant onward. Given this conside-
ration, it will be a trusting Western government indeed that accepts a Soviet
commitment that this plant will not be used for military purposes. 38

Chemical industries also are essential to modern warfare, and some of these

Business Week, August 29, 1970.
Ibid.

The provision of such favorable financing by a French government under President Georges
Pompidou raises intriguing questions. The reader is referred to Henry Coston, M. Pompidou.
qui eles-vous? (Lectures Francaises no. 147/148, July-August 1969), and Entre Rothschild et
Moscou (Lectures Francaises no. 146, June 1969), both published in Paris. Coston's argu-
ments can only be described as extraordinary and should be read with some skepticism. Still,
they have empirical support and the writer has not (as yet) been able to detect error in this
factual support. There may be alternative interpretations, but Coston's charges will have to
be answered at some point.
Business Week. June 19, 1971, pp. 84-90.
Metal-working News (New York), August 16. 1971.
Ibid.

For illustration of this point, see U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Soviet Political
Agreements and Results, 88th Congress, 2d session (3d revision; Washington, 1964), vol.
1. p. viii; "The staff studied nearly a thousand treaties and agreements .... both bilateral
and multilateral, which the Soviets have entered into not only with the United States, but
with countries all over the world. The staff found that in the 38 short years since the Soviet
Union came into existence, its Government had broken its word to virtually every country
to which it ever gavl a signed promise."

390 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

industries contribute directly to any war effort. For example, fertilizer plants
can be converted to the manufacture of explosives. Illustrative of the fundamental
assistance given in this sector for the development of military industries was
the 1930s agreement by the Hercules Powder Company, Inc., to "communicate
the secrets of production" of cotton linter, "prepare a complete design of a
nitrocellulose plant for the production of 5000 tons yearly," provide drawings
(by which the plant couid be duplicated), send engineers, supervise installation
of equipment and startup, train Russian engineers in manufacture of nitrocellulose
and allow a "detailed study of nitrocellulose production" in Hercules' U.S.
plants.- 16

This agreement was the basis of the Soviet explosives industry. Yet it was
described by the company in a letter to the State Department as "apparently
with the view of developing the production of nitrocellulose for peacetime arts.' M "
Inasmuch as this letter was sent after informal discussion with Robert F. Kelley
of the State Department, it has to be assumed that the department granted
approval for Hercules to go ahead on the basis of full information. It is beyond
the bounds of common sense to assume that either the State Department or
Hercules was convinced that the application of this assistance would be limited
to "peacetime arts."

Even in 1963 several congressmen objected strongly to the export of potash
mining machinery to the U.S.S.R. on the grounds that potash could be used
for explosives. However, the Department of Commerce took the position that
potash "is used almost exclusively in the manufacture of potassium fertilizers." 41
Incendiary bombs require sulfuric acid; a process for the concentration of sulfuric
acid was sent to the U.S.S.R. in the 1960s. One process for the manufacture
of tear gas (used by North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam) requires carbon
tetrachloride and benzene; both products were shipped from the United States
to the U.S.S.R. in the late 1960s. * 2 Herbicides have the same chemicals as
riot-control gases, and herbicides are among the volume imports by the U.S.S.R.
from the U.S.A. Both the Japanese anthrax bomb plant at Harbin and the
German Tabun plant were removed to the U.S.S.R. at the end of World War
I!." 3 Since that time the West has given indirect assistance to the Soviet chemical
and biological warfare plants. For example, biological warfare requires refrigera-
tion, and technical assistance has been provided for refrigeration; gelatin or
synthetic polymers are needed to encapsulate biological warfare particles, and
gelatin encapsulating apparatus has been shipped from the United States.

Textiles, of course, are war materials. This was clearly recognized during
World War II, and the military end uses for textiles have expanded since that

'" See Sunon II. p. 246.

40 Letter from Hercules Powder Company. Inc.. to State Department. July 2. 1930.

■" U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Cnnxrexsimuil Record. 88th Congress 1st ses-
sion. 1963; vol. 109, pt. II.

" U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Export Ctintrnl (Washington. D.C.). 1st quarter 1969 and 2d
quarter 1967.

" Seymour M. Hersh, Chemical ant! Bmli>\>kal Warfare (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

National Security and Technical Transfers 39 1

time. In 1943 the Pepperell Manufacturing Company, a major U.S textile
producer, described its wartime activities: the firm manufactured parachute
cloth, airplane rubrics, and life rafts from nylon, uniforms from twill, and jungle
hammocks from percale sheeting. Canton flannel was manufactured for shipment
to the U.S.S.R. for use in leg and foot wrappings, oil filters, and gun patches
Pepperell even described sheets as "war supplies" and commented that cotton
spindles are "weapons. "^

Soviet uses of textiles are of course similar to our own, and indeed Yuri
Krotkov comments that in the early 1960s women's nylon stockings disappeared
suddenly from Moscow shops. Why? "Because Gosplan had used up all its
reserves of nylon in supplying the defense plants.""

What is remarkable is the change in interpretation that has taken place over
the last 20 years. In the 1940s automobile plants and textile plants manufactured
'war supplies"; by the 1960s these plants could manufacture only "peace
supplies." The problem really boils down to one of the Soviets' intent Do
they intend to use the technology to military ends? Some of the foregoing
examples introduce an element of doubt. But if Soviet intent is in fact peaceful
then has the item no strategic implication? And might there not be circumstances
under which peaceful intent could change?

One area in which we can precisely identify Soviet uses of Western-built
products is that of shipping, since each vessel is unique and identifiable.

In the 1930s Western-built ships were used to transport political prisoners
to Siberia. According to A. Dallin, the following ships were operated for that
purpose by the NKVD: Djurma (built in Holland), Minsk (Germany), Kiev
(Germany), Igarka (United Kingdom), Komsomol (United Kingdom), Svirstroi
(United States), Volkhovstroi (United States), Shatourstroi (United States) «
According to V. A. Kravchenko, the Dalstroi (Holland) also was used by

the NKVDto transport political prisoners to concentration camps. "These vessels
were all apparently intended for merchant duty when they were received

Lest the reader argue that such movement was an internal matter and hence
not relevant to military strategy, it should be stated that Western-built ships
also have been used for overtly military purposes against the builders of the
vessels. For instance, it is known that the Soviets have used about 100 vessels
on the supply run from the Black Sea and Vladivostok to carry weapons muni-
dons, supplies, fertilizers, and so on to Haiphong (and earlier to the Cambodian
port of Sihanoukville) to supply North Vietnamese actions in South Vietnam
and Cambodia. The names of 96 of these vessels were obtained," and Table

^ Pepperell Manufacturing Company, People of Peace at War (Boston 1943) p 33
Y». Krotkov. The Angry Exile (London: Heinemann. 1967) p 92

" Car*, ^"sV nr^^' ^^ ^ '" *"*" *"""■ <L ° nd0n: »">"* &
V. A. Kravchenko, / Clime Justice (New York: Scribners, 1950) pp 290 300
U.S Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency. Export Expansion a J Regulation , Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Committee on Banking and
Currency, 91si Corgrcvs, 1st .session (Washington, 1969).

392

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

27-2 lists the origins of their main engines. Of the 96 vessels, identification
of main engines was possible in all but 12. Of the 75 diesel engines it was

Table 27-2 WESTERN ORIGINS OF MAIN ENGINES IN

SOVIET SHIPS (96) USED ON THE HAIPHONG SUPPLY RUN

Engines manufactured

* not in

U.S.S.R.

DIESEL ENGINES:

Manufactured in the U.S.S.R. to Soviet design

Manufactured in U.S.S.R. under license and to

foreign design:

Skoda (at Russky Diesel)

Burmeister & Wain (at Bryansk}

Manufactured outside U.S.S.R.

to foreign design:

Skoda

M.A.N.

Fiat

Burmeister & Wain (in Copenhagen and

elsewhere under license)

Sulzer (Switzerland)

Lang (Budapest)

G6rlitz (G.D.R.)

Lend Lease (United States) a

Non-Lend Lease (United States) 3

Krupp (Germany)

Total diesel engine

STEAM TURBINES AND RECIPROCATING STEAM ENGINES

Manufactured in U.S.S.R. to Soviet design

Manufactured in U.S.S.R. to foreign design

1 (possible)i

Manufactured outside the U.S.S.R.

Canada ■

USA"

United Kingdom*

Sulzer (Switzerland)

ZUT (Switzerland)

Total steam turbines

Grand total: diesel engines 75

steam turbines 9

not identified 12

Source: U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, January 1970.

a Manufacture unknown.

6 Possibly Sulzer steam turbine.

National Security and Technical Transfers

393

determined that 62 had been built outside the U .S .S .R. and 13 inside the U .S ,S .R.
The 13 domestic diesels were of either Skoda or Burmeister & Wain design,
and only one steam turbine is listed as of possible Soviet manufacture and
design,

The Burmeister & Wain technical-assistance agreement with the Bryansk
plant has produced engines for numerous ships used by the Soviets for military
purposes. Table 27-3 lists some Haiphong run vessels with Burmeister & Wain
engines built at Bryansk.

Table 27-3

HAIPHONG RUN SHIPS WITH ENGINES MADE

UNDER THE BURMEISTER & WAIN
TECHNICAL-ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT OF 1959

Soviet
Register no.

Name

Tonnage

Type

Engine mode* no.
(Burmeister & Wain)

4776

5450
569

1965

1967
1964

Belgorod

Dnestrovskiy
Berezovka
Bryenskiy

Rabochiy

Partizanskaya
Slava

11,011

10,996
11,089

Cargo
Cargo

B&W774-VT2BF-160

B&W674-VT2BF-160

B4W774-VT2BF-160

5492

1967

10,881

Cargo

B&W674-VT2BF-160

2127
2172
2232
2266

1964
1963
1963
1964

Pavlovsk
Perekop
Polotsk'
Pridneprovsk

11,089

9,500

11,089

Cargo
Cargo
Cargo
Tanker

S&W 774-VT2BF-160
B&W774-VT2BF-160
B4W674-VT2BF-160
B&W774-VT2BF-160

Sources.- U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, January 1970.
'Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1970 (London) indicates built at Bryansk; Soviet Register
indicates built in Denmark.

Quite apart from main engines, complete ships have been built in the West
and utilized for military purposes. Table 27-4 gives a selected list of such
ships known to have supplied material to North Vietnam, together with their

Western origins.

7ab/e 27-4

SHIPS KNOWN TO HAVE
TRANSPORTED MATERIAL TO NORTH VIETNAM

Reg No.

/ear of

Construction

Name ol ship

PVace of construction
Hull Engines

M26121
M11647
Ml 7082

M3017

1960
1936
1962

1961

Kura(4084 tons)

Arfct*a(2900 tons)

Slnegorsk

(3330 tons)

fr>gur(4084 tons)

West Germany
United Kingdom

Finland

West Germany

United Kingdom

Sweden

West Germany

394 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1 945 -J 965

The Ristna. which was reported off Ghana in 1966 with arms for internal
revolts," is powered by M.A.N, six-cylinder engines (570-mm bore and 800-mm
stroke) built in Hamburg. 5 " During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 Soviet
ballistic missiles were carried to Cuba in the "Poltava" class of dry-cargo
carrier. These have an exceptionally long No. 4 hatch (13.5 meters) enabling
transport of intermediate-range missiles. The class consists of a number of vessels
with common construction characteristics; thus details of one vessel, the Poltava,
will make the point clear. The Poltava (Soviet registration number M-22600)
is an 1 1,000-ton dry-cargo ship with engines constructed by Burmeister & Wain
of Copenhagen, Denmark. The engines are two-cycle supercharged, six-cylinder
diesel marine type, with a cylinder diameter of 740 mm and a piston stroke
of 1600 mm; some vessels of the "Poltava" class have engines made in the
Soviet Union but based on the Burmeister & Wain engine. The Polotsk, for
example, has a Danish engine, but the Perekop has a Soviet-built B&W engine
of the same type. 51

In brief, there is a direct, identifiable military utilization by the Soviets
of technologies, equipment, ant! products supplied by Western governments
under the assumption that these items were for peaceful use.

What is more, there is evidence that there has been a considerable
"leakage" of Western equipment under export control. 52 This, of course, is
a different proposition from export of peaceful goods where reliance is placed
on Soviet intent not to use these goods for military purposes, Where products
are defined as "strategic" and still find their way in quantity to the U.S.S.R.,
there is a problem of ineffective administration.

THE FAILURE OF WESTERN EXPORT CONTROLS

The United States in the Export Control Act of 1949 and the Battle Act
of 1951, and other Western nations under equivalent legislation, have attempted
to restrict exports of "strategic" goods to the Soviet Union. In the United
States the export of purely military goods is administered by the State Department
while the export of "strategic" goods is vested in the Department of Commerce,
although the State Department has a major influence in this area also. The
Department of Defense may register objection to export of a specific item,
but has been overruled on sufficient occasions with regard to strategic goods

" Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIX (March 19, 1967). 35.

10 Registr Soyuza SSR, Registromva kniga morskikh sitdov sovttza SSR 1964-1965 (Moscow
1966).

S1 Ibid,

" See chapter 7, "The Arms Runners," in J. B. Htmon, The Traitor Trade .(New York:
Obolensky, 1963). Hutton is a former Soviet agent who was employed in smuggling strategic
goods. Since the book has an epilogue by W, Averell Harriman it is presumably authentic.

National Security and Technical Transfers 395

that its influence may be considered as greatly subordinate to that of the State
and Commerce departments.

The provision of fast, large ships for Soviet supply of the North Vietnamese
will indicate the type of problem arising where export control has failed. Two
segments of the Soviet merchant marine were examined to determine the relation-
ship between Western origins and maximum speed of Soviet ships. It was antici-
pated that because of the NATO limitations on the speed of merchant ships
supplied to the U.S.S.R. (reflected in export-control laws) the average speed
of NATO-supplied ships would be considerably Jess than ships either supplied
by East European countries to the U.S.S.R. or built within the U.S.S.R. itself.
The results of the analysis are as follows:

SEGMENT 1 ; AVERAGE SPEED OF SOVIET SHIPS USED
ON THE HAIPHONG SUPPLY RUN

(42 ships)
Merchant ships with engines manufactured in Free World 14.62 knots
Merchant ships with engines manufactured in Eastern Europe 13.25 knots
Merchant ships with engines manufactured in Soviet Union 12.23 knots
(all built after 1951 , i.e., after implementation of Sattle Act).

SEGMENT 2: AVERAGE SPEED OF SOVIET SHIPS ADDED
TO THE MERCHANT FLEET IN 1964-65

(392 ships)
Merchant ships with engines manufactured in Free World 14.93 knots
Merchant ships with engines manufactured in Eastern Europe 1 1 .93 knots
Merchant ships with engines manufactured in Soviet Union 10.95 knots

The most obvious point to be made is that the average speed of Western-
supplied ships used by the Soviets in the Haiphong run was 2.4 knots (i.e.,
about 20 percent) above that of Soviet domestic-built ships used on the run!
This segment includes only those ships built after 1951 (i.e., after implementation
of the Battle Act with its stated limitation of speed and tonnage of ships supplied
to the U.S.S.R.)." The second segment (ships added in 1964-65) indicates
that the gap in speed between Western- and Soviet-built ships is widening— that
Western ships on the average are almost four knots, or 36 percent, faster than
domestic-built ships. We may conclude that not only has this discrepancy gone
unobserved among export control officials, but whatever export-control principle
is utilized is being eroded over time.

Figures 27-1 and 27-2 suggest that the lax administration applies also to
weight limitations. Hence the faster, larger Soviet ships are from the West
and the slower, smaller ships are from Soviet shipyards.

It is relevant to point out that under the CoCom provisions each nation

" Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947-196? (Stockholm: Almquisi &
Wiksell. 1968), p. 93. H

396

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

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National Security and Technical Transfers

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398 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

participating in the embargo of strategic materials submits its own views concern-
ing whether or not specific items should be shipped. There is also a unanimity
rule. In other words, no item isever shipped to the U.S.S.R. unlessall participat-
ing nations agree that it should be shipped. Objection by any nation would
halt the shipment. Douglas Dillon, former under secretary of state, has pointed
out: "I can recall no instance in which a country shipped a strategic item to
the Soviet bloc against the disapproving vote of a participating member of
CoCom." 54

It must therefore be presumed that U.S. delegates participated in, and
approved of, export of ships of high average speed as well as marine diesel
engines, and of the Burmeister & Wain technical-assistance agreement of 1959
for Soviet manufacture of large marine diesels — all later used against the United
States by the Soviets in supply of North Vietnam. In summary, the evidence
suggests that the U.S. delegates to CoCom knowingly allowed export of ships
above the NATO speed and weight limits that were later utilized against the
United States. This possibility clearly demands further investigation.

RELEASE OF RESOURCES, INDIRECT
TRANSFERS, AND WESTERN SECURITY

The release of domestic resources is one of the most important effects of
technical transfers from one country to another, and it may be the effect most
difficult for the layman to appreciate. Whenever assistance is provided from
outside the Soviet economic system internal resources are released, and by
substitutions at the margin the Soviet Union is enabled to devote such released
resources to political objectives of the system.

This substitution is of major importance to military objectives because while
domestic resources are being devoted to military development the broader indus-
trial base is being updated and fortified from abroad. The industrial base of
any country is the prime determinant of its military strength and ultimately
the determinant of success in military operations. The United States military
does not produce its own weapons: research, development, and production are
largely handled by private industry . It is the flexibility and efficiency of American
private industry that is the basic resource on which the American military structure
depends.

The Soviet military is equally dependent on Soviet industry. It has been
estimated that between 70 and 75 percent of the annual Soviet military expenditure

1,1 U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Export of Sinueyii- Mtuermli. lit the U.S.S.K. uml
Oilier Blue Countries. Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Ihc Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 87th Congress. 1st session.
Pan I. October 23, 1961. p. 45.

National Security and Technical Transfers 399

goes to industry for the purchase of armaments." The military has top priority,
but its capabilities also reflect Soviet weaknesses brought about by the almost
total absence of innovative effort. Flexibility and innovation for Soviet industry
are imported from the West. Thus, ironically, the prime forces making for
efficiency in Soviet military production are Western initiative and efficiency.
This conclusion can be refuted only if it can be shown (a) that the transfers
of innovation from the West do not take place and (b) that the Soviet military
structure does not depend on the Soviet industrial structure for input materials.
Therefore, we cannot in the final analysis make any meaningful distinction
between military and civilian goods. Every industrial plant directly or indirectly
affords some military capability. It is the availability of Western technology
that makes Soviet industry more efficient. The import of this technology releases
resources for military efforts and also ensures that the Soviet industrial-military
complex incorporates the latest of Western manufacturing techniques.

Nor can any meaningful distinction be made in the last analysis between
technology exports to the U.S.S.R. and those to the other East European bloc
countries. Recognition of political differences between Communist nations has
led to Western policies based on such differences, and specifically to more
favorable economic treatment of less hostile Communist countries. However,
political differences among Communist nations have not led to any reduction
in intra-bloc trade or transfers of technologies. Indeed, paradoxically, the Western
reaction to polycentralism in the form of "more trade" has led to an increased
transfer of Western technology to the Soviet Union. Processes and products
embargoed for direct Soviet shipment are transferred to the Soviet Union indirectly
through East European communist countries. There has been, then, an increase
in transfer of technology to the U.S.S.R. as a result of the Western policies
of the past two decades, policies based on erroneous assumptions concerning
the extent to which polycentralism exists, and can exist, in the economic life
of Eastern Europe .

As the acquisition of Western technology is a prime objective of all Commu-
nist nations, it must be further concluded that one effect on the West's response
to its own interpretations of differing forms of communism in Eastern Europe
has been to provide a more effective economic basis for fulfillment of Soviet
foreign policy objectives. The international political objectives of Yugoslavia,
for example, do not alter the fact that the Yugoslavs can and do supply the
Soviets with such vitally needed items as advanced diesel engines, larger merchant
ships, and copper electrical products. With their technical support to the U.S.S R.
the Yugoslavs are making a far more significant contribution to Soviet interna-
tional aspirations than any possible purely political support would provide.

11 Konstanlin K. Krylov, "Soviet Military-Economic Complex," Mil'uary Review (Fori
Leavenworth, Kans.), November 1971, p. 93.

400 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

A rational policy for any nation is one based on logical deduction from
empirical observation. If a policy is based on erroneous information or on lack
of facts, or if it is developed from accurate data by nonlogical, i.e., mystical,
methods, the policy is not likely to achieve its objectives.

There is adequate reason to believe that Western policy toward the U.S.S.R.
in the field of economic relations is based, first, on an inadequate observation
of fact, and second, on invalid assumptions. In no other way can one explain
the extraordinary statements made, for example, by State Department officials
to Congress, by academic writers, and by 50 years of policies which prescribe
first the establishment and then the continuing subsidy of a system that simultane-
ously calls forth massive armaments expenditures. Those countries which have
been the prime technical subsidizers of the U.S.S.R. are also the countries
with the largest expenditures on armaments against a presumably real threat
from the Soviet Union.

The first requirement of a rational policy in economic relations between
the Western world and any communist state is to determine the empirical facts
governing both economic and strategic -military relations. These three volumes
have established, from a precise technical examination, that the Soviet Union
and its socialist allies are dependent on the Western world for technical and
economic viability. At any time the West chooses to withdraw this technical
and economic subsidy, the Soviet Union must either meet terms laid down
by the West or effect within its own system the changes needed to achieve
setf-generated innovation. The major temporal and political demands of the
second course suggest that the Soviet Union would come to terms. The West,
then, has the option of taking major steps toward developing world peace.

To subsidize and support a system that is the object of massive military
expenditures is both illogical and irrational. In other words, it calls into question
not only the ability and the wisdom but indeed the basic common sense of
the policymakers.

The choice therefore is clear: either the West should abandon massive arma-
ments expenditures because the Soviet Union is not an enemy of the West,
or it should abandon the technical transfers that make it possible for the Soviet
Union to pose the threat to the Free World which is the raison d'etre for
such a large share of Western expenditures. 56

The numerous statements contrary to this conclusion do not stand up to penetrating analysis.
For example. Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach: "We should have no
illusions. If we do not sell peaceful goods to the nations of Eastern Europe, others will. If
we erect barriers to our trade with Eastern Europe, we will lose the trade and Eastern Europe
will buy elsewhere. But we will not make any easier our task of stopping aggression in Vietnam
nor in building security for the United States." U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Banking and Currency, To Amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Hearings, 90th
Congress. 1st session, April 1967, p. 64,

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

Economic Aspects of Technical Transfers

THE UNSTATED PREREQUISITE FOR
CENTRAL PLANNING

The prolific literature on central economic planning published in this century
contains no discussion — or even passing mention — of one apparently essential
prerequisite: there must be systems not regulated strictly by central planning
that are willing to provide technical services and productive units for the centrally
planned system. A world of strictly centrally planned systems based on the
Soviet model, or a single centrally planned world system, could not progress.
It would choke on technical inertia. The Soviet state's dependence on the West
was at least partly recognized by Lenin, 1 and it is effectively conceded by
present-day Soviet leaders when they openly subscribe to advances in Western
technology — not omitting, of course, politically necessary references to
capitalism's "internal contradictions".

The outstanding achievement of central planning is its ability to realize
substantial rates of growth through planned diversion of resources and efforts
into chosen industrial sectors. Let us accept as a premise that over the course
of 50 years Soviet growth rates in most sectors have been substantial. Iron
and steel production is certainly one such sector: Russian pig-iron production
was 4.2 million tons in 1913 and 70.3 million metric tons in 1966, while
steel production wps 4.3 million tons in 1913 and 96.9 million tons in 1966.
Fertilizer production was 42,000 tons in 1913 and 6.9 million tons in 1966.
Chemical fiber production was zero in 1913 and 458,000 tons in 1966. 2 Ship
production totaled ? .75 million gross registered tons in 1914 and 11 million
gross registered tons It 1967. 3

In each case of exceptional rates of growth we find significant acquisition
of Western technology at the start of the rise in growth; indeed, it is a matter
of open record that increments in output were planned to be at least initially

1 See for example, V. 1. Lenin, Selected Works, J. Fineberg, ed. (New York: International

Publishers, 1937), vol. 9, pp. 116-18.
1 Strana Sovelov »i 50 lei (Moscow, 1967), p. 98.
3 John D, Harbron, Communist Ships and Shipping (London, 1962), p. 140.

401

402 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

dependent on the West. The planned increment in production was achieved
in a conscious manner, not by internal technical resources, but by the purchase
of high-productivity advanced units in the West.

Could the Soviet system have attained high rales of growth in any single
sector without outside injections of technology and capacity? The answer is:
apparently not. At any rate, no example has been found of a sector in the
Soviet economy achieving rapid rates of growth without technical injections
from outside the system. The sector that has come closest to showing indigenous
technical progress is the iron and steel industry, with Western technology first
absorbed and then scaled up to provide massive increments in pig iron and
raw steel output. However, with this sequence the sector's progress has been
limited: full modern industrialization demands not only a balanced output of
iron and raw steel but also of finished rolled products. Rolling is not subject
to scaling-up innovation. One can quadruple the size of an open hearth or
a blast furnace, but quadrupling the size of a blooming mill, and certainly
a wide-strip mill, is technically impossible. The continuous casting process
was seen as a way around the problems posed by the blooming mill, i.e.,
as a way to replace scaling up, but here, as we have seen, too-rapid introduction
brought its own problems.

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that Soviet central planning absolutely
demanded from the outset, and still demands, the existence of technically balanced
systems from which it might leach new processes and purchase productive capac-
ity. In the absence of such systems, it probably could not have made great
technical progress.

THE FUNCTION OF IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY
IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

The basic problem of the Soviet economy is, as we have seen, its essentially
static nature. The system apparently lacks internal dynamic factors that make
for indigenous technical progress other than that attained by duplication of an
existing technology. On the other hand, true technical progress involves the
steady substitution of ever more efficient ways of combining resources and
is the most significant factor in increasing standards of living.

The function of imported technology in the U.S.S.R. is therefore to provide
the missing dynamic element of technical progress, or more specifically, to
supply innovation. This is achieved in several sequential steps. First, at an
early stage in a sector's development the productive units themselves are imported,
i.e., the machines, the boilers, the production lines. This is followed by a
second stage, that of duplication or copying of the most useful of the imported
units, according to a standardized design. Long runs of standard units without

Economic Aspects of Technical Transfers 403

model change achieve the favorable growth rates noted. In certain sectors this
may be followed by a third stage-adaptive innovation, i.e., scaling up The
Soviets have made excellent use of the scaling-up procedure in iron and steel
and electricity generation. Such scaling up, however, cannot be applied in all
sectors or in all basic technologies within a sector. As we have seen, i, can
be used in blast furnaces within limits, but not in rolling mills. It can be used
in coke ovens within limits, but not in the production of precision machinery
It can be used in penicillin production, but not in radio-tube production Thus
the adaptive process of scaling up has significant limits.

So far as major indigenous innovation is concerned, we have seen that
this is barely existent in the Soviet Union. There have been a few research
achievements not found in the West (three synthetic fibers, for example) and
some indigenous research has been placed into pilot production (as in the' case
of the Grinenko process). There is no case, however, of a large-scale productive
unit based on self-generated indigenous Soviet technology. The Soviet
technology that comes closest to this achievement is probably the turbodrill-but
this technology is not comparable in its complexity to, say, automobile manufac-
turing, and In any case increasing demands for depth drilling have revealed
turbodrill performance problems.

We can induce at least three contributions from technical transfer in addition
lo provision oftechn.cal modernization: the grant of economic flexibility (through
release of resources), the grant of performance flexibility (because a standardized
design is suitable for only a limited range of end uses), and ihe engineering
contribution that inheres in foreign construction of large production units (those
beyond available Soviet skills but not necessarily involving new technology)
Performance flexibility benefits may be noted in several of the sectors dis-
cussed m the study. One example can be seen with respect to marine boil-
ers mstalled m Soviet ships between 1945 to 1960. All Soviet-made marine boil-
ers are of one size and model. Flexibility for various requirements is achieved
by importing boilers with nonstandard characteristics, e.g., unusual heating sur-
faces and working pressures. The existence of this phenomenon does not emerge
from the trade and production statistics; its detection requires examination of
the specifications for units produced and imported.

The engineering benefit, which is actually a variation of the flexibility con-
tribution, IS exemplified by the large number of complete plants bought abroad
It is also present in such acquisitions as refrigerator ships, where more complicated
systems are purchased abroad and simpler systems are built inside the U.S.S.R.

THE SOVIET APPROACH TO IMPORT SUBSTITUTION

The Soviet approach to import substitution is of particular significance because
in the Soviet Union the process results from more lengthy experience than

404 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

in any other socialist economy. It appears to fall into three distinct stages:
first, import of foreign equipment; second, a period of comparative testing during
which both foreign and domestic copies are used side by side; and third, the
elimination of imports and sole reliance on domestic -produced equipment.

Although this three-stage categorization is generally supported by the informa-
tion presented here, it is possible to document the process fully in only one
equipment area — steam turbines. Data are needed over a period of time (to
cover the three stages hypothesized) to coverall units acquired, built, and installed
and to determine their precise identification. The only source of such complete
information available outside the U.S.S.R. is the Soviet Register of Shipping. 4
Of 5500 entries described in that source, 47 merchant ships are found to have
steam turbines as propulsion units (there are many more in the Red Navy);
these turbines are identified by type, origin, and date of installation.

When these data are plotted, it may be seen that installations fall into the
three distinct periods postulated when viewed in terms of origins: first, a period
from 1953 to 1957 with only foreign purchases (no domestic manufacture):
second, a period from 1957 to 1960 with both foreign purchases and domestic
production of steam turbines; and third, a period after 1960 with only domestic
manufacture. Although import of steam turbines after 1960 would not invalidate
the case (indeed, the Soviets would want to investigate any new Western design
developments), in this case none appear to have been imported in the final
period under consideration.

THE OUTPUT OF ENGINEERING SKILLS

A superficial conflict with the findings of this study is posed by the apparent
numbers of engineers graduated in the U.S.S.R. compared to those in the U.S.A.
A Soviet source gives the following statistics for engineering degrees granted
in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in 1950 and 1965: s

U.S.S.R. 37,000(1950) 170.000(1965)

U.S.A. 61,000(1950) 41,000(1965)

According to these figures, output of engineers with degrees has increased four-
fold in the period 1950 to 1965, while that of the United States has fallen
by one-half in the same period. There is, of course, a relationship between
numbers of engineers and level of technology.

If the Soviets had a vigorous indigenous technology, little further attention
would be paid to this finding. However, the quantity production of engineers

1 Registr Soyuza SSR. Regiurovtiru knign morskikh suitor sovuzu SSR 1964-65 (Moscow,

1966).
5 Strewn Sowtov .... op. cil. n. 2, p. 231.

Economic Aspects of Technical Transfers 405

since the 1930s appears to be inconsistent with the findings of this study. Some
probing indicates a reconciliation. A Russian engineer is not the same as a
Western engineer, particularly an American, engineer. Not only is the Soviet
engineer's training and experience much narrower; his level of skills is far
lower. Indeed, a Soviet "engineer" may not have as high a level of technical
ability as a master mechanic or ship superintendent in the United States. Moreover
there is no question that top-level technical graduates are siphoned into military
work and the balance go into industry; this diversion coupled with the generally
lower skills requirements greatly reduces the effectiveness of the large reservoir
of engineers.

This conclusion is supported by reports from at least two delegations to
the Soviet Union. Appendix 9 of the 1963 Indian iron and steel industry delegation
report 8 cites the engineering force and its utilization at the steel works called
Zaporozhstal . Of a total of 1 6,829 workers, 1367 were classified as "engineers."
These "engineers" were working in such locations as the telephone exchange
(12), stores (8), instrument repair shop (58), water supply station (5), building
repair facilities (20), and scrapyard (19). Obviously they were not engineers
by any Western definition. In the West any one of the above-named operations
(with the possible exception of instrument repair) can function without a single
degree-qualified engineer.

Another example may be found in the report of a USDA forestry delegation. 7
That delegation inspected the Bozhenko furniture plant in Kiev and found that
the 1600 employees included 104 technical people, of whom 64 had university
degrees. Quite clearly if the 64 technical -degree holders in this small furniture
plant are placed according to their abilities, their level of skills must be extraordi-
narily low. In the West such a plant with a comparable output could operate
efficiently without a single technical-degree holder and rarely would there be
need for more than two or three. The Bozhenko furniture plant as described
by the U.S. delegation (and shown in photographs published in the report)
suggests a management problem of major significance. The descriptions and
photographs together depict a plant with abysmally low levels of efficiency
when compared with Western plants. The factory painting facilities (a brick
wall outside the plant), the intraplant "transport" (a man pushing an overloaded
and wobbly trolley), and the general assembly shop could not be found in
Europe or the United States: state factory inspectors would close the plant
down as a hazard for its workers. If such an institution employs 64 degree
holders, the logical questions must be: What are they doing? What is their
training? What is their supposed purpose in the plant?

There are numerous reports of poor construction in the Soviet Union — and

* Iron A Steel Imiixiry in the USSR, and Czechoslovakia: Rrpon of Indian Productivity
Team, (New Delli: National Productivity Council, March 1963), p. 253.

' U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forestry Service, Forestry and Forest Industry in the U.S.S.R.,
Report of a TechMcal Study Group (Washington, March 1961).

406 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

construction quality is a fair indicator of engineering ability. This may be exem-
plified by a report in 1966 to the effect that a French construction company
was negotiating to build "earthquake-proof apartment buildings in the battered
Soviet city of Tashkent. Some 30,000 apartments built [previously] by the com-
pany in Tashkent survived earthquakes there earlier this year." 9

In 1960 two Soviet engineers named Zolotarov and Shteingauz claimed
a world record in building dams on soft ground, mentioning specifically the
dams at Svir and Tsimlyansk . 9 Given the very low ratio of dams built to hydroelec-
tric power potential in the U.S.S.R. and the major engineering problems of
building on soft ground (indeed, the initial engineering effort usually is to locate
bedrock for dam construction), some kind of training problem seems obvious.

Equipment down-time is also an indicator of quality control and engineering
skills in the manufacturing process, and the evidence points to Soviet deficiencies
in this sphere. For example, in 1955 some Russian tractor models averaged
more than one month out of service for repairs: the STZ-NATI required a total
of 56 days in 1955 for overall repairs, 10 and the DT-54 a total of 59 days.
If a tractor is out of commission almost two months in a year for technical
reasons, it is clearly a faulty product.

We may justifiably conclude that the number of degreed engineers in the
U.S.S.R. is not a reliable indicator of the nation's engineering capability, and
that the equivalent U.S. figure should include at least master mechanics, shop
superintendents, and a large proportion of skilled foremen.

USE OF IMPORTS TO FULFILL PLANNING OBJECTIVES

Where planning objectives of increased output cannot be achieved by duplica-
tion or by scaling-up innovation, resort has to be made to imports. Necessarily,
the processes acquired in this manner are frequently those whose development
abroad required large investments in capital and skill.

Examination of Soviet import statistics for the period 1946 to 1966 indicates
that while total import values increased (692 million rubles in 1946 to 7122
million rubles in 1966, or a tenfold increase over two decades), the import
of machinery and equipment remained consistently at one-third of the total
(197 million rubles in 1946 and 2308 million rubies in 1966). However, analysis
of the expenditure components reveals that planning objectives and directives
have been reflected in significant increases in imports in the affected sectors.
For example, the program to build a merchant fleet got under way in the early

" New York Times. October 1 1 , 1966.

8 T. L. Zolotarev and Y. O. Shteingauz, Hydroelectric Power Plants and the Main Trends
in Their Development (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1963), p. 146.
" Problems of Agricultural Economy (collection of articles) {Moscow, 1958); translation:
Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 155.

Economic Aspects of Technical Transfers

407

50s and the import figures reflect the calculations given elsewhere — that since
then over two-thirds of the Soviet merchant fleet has been built in the West.
Similarly, Khrushchev's call for a massive increase in chemical production in
1957 was accompanied by an immediate increase in chemical equipment imports,
a nearly tenfold increase in ten years (from 22 million rubles in 1957 to 100
million in 1959 and an average import of just over 200 million rubles in the
mid to late sixties.)" 11

Internal shortages are also reflected in changing import figures. For example,
the agricultural problems of the early 1960s resulted in massive imports not
only of foreign wheat but also of foreign fertilizers and agricultural equipment
(from 14 million rubles in 1961 to 62 million rubles in 1966).

Table 28- r

SOVIET IMPORTS BY SOVIET TRANSPORT

CATEGORY FROM 1946 to 1966

Year

Total imports
(million rubles)

Machines and

equipment
(Groups 10-19)

Ships and
equipment
(Group 192)

Chemical

industry

equipment

(Group 150)

Agriculture

equipment and

fertilizers

(Groups 181, 342)

1946

692.0

197.4

5.6

3.9

0.1

1947

670.3

119.1

3.9

1.5

0.2

1943

1106.6

99.0

5.4

0.9

0.1

1949

1340.3

193.4

23.6

1.9

1.7

1950

1310.3

281.7

25.8

1.7

6.2

1951

1791.7

372.0

33.9

6.4

0.4

1952

2255.5

486.2

71.6

9.3

0.2

1953

2492.1

664.8

106.7

18.3

0.3

1954

2863.6

875.4

201.7

23.0

0.5

1955

2754.5

832.8

237.5

22.1

6.4

1956

3251.4

805.8

273.8

19.3

6.1

1957

3544.0

846.4

215.5

22.1

13.0

1958

3914.6

958.1

214.7

45.5

10.7

1959

4565.9

1216.7

271.9

103.4

9.7

1960

5065.6

1507.7

340.4

167.0

8.6

1961

5344.9

1561.0

203.1

171.0

14.1

1962

5809.9

2020.6

332.9

141.8

24.8

1963

6352.9

2219.4

366.1

190.2

31.2

1964

6962.9

2398.5

483.9

186.4

53.1

1965

7252.5

2423.1

489.7

167.4

54.4

1966

7121.6

2308.4

493.7

208.0

62.8

Source: Vneshnlaia

torgovlia SSR: Statisticheskii sbornik, 1918-1966 (Moscow, 1967).

Imports provide, as has previously been noted, a degree of economic and
technical flexibility to the Soviet Union; but in the cases noted above they
provide more than flexibility — they provide the means for fulfilling key planning

See Table 28-2,

408 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

objectives. The chemical industry plan, the synthetic fiber and rubber industry
plans, and the automobile and merchant marine plans could not have been
filled even by 10 percent if reliance had been solely on domestic abilities and
resources.

These observations also provide a rational explanation for Soviet emphasis
on domestic production of electricity, steel (simple construction sections rather
than high-quality flat-rolled products), and building products such as cement
and stone. 12 The perennial shortage of housing also suggests a diversion of
construction material resources into other types of construction. Emphasis on
the production of electricity, steel, and construction materials is consistent with
massive import of foreign equipment and processes: the buildings to house
imported process technology and equipment must be provided from domestic
resources. Apart from the import of the steel-fabricated structure for the Stalingrad
tractor plant in 1930 there is no known case of Soviet import of industrial
building structures. These are built to a standard design in the U.S.S.R. from
domestic materials. 1S The major inputs for industrial buildings are structural
steel, plate steel, reinforcing rod, and cement. The planning emphasis on these
products, then, is not founded in dogma but on practical construction demands.
This also squares with observed Soviet postwar reparations practices; rather
than removing fabricated steel structures (as the less experienced Western allies
tried to do) the Soviets removed portable equipment and machinery of a high
value-to- weight ratio. The building shell was erected in the U.S.S.R. and the
equipment bedded down in its new location.' 4

THE "CATCHING-UP" HYPOTHESIS

An obvious benefit from the import of foreign technology is that it affords
less developed countries the possibility of "catching-up" i.e., of establishing
the basic means of production without enormous investment in research and
development and long gestation periods. Presumably, when a nation attains
a certain technological level of advancement it should be able to press ahead
on its own.

This "catching-up" justification for basic technology import seems more
logically applicable to ex-colonial areas, such as India, than to the Soviet Union.

" G. Warren Nutter, The Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962).

" See Sutton II: Western Technology ... 1930 to 1945. p. 251 .

" See Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the
United States. Julv 1946 (Washington, 1946). for excellent photographs of Soviet removal
practice' the remaining portions of the plant are those needing duplication in the U.S.S.R.,
i.e., the building shell, equipment made of fabricated sheet steel, and machinery with a Sow
value-to-weight ratio.

Economic Aspects of Technical Transfers 409

In the first place, there is a widespread misunderstanding concerning the state
of technical development in Tsarist Russia. Whatever may have been the back-
ward nature of the Tsarists" social and political system, their technology was
reasonably well advanced for the time; indeed there is evidence that by 1916
Tsarist Russia had industrial units on a scale and utilizing a technology equal
to that anywhere in the world. 15 Further, pre-RevoIutionary indigenous Russian
innovation was apparent in the beet sugar industry , in aluminum smelting (Bayer),
in synthetic rubber (Ostrimilensky), and in automobiles and aircraft (Sikorsky).
While a great many of the skilled workers, the management personnel, and
the technicians either emigrated or returned to the villages after the revolution,
the physical structure of the Russian economy was largely intact when the
Bolsheviks came to power.

Moreover, various injections of foreign technology have enabled the Soviet
Union to "catch up" in the 1920s, in the early thirties (mid-thirties for aircraft
and oil refining), during World War II, at the end of the fifties, and in the
massive plant acquisitions of the sixties. Thus a temporary need for "catching
up" is not a likely explanation for the continued Soviet reliance on imported
technology. A more plausible explanaton is that there is some inherent inadequacy
in the system which stifles indigenous industrial development. The Soviet system
is forever "catching up," by virtue of its institutional structure. Foreign
technology converts this static system into a viable system.

A generally observed benefit of foreign technology import is that it enables
the recipient country to avoid research and development costs. This saving
may indeed be substantial, but it is minute compared with another factor, i.e.,
the avoidance of expenditures on innovations that fall by the wayside, the so-called
wastes of competition. To allow the market to select the most efficient method,
or the several most efficient methods for the manufacture of any given product,
several hundreds may be taken partway to production (i.e., through pilot-plant
stage) and several dozens actually placed into production. The market is the
final test of efficiency. This process is vital to the dynamic progress of a market
system, and for this reason the wastes of competition are not wastes at all:
if it is necessary for purposes of efficiency to allow rejected processes to fall
by the wayside, it is just as necessary to a viable economy that they be introduced
into the market in the first place.

There is a cost incurred in the development of these fallen processes, however,
and it is one that can be avoided by importing technologies after they have
passed through the discipline of a market economy. The Soviets have been
remarkably adept at selecting processes, after the initial shaking down to two
or three that have ultimately been determined by the foreign market place to
be the most efficient. They chose the Ford automobile in the late 1920s (not
Cord, Maxwell, or any of the hundreds of others that have since fallen by

"■ Sec Suilon I: Western Technology ... 1917 lo 1930, pp. 183-84.

4J0 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

the wayside). They chose (he Douglas DC-3 within a year of its inception— an
aircraft that proved to be the most efficient air transport of its time. They chose
the Rust cotton picker, They have shown a remarkable ability to appreciate the
market economy in operation, to acquire full knowledge of competing
processes, and to step in as soon as a particuiar process has shown itself to have
advantages not shared by others. A Western firm that has had its process or
equipment chosen by the Soviets should use the fact as an advertising
slogan— for Soviet choice has been so remarkably accurate that it is almost a
badge of acceptability.

Finally, the Soviet Union (or any other importer of technology) can avoid
the long gestation periods of modern technologies. The Soviets acquired the
wide-strip mil! within a few years of its introduction in the West. It would
have taken decades to reproduce the technology within the U.S.S.R. They
acquired the German jet and turboprop engines at a time when they had themselves
hardly mastered the manufacture of piston engines. They obtained in the late
fifties and early sixties numerous complete chemical plants far beyond their
own technical abilities and certainty not then duplicable in the Soviet Union
in the foreseeable future. Such gains in time are vital to the fulfillment of
Soviet ideology, which requires a dynamic technical front.

The gestation advantage comes out most clearly in those technologies which
involve a high degree of construction skill and cannot be imported. Atomic
reactors, for example, require a lengthy construction period, cannot be legally
exported from the West, and demand a high degree of construction skill. After
a flashy start in the 1950s the Soviets had only four reactors in operation in
November 1969 (the same number as in 1965), which is a far cry from the
impressive predictions advanced in the 1950s for atomic power development
in a socialist system.

The Soviet economy is always a few years behind the West, but under
censorship conditions this has presented no great problem. By a combination
of careful concealment and clever promotion, 16 the Soviets have had little diffi-
culty in presenting to foreign observers the facade of a vigorous, sophisticated
technology.

"In the developing countries of Asia and Africa, Soviet aid places great stress on modern
scientific symbols. A nuclear research lab is set up in Cairo, a fully automatic telephone
exchange in Damascus, a technological institute in Rangoon — these tokens of advanced
technology are intended 10 convey an image of Soviet progressiveness in human discovery
and inventiveness in the application of science to peaceful progress." Hans Heymann, Jr..
The U.S.S R in the Tct-hitvlogkal Rtice (Santa Monica: RAND Corp.. 1959). Report no.
P-1754, p, 6.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

Conclusions

EMPJRICAL CONCLUSIONS: 1917 TO 1930

The first volume of this study concluded that the Soviets employed more
than 350 foreign con* ^ssions during the 1920s. These concessions, introduced
into the Soviet Union under Lenin's New Economic Policy, enabled foreign
entrepreneurs to establish business operations in the Soviet Union without gaining
property rights. The Soviet intent was to introduce foreign capital and skills,
and the objective was to establish concessions in all sectors of the economy
and thereby introduce Western techniques into the dormant postrevolutionary
Russian economy. The foreign entrepreneur hoped to make a normal business
profit in these operations.

Three types of concessions were isolated: Type I, pure concessions; Type
II, mixed concessions; Type III, technical-assistance agreements. Information
was acquired on about 70 percent of those actually placed in operation. It was
found that concessions were employed within all sectors of the economy except
one (furniture and fittings), although the largest single group of concessions
was m raw materials development. In the Caucasus oil fields— then seen as
the key to economic recovery by virtue of the foreign exchange that oil exports
would generate— the International Barnsdall Corporation introduced American
rotary drilling techniques and pumping technology. By the end of the 1920s
80 percent of Soviet oil drilling was conducted by the American rotary technique;
there had been no rotary drilling at all in Russia at the time of the Revolution.
International Barnsdall also introduced a technical revolution in oil pumping
and electrification of oil fields. All refineries were built by foreign corporations,
although only one, the Standard Oil lease at Batum, was under a concessionary
arrangement — the remainder were built under contract. Numerous Type I and
Type III technical-assistance concessions were granted in the coal, anthracite,
and mining industries, including the largest concession, that of Lena Goldfields,
Ltd., which operated some 13 distinct and widely separated industrial complexes
by the late 1920s. In sectors such as iron and steel, and particularly in the
machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing sectors, numerous agreements
were made between trusts and larger individual Tsarist-era plants and Western
companies to start up and reequipthe plants with the latest in Western technology.

411

412 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945-1965

A. E.G., General Electric, and Metropolitan- Vickers were the major operators
in the machinery sectors. Only in the agricultural sector was the concession
a failure.

After information had been acquired on as many such concessions and
technical-assistance agreements as possible, the economy was divided into 44
sectors and the impact of concessions and foreign technical assistance in each
sector was analyzed, it was found that about two-thirds of the sectors received
Type I and Type II concessions, while over four-fifths received technical-
assistance agreements with foreign companies. A summary statement of this
assistance, irrespective of the types of concession, revealed that all sectors except
one, i.e., 43 sectors of a total of 44, had received some form of concession
agreement. In other words, in only one sector was there no evidence of Western
technological assistance received at some point during the 1920s. The agreements
were made either with dominant trusts or with larger individual plants, but
as each sector at the outset comprised only a few large units bequeathed by
the Tsarist industrial structure, it was found that the skills transferred were
easily diffused within a sector and then supplemented by imported equipment.
Examination of reports by Western engineers concerning individual plants con-
firmed that restarting after the Revolution and technical progress during the
decade were dependent on Western assistance.

It was therefore concluded that the technical transfer aspect of the New
Economic Policy was successful. It enabled foreign entrepreneurs and firms
to enter the Soviet Union. From a production of almost zero in 1922 there
was a recovery to pre- World War I production figures by 1928. There is no
question that the turn-around in Soviet economic fortunes in 1922 is to be
linked to German technical assistance, particularly that forthcoming after the
Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922 (although this assistance was foreseeable as
early as 1917 when the Germans financed the Revolution).

It was also determined that the forerunners of Soviet trading companies
abroad— i.e., the joint trading firms— were largely established with the assistance
of sympathetic Western businessmen. After the initial contacts were made, these
joint trading firms disappeared, to be replaced by Soviet-operated units such
as Amtorg in the United States and Arcos in the United Kingdom.

It was concluded that for the period 1917 to 1930 Western assistance in
various forms was the single most important factor first in the sheer survival
of the Soviet regime and secondly in industrial progress to prerevolutionary
levels.

EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS: 1930 TO 1945

Most of the 350 foreign concessions of the 1920s had been liquidated by
1 930. Only those entrepreneurs with political significance for the Soviets received

Conclusions 4 i 3

compensation, but for those few that did (for example, Hammer and Harriman),
the compensation was reasonable.

The concession was replaced by the technical-assistance agreement, which
together with imports of foreign equipment and its subsequent standardization
and duplication, constituted the principal means of development during the period
1930 to 1945.

The general design and supervision of construction, and much of the supply
of equipment for the gigantic plants built between 1929 and 1933 was provided
by Albert Kahn, Inc., of Detroit, the then most famous of U.S. industrial
architectural firm. No large unit of the construction program in those years
was without foreign technical assistance, and because Soviet machine tool produc-
tion then was limited to the most elementary types, all production equipment
in these plants was foreign. Soviet sources indicate that 300,000 high-quality
foreign machine tools were imported between 1929 and 1940. These machine
toots were supplemented by complete industrial plants: for example, the Soviet
Union received three tractor plants (which also doubled as tank producers),
two giant machine-building plants (Kramatorsk and Uralmash), three major
automobile plants, numerous oil refining units, aircraft plants, and tube mills.
Published data on the Soviet "Plans" neglect to mention a fundamental
feature of the Soviet industrial structure in this period: the giant units were
built by foreign companies at the very beginning of the 1930s, and the remainder
of the decade was devoted to bringing these giants into full production and
building satellite assembly and input-supply plants. In sectors such as oil refining
and aircraft, where further construction was undertaken at the end of the decade,
we find a dozen top U.S. companies (McKee, Lummus, Universal Oil Products,
etc.) aiding in the oil-refining sector and other top U.S. aircraft builders
in the aircraft sector (Douglas, Vuttee, Curtiss- Wright, etc.).

Only relatively insignificant Soviet innovation occurred in this period: SK-B
synthetic rubber, dropped in favor of more useful foreign types after World
War II; the Ramzin once-through boiler, confined to small sizes; the turbodrill;
and a few aircraft and machine gun designs.

The Nazi-Soviet pact and Lend Lease ensured a continued flow of Western
equipment up to 1945.

In sum, the Soviet industrial structure in 1945 consisted of large units produc-
ing uninterrupted runs of standardized models copied from foreign designs and
manufactured with foreign equipment. Where industrial equipment was of
elementary construction (e.g., roasters and furnaces in the chemical industry,
turret lathes in the machine tool industry, wooden aircraft, and small ships),
the Soviets in 1945 were able to take a foreign design and move into production.
One prominent example (covered in detail in this volume) was the Caterpillar
D-7 tractor. The original, sent under Lend Lease in 1943, was copied in metric
form and became the Soviet S-80 and S-100. It was then adapted for dozens
of other military and industrial uses.

414 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Thus in Ihe period 1930 to 1945 Ihe Soviets generally no longer required
foreign engineers as operators inside the U.S.S.R.'as they had in the concessions
of the 1920s, but they still required foreign designs, foreign machines (the
machines to produce machines), and complete foreign plants in new technical
areas. By 1945 the Soviet Union had "caught up" at least twice; once in
the 1930s (it could also be argued that the assistance of the 1920s constituted
the first catching-up) with the construction of the First Five Year Plan by foreign
companies, and again in 1945 as a result of the massive flow of Western
technology under Lend Lease. While the technical skills demonstrated by the
Tsarist craftsmen had not quite been achieved, 1 it may be said that in 1945
the nucleus of a skilled engineering force was once again available in Russia — for
the first time since the Revolution.

EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS: 1945 TO 1965

In the immediate postwar period the Soviets transferred a large proportion
of German industry to the Soviet Union — at least two-thirds of the German
aircraft industry, the major part of the rocket production industry, probably
two-thirds of the electrical industry, several automobile plants, several hundred
large ships, and specialized plants to produce instruments, military equipment,
armaments, and weapons systems. The stripping of East Germany was sup-
plemented by a U.S. program (Operation RAP) to give the Soviets dismantled
plants in the U.S. Zone. By the end of 1946 about 95 percent of dismantling
in the U.S. Zone was for the U.S.S.R. (including the aircraft plants of Daimler-
Benz, ball bearings facilities, and several munitions plants).

Manchuria and Rumania also supplied numerous plants. And as we have
seen, Finnish reparations which supplemented the pulp and paper industries
and ship construction were made possible by U.S. Export-Import Bank credits
to Finland.

In the late 1950s all this industrial capacity had been absorbed and the
Soviets turned their attention to the deficient chemical, computer, shipbuilding,
and consumer industries, for which German acquisitions had been relatively
slight. 2 A massive complete-plant purchasing prdgram was begun in the late

1 Tsarist-era technology was of a higher standard than is generally believed: it had achieved
capability to produce aircraft, calculating machines, and locomotives. Foss Collection,
Hoover Institution; see Sutton I, pp. 183-84.

1 For typical articles that appeared in Western journals as the Soviets took steps to start a mas-
sive acquisition program to fill major technical gaps in the Soviet structure, see: Raymond
Ewell, "Soviet Russia Poses a New Industrial Threat," ASTM Bulletin, no. 239 (July 1959),
43-44; W. Benton, "Are We Losing the Sheepskin War," Democratic Digest, July 1956;
"From Revolution to Automation in 37 Years," American Machinist, November 19, 1956;
G. Marceau, "Eiceptionnelles possibility du forage en U.R.S.S.," Industrie du petrole, 28
(November 1960), 47-49; "Soviet Scientists Emerge from Curtain to Crow about Progress,"
Business Week, September 14, 1957, pp. 30-32.

Conclusions 4 1 5

1950s — for example, the Soviets bought at least 50 complete chemical plants
between 1959 and 1963 for chemicals not previously produced in the U.S.S.R.
A gigantic ship-purchasing program was then instituted, so that by 1967 about
two- thirds of the Soviet merchant fleet had been built in the West. More difficulty
was met in the acquisition of computers and similar advanced technologies,
but a gradual weakening of Western export control under persistent Western
business and political pressures produced a situation by the end of the sixties
whereby the Soviets were able to purchase almost the very largest and fastest
of Western computers.

Soviet exports in the late sixties were still those of a backward, underdeveloped
country. They consisted chiefly of raw materials and semimanufactured goods
such as manganese, chrome, furs, foodstuffs, pig iron, glass blocks, and so
on. When manufactured goods were exported they were simple machine tools
and vehicles based on Western designs, and they were exported to underdeveloped
areas. When foreign aid projects fell behind — although they had been given
first priority on Soviet resources — they were brought back on schedule with
the use of foreign equipment (e.g., British and Swedish equipment was
used at the Aswan Dam). And while great efforts have been made to export
to advanced Western markets Soviet goods with a technological component
(i.e., watches, automobiles, tractors, and so on), a technical breakdown of
these goods reveals in all cases examined either a Western origin or the substitution
of Western parts where the products are assembled in the West. 3

As a further indicator of Soviet technical backwardness, it may be noted
that some Western firms selling to the Soviet Union have found "so many
gaps in the control schemes proposed" 4 that a two-phase quotation format has
been adopted: first a feasibility study is conducted (for which the Western com-
pany is paid), and then the actual quotation is determined for a complete system
based on the feasibility study. In other words, technical inadequacy is such
that the Soviets have not been able to specify exactly what is wanted. What
this reflects is not a lack of scientific skill; it shows a lack of information
on the technical constituents of a modern industrial system.

In the few areas where indigenous innovation was identified in the earlier
period, we find a move back toward the use of Western technology. This is
visible in the use of Western synthetic rubbers to replace SK-B, a renewed
research effort or rotary drilling as a result of efficiency problems encountered
in the use of the Soviet turbodrill, and instances of abandonment of the Ramzin
boiler in favor 0:' Western designs. The research and development effort has
continued, but its results in practical engineering terms have been near zero.
From the technicH viewpoint the Soviet Union at J970 is a copy — a rather
imperfect copy — c r the West. Generally, initial units are still built by Western

For the example of v. u\hes, see Business tVeet, June 6, 1960, p. 74.
Control En$itieerinx (New York), November 1958, p, 80.

416 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

companies and subsequent units built by Soviet engineers are based on the
original Western model, and imported equipment is used in key process and
control areas.

ORIGINAL WESTERN INTENT FOR TECHNICAL TRANSFER

It may be unwise to attempt to read into an historical sequence of events
as important as those described, any rational objective on the part of Western
statesmen. Although the policies concerning trade and technical transfers appear
vague and often confused, there is one fundamental observation to be made:
throughout the period of 50 years from 1917 to 1970 there was a persistent,
powerful, and not clearly identifiable force in the West making for continuance
of the transfers. Surely the political power and influence of the Soviets was
not sufficient alone to bring about such favorable Western policies. Indeed,
in view of the aggressive nature of declared Soviet world objectives, such policies
seem incomprehensible if the West's objective is to survive as an alliance of
independent, non-communist nations. What, then, are the wellsprings of this
phenomenon?

In the years 1917-20 a variant of the modern "bridge-building" argument
was influential within policymaking circles. The Bolsheviks were outlaws, so
the argument went, and had to be brought into the civilized world. For example,
in 1918 a statement by Edwin Gay, a member of the U.S. War Trade Board
and former Dean of the Harvard Business School, was paraphrased in the board
minutes as follows:

Mr. Gay stated the opinion that it was doubtful whether the policy of blockade
and economic isolaton of these portions of Russia which were under Bolshevik
control was the best policy for bringing about the establishment of a stable and
proper Government in Russia. Mr. Gay suggested to the [War Trade] Board
that if the people in the Boishevik sections of Russia were given the opportunity
to enjoy improved economic conditions, they would themselves bring about the
establishment of a moderate and stable social order. 1

At about the same time American businessmen were instrumental in aiding
the formation of the Soviet Bureau, and several hundred firms had their names
on file in the bureau when it was raided in 191 S. 6 Hence there was Western
business pressure through political channels to establish Soviet trade. No one
appears to have foreseen the possibility of creating a powerful and threatening
enemy to the Free World. There was widespread criticism of the Bolsheviks,

5 Minutes or the U.S. War Trade Board, December 5. 1918, vol. V, pp. 43-44.
* New York [Slate] Legislature. Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Seditious Activities
(Lusk Committee). Albany. N.Y., 1919.

Conclusions 417

but this was not allowed to interfere with trade. In sum, there was no argument
made against technical transfers while several influential political and business
forces were working actively to open up trade.

The lack of clear policy formulation and foresight was compounded by
the apparent efforts of some State Department officials in the 1930s to discourage
collection of information on Soviet economic actions and problems. While the
First Five Year Plan was under construction by Western companies, various
internal State Department memoranda disputed the wisdom of collecting informa-
tion on this construction. 7 For example, a detailed report from the U.S. Embassy
in Tokyo in 1933 (a report containing precisely the kind of information used
in this study) was described in Washington as "not of great interest." 8 It is
therefore possible that no concerted effort to examine the roots of Soviet industrial
development has ever been made within the U.S. State Department, Certainly
internal State Department reports of the 1930s provide less information than
the present study was able to develop. Such lack of ordered information would
go far to account for many of the remarkably inaccurate statements made to
Congress by officials of the State Department and its consultants in the 1950s
and 1960s — statements sometimes so far removed from fact they might have
been drawn from the pages of Alice in Wonderland rather than the testimony
of senior U.S. Executive Department personnel and prominent academicians. 9
In brief, a possibility exists that there has been no real and pervasive know-
ledge of these technical transfers — even at the most "informed" levels of Western
governments. Further, it has to be hypothesized that the training of Western
government officials is woefully deficient in the area of technology and develop-
ment of economic systems, and that researchers have been either unable to
visualize the possibility of Soviet technical dependence or unwilling, by reason
of the bureaucratic aversion to "rocking the boat," to put forward research
proposals to examine that possibility. This does not however explain why
some of the outside consultants who were hired by all Western governments

' See U .S . State Dept, Decimal File, 861 .50/Five Year Plan/50.

8 U.S. Slate Dept. Decimal File, 861 .5017/Uving Conditions/709. Report no. 689, Tokyo,
August 31, 1933.

9 A former assistant chief of the division of research of the Department of State has formed
equally harsh conclusions. Bryton Barron has listed four examples of highly strategic tools
whose export to the U.S.S.R. was urged by officials of the Department of State:

■''I. Boring mills essential to the manufacture of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and for the atomic

reactors used in submarines.

"2. Vertical boring mills essential to the manufacture of jet engines.

"3. Dynamic balance machines used for balancing shafts on engines for jet airplanes and

guided missiles.

"4. External cylindrical grinding machines which a Defense Department expert testified are

essential in making engine pans, guided missiles, and radar."

Barron concludes: "It should be evident that we cannot trust the personnel of the Department

to apply our agreements in the nation's interests any more than we can trust it to give us

the full facts about our treaties and other international commitments." See Bryton Barron,

Inside ihe Smte Departmeiu (New York: Comet Press. 1956).

418 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

in such profusion, have not systematically explored the possibility. 10 If it is
argued, on the contrary, that Western Governments are aware of Soviet technical
dependency, then how does one explain the national security problem, outlined
in chapter 27?

An argument has been made that a policy of technical assistance to the
U.S.S.R. before World War II was correct as it enabled the Soviets to withstand
Hitler's attack of June 1941. This is ex post facto reasoning. The German
Government financed the Bolshevik Revolution with the aim of removing an
enemy (Tsarist Russia), but also with postwar trade and influence in mind.
This German support was largely replaced in the late 1 920s by American technical
assistance, but until the mid- 1 930s the Germans were still arming the Soviets;
it was only in 1939 that Hermann Goering began to protest the supply. Thus
in the twenties and the early thirties it was not possible for anyone to foresee
that Germany would attack the Soviet Union.

The Bolsheviks were assisted to power by a single Western government,
Germany, and were maintained in power by all major Western governments.
The result is that we have created and continue to maintain what appears
to be a first-order threat to the survival of Western civilization. This was done
because in the West the political pressures for trade were stronger than any
countervailing argument.

This conclusion is supported by the observations that in both the 1930s
and the 1960s the U.S. State Department pressed for the outright transfer of
military technology to the U.S.S.R. over the protests of the War Department
(in the thirties) and the Department of Defense (in the sixties). When in the
1930s the War Department pointed out that the proposed Dupont nitric acid
plant had military potential, it was the State Department that allowed the Dupont
contract to go ahead." A Hercules Powder proposal to build a nitrocellulose
plant was approved when the State Department accepted the argument that
the explosives produced were intended for peacetime use. 12

In the 1960s we have the extraordinary "ball bearing case" of 1961, which
revealed that the U .S.S.R. was to receive 45 machines used to produce miniature
ball bearings (in the United States almost all miniature ball bearings are used
in missiles). That proposal was called a "tragic mistake" by the Department
of Defense but supported by the State Department. In 1968 came the so-called
"Fiat deal" under which the United States supplied three-quarters of the equip-
ment for the Volgograd plant, the largest automobile plant in the U.S.S.R.
This agreement ignored an earlier interagency committee finding that 330 military
items can be produced by any civilian automobile industry and that the automobile
industry is a key factor for war. It also ignores an argument particularly stressed

l " Seep.x.

11 See Sulton, Western Technology . . . 1930 m 1945, p. 101 .

12 Ibkl.. p. 113.

Conclusion* 4 ] 9

here — that any automobile plant can produce military vehicles. The supply of
U.S. equipment for the Volgograd plant was diametrically opposed to any
policy of denial of exports of stratetic goods to the Soviet Union, for under
any definition of "strategic" the Volgograd plant has clear and significant
military weapons capability. Yet the State Department was strongly in favor
of the shipment of the plant equipment. The developing story of the Kama
plant suggests history is repealing itself.

Under these conditions, where policy is so far removed from logical deduc-
tion, it would be imprudent to arrive at any conclusion concerning Western
intentions. If logical intentions exist — and in chapter 27 it is suggested that
our strategic policies are not logically derivable from observable fact — they
are obscure indeed. The writer leans to the position that there is gross incompe-
tence in the policymaking and research sections of the State Department. There
is probably no simple, logical explanation for the fact that we have constructed
and maintain a first-order threat to Western society.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union has a fundamental problem. In blunt terms, the Soviet
economy, centrally planned under the guidance of the Communist Party, does
not constitute a viable economic system. The system cannot develop technically
across a broad front without outside assistance; internal industrial capacity can
be expanded only in those sectors suitable for scaling-up innovation and duplica-
tion of foreign techniques.

Quite clearly a modern economy cannot be self-maintained, however skilled
its planners and technicians, if technical adoptions in basic industries are limited
to processes that lend themselves to scaling up or duplication. Further, the
more developed the economy the greater its complexity ; consequently the planning
problems associated with the acquisition of information must surely increase
in geometric ratio.

Logically, then, a system that is strictly centrally planned is not efficient
either for rapid balanced growth or for any growth at all once the economy
is past the primitive stage. Beyond that stage, the chief function of central
planning, so far as the economy is concerned, becomes the retention of political
control with the ruling group. There are few economic functions, and certainly
no technical functions, that cannot be performed in a more efficient manner
by a market economy.

How have the Russian Party member, the Politburo, Stalin, Khrushchev,
and Brezhnev looked upon Western technology in relation to Soviet technology?
This is indeed a fascinating question. Party injunctions, for example in Pravda,
suggest that on many levels there has been a deep and continuing concern

420 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

with lagging Soviet technology. The general problem has long been recognized,
ever since Lenin's time. But Lenin thought it curable; 13 the current Politburo
must at least suspect it is incurable.

It is however unlikely that either the Party in Russia or the Communist
parties in the West have fully probed the depths of the problem. First, their
writings mirror a persistent confusion between science and technology, between
invention and innovation. M Second, it is unlikely that most Marxists appreciate
how important an indigenous innovative process is to a nation's self-sufficiency
(in contrast to their clear understanding of the value of scientific endeavor and
invention). Even breakaways from Marxist dogma still find it difficult to absorb
the notion that virtually all widely applied (i.e., innovated) technology in the
Soviet Union today may have originated in the outside world. Third, Russian
designers and engineers may have succeeded in deceiving the Party and even
themselves. By claiming as indigenous Russian work designs which in fact
originated in the West, they may have obscured the realities of Soviet technology.

The dilemma facing the Soviets in 1970 is stark and overwhelming, and
periodic reorganization and adjustments have not identified the basic cause.
Indeed, each reorganization either stops short of the point where it may have
lasting effect or leads to yet further problems. This is because the Party continues
to demand absolute political control while a viable economy increasingly demands
the adaptability, the originality, and the motivation that result from individual
responsibility and initiative. Attempted solutions through use of computers may
temporarily ease the problem, but ultimately they too will result in confusion
because accurate information still has to be acquired and analyzed. The computer
is only as useful as its human operators are capable and as its data input is
sound. In any event, who will supply the computers?

Moreover a communist regime cannot yield political power; doctrine demands
continuance of power in the hands of the Party. The economy demands diffusion

13 V. I. Lenin, Selected Wtirks, J. Fineberg, ed., vol. IX (New York. International Publishers
1937), pp. 1 16-1 18.

''' Another and more puzzling facet of the Soviet concept of what begets innovation is found
in descriptions of the innovators process in practice. For example, an article by G. I).
Nagigin on innovation in the glass industry stales: "Technical offices were established
(in one factory) before the start of the competition. Leading engineers and technologists were
on duty in these offices and gave practical assistance to innovators who turned to them for
advice, consultation, etc. The technical offices are equipped with reference literature and other
material needed by innovators and inventors. For example, there is a drawing board and the
necessary instruments in the technical office of the Gushkovskii Works. The establishment
of well-equipped technical offices, with qualified engineers on duty, naturally had a very favorable
effect on the development of innovation and invention work in the factories." Steklo i keramiku
(New York), vol. XIV, no. 2. p, 66. A table is included in the article giving "results."
We have to assume that this scheme to encourage competition was a serious attempt to induce
the innovatory process — although one is tempted to dismiss it as naive in the extreme. It need
only be said that anyone with the slightest knowledge of invention and innovation would con-
clude that little that is worthwhile can he achieved by such a forced and artificial process.

Conclusions

421

of power. What will be the result? If Russian historical precedent is any indicator,
then the outlook is gloomy indeed. The Russian Revoluton was a gigantic
and violent upheaval. The first revolution achieved what had been attained
by evolutionary means elsewhere, the substitution of relatively democratic control
for autocracy. Then the briefly emergent democratic forces in Russia were
caught between the autocracy of the right and the Bolsheviks of the left and
were rendered impotent. A new absolutism took power. Today there is no
question that a fundamental change has to come again; what is unknown is
the form that change will take and whether it will be revolutionary or evolutionary.
It is also clear — and the writer makes this assertion only after considerable
contemplation of the evidence — that whenever the Soviet economy has reached
a crisis point, Western governments have come to its assistance. The financing
of the Bolshevik Revolution by the German Foreign Ministry was followed
by German assistance out of the abysmal trough of 1922, Examples of continuing
Western assistance include the means to build the First Five Year Plan and
the models for subsequent duplication; Nazi assistance in 1939-41 and U.S.
assistance in 1941-45; the decline in export control in the fifties and sixties;
and finally the French, German, and Italian credits of the sixties and the abandon-
ment of controls over the shipment of advanced technology by the United States
in 1969. All along, the survival of the Soviet Union has been in the hands
of Western governments. History will record whether they made the correct
decisions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN BUSINESS FIRM

The Western business firm has been the main vehicle for the transfer process,
and individual firms have, of course, an individual right to accept or reject
Soviet business in response to their own estimation of the profitability of such
saies. There is ample evidence in the files of the U.S. State Department, the
German Foreign Ministry, and the British Foreign Office that Western firms
have cooperated closely with their respective governments in negotiating for
such sales.

Historically, sales to the Soviet Union must have been profitable, although
the Russians are reputed to be hard bargainers and there have been numerous
examples of bad faith and breaches of contract. Firms have accepted theft of
blueprints and specifications, ' 5 duplication of their equipment without permission
or royalties," 5 and similar unethical practices and still deemed it worthwhile
to continue trade. This applies particularly to larger firms such as General

Sutlon 11, pp. 263-(j

ibid.

422 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development , 1945-1965

Electric, RadioCorpcration of America, Ford Motor, Union Carbide, and Imper-
ial Chemical Industries, Ltd. There is evidence that larger firms are able to
demand and obtain somewhat more equitable treatment from the Soviets, partly
by virtue of the fact that respective foreign offices are more willing to back
them up and partly because the Soviets are aware of the relatively few sources
for their new technologies. But less well-known firms such as Lummus, Universal
Oil Products, and Vickers-Armstrongs (Engineers), Ltd., apparently also have
found that Soviet business pays.

This profitability must be balanced against possible loss of domestic sales
in the face of hostile domestic publicity. American Motors found itself in this
trap in 1966, when it had no more than vaguely contemplated sales to the
U.S.S.R. 17 — and other firms have suffered boycotts. As long as these sales
and the impact of such sales on Soviet capabilities were relatively unknown,
however, the possibility of boycotts was not great. It appears that some revalua-
tion may be in order in the light of the findings of this study; i.e., the factors
entering into the tradeoffs in considering such business may change. This applies
certainly to sales to Red China, where we now stand at a point equivalent
to about 1921-22 with the Soviet Union. It is eminently clear that comparable
sales over a period of 50 years could place Red China on an equal industrial
footing with the U.S.S.R. The difference between the early seventies and
the early twenties is that we now have the example of the U.S.S.R. before
us: trade has built a formidable enemy, while hopes for a change in ideology
and objectives not only have gone unfulfilled but are perhaps more distant than
they were 50 years ago.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

The Soviet problem is not that the nation lucks theoretical or research
capability 1 * or inventive genius, The problem is rather that there is a basic
weakness in engineering skills, and the system's mechanisms for generating
innovation are almost nonexistent.

Table 29-1 suggests the sparseness of Soviet innovation; engineering weak-
nesses are implicit in continuing plant purchases abroad — while such purchases
continue the Soviets are not building plants using their own laboratory discoveries.
Why does the Soviet system have such weaknesses?

There is certainly no choice among competing inventions using market
criteria, but if more useful Soviet processes existed they would be adopted
whether market-tested or not. Absence of the marketplace is not, then, sufficient

1T See Mitwaukcv Journal. January 22. 1967.

IH For example of Russian research capability see A. V. Zolotov. Prtthtcma tiutxusxkor katax-

ini/y !908 g. (Minsk. 19691, a fascinating empirical study of various hypotheses relating In

the gigantic meteorite that fell in Siberia in I9CIR.

Conclusions

423

Table 29-1

INDIGENOUS SOVIET INNOVATION, 1917-65

1977 to 7930

7930 to 1945

1945 to 1965

Primitive tractors

Turbodrill

Alumina from nepheline

Synthetic rubber; SK-B

Once-through boiler

Machine guns

Electro-drill

Aircraft

Sputnik

Medical sutures

Electro-slag welding

"Scaling up"

Source: Based on table 25-2.

reason to explain the absence of innovation. There maybe, as has been suggested
elsewhere, no compelling pressures to develop innovation despite the fact that
the Party is constantly exhorting technical progress. But the explanation that
most adequately covers the problem is one that has been previously mentioned
though not heretofore stressed-the "inability hypothesis." The spectrum of
engineering skills required to build a complete polyester plant, a large truck
plant, a fast large-capacity computer, and a modern marine diesel engine just
does not cxisi in the Soviet Union. Sufficient engineering skills do exist for
limited objectives — a military structure can be organized to select and marshal
the technology of war, or a space program can be decreed and realized through
top-priority assignment of resources. But the skills are not present to promote
and maintain u complex, self-regenerative industrial structure.

The point to be stressed is that if there were adequate engineering ability
some innovation would be forthcoming in the form of original new processes,
and such innovation would appear in many sectors of the economy. This is
generally not the case. In most sectors the West installs the initial plants and
subsequent plants are duplicates based on that Western technology. Once the
sector has been established, major new innovations within the sector tend to
be either imported technologies or duplicates of imported technologies. Therefore
pervasive "inability" in engineering seems the most likely basic explanation.
For some reason — and this study has not explored the diverse institutional factors
within the system that might be responsible — Soviet central planning has not
fostered an engineering capability to develop modern technologies from scratch,
nor has it generated inputs {educational, motivational, and material) to achieve
this objective.

The world is now presented with 50 years' history of industrial development
in the most important of socialist experiments, and censorship can no longer
hide the problem. Every new Soviet purchase of a major Western technology
is pari passu evidence for a central lesson of this study: Soviet central planning
is the Soviet Achilles' heel.

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Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R." Washington, 1945.
"Welding Research and Development in the U.S.S.R." A Report on the Visit

of a B.W.R.A. Party to Welding Research Institutes in the Soviet Union.

October 1960.

PERIODICALS

ASTM Bulletin, Easton, Pa.

Aero Digest, Washington, D.C.

Aeronautics, London.

The Aeroplane, London.

Air University Quarterly Review, Montgomery, Ala.

American Aviation, Washington, D.C.

American Chemical Society, Chemical and Engineering News, Washington,

D.C.

American Machinist, New York.

American Slavic and East European Review, Menasha, Wise.

American Society of Naval Engineers, Journal, Washington, D.C.

Automobile Engineer, London.

Automotive Industries, Philadelphia, Pa.

Aviation Week, New York.

Biulletin' tekhnikoekonomicheskoi informatsii, Moscow.

Boeing Magazine, Seattle, Washington.

British Chemical Engineering , London.

British Zone Review, Hamburg, Germany.

Business Week, New York.

Canadian Aviation, Toronto.

Canadian Chemical Processing, Toronto.

Canadian Mining Journal , Ottawa.

CERN Courier, Geneva, Switzerland.

Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, New York.

Chemical Week, New York.

Die Chemische Fabrik, Berlin, Germany.

Die Chemische Technik, Berlin, Germany.

Bibliography

453

Chemistry and Industry, London.

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, New York.

Commercial Fisheries Review, Washington, D.C.

Congressional Record, Washington, D.C.

Control Engineering, New York.

Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, Prague.

Czechoslovak Foreign Trade, Prague.

East-West Commerce, London.

East -We st Trade News, London.

Economic Review of the Soviet Union, New York

The Economist, London.

Electrical Review, London.

Electrical World, Manchester, England.

Electronic Design, New York.

Electronics, New York.

Engineering News-Record, New York.

L' Express, Paris.

Far Eastern Review, Manila, The Philippines.

The Financial Times, London.

Flying, New York.

Fortune, New York.

Gas Journal , London.

Glass and Ceramics, Washington, D.C.

The Glass Industry, New York.

Hosiery Trade Journal, Leicester, England.

I.E.E. Journal, London.

Indian Construction News, Calcutta.

Industrial and Engineering Chemistry,

Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R

Institute of Metals, Journal, London.

Interavia, Geneva, Switzerland.

Iron Age, Midd-etown, New York.

Izvestia, Moscow.

Japan Times, Tokyo.

Journal of Metal i. New York.

Kommunist, Yerevan.

Kotloturbostrocnie , Moscow.

The Los Angeles Times.

Mashinostroenie , Moscow.

Mechanical Harilling , London

Metallurgia. Milichestcr. England.

Metal Progress, J^veland, Ohio

Washington, D.C.
Bulletin, Munich, Germany.

454 Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

Metalworking News, New York.

Metsalehti, Helsinki, Finland.

Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

The Minneapolis Tribune.

Missiles and Rockets, Washington, D.C.

Le Monde.

Morskoi flot, Moscow.

The Motor Ship, London.

Nauka i zhizn' , Moscow.

Neue Ziircher Zeitung.

The New York Times.

Nucleonics, New York.

The Oil Weekly, Houston, Tex.

Ordnance, Washington, D.C.

The Oriental Economist, Tokyo.

Petroleum Refiner, Houston, Tex.

Petroleum Week, Chicago, 111.

Polish Technical Review, New York.

Pravda, Moscow,

Problems of Economics , New York.

Product Engineering, New York.

Promyshlennaia energetika, Moscow.

Railway Age, Chicago, 111.

Railway Mechanical Engineer, Philadelphia, Pa.

Rock Products, Louisville, Ky.

The San Jose Mercury, San Jose, Calif.

The Shipbuilder and Marine Engine Builder, London.

Shipping World and Shipbuilder, London.

Skinners Silk and Rayon Record, London.

Society of Automotive Engineers, S.A.E. Journal, New York.

Society of Glass Technology, Journal, London.

Spravochnik khimika, Moscow.

Stal', Moscow.

Stanki i instrument, Moscow.

Steklo i keramika. New York.

Textile Research Journal , New York.

Textile World, New York.

The Times, London.

Trains, Milwaukee, Wise.

Transportnoe mashinostroenie, Moscow.

Undersea Technology, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Export Control Quarterly, Washington, D.C.

Bibliography

455

U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, Annapolis, Md.
Wall Street Journal, New York.
The Washington Post.
Welding Journal , London.
Za industrializatsiiu, Moscow.

Index

Abe rda re Cables, Ltd. (U.K.), 331
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 272
Abraham filter press {for beet sugar pro-
cessing), 52, 345
Academy of Science, U.S.S.R. (Akademiia

Nauk S.S.S.R.), 277, 318-20, 322
Achcson, Dean, 73
Adamian, I., 330
Adlur, C.li., 166
Adler Trumpf automobiles, 195
A.Ii.G. (Allgumeine Elckuizitats-Gesetl-

schaft, W. Ger.), 90-91, 315, 41 1-12
Aetna Standard Company, 130
aircraft:

embargoes on, 53
helicopters, 368
high-speed models, 378
under Lend Lease, 3-5 passim, 12-14
passim, 254-55, 266, 267-68n.4t,
269, 278
in Tsarist technology, 409, 414n.!
war planes: Western prototypes, 254-55,
257, 266-67, 269, 279n,82; Soviet
models, 254-55, 264, 266-70, 279n.
82; rocket models, 269

engines:

BMW, xxix, 119, 258-60, 262, 264, 278
Junkers, xxix, 119, 258-64, 278, 307
machine tools for, 305-7 passim, 417n.9
Rolls-Royce, xxix, 255, 257, 263-66, 278
Soviet models, 262-66, 278
Western aid to, general, 368, 410

industry:

heavy presses for, 377

landing systems for, 329, 334, 368

reparations to, 29, 255-62, 268-70, 414

Soviet innovations in, 368, 409, 413,423

U.K. aid to, 255

Western aid to, general, 368

Aiton & Company, Ltd. (U.K.), 1 83
Akademiia Nauk S.S.S.R. See Academy of

Science, U.S.S.R.
Alco (American Locomotive Company), 64,

215, 219, 249-50. 397
Alexander I, Tsar, 335n.l
Alexandrov, Vladimir, 1 9
Allied Control Council, 1 7, 25-26, 27
Ali-Union Artificial Fiber Research Institute

(VNIIV) (US.S.R.), 179
Allis-Chalmcrs Corporation, 213
Almond, Gabriel A., 19
Alpine Monton Company (Austria), 37
Abthom. See Schneider-Alsthom, Societe

Alsthom
Ambi-Budd Presswerk A.G. (Gei.), 39, 195
American Association of Railroads, 252
American Motors Corporation, 422
American- Russian Industrial Syndicate, Inc.,

67
American Welding Society, 131
Amtorg, 72, 212, 266, 321,412
Anaconda ore cars, 104
Anorgana (New Rokita) briquetting plant

(Poland), 141
Ansaldo shipyards (Italy), 227-28
A.P.V. Company (U.K.), 177
Arab Contractors, Ltd. (Egypt), 97
Arcos(U.K.), 412
Aidenne, Manfred von, 236-37
Argonne National Laboratories, 244, 247,

319,328
armaments. See weapons
Artsimovich, Lev, 247
Asahi Chemical Company (Japan), 184
Aschberg, Olaf, 67n.3, 68, 69, 70
Associated Engineering group (U.K.), 1 19
Astra Romana oil company (Rumania), 38

457

458

Index

Aswan Dam, 92, 93, 96-99, 415

Ateliers et Chantiers de Bethune (France),
227

Atha, B., Company, 124

Atlas Copco (Sweden), 98

Atlas diesel engines, 299, 374

Atlas Steel (Canada), 124

atomic energy:

and CERN aid, 245-47

for electric power generation, 332-34

passim, 4 1
and espionage, 231-34, 239
German research in (pre-1945), 232-38
for marine propulsion, 293-94, 417n.9
in reparations, 234-38, 241-42
and Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia, 83-84
Soviet lag in, 378-79, 410
Soviet research in, 231, 245, 247, 318-19,

324
U.S. delegation on (1963), 245-46
use of graphite in, 10, 236, 238

Austria:

in aid 1o Soviet Sectors: consumer goods,
368; iron and steel, 366; pharmaceu-
ticals, 367; railroads, 250-51, 368

exports to U.S.S.R. (1 953-6 1 ), general, 4 1
German aircraft induslry in, 258-59
reparations from, 15-17 passim, 37-38,

196
Soviet financing in, 71
Soviet oil production in, 1 39
Audi automobiles, 193
Auer A.G. (Ger.), 235,241
Auto-Bark (Ger.), 195
Auto-Rader (Ger.), 195
Auto-Union A.G. (Ger.), 193-96
automotive industry:

automobiles: in COMECON agreements,
79, 83; embargoes on, 53; engines for.
193, 223-26, 372-73, 387; Fiat pro-
duction in U.S.S.R., 156, 191n.3,
200; standard Soviet models, 192,
197-98, 223-26, 384; U.S. aid to,
191-93, 199-203 passim, 213, 224-26,
418-19; from W. Germany, 47; West-
ern aid to, general, 368

farm machinery, general, 211-13, 367,
407

in Germany (pre-1945), 383

Gorki plant, 192, 197, 200, 226, 257,
384, 385, 389

internal combustion engines, Western

origins of, 214, 224-26, 230
Jeeps, 4, 193, 198, 225-26, 384, 386
Kama plant, 192, 203, 383-84n.l6, 388-

89,419
military potential of, 191, 200, 383-89

391,418-19
military vehicles, general, 382-89
Moscow Small Car plant, 197, 384
motorcycles, 6, 193-94, 196
1930s imports to, 413
reparations to, 38, 193-96, 414

tanks: German producers of (pre-1945),
194-96 passim; and Italian aid, 368;
under Lend Lease, 3-6 passim, 12-14
passim; Soviet innovation in, 361 ■
and U.S. aid, 203-4, 382, 383

tires: under Lend Lease, 7, 161; in
reparations, 37, 160-61; for Soviet-
Fiats, 156; Western technology for,
160-62, 165, 366

tractors: Caterpillar D-7, xxix, 113-14,
205-10, 213, 413; in COMECON
agreements, 79; early Soviet tech-
nologies, 357, 369, 423; under Lend
Lease, 4, 6, 7, 193, 205; repairs on,
406; Sovicl S-80, xxix, 205-10, 213,
413; Simula rri Sovicl models, xxx,
204, 384, 406; and U.S. aid, 203-4,
226, 367, 382, 413; U.S. prototypes
for, xxix, 57, 113-14, 203, 205-11;
and Western technology, general, 367

truck engines: in reparations, 195-96;
Soviet production of, 222-26, 230;
U.S. prototypes for, 199, 222-23;
Western technology for, general, 372-
73; YaAZ models, xxix, 222-23

trucks: at Aswan Dam construction, 97;
at Bhilai project, 93; German produc-
tion of (pre-1945), 194-96; at Kama
plant, 203, 383-84n.l6, 388-89; under
Lend Lease, 3-7 passim, 10, 21, 193,
1 99-200 ; standard Soviet models, 1 92,
198-200, 384; and "Transfermatic
case," 387-88; from U.K., 44-45;
Western aid for, general, 368

U.K. delegation to (1963), 193, 197

Urals plant, 199, 384

Volgograd plant, 67, 75, 192, 200-3,
384-88 passim, 418-19

and Western embargoes, xxvii-x.xviii, 53,
20!
Aveling-Barford (U.K.), 59, 97, 98
Azov Bank, 71

index

459

Baade, Walter, 262, 268
Badische Anilin (W. Ger.), 163
Bagley Sewall, 184
Baird and Tatlock, 325

Baker Perkins Chemical Machinery Ltd

(U.K.), 177, 183
Baldwin locomotives, 249
ball bearings technology:

and Centalign B machines (1961), 312-

13, 316-17, 388n.29, 418

Czech aid to, 84

in reparations, 18, 29,414

and weapons systems, 312-14, 388n.29
418

Western aid to, 88, 312, 367
Baltic States, 185-86, 188-90 passim
Bank of Manhattan, 71n.28, 72
Banque Commerciale pourl'Europe du Nord

(. . . pour les Pays du Nord), 69-70
Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, 70
Barron, Bryton, 417n.9
Barth Company (Neth.), 212, 213
Barwich, Heinz, 237

BASF acetylene production process, 147

159
Bales (U.K.) mechanical dump cars, 59
Baltic Act (Mutual Defense Assistance

Control Act of 1951), xxvii-xxviii, 53-

54, 55, 85-86, 394-95
Bayer sinter process, 117, 119, 409
Bayrische Stickstoffwerke A.G. (Ger.) 157
Behr fiberboard manufacture process, 188
Belgium, 123, 127n.l8, 149, 150-51, 166,

168, 223, 229, 235, 281, 342, 366
Bell Telephone, 318
Bendix automatic washers, 56
Bendix echosounding equipment, 287
Benoto (France) mechanical dump cars, 59
Bentley Engineering Group (U.K.), 176
Benz, Prof. (German aircraft designer), 269
Berne r Industries, 164
Berry cotton picker, 2 1 3
Bessemer, Sir Henry, 124
Bhilai steel plant (India), 92-96, 98, 99
Billeter & Kluntz (Ger.), 307, 311, 316
Billiter electrolytic cells, 145
BIOS. See British Intelligence Objectives

Committee
Birlcc, Ltd. (U.K.), 132n.36
Black, Kugene R., 71 n.28
Black otc crushers, 104

Blake and Symons crushers. 52
Blaus-Roth textile plant equipment, 178
Blough, Roger M.,71n.28
BMA (Braunschweig Maschinenbau Anstalt)

(Ger,) rotary diffusers (for beet sugar

processing), 337, 342
BMW (Bayerische Motorenwerke A.C.)

(Ger.), xxix, 119, 195, 196, 258-60,

262-64, 278, 373
Boeing Company, 255, 266-67, 269, 278
Boel et Fils S.A. (Belgium), 28 1
Bohner & Koehle (Ger.), 305
Bolshevik Revolution, 66n.l, 67, 183 188

200n.38. 335, 352, 409, 411, 412, 418,

421

Bolsheviks, xxxi, 67, 68, 69, 72, 409, 416
418,421

Bombrini Parodi Delfino (Italy), 176

Booker Brothers, Ltd. (U.K.), 349

Borisov, A.L, 181

Bosch electrical system (for automobiles)

197
Brandner (German aircraft engineer) design

team, 263-64
Brandt, A.J., Inc., 192, 198-99, 373
Braun, Franz, A.G. (Ger.), 308
Braunkohle-Benzin A.G. (Ger.), 139
Brezhnev, Leonid, 419
Bridge, David, Ltd. (U.K.), 161n.40
Bricghel-Mullcr predefacator (for beet sugar

processing), 344
British Intelligence Objectives Committee

(BIOS), 257
British Iron and Steel Research Association

(BISRA), 162

British Nylon Spinners, 182

British Shoe Corp., 354

British United Shoe Machinery Company,
354

Brooke-Marine, Ltd. (U.K.), g, 45, 286-87

Brookhirst Switchgear, Ltd. (U.K.), 331

Brown, John, &. Company, Ltd. (U.K.), 183

Brown-Boveri (Italy), 61-62, 138

Browne compasses (for shipping industry),
287

Brozgol, M., 325

Brunsviga calculators, 314-15

Brush Group (U.K.) (electric power equip-
ment suppliers), 331

Bryant Automatic grinders, 77

Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 312-13

Buchi turbochargc system, 250

460

Index

Buckau-Wolf (Ger., prewar factory), 90

215-16, 219,290, 374
Bucyrus-Erie excavators, 60
Budd Company, 195, 373
building industries:

cement industry: in COMECON agree-
ments, 79-81; Czech aid to, 83-85
passim; Danish aid to, 50, 367; E.
German aid to, 52; French aid to,
172-73, 367; French delegation to
(1960), 108, 173; German aid to
(pre-!945), 367; Italian aid to, 49; in
reparations, 18, 21, 22, 31, 35, 170-
72; Soviet emphasis on, 408; Swiss
aid to, 88

cranes, 4, 10, 36, 44, 48-51 passim, 103,
113, 204,281

earthmoving equipment, general: in
Aswan Dam construction, 97; at
Bhilai project, 93; from U.K., 46

E. German aid to, 51

excavation equipment, 44, 48, 50, 58,
60, 80-81, 93, 97-98, 111-14, 204,
365

Lend Lease aid to, 4, 8

plastics in, 61

in Soviet technical literature, 59

standard Soviet industrial plants, 146,
172-74 passim

UNRRA aid to, 13

weaknesses in, 405-6

Western exports to, 4S, 48-50

and Western plant designs, 333-34, 350,
415
Bulgaria:

in aid to shipping, 283-85, 300, 301

in aid to Syria, 98

in COMECON agreements, 80-82

reparations from, 15-17 passim
Bundy, William P., 388n,29
Buras, E.M.,Jr., 179
Burma, 96n.9
Burmeister & Wain A/S (B&W) (Denmark):

agreements in Finland, 91

agreements in Poland, 77, 87, 89-90

agreements in Yugoslavia, 90-91, 283

Bryansk plant of, 55, 77, 89, 91, 217,
221,299, 383,392-93

in Soviet diesel technology, general, 55,

64, 76, 215-21 passim, 283, 284,

294, 299, 373, 374, 382, 383, 392-

94, 398

Buschbeck, Dr. (German glass expert), 167,

315

Bussing-National Automobil A.G. (Ger) 24

195, 196
Butler planers, 311

Butterfield, W.P., Ltd. (Engineering) (U K )

183
BX Plastics (U.K.), 164
Byrnes, James, 73

Calder Hall reactor (U.K.), 243

California, University of (Berkeley), 231

Cambodia, 391

Campbell, Robert W., 133, 134, 138,315

Canada:

in aid to U.S.S. R.: asbestos processing
equipment, 105; electric power tech-
nology, 330, 334; steam turbines
(for marine propulsion), 392
continuous casting in, 124

electric power delegation from, 331-32
372

nickel refining in, 115, 121, 366

peat industry in, 112

Soviet espionage in, 231-32, 234

Soviet inventions in, 358, 360
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corn, (U.S.),

240
Caiboloy computer, 321
Carle & Montanari (Italy), 351
Carter carburetor unit, 197
Carter Oil Company, 134
Case, J. I., 213
Cassel, Gustav, 70

"catching up" hypothesis, xxv-xxvi, 408-9,

414
Caterpillar Tractor Company, xxix, 44, 111-

14, 205-10,213,373,413
Cavendish Laboratories (U.K.), 234
Cegielski (Poland), 87, 89-90, 374
cement. See under building industries
Centalign B (ball bearing technology), 312-13
Central Asiatic Financial Project, 69
Central Automobile and Engineering Re-
search Institute (U.S.S.R.), 193
Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics

(U.S.S.R.), 257
Central Mutual Credit Bank, 71
central planning:

achievements of, 401-2

and computer technology, 319, 420

dependence of, on imported technology,

401-3,419
and E. European poiyccntralism, 399

Index

461

central planning (cont.):

effects of, on innovation, xxvi, 124, 361-
62, 378,409,419-20,422-23

sectors stressed under, 406-8, 423

Central Research Institute for Ferrous Metal-
lurgy (U.S.S.R.), 125

Central Scientific and Research Institute for
the Sugar Industry (TslNS) (U.S.S.R.),
342-46 passim

Central Scientific Research institute of the
Sewing Industries (U.S.S.R.) 352-53

CERN (European Center for Nuclear Re-
search) (Switz.), 245-47

Chambers, Newton, & Company, Ltd. (U.K.),

Chase Manhattan Bank, 7 ln.28, 72
Chase National Bank, 71-72
Chatiilon Tire Cord (Italy), 160, 176
chemical industry

E. European aid: Czech, 83; E. German,
52, 366-67

Japanese aid, 51, 149

under Khrushchev, 146-50, 407, 408, 410

Lend Lease supplies to, 8

at 1960 European exhibition, 364

reparations to, 35, 38, 145

Soviet weaknesses in, 144, 146-47 152
158-59, 379

war potential of, 389-90

Western aid: Belgian, 149, 366; Danish
50, 366-67; French, 149, 366-67;
Swedish, 49, 366; U.K., 45, 46, 144-
49 passim, 366; W. German, 46-48
passim, 147, 366-67

and Western data restrictions, 63

and Western embargoes, 145

See also chemicals, fertilizers, fiber in-
dustry, plastics, rubber
chemicals:

ammonia, 145, 149, 150-51

and automated sampling techniques, 325

caustic soda, 145,152

from E. Germany, 51

herbicides, 144, 148, 390

under Lend Lease, 5, 9-10

organics, general, 144, 145, 158-59

nitric acid, 271, 418

pesticides, 147-48, 366

petrochemicals, 144. 147, 149, 162

resins. See under plastics

sulfuric acid, 144, 145, 152, 390

urea, 149, 150-51, 162-63

See also chemical industry, fertilizers,
fibers, plastics, rubber

Chicago Kitchen Company, 350

Chicago-Pneumatic drilling bits, 59

Chicago, University of, 242

Chihua Paper Company (Manchuria), 187

China, 54, 88, 290-91, 309, 422

Chinese Eastern Railway, 70

Chiyoda Chemical (Japan), 164

Cincinnati machine tools, 311

CIOS. See Combined Intelligence Objectives

Committee
Clark, M. Gardner, 122, 123, 132n.37
Clarke-Chapman & Company, Ltd, (U.K.),

286
Clay, Lucius, 18
coal industry ;

brown coal extraction equipment: in
reparations, 30n.43, 104, 139-41;
Western prototypes for, 108
coke ovens, 141-43, 380, 403
in COMECON agreements, 80
in concession agreements, 4 1 1
in general reparations, 35-36
Soviet production figures (1955), 106
in Soviet technical literature, 60
Soviet weaknesses in, 379
in U.K.. 106

Western equipment prototypes, 106-9
Wfestern exports to, 47, 103

CoCom ([International! Coordinating Com-
mittee) (Paris), 53, 55, 86, 116, 201,
395, 398

Cohen, Karl, 233

Cohn, N., 328

Colbum glaumstking process, 168

Colmol (Korfmann) cutter loaders, 107-8

Columbia University, 236

Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcom-
mittee (CIOS), 119, 120, 257, 305-6

COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance), 64, 76, 78-83, 86, 151, 221,
252

communications technology:

for aircraft landing systems, 329, 334
from Japan, 51

radar, 270, 276. 326-27, 357, 361,

382, 417n.9
radio: for detection and remote control,

315; embargoes on, 53; under Lend

Lease, 4-6 passim; as navigation aid.

287, 291, 328; in reparations, 35,

462

Index

communications technology (com.):

327; Soviet weaknesses in, 403; and
U.S. technology, 367
as reparations, general, 327, 334

signal equipment: under Lend Lease, 4,
8; for railway industry, 248

telephone equipment: under Lend Lease,
3, 8; for Moscow information center,
329; as navigation aid, 287; in repara-
tions, 327; Western aid to, general,
367

teletype equipment, 4, 8, 9

television: color systems for, 330, 334,
367; circuits for, 61; and German
reparations, 327; and Moscow tower,
364; Soviet sets, xxix, 329-30; tubes
for, 168; Western aid to, general, 367
Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

general, xxvi, xxx, 30, 360, 363-64,
419-20,423

Twentieth Congress of (1956), 125, 126

Twenty-third Congress of (1966 J, xxvi
Compagnie des Machines Hull (Prance), 322
computers:

in atomic energy research, 244, 318-19,
323

and automation congress (Moscow,
1960), 323-25

as central planning aid, 319, 420

export control of, 321, 415

in Prance, 319

from Italy, 322

Soviet models, 319-21, 327

Soviet weaknesses in, 244-45, 247,
279n.82, 318-20, 321-26 passim, 334

and U.K. technology, 319-20, 322-23,
367

U.S. exports of, 85,91,321-22, 325, 367

in U.S.A., 318-23

in weapons systems, 323, 3 25

in W. Germany, 319

Western prototypes, 58, 327-28

mentioned, xxviii

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